Re-examining the question of legitimacy in the European Union and in a member state: the case of Greece by Mavrikos, Tina
Doctoral Thesis 
Re-Examining the Question 
of Legitimacy in the EUROPEAN UNION and in a 
Member State: The Case of GREECE 
by TINA MAVRIKOS 
Ph. D. 
The University of Edinburgh 
Department of Sociology 
Supervisors: Prof. John Orr and Mr. John Holmwood 
submitted: 22 May 1996 
viva voce: 13 September 1996 
Ng 
DECLARATION 
The work in this thesis is the result of the candidate's own research except where 
otherwise indicated. It has not been accepted, nor is it being concurrently submItted 
in candidature for any other degree. 
Candidate: 
Tina Mavrikos 
University of Edinburgh, Scotland 
Ph. D., Department of Sociology, Faculty of Social Sciences 
May 1996 
ABSTRACT 
Re-Examining the Question of Legitimacy in the European Union and in a 
Member State: The Case of Greece 
The concept of legitimacy is one that has been much discussed and analysed in the 
various disciplines of social science and it remains a highly contentious issue. The 
difficulty is not merely one of conceptual definition. Problems of legitimacy have 
also changed in our present era as political institutions increasingly transcend the 
national boundaries which once defined the field of the concept's application. 
The present study proposes a way to re-examine the question of legitimacy. First, it 
offers a theoretical differentiation of the concept along five dimensions: those of 
civil society, democracy, the welfare state, the economic environment, and security 
and defence. Second, this theoretical argument is given practical substance in 
examination of the relation between institutions of the European Union and those of 
one of its mernber states, Greece. Although Greece is used as a testing ground for 
the framework, and inevitably will entail some features unique to it, it is argued that 
major aspects of the study are valid for other member states as well. By 
investigating both theoretical and empirical aspects of legitimacy, this study offers a 
more refined understanding of issues which are increasingly pressing as this century 
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Chapter One 
EXAMINING THE CONCEPT OF LEGITIMACY 
1.1 Introduction 
The study which follows seeks to address the concept of legitimacy and apply it to 
the European Union and to contemporary Greece. No study of a member nation- 
state can ignore today the EU, as the degree and depth of its competencies incrcases 
and thus the extent to which it affects the political, social and economic life of its 
members. The intention is that by exploring the dilemmas of legitimacy that the EU 
faces in the post-Maastricht, pre-1996 Intergovernmental Conference era, the 
explanation of the case of Greece can become more lucid. The central part of this 
study focuses on Greece, which is both an under-investigated and a particularly 
significant example, as will become apparent. 
In any discussion concerning the question of legitimacy inevitably one encounters 
different interpretations and opinions as to what the concept means, how it is to be 
interpreted, as well as a multiplicity of other difficulties related to studying such a 
contentious issue. Selecting a starting point and adopting a particular position vis-ý- 
vis the notion of legitimacy can, therefore, be quite perplexing. The theoretical 
foundation of this study is based on a re-examination of the concept of legitimacy 
along five dimensions: those of civil society, democracy, the welfare state, the 
economic environment, and security/de fence. These will be explored in detail in this 
chapter. The scheme developed in this study enables one to investigate some of the 
components of the legitimacy question which allows for a more complete 
examination of the concept. 
1.2 Dimensions of the Legitimacy Problem 
A brief look at the social science literature concerning the question of legitimacy 
reveals the abundance of writings on and interpretations of this concept. The 
innumerable uses and meanings of the term reflect a dilemma of studying and 
defining such a concept. One can identify a subjective definition of the term 
lec, itirnacy, for example, by reading the works of Jean Jacques Rousseau whose 
legitinzate expression was perceived to be the expression of the general will. 
1 
I Or the 'will of the majority. ' See, Jean Jacques Rousseau, The Social Contract in The Essential 
Rousseau, Lowell Bair trans., (NY: New American Library) 1974. 
Other seventeenth and eighteenth century writers such a Hobbes and Locke2 saw 
legitimacy deriving from the idea that individuals join civil society and willingly put 
themselves under rules which they believe to be equitable and just. It was David 
Hume who espoused a benefit based theory of legitimacy, believing that political 
leaders would be perceived as legitimate "so long as they deliver the goods. -3 
Post-World War Two analyses of legitimacy have added to the multitudinous 
definitions already established. R. Dahrendorf has identified legitimacy as " ... a 
moral concept. It means that what governments do has to be right. "4 S. M. Lipset 
has outlined an evaluative definition of the term, 5 while F. D. Weil equates 
legitimacy with democracy, and thus a legitimacy crisis as a rejection of 
democracy. 6 Leonardo Morlino and Jos6 R. Montero define legitimacy in their 
study as "... a set of positive attitudes of a society towards its democratic institutions, 
which are considered as the most appropriate form of government. -7 
No twentieth century analysis of legitimacy, however, can ignore the work of Max 
Weber whose analysis of legitimacy draws on 'three pure types of legitimate 
domination' -- traditional, charismatic, and legal/rational rule. 
8 These ideas 
articulated by Weber have continued to act as a springboard for further examination 
of the question of legitimacy. In fact Weber managed to combine in his analysis of 
legitimacy key concepts such as power, authority, and relate these to the state. He 
was able to further the secularised definition of legitimacy begun during the 
Enlightenment and carry it into the beginning of the twentieth century. 
2From whom the 'consent' based theory of legitimacy is derived, i. e., the notion of a social 
contract. 
3See, Albert Weale, "The Single Market, European Integration and Political Legitimacy, " 
Unpublished theme paper prepared for ESRC/A7 Cost Action Conference, University of Exeter, 8-11 
Sept. 1994. 
4Ralf Dahrendorf, "Effectiveness and Legitimacy: On the 'Governability' of Democracies, " 
Political Quarterly, Vol. 5 1, No. 4,1980, p. 396. 
5"Legitimacy involves the capacity of the system to engender and maintain the belief that the 
existing political institutions are the most appropriate ones for the society. " S. M. Lipset, Political 
Man: The Social Bases of Politics, reprinted in Legitimacy and the State, W. Connolly, ed. (UK: 
Basil Blackwell Pubs. ) 1984, p. 88. 
6Frederick D. Weil, "The Sources and Structure of Legitimation in Western Democracies: A 
Consolidated Model Tested with Time-Series Data in Six Countries Since World War 11, " American 
Sociological Review, Vol. 54, Oct. 1989, p. 685. 
7Leonardo Morlino and Jos6 R. Montero, "Legitimacy and Democracy in Southern Europe, " In 
The Politics of Democratic Consolidation, Richard Gunther, P. Nikiforos Diamandouros and Hans- 
JOrgen Puhle, eds. (Baltimore and London: The John Hopkins University Press), 1995, p. 232. 
8See, Max Weber, Economy and Society, Vol. 1, Ch. III, Guenther Roth & Claus Wittich eds. 
(LA, California: University of California Press) 1978. 
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Weber was convinced that legitimacy could be maintained based on formal, legal 
procedures, as well as "the right of those elevated to authority under such rules to 
issue commands (legal authority). "9 Rationalisation, 10 bureaucracy, and the further 
development of capitalism for Weber, were becoming the decisive forces in the 
organisation of modern society and its administration. He strongly believed that 
rationalisation was a far better premise on which to organise society when compared 
to traditional forms. He favoured a parliamentary system which could elect 
'professional parliamentary deputies' who could conduct the business of politics in a 
fair and objective manner. However, Weber himself admitted that 
"[plarliamentarization and democratization are not necessarily interdependent, but 
often opposed to one another. " II 
In the present post-cold war and post-Treaty on European Union era of European 
integration, the political climate in Europe and the nature of relations among 
political actors and institutions have changed spectacularly since Weber's time. No 
one would argue against the notion that the bureaucratic apparatus in west European 
nation-states continues to be of utmost importance in the organisation of 
administrative operations and in some cases (as will be shown with the example of 
Greece) continues to expand. But the expansion of the bureaucracy has also been 
accompanied by a concomitant recognition found among national political leaders 
that technocratic 'expertise' cannot alone create legitimacy for public policy. It has 
been generally recognised by both those directly involved with the EU integrative 
process and observers of it, for example, that EU governance can no longer be 
legitimised based solely on the logical, rational characteristics of technocracy, 
particularly as Weber once perceived them. 
The point here, however, is to acknowledge that albeit writing in a different era and 
under quite different circumstances, Weber's examination of the sources of 
legitimacy, particularly the latter of the three, legal rule, can be utilised as a starting 
point for further inquiry into the characteristics presently associated with legitimacy 
both on an EU level and on the level of member states. As Weber clearly pointed 
out himself, his 'three types' are by no means an end in themselves, and were merely 
intended to act as theoretical constructs. 
91bid., p. 263. 
I OReferring here to Max Weber's legal-rational model. 
II Ma\ Weber, Economy arid Societ)-, op. cit., Vol. 111, p. 1442. 
3 
Keeping within a framework of rational discourse then, is it possible to move 
beyond Weber's three ideal constructs and establish which dimensions of lecitimacN, 
are presently associated with EU member states entering the twenty-first centurý-" 
Such an attempt will be made here, where an outline for a theoretical framework 
facilitating an examination of legitimacy will be supplied. 
In Joseph Weiler's piece concerned with the problems of legitimacy in the ECIEU, 
he sets out to explain the difference between democracy, formal legitimacý,, and 
social legitimacy. He demarcates a formal (legal) as opposed to a social (empirical) 
aspect of legitimacy which best suits a discussion of legitimacy as it relates to EU 
member states in this study. He writes: 
Formal legitimacy as regards institutions or systems connotes that, in 
the creation of the institution or system, all requirements of the law are 
observed. ... Social legitimacy connotes a broad societal acceptance 
(empirically determined) of the system. 12 
He goes on to note that "[a]n institution or system or polity, in most (but not all) 
cases, have to enjoy formal legitimacy in order to enjoy social legitimacy. ... But a 
system that enjoys formal legitimacy will not necessarily enjoy social legitimacy. " 13 
This differentiation of legitimacy that Weiler sets out assists one in dissecting the 
concept of legitimacy and will be adopted for the purpose of discussion in this study. 
The intent will be to identify at least two major currents within the concept of 
legitimacy -- a political and a social. In other words, there seems to be a political 
component which can be said to be associated with the features of a political system 
(Does it operate according to written rules? Are these rules democratic? Is there a 
separation of powers? ) as well as a social component, which includes those aspects 
of the concept of legitimacy which are subjective (and thus more difficult to 
enumerate) and which certainly are socially, historically, and culturally procured. 
Some of these social influences may include cultural (indigenous) characteristics of a 
population based on historical experiences, for instance, that can affect perceptions 
of legitimacy. What will be attempted in this study, for example, is an investigation 
as to which historical experiences (as well as which socio-cultural and political 
characteristics) affect how Greeks perceive what is legitimate. Both the political 
and social elements of the legitimacy equation thus need to be examined for a 
comprehensive picture of the concept to emerge. Although the case of Greecc is 
12joseph Weiler, "After Maastricht: Community Legitimacy In Post- 1992 Europe, '' In Singular 
Europe, William James Adam, ed., (Ann Arbor, Michigan: The University of Michigan Press) 1992, 
P. 19. 
131bid., p. 20. 
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taken as the focal point in this study, it seems possible to presume that this type of 
investigation into legitimacy could also be performed for other EU member states, a, 
well thus allowing for comparisons to be made. 14 
In order to synthesise what seems to me to be important aspects of these different 
approaches to legitimacy, I propose distinguishing five different dimensions of 
legitimacy to better understand their different dynamics and the complexities in theil* 
interrelationships. These dimensions are: civil society, democracy, the welfare state, 
the economic environment, and issues of security and defence (see below Table 1.1: 
Dimensions of the Legitimacy Problem Applied on a National Leý'el). 
Dimensions of the National Level 
Legitimacy Problem (EU Member State) 
(a) Civil Society Developed (exceptions: Greece, Portugal, 
southern Italy) 
(b) "Democracy" The question of political accountability (Tormal' 
legitimacy); social and cultural influences that 
affect how citizens view their political system 
(c) Welfare State Unable to handle increasing demands; but only a 
minority of national public is willing to see health 
& social welfare policies addressed jointly with 
the EU 
(d) Economic Difficulties in sustaining economic growth and 
Environment prosperity; meeting the criteria for EU monetary 
convergence; unemployment; competing in a 
global economic environment, etc. 
(e) Security and A national defence policy still considered integral; 
Defence Common Defence & Foreign Policy supported to 
a degree, but allowance for unilateral action 
remains indisputable 
Table 1.1 Dimensions of the Legitimacy Problem Applied on a National Level 
141t may be the cas e likewise that considering the social as ýýell as the political aspects ol 
legitimacy can prove particularly useful for understanding Eastern and Central European nation-states 
that are hoping to be included in the next EU enlargement. 
1.2.1 CIVIL SOCIETY 
One of the immediately identifiable components associated with the question of 
legitimacy today is that of civil society. Renewed discussions concerning the nature 
of civil society came on to the agenda particularly in the late 1980's. partially due to 
the events that were transpiring in Eastern and Central Europe following the demise 
of the Soviet Union, and partially owing to the further integration and expans-ion 
plans of the European Community in western Europe. The transformations occurring 
in nation-states in southeast Asia and the Pacific also added to the established 
momentum of exploring the idea of civil society in countries which had hitherto not 
entertained thoughts of the role of a civil spirit in their societies. Hence changing 
socio-economic and political environments on continental Europe and to a lesser 
degree in the Far East touched off a series of debates about the role of civil society 
and its place within a world in flux. 
Despite the consensus as to the importance of re-examining the concept of civil 
society, what came out of the renewed examinations in the 1980's was that there 
remained vast differences of opinion as to the best method of analysis as well as to 
the fundamental questions being asked. As is the case with the term legitimacy, the 
expression 'civil society' has been used in a variety of disparate ways to describe 
society as it has developed in the modem world. Michael Walzer writes that "[t]he 
words 'civil society' name the space of uncoerced human association and also the set 
of relational networks -- formed for the sake of family, faith, interest and ideology -- 
that fill this space. " 15 J. L. Cohen and A. Arato define civil society "... as a sphere of 
social interaction between economy and state, composed above all of the intimate 
sphere (especially the family), the sphere of associations (especially voluntary 
associations), social movements, and forms of public communication. " 16 Others 
have maintained that civil society is many things and thus difficult to define 
succinctly: "... Civil Society is that set of diverse non-governmental institutions 
which is strong enough to counterbalance the state and, while not preventing the 
state from fulfilling its role of keeper of the peace and arbitrator between major 
interests, can nevertheless prevent it from dominating and atomizing the rest of 
society. " 17 
15Michael Walzer, "The Civil Society Argument, " In Diniensions of Radical Octnocrac. y, 
Chantal Mouffe. ed. (London: Verso) 1992, p. 89. 
16Jean L. Cohen and Andrew Arato, Civil Society and Political Theoiý-, (Cambridge, Nlassý The 
MIT Press) 1992. p. ix. 
17Ernest Gellner, Conditions of Libeny: Civil Societ ,v and 
Its Rivals, (NY: Penguin) 1994, p. 
However. Gellner further goes on to note that although the definition which he has produced does 
6 
Moreover, debates and discussions that animate analyses of ciý-il society continue in 
variegated directions. The state-ciý'il society debate continues, 18 as haý-e disputes 
concerning the public versus the private spheres. The ethical, moral interpretation is 
still on the academic horizon as well. 19 A medley of views as to how to define and 
study civil society abound, and depending upon ones' political perspective -- either 
to the left or right -- delineations are made, which when compared, are quite 
disparate. 20 
Nevertheless, on closer examination one can observe that there are certain features 
found within west European societies which appear to be important in 
comprehending civil society as well as legitimacy. For example, one can detect that 
in northwestern members of the EU there is a more developed, sophisticated, and 
mature social environment which allows for the expression of citizens' interests 
through the formation of interest groups, associations, and voluntary organisations. 
That is not the case in civil societies of southern Europe (particularly southern Italy 
and Greece), where one does not witness the same degree of maturation within their 
structural and institutional frameworks. As will be revealed in Part 11 of this study 
which focuses on the case of Greece, southern EU mernber states have not 
experienced the same historical or structural evolution of societal institutions as 
those of the north. This has resulted in a difference in the type of civic environment 
that has evolved in these nation-states which has affected: (a) the avenues by which 
political participation occurs; (b) the degree of cynicism felt by citizens towards their 
indigenous political decision-making processes, and thus their satisfaction with how 
democracy operates in their nation-state; 21 and (c) the extent to which they feel their 
political environment is legitimate. 
It appears, therefore, that the degree and extent of the growth of civil society (or its 
lack thereof) and its inclusive institutions (as well as its relationship with the state) 
are relevant for comprehending the sources behind legitimacy. Where the 
somewhat describe what civil society is, "... this definition has a grave deficiency. It is good as far as 
it goes, but it does not go far enough. The problem is simple: such a definition would include under 
the notion of 'Civil Society'many forms of social order which would not satisfy us. " Ibid., pp. 5-6. 
18See "State and Civil Society" from Antonio Gramsci's Selections Front the Prison Notebooks, 
(NY: International Publishers) 1971; and for more contemporary critiques see, John Keane, ed. Civil 
Society and the State: New European Perspectives, (London: Verso) 1988. 
19See, Adam Seligman's The Idea of Civil Society, (NY: The Free Press) 1992. 
20Compare, for instance, JUrgen Habermas' The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere 
with recent literature by authors espousing ideas from the new right. 
21 For a discussion of the process of democratic consolidation in Greece and more generally in 
southern Europe, see The Politics of Democratic Consolidation: Southern Europe in Comparative 
Perspective, Richard Gunther, P. Nikiforos Diamandouros and Hans-Rirgen Puhle, eds. (Baltimore: 
The John Hopkins University Press) 1994. 
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conception and ideal of civil society and that of a civic consciousness has been well 
cemented -- and codified -- into the foundation of society through political. "'ocial 
and economic structures, as is the case in northwest EU member states, one discerns 
a level and degree of legitimacy for the establishment that is absent in the nation- 
states to the south. Where the idea of modem civil society with its institutions and 
associations is less well formed (as will be shown is indicatiN, e of the case of 
Greece) we witness one of two phenomena: either other structures, traditional 
institutions or practices fill in the gaps and thus legitimise the status quo, or we begin 
to see the traces of a dilemma of legitimacy. In either case, however, an analysis of 
the civic environment seems integral for explaining and understanding legitimacy. 
This requires one to tie in a bit of the historical development of the state as well. 
Indeed, the time seems right to begin an investigation into how the concept of civil 
society can be explored by placing it within a larger framework, i. e., by identifying 
the indigenous forces and structures affecting civil society as they are inflLienced 
through their association and interaction with transnational organisations. The case 
of Greece will provide key insight into a particular EU member state and how its 
civic environment has been affected by its association with the EU and in general by 
exogenous forces, and how, if at all, this has influenced perceived legitimacy in 
Greece (of both the indigenous political environment and the European Union). This 
can perhaps facilitate a preferred and more accurate exegesis of the concept of 
legitimacy. 
1.2.2 DEMOCRACY 
Representative democracy has been one of the cornerstones of western nation-states 
and certainly remains so today. What has become symptomatic of the present era, 
however, is a growing sense of uneasiness felt among western publics who are not 
content with how democracy is operating in their respective nation-states. Based 
upon EUROBAROMETER surveys, one can discern that there is increasingly a larger 
number of citizens who are "not satisfied" or "not at all satisfied" as to ho", 
dernocracy is operating within the confines of their nation-state. These feelings are 
particularly acute among citizens in the southern Mediterranean, i. e., Italy, Spain, 
and Greece, which have the highest percentage of dissatisfied citizens. 
22 
221taly 779(- not satisfied, Espaha 67% not satisfied, Greece 6617(- not satisfied. 
EUROBAROME'll-R, #4 1, July 1994, p. 2. 
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This phenomenon, however, is evident not only at the level of the nation-state, but 
at an EU level as well. The issue of democracy, then, needs to be analysed and 
examined within an environment which goes beyond the nation-state, as 
transnational institutions are now playing a vital role in decision-making processes-. 
As Robert Dahl notes: " ... the proliferation of transnational activities and decisions 
reduces the capacity of the citizens of a country to exercise control over matters 
vitally important to them by means of their national government. "23 David Held 
maintains that " ... the meaning of national democratic decision-making today has to 
be explored in the context of a complex multinational, multilogic international 
society, and a huge range of actual and nascent and global institutions which 
-24 While not denying the continued transcend and mediate national boundaries. Z__ 
importance of the nation-state, Held argues that globalisation is affecting 
relationships among nation-states and within nation-states, and this is an important 
ingredient which needs to be taken up by those involved in political theory today. 
Institutions like the EU are prime examples of why the notion of democracy needs to 
be placed within a larger framework -- certainly beyond that of the nation-state. Yet 
at the same time, democracy still needs to be examined at the national level, since 
the nation-state remains the prevailing means of ordering societies as well as the 
foremost arena through which citizens can hold their leaders accountable for their 
actions. However, a theoretical as well as a practical examination of democracy has 
to adjust itself to the dynamics of a global system, and be able to explore the web of 
relationships found within on many levels (from community to local to regional to 
national and international). This feeds into the question of legitimacy in many ways, 
appropriately posed as questions by David Held. For instance he asks: 
What is the fate of the idea of legitimate rule when decisions, often 
with potentially life-and-death consequences, are taken in polities in 
which large numbers of the affected individuals have no democratic 
stake? 
What is the fate of legitimacy when the process of governance, both 
routine and extraordinary, has consequences for individuals and 
citizens within and beyond a particular nation-state and when only 
some of these people's consent is regarded as pertinent for the 
justification of rule and policy? 25 
23Robert A. Dahl, "A Democratic Dilemma: System Effectiveness Versus Citizen Participation 
Political Scictice Quarterl 
- N-, 
Vol. 109, No. 1,1994, p. 17. 
24David Held. ed. Political Theorý- Today, (Cambridge, UK: Politý Press), 199 1, p. 208. 
251bid., p. 204. 
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The notion of democracy, then, particularly in terms of its association with 
legitimacy, needs to be examined and explored in at least two ways: (1) in term.,, of 
accountability, that is, looking at the existing procedures whereby policy decisions 
are made on a national level and then on a transnational level (EU level) and 
examine the dynamics therein ('formal' legitimacy in Weiler's definition): and (2) bN, 
assessing the social and cultural influences which affect how citizens N'iew their 
political system (and the EU decision-making process) in an attempt to better 
comprehend the question of legitimacy ('social' legitimacy as defined by Weiler). 
There appears to be a need to examine such questions as democracy and its 
relationship to the concept of legitimacy by taking into account both the political and 
social variables which influence the degree of satisfaction that citizens feel towards 
their political decision-making process. This can not be fully understood by simply 
looking at the idea of accountability. There are clearly socio-cultural influences 
which work in conjunction with political accountability within a given nation-state 
(or a transnational structure such as the EU) and together these affect how citizens 
evaluate their satisfaction with how democracy is operating within their indigenous 
nation-state as well as whether they perceive their system as legitimate. 
Other contemporary analyses of this apparent dissatisfaction felt towards democracy 
have identified this malaise in terms of a 'moral crisis, ' the characteristics of which 
include " .. a 
feeling of historical aftermath and disorientation ... a broad distrust of 
political representatives regardless of ideology ... [and] open-endedness. "26 
Whether or not this viewpoint is accurate or not, it does not seem fruitful to utilise 
the term 'crisis' to define or explain the current questioning of democracy today. 
This term is saddled with too much previous baggage (particularly from the decades 
of the 1960's and 1970's) which prevents one from being able to explain the present 
doubts felt towards the functioning of democracy using this terminology. 
In any case, it does not seem helpful to declare that we are experiencing a 'crisis' no 
matter how that term is used or defined. It appears, rather, that western societies 
have reached a crossroads in so far as changing social, political, and economic 
circumstances have brought with them the need to make fundamental structural 
modifications and other organisational adaptations to the institutional frameworks of 
western nation-states (especially in light of new political orders such as the EU). 
One should refrain from making sweeping generalisations about how and where 
'such changes should occur, however, since it is evident that the member states of the 
26Charles Maier, "Dernocracy and its Discontents, " Foreign Affairs, July/Aupi,, t 1994, pp. 53- 
58. 
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EU are quite diverse, and have very different structural compositions. Changes will 
have to be made by each member state of the EU in accordance with its particular 
situation, Greece in this study, acting as one such example for investigation. 
1.2.3 THE WELFARE STATE 
A discussion of the welfare state and the next aspect to be examined -- the economic 
environment -- are innately linked and thus an explanation of one will overlap into 
the other. This seems to be the case as many would agree that economic growth is a 
necessity for sustaining the welfare state although it does not guarantee it. 27 
However, the welfare state deserves to be discussed as a separate dimension 
associated with legitimacy, as economics is only one of many debated facets 
pertaining to welfare state issues. Disagreements over the role of the welfare state 
(what it should be, how much of it is needed, who should pay for it) have continued 
unabated most pronouncedly since the 1960's when concerns for the welfare state 
and its durability came to the forefront of discussions in academia, and by the 1970's 
many were predicting the collapse (or 'crisis') of the welfare state. The western 
welfare state has not collapsed as was predicted, but certainly it appears to be facing 
new challenges in terms of how to continue to provide services to its citizens as new 
political, social, and economic realities have now to be confronted in this last decade 
of the twentieth century. 
Explanations as to how the modem western welfare state is facing up to new internal 
challenges and unprecedented obstacles are plentiful and speckled with political 
undertones. From the left one finds Rirgen Habermas' critique of the welfare state 
which remains one of the leading interpretations attempting to establish "how the 
modern problem of legitimacy arises from structures of the bourgeois state. "28 
Habermas maintains that "... threats to legitimacy can be averted only if the state can 
credibly present itself as a social welfare state which intercepts the dysfunctional 
side-effects of the economic process and renders them harmless for the 
individual... " 29 His conception of the role of the state in advanced capitalist systems 
hinges on the premise that the capitalist market creates needs which it can not 
feasibly sustain and this necessitates the state to step in and remedy the situation (by 
27As Richard Rose has stated: "Economic growth is the sine qua non condition for increased 
welfare in society. " "Bringing the State Back In, " In New Perspectives on the Welfare State in 
Europe, Catherine Jones, ed. (London: Routledge) 1993, p. 227. 
28jUrgen Habermas, Communication and the Evolution of Society, (Boston: Beacon Press) 1979, 
p. 178. 
291bid, p. 194. 
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creating welfare policies to protect the natural and social environment, for example). 
The state, however, eventually finds itself in a position where it has to take on more 
and more responsibilities to avert a crisis, and by interfering in this way, the state 
ultimately tampers with the 'natural' regulation of the laws of free market 
capitalism. 30 These responsibilities that the state has to take on also have become 
increasingly diffuse and hard to define which ultimately means they are difficult to 
fulfill, linking them to the question of legitimacy. What has occurred is that the 
'invisible hand' which is to naturally even-out economic activities becomes reified, 
and worse still, must then be guided. This then creates the need for legitimation of 
state activity, since it falls within the scope of the 'political. 131 It would be 
interesting to further expand Habermas's notion of a 'legitimacy crisis' from a state 
level to that of the EU. In other words, as the EU takes over more competencies 
from member states, will the EU face the same (or a similar) 'legitimacy crisis' in 
Habermasian terms as the western advanced capitalist state has? 
It is also worth mentioning here the discussion of legitimacy as outlined by Claus 
Offe32 when discussing the inherent contradictions of advanced capitalist states 
since Offe's work also seeks to describe legitimacy, how it emerges and the problems 
which arise when it begins to be questioned. First, Offe's discussion of legitimacy 
explains what he believes is the crux of the matter which is centred not so much on 
the formal rules themselves (in a Weberian sense) but on "... what are the conditions 
under which these legitimating rules find universal acceptance, and under what 
conditions do they fail to find such acceptance ... --33 In other words, Offe argues 
30See, Rirgen Habermas' Legitimation Crisis, (London: Heinemann Educational Books) 1973, 
especially "Part 11. Crisis Tendencies in Advanced Capitalism. " 
311f one was to employ Habermas's rather deterministic hypothesis that the present economic 
circumstances have created the need for the capitalist state to interfere in the natural laws of the free 
market thus precipitating a 'legitimacy crisis', it appears then that Greece should be on the very brink 
of such a crisis. If the degree of state intervention in market mechanisms indicates the extent to 
which a 'legitimacy crisis' is apt to occur due to the politisation of the economic sphere, then by all 
indicators, Greece would appear as a prime example of a nation-state about to experience a major 
explosion. Such a superficial application of Habermas' notion of legitimacy, however, leads to false 
and erroneous conclusions. Although Greece has a centralised state which directly intervenes in the 
capitalist economy, one must realise that the retarded level of economic development in the country 
and the still developing structures and institutions has created the need for the state to step in and act 
to fill in the gaps left behind. A 'legitimacy crisis' as explained by Habermas is averted because state 
actions are ipsofacto perceived of and acknowledged as legitimate in lieu of the recognition that 
capitalist structures and practices (and civil society as will be explored in Chapter Four of this study) 
still remain, in many areas, in their infancy. In reality, then, Greece can not be described as an 
advanced capitalist state in Habermasian terms and thus in many ways is not yet susceptible to the 
same types of legitimacy dilemmas as its north European EU partners which are more mature 
capitalist states. 
32See, Claus Offe, "Legitimacy versus Efficiency, " In Contradictions of the Weýfare State, John 
Keane, ed., (Cambridge, Mass: The MIT Press) 1984, pp. 130-146. 
331bid, p. 135. 
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that the question of the legitimacy of rules is derived not so much from what the 
rules are about (content), but on the acceptance of such rules which is determined 
partly by the perceived consequences or results of such rules. He writes: 
... the preference for democratic government is not based on the rules themselves but on the expectation that this form of government will 
contribute to common and individual welfare and other desirable goals. The 
ability of governments actually to produce such ends -- or at least to create 
the appearance that it is able to achieve such goals -- may consequently be 
considered as one major determinant of what we have called acceptance of 
the legitimating rules that, as formal rules, have themselves to be legitimated. 
The problem of legitimacy thus turns out to be caught in the dialectic of form 
and content. 34 
This emphasis which Offe places on the perceived consequences of rules laid out by 
democratic governments which he sees as a determinant of the legitimacy of these 
rules -- a causal argument, while certainly illuminating part of the issue of the 
question of legitimacy, seems to fall short of comprehensibly laying out a way by 
which to actually examine the degree of legitimacy for government rules. Offe's 
argument assumes, for instance, that there is a base level of agreement as to what 
are the perceived consequences or expectations of rules. It is true that we follow 
traffic laws not because in and of themselves there is any innate preference to do so 
(there is no real overriding rule that states that it is proper to drive on the left as 
opposed to on the right), but because we know that the consequences can be deadly. 
However, is there ever a time that we all agree on (or know of) what the 
consequences or results of government rules are? What happens when a 
controversial government rule is passed and made into law? Even if we assume that 
we can determine the conditions under which a rule is perceived of as acceptable or 
not, can we determine that all citizens perceive the consequences of governmental 
actions in the same way and thus make assumptions about the legitimacy of such 
governmental actions? 
On the other side of the debate theoretical contributions about the welfare state have 
continued deriving from British empiricism stemming from the ideas of T. H. 
MarshaIJ35 and Richard Titmuss. T. H. Marshall's notion of citizenship involved 
access to certain rights and powers, for example, civil rights, political rights, and 
social rights. As Gosta Esping-Andersen has noted, Marshall as well recognised 
341bid, p. 135. 
35See Citizenship Today: The Contemporary Relevance of TH. Marshall, Martin Bulmer and 
Anthony M. Rees, eds., (London: University College London Press) 1996, which consists of some of 
the more recent essays on Marshall's work. 
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that social citizenship constitutes the core idea of a welfare state, "36 and this remains 
a vital component in the present debates. In describing the aspects of the welfare 
state, Marshall believed that it was characterised by two seemingly contradictory 
traits: individualism and collectivism. 37 In so doing he identified one of the most 
important antitheses of the welfare state which is still relevant for contemporary 
discussions of the subject. On the one hand, debates have focused on the individual 
who is perceived of as having a right to certain fundamental provisions which need 
to be secured by the state. On the other hand, discussions have centred on society as 
a collectivity, a rather nebulous and ill-defined idea which is conjured up to provide 
a ground on which to contemplate which welfare provisions should be provided by 
the state and to whom they should go; which provisions are not considered state 
responsibilities, and who is to pay for these. Few societies have been successful in 
juggling both of these apparently contradictory roles of the welfare state, (one 
normative and one objective) and as T. H. Marshall once remarked: "The 
harmonizing of individual rights with the common good is a problem which faces all 
human societies. ', 38 
Richard Titmuss' delineation of three major categories of welfare (social, fiscal, and 
occupational) have contributed to the ongoing investigation of the welfare state as 
has his three models of social policy. 39 Noteworthy likewise is G6ran Therborn's 
work which sees welfare state activities as constituting "one kind of relations [sic] 
between a state and its population. -40 Therborn insists that this relationship must be 
explored in terms of conditions and resources, as this aspect has been sorely 
unexplored in the past. 
36GOsta Esping-Andersen, The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press) 1990, p. 21. Esping-Andersen, argues, however, that Marshall's concept ".. must be 
fleshed out. " Ibid, p. 21. In other words, one can not simply look at the rights the welfare state 
allows for, but also how the other activities of the state are conducted including those from the market 
and the family. 
37"1 take the most relevant aspects of the Welfare State, in this context, to be the following. 
First, its intense individualism. The claim of the individual to welfare is sacred and irrefutable and 
partakes of the character of a natural right. ... But if we put individualism 
first, we must put 
collectivism second. The welfare state is the responsible promoter and guardian of the welfare of the 
whole community, which is something more complex than the sum total of the welfare of all its 
individual members arrived at by simple addition. " T. H. Marshall, Class, Citizenship, and Social 
Development, (Garden City, NY: Doubleday and Co. Inc. ) 1964, pp. 236-237. 
381bid, p. 237. 
39The Residual Welfare model, the Industrial Achievement Performance model, and the 
Institutional Redistributive model. See, Richard Titmuss, Social Policy, (London: George Allen & 
Unwin Ltd. ) 1974. 
4OG6ran Therborn, "States, Populations and Productivity: Towards a Political Theory of Welfare 
States, " in Politics and Social Theory, Peter Lassman, ed. (London: Routledge) 1989, p. 65. 
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However, in my view, the most significant contribution to the deliberations on the 
welfare state is that of Gosta Esping-Andersen and his three regime-type I clusters' 
based upon examining the relationships found among state, market and family 
arrangements. 41 In the first of these 'clusters' he identifies the 'liberal' ýý-elfare state 
which includes the USA, Canada, and most of the English-speaking countries, in the 
second -- 'corporatist-statist' -- are Austria, France, Germany and Italy (and I -suppose 
he would place Greece in this category, although not without some difficulty as I 
shall discuss subsequently); and lastly there is the 'social democratic' regime-type 
which include the Scandinavian countries. In identifying these three 'clusters. ' 
Esping-Andersen emphasises that there is 'no single pure case, ' and that: 
[a] theory of welfare-state developments must clearly reconsider its 
causal assumptions if it wishes to explain clusters. The hope of finding one single powerful causal force must be abandoned; the task- 
is to identify salient interaction-effects. ... three factors in particular should be of importance: the nature of class mobilization (especially of 
the working class); class-political coalition structures; and the 
historical legacy of regime institutionalization. 42 
Clearly as European integration has expanded, and as more members have joined 
with different welfare systems, the problem of synchronising and juggling the 
various welfare traditions has become more acute. There is thus a constant iieed to 
create new schemes, or amend old ones, in order to incorporate new members and 
their particularities. 
Stephan Liebfried has done just that and has further built upon Esping-Andersen's 
work and devised a fourth regime-type which he refers to as "Latin rim countries. ' In 
this category he places 'rudimentary' welfare states which have distinct traditions of 
welfare which make them markedly different from other nation-states. In Chapter 
Seven of this study an attempt will be made to apply Liebfried's delineation of a 
'rudimentary' welfare state to that of Greece. 
Although each of these above mentioned accounts of the welfare state are valuable in 
identifying the characteristics and role of the western welfare state as well as some 
of the perplexities found therein, when looking at how the welfare state will be 
affected by new developing political orders such as the EU, one is left somewhat in 
the dark. There is very little written on the affects of the western welfare state from 
external forces -- i. e. coming from the international or transnational environment. 
41See, Gosta Esping-Andersen's The Three Worl(Is of WClfare Capitalism, op. cit., especiallý 
"Part 1. The Three Welfare State Regimes. " 
421bid., p. 29. 
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The present reality seems to indicate that western society has become indicative of a 
series of contradistinctions: technological advancement and industrial innovation 
which has brought with it unprecedented intellectual achievements on the one hand, 
and on the other hand this has created insurmountable obstacles for the state. The 
modem welfare state has now to face multitudinous demands being placed upon it 
which can range from participating in a global economic market through the growing 
use of fiber optics, to environmental measures to avert an ecological disaster, to 
providing for adequate housing for those who can not afford it. The role of the 
welfare state now has to be dynamic to keep in tune with the new needs of a society 
constantly mutating, yet at the same time has to maintain stability and remain 
consistent in delivering promised welfare services. 
The increasing responsibilities and regulations that the welfare state is now trying to 
juggle has indeed put heavy strains on the institutional structures that lay within its 
boundaries. Yet so far we have not seen the evolution of any other political order 
which could replace the nation-state as we have come to understand it. Disputes as 
to the degree of sovereignty that has been retained -- or lost -- by the nation-state in a 
world of interdependence brought on by globalisation continue. Both those 
advocating the permanence of the nation-state and those forecasting its demise seek 
out facts to sustain their respective positions. Held in common is the belief that 
indeed the present era has brought with it transformations which affect the political, 
social and economic environments and that the accompanying institutions found 
within these environments can not remained ossified. 
Given then, the enormous demands required of the welfare state today, one would 
expect that citizens of modem nation-states would acknowledge that certain areas of 
state responsibility could perhaps be tended to through a cooperation of nation- 
states. In lieu of the recognition that the economic environment of the modern 
nation-state no longer functions autonomously due to economic interdependence 
created by world markets, it would seem to make sense that other areas that were 
once traditionally held by the state could be best handled through a coordination 
with other states facing similar difficulties. However, as we shall see in the next 
chapter, a great majority of EU member citizens believe that their national 
government should retain the responsibility for deciding policies in such areas as 
health and social welfare, education, participation of workers' representatives on 
company boards, and cultural policy. 43 This may be an emotional rather than a 
43EUROBAROMETER, #40, December 1993, A53-A54. 
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practical problem of transferring allegiance from the nation-state to the EU, in other 
words, a question of social legitimacy. 
This then, appears to be a piece to the puzzle to explaining the question of 
legitimacy. Owing to the transformation of the welfare state in this latter part of the 
twentieth century as provoked by world developments, it has become rnore arduous 
for national governments to provide public provisions that came to be demanded by 
citizens and which became de facto in the post World War Two era. Suddenly. 
however, national governments have begun to re-evaluate whether they can afford to 
continue providing such services, and increasingly a cost-analysis philosophy has 
come to be the guiding force in determining what public services will continue to be 
provided, and which will be driven into the private sphere. 44 This has resulted in a 
legitimacy gap between the 'governed' and the 'governors, ' the degree of which 
depends upon the extent to which the state originally took on welfare 
responsibilities. One can establish, therefore, a correspondence between what 
welfare provisions citizens have come to expect from their national government -- 
which they are not willing to have displaced on to an EU level -- and the ability of 
the welfare state to continue to provide these provisions which affects how citizens 
view their government, including the degree of legitimacy felt towards that 
government. 
1.2.4 THE ECONOMIC ENVIRONMENT 
Closely related to the challenges facing the western welfare state are the 
complexities associated with the issue of economic growth and prosperity. The 
ability to successfully manage economic affairs appears today to be particularly 
integral for national governments in maintaining their legitimacy, but obviously only 
one of several facets which needs to be examined. Needless to say, economic 
stability and growth have always been important features of legitimacy for any 
government, and economic prosperity sustains a welfare state although as 
mentioned, it does not guarantee it. However, presently, in light of a changing 
economic environment indicative of global markets and world-wide economic 
competition, the relationship between economic prosperity and legitimacy appears to 
be more intimate. Nonetheless, what must be emphasised as well is that there is no 
44An immense debate has centred around whether the private or the public sphere Ps the 
appropriate level in which to speak of societal pro\Isions. The health care debate in the USA and 
changes in the NHS in the UK are of but two examples of where the private vs. the public dispute 
about health care is currently raging. 
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functional relationship or one-to-one link between favourable economic performance 
and legitimacy, the former not always guaranteeing the latter. 
One of the many economic and political realities that have to be confronted now by 
western nation-states as concerns economics is the rapid and decisive events which 
have occurred in Eastern and Central Europe which have resulted in more economic 
actors competing for their share in the 'free' market arena. Many of these former 
Soviet bloc states are strategically situated geographically, bordering on west 
European nation-states which makes them very favourable for trade and other 
economic interaction. These Central and Eastern countries therefore have an 
advantage over their competitors in the Far East as they are geographically adjacent 
to EU members. These once closed economies have suddenly turned 'capitalist' and 
are attempting to enter into the European market arena (and the EU itself) and in fact 
the global market as well. 
The three most promising candidates on the queue to join the EU45 from Eastern 
and Central Europe and those who pose the fiercest challenges economically are 
clearly Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic. The Czech Republic in particular 
has a formidable economic record with " ... $7 billion in hard currency reserves, no 
foreign debt and one of the region's most promising in flation- fighting currencies., '46 
Hungary has already implemented a policy whereby no new laws or regulations are 
passed in the national assembly that can hinder trade in any way with EU member 
states or create obstacles in Hungary's petition for entry into the EU. Although 
obviously these states have a way to go before they can boast of economic prosperity 
and full de-regulation of their previously tightly state-run economies, they have 
moved in leaps and bounds toward opening up their economic sectors and making 
structural changes to accommodate a western-style capitalist market system. As Vit 
Stepanek, a top official in the Czech Republic's Economics Ministry in Prague 
recently noted, "We went from a command economy to a market economy, and from 
a communist regime to democracy. But as we are changing, Europe as a whole must 
change, too. ', 47 
45The queue for EU membership continues to grow rapidly as other Eastern and Central 
European nations submit their applications for consideration to the EU authorities. Indeed one of the 
major issues at the upcoming 1996 Intergovernmental Conference will be to discuss further 
enlargement of the EU and the consequences of such an enlargement on the institutional framework 
of the Union. 




Another important economic transformation which has affected west European 
economies has come from countries in South East Asia and the Far East, who have 
recently become new participants in the global market, and who now pose an 
additional menace for the west. These countries' domestic economic environments 
are far less developed when compared with those of the west, and certainly 
technologically retarded, yet they have become western Europe's most threatening 
competitors since they have cheap labour costs, low salaries, fewer benefits for 
workers, and low overhead costs as employees work under poor working conditions. 
This results in products that are manufactured below the cost of what the same 
product is produced for in the West. 48 This reality has created severe economic 
worries for western economists who are faced with reflecting on the fact that the 
fastest growing economies are outside of Europe, and these are the ones which pose 
the most threat. 
Faced with such stiff competition, EU member states, in an attempt to keep 
competitive and market shares, have increased productivity by employing new 
technologies to the point of making domestic jobs redundant. This has resulted in an 
unemployment problem (an additional pressure on the western welfare state) unseen 
in Europe since the interwar years. High unemployment rates (the average EU 
unemployment rate is currently hovering at around I I%) coupled with slow growth 
rates has meant that west European economies have to defy the odds and attempt to 
forge ahead in strengthening their economies, one such attempt being through the 
Single European Market (SEM) project, and other such coordinated endeavors 
outlined in the European Commission's White Paper on "Growth, Competitiveness, 
Employment. " 
What seems clear, however, is that a European employment force today has to be 
multi-purpose, as flexibility leads to marketability in an economic environment 
which presupposes literacy and knowledge of a different kind -- to be able to 
communicate "... in a context-free code. "49 And certainly the advent of 
48A comparison of average 1993 hourly labour costs in manufacturing, in dollars, from five 
western nation-states as compared to five Asian countries reveals some stark differences: 
Western Germany: $24.87 Taiwan $5.46 
Switzerland: $21.90 Singapore $5.12 
Belgium: $21.00 South Korea $4.93 
Netherlands: $19.83 Thailand $0.71 
Austria: $19.26 Philippines $0.68 
From DRI McGraw-Hill, Morgan Stanley Research, reproduced in The Wall Street Journal, Friday, 
Sept. 30,1994, p. R4. 
49Emest Gellner, "Civil Society in Historical Context, " International Social Science Journal, 
129, Aug. 199 1, p. 508. 
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globalisation will have far more reaching consequences on the structure of the work 
force as well as on society in genera150 throughout western Europe (and abroad Lis 
well) in the future. 
As far as domestic spending is concerned, it continues to rise as governments find 
themselves constantly needing to regulate as well as to dispense social wch'are 
benefits, which continually adds to already huge national deficits. As was 
mentioned previously, national governments have been trying to discharge from the 
public sphere into the private sector welfare responsibilities to ease their economic 
burdens. This has not gone over well with the citizens of EU member states, 
however, nor with trade union organisations which complain that jobs are melting 
away and that their benefits are shrinking, even though they reallse that costly social 
benefits may be partially what is forcing many companies and firms to go seek out 
cheaper labour abroad. 
Tying these economic realities to the question of legitimacy requires one to 
acknowledge that there are vast differences of opinion as to how the new economic 
environment is to be confronted. It is obvious that dramatic changes which are 
occurring in Eastern and Central Europe as well as in Asia necessitate adaptations in 
west European nation-states as well, but there is less of a consensus as to how these 
transformations should occur and in what ways. National governments realise that 
they need the support of their citizenry in order to make changes, and that these 
changes must be perceived of as legitimate by their citizenry. Likewise they are 
aware that their slim parliamentary majorities necessitate them to make whatever 
changes have to be made slowly so as not to lose public support and thereby be 
voted out of office. 
National governments, therefore, must be prepared to act and react to unexpected 
circumstances which might occur in the economic sector while understanding that 
their level of legitimacy as perceived by their respective citizenry needs to be taken 
into account. This does not mean, however, that the citizens of west European 
nation-states, solely based on economic efficiency, will perceive their political 
systems as less legitimate. Rather, what is suggested is that a government's sense of 
legitimacy is affected by the standard of living that it can provide its citizens as well 
as a series of cultural and social factors which feed into this issue. Just ýts the 
differences between workers and their working conditions in western Europe are 
5OScc, Anthony Giddens, The Consequences of Modemit 
' 
v. (Stanford, California: Stanford 
Universilý Press) 1990, for an account of 'post-modemity' and its consequence,,. 
20 
different from those of their counterparts in Asia for reasons not simply based on 
economic characteristics (pay and social benefits, for example) but in terms of 
social, cultural, and historical contrariness, so too does this apply to the question of 
legitimacy. What would be perceived of as legitimate by an Asian worker (as well 
as what would be perceived of as acceptable or fair pay) is in contrast to what would 
be perceived of as legitimate by a west European worker, and this goes beyond 
simply economics. In both cases, however, economic prosperity and growth seem to 
be a part of the legitimacy equation albeit in very different ways. It is pertinent to 
mention as well that long-term economic hardships bome by a population over a 
sizable period of time may sow the seeds of discontent affecting the level of 
legitimacy much more than a short-term austerity programme whose duration is 
fixed. 
1.2.5 SECURITY/DEFENCE 
A final dimension which will be made manifest to reveal its association with the 
question of legitimacy concerns the issues of security and defence. Throughout this 
century as nation-state building has flourished unlike any era previously, security 
and defence responsibilities have resided primarily within the sovereign borders of 
the nation-state, where the national government has taken up the liability for such 
matters. Weber's definition of the state as "a human community that successfully 
claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given 
territory,, 51 very much reflected the notion that the issues of security and defence 
were those that would be solely within the realm of responsibility of the state and 
that there they would be perceived of as legitimate. 
However, as the ideal of cooperative relations among western nation-states evolved 
into modern forms of organisation in the post-World War Two era, the issues of 
security and defence began to be perceived of in relation to other nation-states and a 
system of friendly alliances was transformed into organisations such as NATO and 
the European Coal and Steel Community which had as one of their goals the 
prevention of any future deadly hostilities among their member states. Today, in an 
era of rapidly changing geopolitics which has brought with it a large degree of 
uncertainty and fear, the need for cooperation and synchronisation among west 
European nation-states (and with Eastern and Central European nation-states as well) 
appears more pressing than ever before. Tumultuous changes which are occurring in 
51Max Weber, Front Max Weber. - Essays in Sociology, translated and edited by H. H. Gerth and 
C. Wright Mills, (London: Oxford University Press) 1958, p. 78. 
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the republics of the former Soviet Union and the conflicts which blew up in the 
Balkans have created a great deal of uncertainty and fear, particularly among those 
residing in continental Europe (and especially for those nation-states such as Greece 
whose geographical proximity to the conflicts make their position very precarious). 
Therefore, on the one hand, it appears that the issues of security and defence seem to 
lend themselves to cooperative planning and organisation and there is certainly a 
degree of support for such endeavors among EU member citizens, 52 but on the other 
hand security and defence remain issues that are some of the most national in 
character. National governments as well as citizens are not willing to give 
transnational organisations the degree of power which would allow them effectively 
to make vital (or final) decisions concerning questions of security and defence, as 
they continue to perceive the national level as that one which has the legitimate right 
to do so. 53 Allowance for unilateral action, for example, is believed to be 
indisputable, which seems to indicate that the underlying matter involved, that of 
national sovereignty, is the more complicated and sensitive concem at hand. 54 
Yet it does not seem fruitful to pit the nation-state against developing international 
organisations and then try to decide which is losing sovereignty and which is gaining 
it. Obviously the member states of the EU are under certain constraints as to specific 
actions that can be taken unilaterally by their national governments as it concerns 
such things as military action, location of weapon systems, but this has been a basic 
principle of NATO for many more years and at least in the immediate post-World 
War Two era was very strictly monitored and enforced. Since NATO has not 
stripped a single member of the alliance of its sovereignty, it may be said that the EU 
will likewise not abolish member states of their sovereignty, at least not at any time 
in the immediate future. What does appear to be happening, however, is that issues 
such as defence and foreign policy require readjustments among member states of 
52Public support among citizens of the EU as concerns whether the EU should be working 
towards a common defence foreign policy towards countries outside the EC/EU has been rising 
during the past four years. In 1994 it was 75%for as opposed to 15% against supporting such a 
policy. EUROBAROMETER, #41, July 1994. However, there remain great discrepancies among 
member states, Greece having only 27% of the population believing that the EU level is the 
appropriate level for deciding defence and security policy. 
53Analysts of Community policy-making such as Giandomenico Majone, for example, argue that 
"Given the progressive loss of control over economic policy, social policy is, with foreign policy, one 
of the few remaining bulwarks of national sovereignty, and for this reason alone national 
governments will do their best to protect it. " "'Ibe European Community Between Social Policy and 
Social Regulation, " Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol. 3 1, No. 2, June 1993, p. 162. 
54For a discussion of sovereignty and how it is being affected by the EU, see Neil MacCormick, 
"Sovereignty, Democracy and Subsidiarity, " In Democracy and Constitutional Culture in the Union 
of Europe, Richard Bellamy ed. et al., (London: Lothian Foundation Press) 1995, pp. 95-104. 
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the EU so as to allow them to develop more of a common stance on foreign affairs. 
Certainly these readjustments will entail a qualification of sovereignty which will be 
more difficult for some members than others (i. e., Greece and the UK) to tolerate 
and accept, but it seems unwise to predict the abrogation of the nation-state as the 
main repository of sovereignty as yet. What one should be investigating rather, 
is not a theory of the state, or a theory of the international order, but a theory of the 
changing place of the democratic state within the international order. ', 55 
Given this state of affairs, then, the question which emerges is: on what level do we 
examine the concept of legitimacy as it relates to issues of security and defence? If 
traditionally the nation-state was the level at which security and defence was 
legitimate, then some would argue that there it will remain legitimate. 56 But there is 
further evidence to support an argument that in a world of accelerated globalisation, 
nation-states need (are forced? ) to collaborate with one another in developing policy, 
even though in the past they may have faced such issues as defence and security on 
their own. Certainly in an era of globalisation more pressure is being placed on 
national governments to cooperate with other nation-states when facing serious 
security threats. Yet as will be brought up in the next chapter, the European Union 
has yet to convince its citizens as well as national leaders that it should be the 
legitimate repository for such a type of decision-making, and has yet to develop the 
necessary organisational structures to do so. 
Hence by examining the concept of legitimacy, one observes that a gap has 
developed between the level of the nation-state and a developing transnational level. 
The nation-state no longer can be seen as the primary instrument for making security 
and defence decisions, yet the EU has not yet won over EU member state citizens 
and their national leaders to the view that is should take over this important 
responsibility. The question of who is now the legitimate actor vis-a-vis matters 
involving security and defence reflects precisely part of the complexity involved in 
establishing the arena in which such questions should be asked and examined in a 
world of internationalism 
5513avid Held, op. cit., p. 223. 
56"So, is the coming of international government now logically unstoppable? Yes, but it will 
advance with much difficulty, because two of the three ingredients of the rise of the nation-state -- 
identity and legitimacy -- are missing at the higher level. While the principle of noninterference in 
the affairs of nation-states may be weakening, the willingness of people to die to impose the world's 
standards is weakening, too. People must look to the nation-state for their military security. " 
Nicholas Colchester, "Goodbye, Nation-State. Hello ... What? " New 




Each of the previously mentioned dimensions of the le2itimacy question explore 
particular aspects of the subject helping to bring to light the different facets invok-ed. 
These dimensions of legitimacy must be viewed contemporaneously and historically 
for one to obtain an accurate appreciation of the forces and structures at work- behind 
the phenomenon of legitimacy. What has been perceived as legitimate -- and by 
whom -- has changed over time thus making the concept a dynamic and unfixed one. 
Therefore any scheme which is developed to exarn-ine such a concept must also be 
dynamic and flexible. By investigating both the political (Tormal') aspects of the 
concept as well as the social ('empirical') component, my hope is that a more explicit 
and transparent understanding of legitimacy will emerge. 
1.4 The Remainder of this Study 
Chapter Two that follows sets out to examine the concept of legitimacy by relying 
on these five dimensions which will be applied to the European Union. Chapter 
Three (which will end Part I of this study) will focus on the EU and the policy and 
decision-making processes and how these feed into the legitimacy question which 
will complement some of the comments made in this chapter and in Chapter Two. 
The central part of this study will concentrate on a particular EU member state -- 
Greece. Again the aforementioned five dimensions of the legitimacy question 
selected will be applied to the case of Greece so as to make more substantive an 
investigation of this concept. One general observation which should be noted is that 
the discussion of Greece mainly concerns the post- authoritarian era, that is, the 
period after 1974. Although some mention is made of historical events and other 
significant incidents from earlier periods, the primary time frame of this 
investigation of Greece is after the fall of the Colonels up to the present. 
Chapter Four seeks to investigate the Greek state and applies the notion of civil 
society to modern Greece. Mention will be made of the Greek civic environment 
and how EU membership has affected Greek society. Chapter Five explores the 
issue of democracy in Greece and centres on the formal aspects of legitimacy in 
Greece by briefly examining the Greek political system and how it functions in 
practice. Following a discussion of the political aspects of legitimacy in Greece, 
Chapter Six turns to the issLie of the welfare state, and a characterisation of the Greek 
welfare state is made as a 'rudimentary' welfare state as based on the schemes of 
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Gosta Esping-Andersen and Stephen Liebfried. The Greek economic environment iý' 
taken up in Chapter Seven, which attempts to re,,,, eal how close (or far) Greece is 
from attaining the EU convergence criteria required for monetary union, while the 
Greek underground economy is as well referred to. Lastly, Chapter Eight survcyý' 
how geopolitics affects issues of security and defence in Greece. Particularly Lifter 
the fall of Soviet communism, issues of security and defence have come to the fore 
of discussions within Greek corridors and among those concerned with foreign 
policy. The proposed EU Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and 
Greece's recent entry into the Western European Union (VYIEU) as a full member (in 
April of 1995) will be discussed as they feed into the question of legitimacy. This 
study will end with a brief conclusion which will attempt to pull together the various 
pieces of this study and bring this discussion to a close. 
2-5 
Chapter Two 
LEGITIMACY, THE EU AND THE CASE OF GREECE 
2.1 Introduction 
The present chapter offers an overview of developments in the European Union and 
aspects of the recent social and political history of Greece. It also applies the f1VC 
dimensions of legitimacy as outlined in the previous chapter to the European Union. 
The intention in this chapter is fivefold: to survey the evolution of European 
integration; to explore the question of legitimacy as it relates to the European Union, 
to introduce the national vs. supranational debate; to make some remarks about the 
nature of the Greek nation-state; and lastly to provide information concerning 
Greece's entry into the Community. 
2.2 A Brief Historical Explanation of the Evolution of European Integration 
Membership Decade Theory of Integration Economic 
Integration 
France, Germany, Italy, 
Belgium, Luxembourg, 1950's functionalism frcc trade area 
Netherlands 
1960's neofunctionalism customs union 
Ist Enlargement I Jan. 1973 1970's confederalism, common market Denmark, UK, Ireland inter overnmentalism, 
2nd Enlargement I Jan. 1981 
Greece 1980's quasi -federal ism single market 
SEA 
3rd Enlargement I Jan. 1986 
Spain, Portugal 
4th Enlargement I Jan. 1995 1990's supranationalism, Economic Monetary 
Austria, Sweden, Finland federalism, Union 
persistent intergovernmental- 
ism 
Table 2.1 From 'Free Trade' Area to 'Union' : From 'Six' to 'Fifteen' D/ 
18 April 1951 ECSC: European Coal and Steel Community 
25 March 1957 EEC: European Economic Community 
25 March 1957 EAEC: European Atomic Energy Community 
28 February 1986 SEA: Single European Act -- EC: European Communities 
7 Februarv 1992 TEU: Treaty on European Union -- EU: European Union 
a vo n Integration 
57Table based on Juliet Lodge's examination of European integration found in "The Challenge of 
the Future, " Preface, The European Cornmuniýv and the Challenge of the Futui-e, 2nd edition 
(London: Pinter Publishers) 1993, pp. xiii-xx\, I. The first two columns, 't-nembership' and 'decade' are 
my own additions, as is the last row concerning the 4th enlargement. 
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As the above tables reveal, there has been a qualitative as well as a quantitative 
expansion of European integration throughout the past four decades. Each decade 
had a prevailing theory (or theories) of integration which today are used to represent 
the general expression of the mood at the time. The extent to "-hich economic 
integration occurred can also be partially explained along these lines, although it will 
be argued in this study that economic variables must be seen and viewed along with 
many other determining factors arising from the political and social environments. 
respectively. 
One underlying assumption concerning membership of the Community (and now the 
Union) has been that all members must incontrovertibly possess democratic systems 
and thus have politically legitimate, i. e., so-called 'democratic' governments. 58 For 
example, Greece's associate membership was put on hold once the Colonel's came to 
power in 1967 and Spain and Portugal were allowed in only after the fall of their 
respective dictatorships. An interesting scenario, one which the Community would 
have been utterly unprepared to confront, would have been if any of these countries 
while full members of the Community had experienced a return of a dictatorship. In 
such a situation the Community would have been faced with having to swiftly create 
official legislation for removal procedures -- indeed an unprecedented action. 
By examining the evolution of European integration it becomes apparent that at least 
at its inception, the notion of west European nation-states cooperating with each 
other in various economic arenas was not one that was widely socially accepted 
among the general citizenry of Europe. Much hostility and animosity was still felt 
between the populations of France and Germany, for example throughout the 1950's, 
although clearly the ECSC was seen as a way to intertwine the economies of these 
two western nation-states so as to prevent any further hostilities from arising 
between themselves and their neighbours. This preventive character that the ECSC 
had would gradually be transformed into one of cooperation by the 1960's, when the 
relationships among EEC members would turn towards mutually beneficial 
expressions of collaboration vis-a-vis economic problems and dilemmas held in 
common. The oil crisis which affected Europe by 1973 most immediately revealed 
the necessity for Community members to join forces and find solutions for European 
dependency on imported petroleum, and made manifest the need for more and better 
synchronisation among members in diversified areas of trade and tariff law.. "-. The 
5(ýThis issue may be brought up in more particular terms as countries from Eastern and Central 
Europe are now on the queue to join the Union with very different political traditions which ha% e 
been considered by many as neither 'westcrn' nor 'democratic. ' 
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economic recession which occurred in the decade of the 1980's was equally deci,,, i%'e 
in creating an atmosphere which seemed to propel Community members to link up 
with each other to tackle increasingly formidable obstacles from the international 
arena. The degree and extent to which technological innovation is occurring 
presently has added potency to the argument for further integration and the global 
economic environment which has brought with it an unprecedented level of 
competitiveness all lend credence to the Euro-enthusiasts plans for the development 
of a united Europe. 
Thus, the degree of legitimacy for European integration has differed quite 
substantially throughout the past forty years. The degree to which Europeans have 
perceived integration as legitimate has depended partially on the economic climate 
prevailing at the time and other social and political factors which together 
determined the degree and extent to which Europeans favoured or disapproved of the 
integrative project. Nor did these factors coincide in each member or prospective 
member country to produce a necessary convergence with any prevailing definition. 
What needs to be kept in mind is that European integration is a dynamic process 
rather than an end goal, and this makes it difficult to make predictions about its 
direction with any degree of certainty. The fact that the European Union still 
remains a nebulous idea subject to a variety of definitions is proof enough that there 
are specific complexities which one encounters when investigating European 
integration. This same reality holds true for the concept of legitimacy. 
Hence it is a truism that a great deal of the impetus (perhaps even necessity) for 
European integration over the past four decades has come from exogenous forces -- 
presently from a new evolving global environment -- rather than from indigenous 
sources. Certainly the perceived communist threat in the post-World War Two era 
was the most decisive force persuading west European leaders and their citizens that 
cooperation and joint ventures with their allied neighbours would secure their futurc 
in a divided world. To a great extent this was how the European integrative process 
was initially legitim-ised: it was a tangible way to prevent any future conflicts among 
its members, and it was the best bulwark against any encroaching communist threat. 
It seems important to ernphasise that, at present, the European Union as it appears to 
be evolving, is attenipting to develop the prerequisites of a political and social union 
as well as an economic one, although clearly the economic features are developing 
more rapidly than the political and the social. The level and degree of coordination 
within the political and social spheres, however, most recently has been enhanced by 
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the TEU through further cooperation in such areas as security and defence as well as 
social regulations. Further coordination has been planned for the 1996 
Intergovernmental Conference as well. Nevertheless the type and degree of I 
coordination being attempted at this present stage of European integration which 
includes a multiplicity of joint economic, political and social ventures, is the most 
ambitious and inclusive endeavor that has been attempted to date. It remains to be 
seen whether or not these enterprising goals can be achieved. 
2.3 Legitimacy and the European Union 
What must be recognised at the start is that the European Union (EU) is not a flati . oil 
or a state or an international organisation as we have come to understand these 
terms. It is something else. Specifying the nature of that something else is part of 
the problem of legitimising it as well. The two descriptions that act as quasi- 
definitions of the EU today -- the EU as a union on the road to becoming federal 
versus the EU as a community of nation-states -- do not shed much light on the 
question of how to legitimise this union to the member governi-nents and their 
citizens. Therefore, what is necessary is a fresh re-examination of the concept of 
legitimacy as it applies to the EU and its member states, as more powers and areas of 
competence are transferred from the nation-state to the EU. 59 
How do we apply the dimensions of the legitimacy problem to the European Union 
in the post-Maastricht era? As mentioned, clearly the EU is neither a state nor a 
federal system, but rather a hybrid (and still evolving) political order, and this is 
certainly part of the problem of legitimising it as well. The EU therefore stands out 
as a unique (and unprecedented) type of political, social and economic institution 
which means that when exploring the question of legitimacy, there will be very 
specific difficulties as they relate to the particularities of the EU itself and its internal 
and external relationships and operations. As Albert Weale has pointed out: 
... we cannot simply transpose an understanding of 
legitimacy suitable 
to the nation-state to the European level, or, more particularly, we 
can[not] assume that the same sorts of processes that sustain 
allegiances in stable nation states will apgly to cases where the locus 
6 of those allegiances is being challenged. 
59St, c Tina Mavrikos, "The Question of Legitimacy, " Jounial ofModern Greek Studies, pp. 25 1- 
209 where the author first debuted these ideas, found in Appendix 2 annexed to this study. 
60Albert Weale, "The Single Market, European Integration and Political Legitimacy, " Theme 
Paper Prepared for ESRC/A7 COST Action Conference, University of Exeter. 8-11 Sept. 1994, p. 6. 
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Yet, for the EU to be successful in its endeavors, it must be able to establish 
legitimacy for its policies, especially in light of the fact that the EU continues to 
expand into new policy areas which intimately affect EU member state citizens. 
Further enlargement of the Community means that new members (some accustomed 
to very different ideas of how decision-making should be conducted) can challen, -, c 
the existing procedures. The policy-making and decision-making processes as theN, 
relate to the question of legitimacy will be the focus of the next chapter of this study. 
The EU currently finds itself poised at a very crucial phase in the process of putting 
into action an ideal of a united Europe as set out in the TEU. This decisive period of 
European coordination will require a sense of legitimacy on the part of all those 
involved (both directly and indirectly) for it to be successful in achieving such goals 
as the EMU (European Monetary Union) and the CFSP (Common Foreign and 
Security Policy). For such policies to be effectively implemented, legitimacy is 
required, and an investigation into this requires one to go beyond the rather 
simplistic idea that legitimacy as it refers to the EU refers merely to 'acceptance' of a 
set of specific policies. The question likewise arises as to who the decision-makers 
are, and who they are accountable to. 
There seems no doubt that the EU has come to acquire among its mernber 
governments and their citizenry a degree of 'functional' legitimacy. By this what is 
meant is that the EU does have a policy agenda, and therefore tangible results can be 
reviewed and evaluated. But the EU is going to require much more than a functional 
legitimacy if it hopes to achieve its outlined goals. The more Integral aspect of the 
legitimacy equation for the EU concerns not only whether or not particular policies 
are viewed as acceptable to EU member citizenry, but the more profound question 
now being asked is whether the EU should have the authority to make binding 
decisions in certain areas of competence once reserved for national governments, 
and if so, under what conditions should this be accepted. 
Joseph Weiler's assessment of the legitimacy problem confronting the EU61 has 
been given widespread attention as it remains one of the most quoted pieces written 
on the subject. His ideas have been widely cited by those who have taken up this 
question even though many do not agree with his somewhat neo-Gaulist conclusions. 
The point here is to acknowledge that his analysis is important because it goes 
beyond the 'democratic deficit' issue and explores the differences between 
6lJoseph H. H. Weiler, "After Maastricht: Community Legitimacy in Post-1992 Europe, " in 
Singular Europe, William James Adams, ed., (Ann Arbor, Michigan: 1-he Uni%-crsit\ (4 Nlichigan 
Press) 1992. 
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democracy, formal legitimacy and social legitimacy, and finally puts on record that 
concepts such as democracy and legitimacy are not interchangeable and thus should 
be analysed as distinct principles. 
... it would be difficult for a nondemocratic government structure or 
political system to attain or maintain legitimacy in the West, but it is 
still possible for a democratic structure not to enjoy legitimacy ... the existence of democratic structures surely influences the legitiniacy of 
govemance structure, it does not guarantee it. 62 
The attempt here will be to move beyond Weiler, however, and explore the issue of 
legitimacy as it pertains to the EU in the post-TEU era by trying to build upon the 
ideas already outlined by previous authors (for example, the issue of the 'democratic 
deficit, ') as well as explore the social aspects of legitimacy which appear to be just as 
essential in understanding this phenomenon as are such issues as political 
accountability. Weiler's differentiation of a 'formal' and 'social' legitimacy will be 
utilised and further expanded on in discussions relating to both. 
Bearing in mind then, that there are unique idiosyncrasies (and intricacies) which are 
very specific to the EU in a discussion of legitimacy, one can apply the five 
dimensions of legitimacy as a guide for exploring this yet unpaved road of European 
integration. Table 1.3 presents the dimensions of legitimacy as they are hei-C 
interpreted to apply to the European Union. The unavailability of precise terms and 
language to describe the European Union at present often requires those who study it 
to carve out their own framework in the absence of appropriate existing formulas. 
The theoretical scheme composed of five dimensions suggested in this study is quite 
flexible and can be adopted to suit the particular case under discussion. 
621bid., p. 19. 
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Dimensions of the Supranational Level: European Union 
Legitimacy Problem 
(a) "Democracy" "Democratic Deficit; " a look at the organs of 
the EU; EU lobbying; subsidiarity 
(b) Economic EMU and EU legitimacy-, can the SEM initiative 
Environment and EMU lead the EU competitively 
into a global world market arena? 
(c) Welfare State Vast majority of Europeans see scientific & 
development policy (i. e., environmental policics) 
best confronted -- more efficiently -- with EU help. European public has become convinced that 
technical solutions are best sought at with EU 
assistance, but not social welfare policies (i. e., 
health & education policies) 
(d) Civil Society "Common European Social Space" 
1989 Social Charter 
1992 TEU, Agreement on Social Policy 
public (European) consensus, knowledge, and 
awareness about the'social' is weak 
(e) Security and Obstacles in creating a Coininon Foreign and 
Defence Security Policy, especially since geopolitics 
results in different concerns among EU members. 
There remains the question of the role of other 
organisations: NATO, WEU (Western European 
Union 
Table 2.3 Dimensions of the Legitimacy Froblem Applied to the 
European Union 
2.3.1 Democracy 
The lack of democratic procedures in policy decision-making and policy 
iniplementation at the EU level has been the topic of much recent discussion, 
particularly in the post-Maastricht era and following the June 1994 Euro-elections 
which elected 567 members to a new European Parliament, and in January 1995 a 
new President of the Commission was appointed and indeed a new European 
Commission expanded from seventeen to twenty Commissioners. The catch all 
phrase 'democratic deficit' has been used to refer to the gap which has developed as 
more competencies are transferred from the national level to the EU level but 
without the accompanying degree of democratic accountability which could 
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effectively legitimise this transference of power. As was argued in Chapter One. the 
lack of satisfaction felt among citizens of the EU as to whether democracy in their 
own countries was operating as they desired is demonstrable by looking at 
EUROBAROMETER surveys. Negative feelings can be observed towards the 
operation of the EU as well, albeit in a different way, since people hold different 
expectations of their national government than they do of the EU. and EU processcs 
and undertakings remain quite remote for most citizens. 
However, the concern at the foreground of discussion is that "... the European Union 
is failing to win support from its citizens for measures carried out in their name and, 
ostensibly, for their benefit., '63 This hits at the heart of the problem which lends 
itself directly to the question of political legitimacy. The EU, in terms of how 
decisions are taken, cannot be said to be functionally operating along democratic 
lines (see Diagram 2.1: Political Aspects of EU Legitimacy). Although it is 
impossible to comprehensibly explain the inadequacies of the EU as regards its 
internal operation in this study, some remarks will be made to demonstrate where the 
main organs of the EU (European Parliament, Commission, Council of Ministers, 
and European Court of Justice [ECJ]) either enhance or debilitate legitimacy. 
Chapter Three of this study will explore specific EU policy areas in order to explain 
how decisions are taken and how this relates to the EU's problem of legitimacy. 
Here a look at the institutions of the EU and their formal operations will enlighten a 
discussion of the practical duties of EU organs. 
63Financial Times, editorial, 20 September 1994. 
EU PARLIAMENT 
Functionally powerless, but directly 
politically accountable to EU citizens 
EU COMMSSION 
Functionally powerful, but not 
directly accountable to EU 
citizens 
" cooperative relationship between these two bodies; mutually legitimating 
" both supranational institutions, as both are representing 'Europe' 
" both are possessing exiguous degrees of political legitimacy 
I COUNCIL OF MINISTERS EUROPEAN COURT OF 
JUSTICE 
9 these are the two most powerful organs of the EU, albeit in different ways 
Councils of Ministers: the most intergovernmental of EU organs, yet that 
one which will ultimately decide the degree of EU supranationalism 
ECJ: legitimacy rests on its legal status; that organ which most openly 
challenges national authority while providing for the foundations of EU 
legitimacy 
Diagram 2.1 Political Aspects of EU Legitimacy 
The most obvious starting point for a discussion of the organs of the EU and the role 
they play vis4-vis the legitimacy question is the European Parliament (EP), which 
most recently has attempted to use its newly acquired powers to exert more pressure 
within the EU decision-making process so as to voice its opinions effectively (as 
well as supposedly close the 'democratic deficit'). 64 This organ of the EU, however, 
despite its post-TEU consultative and co-operative powers, primarily remains an 
advisory organ only. 65 What must be kept in mind is that the EP is not a proper 
legislature (as compared with a parliament on a national level, for instance) since it 
does not have any formal mechanisms -- or channels -- for initiating legislation. 
64AImost all literature which refers to or analyses the 'democratic deficit' within the EU suggests 
that the EP will need to acquire more powers if there is any hope of this gap receding. See, David 
Martin's, "European Union and the Democratic Deficit, " (UK: John Weatley Centre, "Occasional 
Paper") 1991; Shirley Williams, "Sovereignty and Accountability in the European Community, " In 
The New European Community, Robert 0. Keohane and Stanley Hoffman, eds., (Boulder Colorado: 
Westview Press) 1981; Martin Holland, European Community Integration, (London: Pinter Press) 
1993; and David Coombes, "Problems of Governance in the Union, " In Maastricht and Beyond, 
Andrew Duff, ed., et. al. (London: Routledge) 1994. 
65But they have tested out their newly acquired powers as was indicated in the narrowly 
confirmed affirmative vote in the 1994 election of the president of the Commission -- Jacques Santer 
-- 260 to 238 with 23 abstentions. Lionel Barber, "Santer wins grudging vote 
from Euro-MPs, " 
Financial Times, Friday, 22 July 1994. 
Tle EP's interrogation of new Commissioners in January 1995 reveals as well that MEPs are set 
on using their influence to the maximum. 
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Two of the EP's most formidable powers are in fact financial: its ability to change 
and/or influence the budget which is submitted by the Council and the Commission; 
and its ability to reject the budget in total. 66 But the EP has no power whatsoever in 
overseeing any of the other organs of the EU (i. e. the Council of Nfinisters or the 
Commission) and thus there can not be said to be any checks and balances formula 
at work. 67 Having stated that, however, it seems somewhat ironic to mention that 
the EP is the only organ which has direct accountability to the citizens of the Union 
(since 1979 its members have been directly voted in). The other organs of the EU do 
not have (and have never had) any independent political legitimacy nor 
accountability in any directly 'democratic' sense. 68 Thus "the ultimate locus of 
political authority and the source of democratic legitimacy [in the EU] remain 
obscure. ', 69 
Clearly, however, of all the relationships among the organs of the EU that can be 
examined, there is much more of a cooperative relationship between the EP and the 
Commission70 since both can be described as supranational institutions and both 
perceive the Council of Ministers as their natural rival, since the Council is seen as 
the most intergovernmental institution within the EU and that one which wields the 
most powers of decision-making. The EP and the Commission also find themselves 
rubbing shoulders more often, as Commissioners are often represented in EP 
committees, answer questions in Parliament, and they present their annual 
programme to the Parliament for debate. The relationship between the EP and the 
Commission is definitely more one of cooperation, and since the signing of the TEU, 
there has been more synchronisation and consultation between these two bodies. 
Moving on to the Commission, what stands out about this organ vis-a-vis its 
relationship to the question of legitimacy is that its members are selected by national 
66Martin Holland, op. cit., p. 100. 
67Kevin Featherstone claims, for instance, that the EP should be given such powers as that of 
electing the Commission, or electing the Commission from its own personnel, and having the ability 
to dismiss individual Commissioners. See, Kevin Featherstone's "Jean Monnet and the 'Democratic 
Deficit' in the European Union, " Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol. 32, No. 2, June 1994, p. 
166. 
68See, Helen Wallace's "European Governance in Turbulent Times, " In Economic and Political 
Integration in Europe, Simon Bulmer and Andrew Scott, eds., (Oxford: Blackwell Pubs. ) 1994; and 
Juliet Lodge's, The European Community and the Challenge of the Future, (London: Pinter 
Publishers) 1993, esp. ch. 12, for more comprehensive discussions of these issues. 
69juliet Lodge, op. cit., p. xxiv. 
70AIthough some are of the opinion that a cooperative relationship can be forged between 
national deputies and MEPs by setting up a committee in each member state that would deal with 
Community issues and affairs. See Shirley Williams, "Sovereignty and Accountability in the 
European Community, " op. cit. 
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political leaders, and citizens have no say whatsoever as to who is appointed (the EP 
can only dismiss the Commission as a body). Therefore, the composition of this 
organ is not scrutinised by the public, as is the case with its president, who is decided 
upon in a vote in the Council of Ministers. The fact that its members are non-elected, 
and the reality that this organ wields a substantial amount of supranational power, 
are two clear examples of where the legitimacy gap can be found. The Commission 
plays both an administrative and executive role, especially since the SEA which 
amended Article 145 of the EEC Treaty and "confer[s] on the Commission, in the 
acts which the Council adopts, powers for the implementation of the rules which the 
Council lays down. "71 Having the ability to participate directly in policy-making 
and policy decisions within the EU has meant that the Commission remains one of 
the most powerful organs of the Union. Acting as the guardian of the treaties, the 
Commission also has acquired a kind of bogey-man character, since it has the power 
to report to the Court of Justice any infringements of the treaties made by member 
national governments. 72 Clearly the Commission was perceived by the founders of 
the Community as that institution that would lay the cornerstone for the development 
of a federal union. Needless to say, that idea has not materialised, but the 
Commission continues to play a very significant role in EU decision-making as more 
national competencies are being removed from national governments and are falling 
partially into the lap of the Commission as they are becoming competencies held 
jointly with the EU. During the 1996 Intergovernmental Conference to determine 
the future fate of the institutions of the EU, both the EP and the Commission will be 
two of the most debated organs as they are presently possessing exiguous degrees of 
political legitimacy. 
The other two main organs of the EU -- the Council of Ministers and the Court of 
Justice, hold unique positions within the EU, both having attained pre-eminent 
positions of power in very different ways. The Council holds two contradictory roles 
of being the most intergovernmental institution within the EU on the one hand (its 
members are to speak on behalf of individual member states), and on the other hand 
possesses the ultimate power to propel further integration and decide upon the extent 
of EU supranationalism. As is the case with the Commission, the Council has both 
an executive and legislative function within the EU, but unmistakingly has the upper 
hand as the locus of decision-making power. The Council, whose members are 
71Single European Act, Article 10, Treaties Establishing the European Communities, 
(Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities) 1987, p. 542. 
72Greece quite frequently finds itself with a case pending in the European Court of Justice and 
holds the ignominious distinction of having been the first EU member state to be taken to the ECJ in 
the post-Maastricht era while holding the Council Presidency. 
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made up of national leaders, has legitimacy in so far as these national officials have 
been voted into power by their citizens and are perceived to be representing their 
nation's interests within the EU. But Council discussions (described by many as 
wheeling and dealing) are cloaked in secrecy and lack both openness and 
transparency, as will be discussed in Chapter Three. Likewise observers of the 
Council point out that there seems nothing very democratic about the national veto 
which still remains a prerogative of Council members, and which caused a stir when 
John Major vetoed Mr. Dehaene as a possible replacement for Jacques Delor as 
Commissioner president at the Corfu Conference in June 1994. This method of 
choosing a Commissioner president (a position which has become one of the most 
powerful in Europe) behind closed doors created a great deal of publicity as well as 
animosity, especially among MEPs who have come to realise that they effectively 
wield no power to influence the Commission make-up nor can MEPs be said to 
represent in any substantial way the 372 million citizens of the Union. 
The European Court of Justice, on the other hand, is an organ whose legitimacy rests 
on its legal status and its authority to decide on rulings and uphold Community law. 
National courts must conform to Community law, thus Community law takes 
preference over all forms of national legislation. These features of the ECJ more 
than any other challenge the authority and sovereignty of the nation-state, while at 
the same time provide the foundation for EU political (or what Weiler terms Yormal') 
legitimacy. 73 
The ECJ over the years has continued to provide cohesion and an element of 
supranationalism which is often overlooked by those observing the institutions of the 
EU. It has developed into a powerful organ and a decisive actor within the 
Community integrative process, and its decisions concerning a wide range of issues 
-- from human rights to fishing rights -- have left a permanent mark on the 
integrative process and the federalist nature of the EU. 
A brief discussion of the main institutions of the EU highlight some of the areas 
where the political legitimacy gap is lurking within the internal operations of the 
Union. A more comprehensive picture of legitimacy, however, can perhaps be 
arrived at by considering other devices which have been utilised to redress this 
73See also the empirical study done by Gregory A. Caldeira and James L. Gibson, "The 
Legitimacy of the Court of Justice in the European Union: Models of Institutional Report, " American 
Political Science Review, Vol. 89, No. 2, June 1995, pp. 356-376. These two authors explore the 
question of political legitimacy of the European Court of Justice by using a survey compiled in 
September 1992 that attempts to detect various attitudes and awareness of and support for the ECJ. 
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legitimacy gap. One of the forums for citizen input at a Community level, for 
instance, has taken the form of a European lobbying arena. Since the signing of the 
SEA in 1986, more organisations and interests (such as environmental groups, and 
financial and business associations) have sought after particular EU Commissioners 
in an attempt to influence specific policy outcomes in their respective areas of 
interest. However, many lobbyists go to Brussels without an adequate understanding 
as to how decision-making takes place within the EU, and are therefore not very 
successful. What this amounts to is that there is a very large 'information deficit' 
which needs to be addressed with the same urgency as that of confronting the lack of 
democratic procedures. Too few citizens are knowledgeable about how the EU 
operates and the means by which they can influence the policy-making process at the 
EU level. 
The principle of subsidiarity has also been employed as a way to create a sense of 
legitimacy for the EU in the post-TEU era while at the same time striving to 
diminish the 'democratic deficit' by bringing the decision-making process closer to 
citizens. Although there are varying interpretations as to what subsidiarity means in 
practice, the way by which it is incorporated into the TEU is as a principle whereby 
"decisions are taken as closely as possible to the citizens. "74 However, elsewhere 
within the TEU, subsidiarity is portrayed as a device for setting limits on 
Community competencies. 75 It is argued, therefore, that subsidiarity is presented 
within the TEU as both a substantive principle and as a procedural criterion. 76 The 
varying interpretations of what subsidiarity means in practice, therefore, has 
weakened its sense of legitimacy since few can agree on exactly what it means and 
how to implement it. Fundamentally, however, subsidiarity at the nation-state level 
necessitates a devolution of the decision-making process from the central 
administration to lower echelons of government. This presupposes that there are the 
basic structures in place for such a displacement of power. As will be shown with 
the example of Greece, which is indicative of a centralised state with a weak civil 
society, there are very few levels of government below that of the central 
government, and it has been only since the local elections held in the autumn of 1994 
that Greeks have had the opportunity to vote into office prefecture councillors. 
74Treaty on European Union, Title I, Article A "Common Provisions. " 
751bid, Title II, Article 3b. 
76See, Andrew Scott, et al. "Subsidiarity: A 'Europe of the Regions' v. the British Constitution? " 
Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol. 32, No. 1, March 1994, pp. 47-61, for a comprehensive 
discussion concerning this issue. 
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As concerns the principle of subsidiarity. then, where there is a higher degree of a 
devolution of power to lower levels of government, particularly on a regional level, 
as is the case in Germany for example, then one can speculate that the idea of 
subsidiarity can function more efficiently in bringing decision-making closer to the 
citizens. It is quite clear, however, that central governments fear losing power and 
often create formidable obstacles so as to hinder this devolution of power (i. e., as 
was the case in the UK during the Thatcher years). Reserved optimism can perhaps 
be expressed for member states such as Greece in utilising such a principle, since 
there exists no precedent of decentralisation which effectively gives independent 
powers of decision-making to local authorities, and other intermediary pressure 
groups and associations which are independent of any of the major political parties 
still remain in their infancy. 
Another structure which has been created in the post-TEU era to alleviate the 
remoteness of the EU is the 'Committee of the Regions. '77 This Committee was 
created to allow the various regions within the EU member states to express their 
opinions to the Council and the Commission concerning projects to be implemented 
in their localities. The hope is that this will facilitate better communication between 
the particular regions which have been targeted for EU Structural Funds and the 
Commission, while at the same time bringing the EU 'closer to home. ' However, the 
Committee was established and given 'advisory status' only, which amounts to very 
little functional power to considerably affect EU policy decisions taken for their 
benefit, supposedly. Therefore, neither subsidiarity nor the 'Committee of the 
Regions' have been able to close up the EU 'democratic deficit' as was intended by 
the framers of the TEU. 
Democracy can thus be cited as a constituent element in a contemporary discussion 
of legitimacy. It is a leading force in establishing the determinants of legitimacy, 
both on a national level and in the EU. It is quite possible, as some have remarked, 
that the more profound reality which needs to be confronted as we enter the twenty- 
first century is that the 'democratic deficit' found within the EU is simply a reflection 
of the failure of twentieth century democratic nation-states to establish what David 
Coombes has expressed as 'good govemment. ' He writes: 
In practice, not all, or even any, member states of the European 
Community may be considered capable in their present form of 
attaining the standards of good government implied hy classical 
constitutionalism. This could be one explanation for their failure to 
77Treaty on European Union, Title II, Article 198. 
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apply those standards also on a European scale. In other words, the 
failure of European federalism as a contemporary project may be 
more closely associated than is normally imagined with a C) 
corresponding failure of the national state in its modem form. 78 
Others promoting the idea of a federal union have claimed that only a European 
Union constitution, laying down formal principles, can solve the 'democratic 
deficiency' problem that the EU is currently facing. Some have e\-cn proposed a 
'democratic baptism, ' calling for a kind of constitutional convention as a ineans of 
adopting a European Union constitution which could arouse the necessary degree of 
popular support and participation which would be needed for such an endeavol-. 79 
In any case the 'democratic deficit' has now been recognised as an important concern 
which the EU can no longer ignore nor simply partially address. Action Is 
immediately needed to combat what is being exposed as a major weakness of the 
Union which intimately affects its degree of perceived legitimacy. 
2.3.2 The Economic Environment 
More than any other area of coordinated policy within the Union, the economic 
sphere has been perceived as that area which can facilitate the integrative process 
and create the necessary impetus to drive Europe forward. With the signing of the 
Single European Act (SEA) in 1986 and its implementation on July 1,1987, Europe 
moved determinedly towards the 1992 initiative which was thought to functionally 
achieve at last a single internal market for the free movement of goods, persons, 
services and capital throughout member states. Needless to say, strides toward 
economic integration were taken previous to the SEA, back in the late 1970's with 
the EMS (European Monetary System) and the inception of the ECU (European 
Currency Unit). But it was not before the signing of the SEA that these forerunners 
of economic integration would be given due attention. The culmination of these 
endeavors was the signing of the Treaty on European Union in Maastricht on 7 
February, 1992 which established the EMU (European Monetary Union) and set the 
date for the final entry into the EMU as I January 1999, or as soon as 1997 (if a 
majority of member states are able to fulfill the necessary economic conditions 
required). 80 The TEU likewise established a series of other measures to be adopted 
78David Coombes, "Problems of Governance in the Union, " In Maastricht and Beyond, Andrew 
Duff ed. et al. (London: Routledge) 1994, p. 177. 
79S4, c Albert Weale, "Democratic Legitimacy and the Constitution of Europe, " In Democrac , I, 
and Constitutional Culture in the Union of Europe, Richard Bellamy, et al. ed. (London: Lothian 
Foundation Press) 1995, pp. 81-94. 
80TrearY on European Union, Titic II, Article 109j. 
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in the final stage of economic and monetary union, including a European System of 
Central Banks (ESCB), and at the core the ECB (European Central Bank)-81 a 
European Investment Bank; 82 and most contentious, a single currency, with fixed 
exchange rates. Along with these provisions is theCommon Commercial pollc\.,, 83 
which "... shall be based on uniform principles, particularly in regard to chanL-e,, in 
tariff rates, the conclusion of tariff and trade agreements, the achievement of 
uniformity in measures of liberalization, export policy and measures to protect trade 
... -84 The TEU's most 
inspiring feat, however, was perceived to be the creation of a 
Union, with the three European Communities acting as the main pillar, the CFSP as 
the second pillar, while the third being 'provisions on cooperation in the fields of 
justice and home affairs. '85 Clearly, however, economic and monetary union has 
become the outstanding characteristic which will perhaps inevitably be that which 
makes or breaks the Union. Whether the EU member states are able to achieve 
economic and monetary union, nonetheless, will be partially determined by forces 
outside the EU -- global economic conditions -- which are much more difficult to 
predict. 
Having established that examining the EMU is like trying to hit a moving target, 
some implications of EMU as they relate to legitimacy will be attempted here. 86 
The EMU will as well be brought up in Chapter Three when examining the policy- 
process in the EU. First, the most obvious implication of the EMU and its final 
completion is that member states will lose their autonomy in these areas, i. e., in 
making monetary and macroeconomic decisions. 87 Those promoting economic 
integration, however, note that what will be gained is much more important for 
European economies, namely, the ability to create common macroeconomic policy 
which will have such favourable effects as creating a single currency which 
substitutes the discipline of the foreign exchange market with the discipline of the 
bond market. ', 88 The question of whether these economic policies can be 
legitimised to the citizens of the Union, however, most likely depends upon whether 
81 Ibid, Title 11, Article 4a. 
821bid, Title 11, Article 4b. 
831bid., Title VIL 
841bid, Title 11, Article 113, p. 44. 
851bid, Title VI. 
86See Thierry Naudin's "The Feel-Good Factor That EMU Ignores at Its Peril, " European, 9-15 
November 1995, for a discussion of the public's view of EMU and ýý hat this means for EU economic 
integration and the completion of a single currency. 
87There is of course the question of whether or not member states presently control their 
economies, or whether global forces long ago took over the role of deciding macroeconomic policy. 
88"Unity By Market Force, " Wall Street Journal, Oct. 14,1994. 
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they are successful or not. Currently, of the full members of the EU. only 
Luxembourg meets the necessary criteria as outlined in the TEU for economic 
convergence. 89 Whether the other member states will be able to meet these 
requirements remains to be seen (Greece, for example, is far behind even according 
to optimistic forecasts). 
Second, the ESCB will bring with it a degree of monetary federalism %%, hich is 
unprecedented in the history of European integration. The question again arises as to 
how to converge such diverse economies found at various levels of development and 
growth. True, the transition period incorporated within the TEU was purposefully 
placed to smooth over economic differences and allow for the less developed 
economies to catch up with the more advanced. But this does not appear to be 
sufficient to close up the huge gap between the developed north and the less 
developed south. It seems unfeasible as well to believe that you can have a federal- 
type monetary and economic policy while simultaneously having intergovernmental- 
type decision-making for political and social policies: that is like having an animal 
with one type of paw in the front, and another type in the back -- it will not stand for 
long. As Loukas Tsoukalis has pointed out: 
... the new treaty [TEU] has left several important questions 
unanswered; or at least, the answers provided are not entirely 
convincing. They refer to the costs and benefits of EMU in a 
Community which is still characterized by a high degree of economic 
diversity and relatively limited political cohesion; and also in a 
Communit where political institutions fall far short of economic 
ambitionsA 
Lastly, returning back to the issue of a single currency and the question of 
legitimacy, one can observe a very significant reality which could materialise out of 
the development of a single currency: namely, that national leaders will find 
themselves much more accountable for their national deficits, and thus how they 
spend taxpayers' money. Under a single currency and fixed exchange rates, there 
will no longer be pressure coming from foreign exchange markets to impinge upon 
national politicians. This means that national politicians will be solely responsible -- 
and accountable -- to their citizens for national spending and the matter of the 
89The four main criteria are: (1) government debt not exceeding 60% of GDP; (2) government 
deficit not exceeding 31T of GDP. (3) inflation rate not more than 1.5% above the average ()I I the 
three members with the lowest rates; and (4) exchange rate stability based upon the performance of 
the member state currency over a period of two years prior to the final assessment. See Protocol oil 
the Evcessive Deficit Procedure, Article 1, and Protocol On the Convergence Criteria Referred to in 
Article 109j of the Treaty Establishing the European Coniniunlo-, Article I and Article 3, annexed to 
the TEU, op. cit. 
901-oukas Tsoukalis, The. %'cýi' European Econorn. y, (NY: Oxford University Prevs) 1993, p. 227. 
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national deficit. 91 Ultimately, this could affect a particular administration's 
legitimacy to a great extent, and certainly tighten the slack between the governors 
and the governed. 
Finally, more generally, whether the EU is perceived of as legitimate in terms of 
economic performance will greatly depend upon whether it can propitiously confront 
Europe's unemployment woes while at the same time aggressively compete in a 
global market arena. The EU Commission's "White Paper" on Growth, 
Competitiveness, Employment was written for the purpose of doing just that: "to 
assist decision-making -- at a decentralized, national or Community level -- so as to 
lay the foundations for sustainable development of the European economies, thereby 
enabling them to withstand international competition while creating the millions of 
jobs that are needed. ', 92 If these economic goals can be achieved, then certainly the 
EU's legitimacy, as concerns its management of economics, could substantially be 
strengthened. If global economic pressures continue to plague European economies 
as they have during this last decade of the 20th century, then one can suppose that 
the question of legitimacy will be at the forefront in any further understanding of the 
EU integrative process and of member nation-states. 
The economic life of a nation-state has continued to be a particularly pressing 
concern for both politicians and citizens. Economics is something which affects 
citizens intimately and one which tends to motivate citizens to act. It remains to be 
seen if the EU and those promoting economic and monetary union can realise their 
goals through the EMU as outlined in the Treaty on European Union. What will 
likewise be soon evident is whether the EU's goals are in synchrony with a changing 
global economic environment which continues to expand as new economic actors 
are entering from the East and abroad. The EU's enlargement to fifteen members 
also poses particular economic challenges in coordination and synchronisation. 
Economic and monetary integration, therefore, appears closely tied to understanding 
the future direction of the EU as well as its sense of legitimacy. 
Reports in the media during the first four months of 199693 began to indicate that 
member citizens of the Union were becoming weary of the possible fall-out from a 
91 "Politicians will have to bear the pain of increased deficits themselves, not spread then like a 
bad cold to the nation's corporations. " "Unity By Market, " op. cit. 
92COmmission of the European Communities, Growth, Competitiveness, Employment: The 
challenges and waysjorward into the 21st century, White Paper, (Luxembourg: Office for Official 
Publications of the European Communities) 1993, Preamble. 
93See particularly the printed press from 22 January to 30 January 1996 which almost daily 
carried reports on the prospects of developing a viable EMU. 
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single European currency. German citizens in particUlar94 have expressed their 
doubts about the EMU (as have some senior German politicians95) as hIgh 
unemployment rates in that country have created worries among citizens as to 
whether or not unemployment will further increase as a result of the fall-out affects 
of the EMU. Therefore social misgivings are beginning to surface among the 
citizens of the Union and a public realisation is setting in that some people have 
much to gain from a single currency and some may have much to lose. 
2.3.3 Welfare State 
The question of the rise of the welfare state and its connection with legitimacy has 
stiffed lively debates most recently within academia as well as within European 
political circles. As has been discussed, there are those who have focused on the 
modern capitalist state and its internal legitimacy dilemmas, others who have 
associated the issues of welfare with the discussion of the private versus the public 
debate, and still others who emphasise the importance of social citizenship and the 
welfare state. However, analyses of the welfare state and how its future will be 
affected by an evolving political order such as that of the EU are far and few 
between and indeed seem worthy of exploration. 
Esping-Andersen's three regime-type clusters (liberal, corporatist-statist, and social 
democratic) have been used by those attempting to discuss the various types of 
welfare states found among EU member states. 96 Stephan Leibfried has expanded 
Esping-Andersen's Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism and added a fourth --'Latin 
rim' countries -- which include Spain, Portugal, Greece, southern Italy, and some 
parts of France. 97 Leibfried examines the obstacles associated with an attempt to 
forge a 'European welfare state' by concentrating on European poverty and the 
various ways in which EU member states have dealt with this issue. His analysis 
clearly points to the many difficulties which must be confronted if any type of 
meaningful coordination is to occur in the field of social policy. At present there is 
no such thing as an EU welfare state, and the vast differences found among the 
characteristics of EU member states will most likely prohibit the formation of a 
94See EUROBAROMETER surveys, nos. 41-43 which reveal that more than fifty per cent of 
Germans polled are 'against' the proposal for a single currency. See also The European, 2-8 May 
1996 for results of a recent poll which confirms that a majority of German's polled are against a single 
European currency. 
95See Financial Times, 16 January 1996. 
96GOsta Esping-Andersen, The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press) 1990. 
97See, Stephan Leibfried's, "Towards a European Welfare State? " in New Perspectives on the 
Welfare State in Europe, Catherine Jones, ed., (London: Routledge) 1993. p. 133-156. 
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harmonised and universally acceptable social policy which is a nece""ary 
prerequisite for a common European welfare state formation. As Lejbfrjed states. 
Modern, institutional, residual and rudimentary welfare states start 
from rather different, in some cases contradictory, goals and are built 
on quite disparate intervention structures, and they do not share a 
common policy (and politics) tradition that could serý, e as a centripetal 
force. In any case, this divergence of regimes does not lend support to 
the notion that a European welfare state might grow ,,, ia automatic harmonization, building from the national towards the EC le,. -el. A 
'bottom up' strategy for EC 'social integration' policY seems 
stillborn. 98 
What is evident, then, in terms of an analysis of the welfare state and the EU is that 
there are formidable difficulties in attempting to catapult a coinnion social policV 
among EU member states (as three new members joined the EU in 1995 and as 
others are applying for membership) which have such diverse historical and 
structural traditions. Yet at the same time, the welfare state, formed and 
particularised throughout this century, has become debilitated as economic 
competencies once held by member nation-states move on to the EU level. 99 Thus 
there appear to be two occurrences running in parallel: on the one hand we see the 
EU member state unable to sustain the degree and extent of wcIfare benefits once 
promised to their citizens which laid the basis for social citizenship on a national 
level, and on the other hand we witness the EU (and those promoting further 
integration) holding high hopes of creating a social Europe but without the 
functional degree of legitimacy (or money) required to forge such an ambitious 
project. The nation-state, perceived to be the legitimate repository for welfare 
concerns, can no longer dispense them as demanded by their citizens. Alternatively, 
the EU is unable to mold together a framework for a common welfare policy which 
would be acceptable to all member states. This dilemma of the welfare state brings 
into focus an immense conundrum for EU policy-makers, articulated by Richard 
Rose who notes that: 
[t]he European Community can inake respect for priceless civil and 
political rights a condition for membership, but it cannot confer upon 
its 320 million citizens a right to equal benefits in education, health 
care and social security, for there is no political consensus for the 
massive redistribution of income that this would require between 
Northern and Southern Europe, and in future between Western and 
981bid., p. 143. 
99"Without an EC welfare state, in the long run, regional. national 'ýelfare regimes will be in 
atrophy: their economic legitirnatory bases would siowly erode Nvith the completion and further 
development of the Common Market -- ... " Stephan Leibfried, op. cit., p. 
139. 
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Eastern Europe. There is not even a consensus about what the 
appropriate standard of social welfare ought to be. 100 
A look at EUROBAROMETER surveys from 1992 and on (post-TEU era) reveals some 
noteworthy trends exhibiting European opinions as to which areas of competence 
they consider to be appropriate for the EU and which they do not. Consistently these 
surveys reveal that a vast majority of those asked believe that scientific and 
development policies -- environmental policies, scientific and technical research, and 
the fight against drugs -- can be best handled in a joint EU decision-making 
arrangement. 10 1 In other words, there appears to be a general agreement held 
among European publics that technical solutions are more efficiently and effectively 
undertaken with EU assistance. Yet when one examines such policy areas as 
workers' safety, cultural policy, worker participation, health and social welfare and 
education, what emerges is that these areas are overwhelmingly perceived to be 
national competencies (more than half the population citing them as areas where 
joint decision-making with the EU is inappropriate). 
But perhaps we walk down the wrong path in trying to decipher what policies should 
remain on the national agenda, and which are those that can be conceded to the EU. 
Perhaps, as Albert Weale aptly has put it: "... the issue is not what sort of welfare 
policies will the EU develop, but whether the EU can develop particular sorts of 
policies that have hitherto been characteristic of the nation state. " 102 Presently, if 
the EU is to attempt to develop social policies that go beyond the technical or 
scientific, then the European public will have to be convinced that they can be best 
dealt with at that level. There currently, however, does not appear to be popular 
legitimacy for such a manoeuvre -- neither on the part of national leadership, nor 
with the general public. However, there is a general recognition on the part of 
Europeans that concerns such as environmental pollution can be competently dealt 
with in cooperation with the EU, and in fact perhaps on a multi-tier level of 
governance and decision-making (stretching from local to global). Therefore, there is 
10ORichard Rose, "Bringing Freedom Back In, " in New Perspectives on the Welfare State, 
Catherine Jones, ed., op. cit., p. 226. 
101 Conipare, EUROBAROMETER Nos. 38-43. The actual question is worded as follows: "Some 
people believe that certain areas of policy should be decided by the (NATIONAL) government, while 
other areas of policy should be decided jointly with the European Comm un ity/Eu ropean Union. 
Which of the following areas of policy do you think should be decided by the (NATIONAL) 
government, and which should be decided jointly with the European Community/European Union? " 
EUROBAROMETER # 41, A34. 
102Albert Weale, "Social Policy and European Union, " Social Policy and Adniinistration, Vol, 
28, No. 1, March 1994, p. 6. 
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a precedent for EU social regulations but not for a comprehensive EU social 
policy. 103 
The transmutations occurring within the welfare state are indeed numerous and 
significant, both for the future form the welfare state will take as well as for how this 
will influence the question of legitimacy and the EU. What contribution the EU will 
make to this debate depends largely upon the importance it is given within the 
confines of the EU and how it is seen to affect the policy-making process. A few 
hints as to where some of the problems lay have been mentioned here, although a 
much more comprehensive investigation of the welfare state and the EU would be 
needed to reveal the challenges facing both ahead. 
2.3.4 Civil Society 
The particular concept of civil society is one which perhaps best reveals the 
inadequacy of simply applying national characteristics to a political form that is 
beyond (developing both above and below) that of the nation-state. Yet at the same 
time, analyses concerning the EU as they refer to legitimacy often bring up the very 
point that what is most lacking of the EU is popular acceptance, i. e., some kind of 
social element which could 'personalise integration' for the citizens of EU member 
states. 104 
A discussion of the social aspects of the EU seems warranted, then, if for no other 
reason than that is what the EU appears to be most bereft of, thus making it an issue 
innately related to the question of legitimacy. 
For those trying to promote further social EU integration, steps were taken in the late 
1980's to attempt to propel some sort of 'common European social space, ' which was 
given a concrete form in the creation of a 'common citizenship' found within the 
TEU. 105 This common citizenship has come to mean that all citizens of EU 
member states share some basic rights and freedoms. In more functional terms, EU 
citizenship has effectively been ascribed to electoral issues, which, for the first time 
103For a discussion of the differences between EU social policy and social regulation, See 
Giandomenico Majone, "The European Community Between Social Policy and Social Regulation, " 
Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol. 3 1, No. 2, June 1993, pp. 153-170. 
104See, for example, Juliet Lodge, The EC and the Challenges of the Future, (London: Pinter 
Publishers) 1993; Mark Wise, et al. Single Europe to Social Europe, (UK: Longman Group Ltd. ) 
1993; Martin Slater, "Political Elites, Popular Indifference and Community Building, " In The 
European Community: Past Present and Future, Loukas Tsoukalis, ed. (UK: Basil Blackwell) 1983. 
105Treaty on European Union, Title 1, "Common Provisions, " and Title II, Part Two 
"Citizenship of the Union. " 
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in the June 1994 Euro-elections permitted residents living in a member state of 
which they were not nationals to vote and stand as a candidate In that member state 
(this applying to municipal elections as well). Other specifications pertaining to EU 
citizenship outlined in the TEU concern legal attributes such as protection by an), 
member states' consul or diplomatic mission in third countries where these are not 
found from one's own nation-state; the right to petition the EP; the right to apply for 
the office of Ombudsman, etc. 106 
These measures established within the TEU were specifically designed to act as a 
functional propeller forging a sense of European identity among citizens of the 
Union. The belief was that shared legal rights and obligations would assist in the 
creation of a'common' social space, which was seen by many, especially those with 
a federalist vision for the EU, as the first steps toward a supranational social 
environment. The neofunctionalist notion of spillover, in effect, was to become 
visible within the social environment, particularly following the establishment and 
implementation of the Single European Act (SEA) (which gave the Community 
added competencies in the area of social regulation) and the Single European Market 
(SEM) initiative. 
The reality in Europe, however, has not reflected these ambitious social designs. 
The idea that common citizenship, as defined in the TEU in limited legal terms, 
would produce the hoped for spirit of acquis communautaire has not materialised. 
Needless to say, an evaluation of whether EU citizenship can truly further social 
integration in Europe stretches back to debates about what citizenship is and whether 
it evolves over time or whether it is possible to create a sense of social identity by 
simply having citizens legally accrue civic and political rights. 107 There are those 
on one side of the debate who strongly believe that the provisions for EU citizenship 
set out in the TEU, although providing for a legal identification, will set the stage (in 
time) for further movements in this direction and in any case has set an important 
federal precedent. 108 Those on the other side of the fence hold more reserved 
judgments as to whether EU citizenship will promote the kind of social identification 
which is a prerequisite for further social cohesion and social policy- inaking. 109 
1061bid., Title II, Articles 8c-8e. 
107See, Elizabeth Meehan, Citizenship and the European CornmunitY. (London: Sage 
Publications) 1993, for a detailed discussion, especially ch. 1. 
108For example, Martin Holland's, European Coninuinity Integration, (London: Pinter Press) 
1993. 
109" 
... how are Nve to understand a coninuinitv which gathers under a principle of unity and 
common identity a number of individual and groups, which have already been defined and constituted 
according to territorial. ethnic, socioeconomic. cultural and other criteria of belonging, themselves 
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The split between these opinions, therefore, is over whether you can simply 
introduce legal measures to promote unity and standardisation and have this spill 
over into the social arena, or is it more appropriate to recognise that European 
societies are distinct and however much standardisation. and synchroni-s-ation occurs 
via legal means, citizenship and social identification have meanings which are 
socially contextualised. 110 
The TEU also pledged to uphold the principles laid out in the 1989 Social Charter in 
the "Protocol on Social Policy. " III The Social Charter covered such areas as child 
labour, maternity leave, equal pay for men and women, and health and safety in the 
workplace. The objectives set out in the Protocol, however, are very vague and do 
not add anything very new to the 1989 Social Charter or to the establishment of a 
common social space as will be revealed in Chapter Three which further explores the 
Agreement on Social Policy. But they were enough to steer the British conservative 
government of John Major to opt-out and even caused the Italian government under 
the premiership of Silvio Berlusconi in 1994 to re-evaluate Italy's participation in the 
Social Chapter. 112 There is much concern felt among national political leaders that 
common social provisions are economically unfeasible and will deter further 
Europe's competitiveness. Much convincing will need to occur to ensure national 
leadership that developing common social objectives is both wise and economically 
affordable. 
Although one might assume that the citizens of EU member states are much more 
enthusiastic about the social dimensions of EU integration than are their national 
leaders -- perceiving the EU as a social safety net and perhaps providing them with 
social provisions which would not otherwise be offered by their national 
governments -- opinion polls continue to reveal that there is a very low level of 
knowledge and awareness about EU integration, particularly about the 'social' 
aspects of integration. This provides for a key element in the legitimacy equation. 
How can the EU legitimately introduce a social dimension if EU citizens are not 
forged in the course of a common history? " Etienne Tassin, "Europe: A Political Community? " In 
Dimensions of Radical Democracy, Chantal Mouffe, ed., (London: Verso) 1992. 
1 1013y law in Greece, for example, shops are now open all day in Athens, from 9 am to 5 pm 
instead of closing at 2 pm for siesta and then reopening from 5-9 pm as is the case in Thessaioniki and 
most other cities and villages in Greece. But you will rarely -- if ever -- find a crowded store in the 
capital at 4 pm, and even tourists and visitors seem to adapt to the local custom of rest and relaxation 
in the afternoon to be followed by continental dinners at 10 pm. 
II ISee, "Protocol on Social Policy, " annexed to TEU and the discussion of the same in Chapter 
Three of this study. 
II 2Victor Smart, "Consternation as Italy Supports Bri tai n Over Soý: lal Chapter, " The European, 
29 July -4 August 1994. 
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aware of what this entails? Clearly a policy has to be visible for it to be perceived as 
legitimate. Moreover, the belief held by Euro-enthusiasts that the development of a 
common social space will facilitate a kind of legitimacy for other EU polic, ,- In the 
economic sphere also remains to be seen. It seems unwise to presuppose that social 
policies can be formulated on a common basis in the first place. as the case of the 
1992 TEU Social Policy debate revealed; never mind that this would create the basis 
for further EU legitimacy. Obviously the social dimension of EU integration is 
important insofar as how EU member citizens perceive themselves within the Union. 
but it has not become evident that this can alone establish a firm ground for EU 
legitimacy. 
Looking at the social dimensions of the EU discloses clues to explaining the idea of 
legitimacy and how this concept needs to be investigated as it applies to the EU. As 
it relates to the EU, there is a multiplicity of difficulties in establishing how a so- 
called common social space is to develop and whether this kvill have to evolve into 
some form of a common civil environment or whether this process can be 
accelerated by creating legal provisions to speed up the formation of some kind of 
social construction which could stretch beyond the nation-state. Both those 
promoting the idea that the social dimension will add the needed degree of 
legitimacy that is required to sustain the EU integrative momentum and those who 
are more uncertain as to how further social integration can add efficacy to the 
European project acknowledge that the social element is gaining in significance and 
is a variable which can swing the pendulum of public opinion. 
As the EU has expanded its membership to include nation-states to the north and 
perhaps next to Eastern and Central Europe, a discussion of the social dimension and 
the notion of civil society will continue at the forefront of debates (most likely into 
the next century). This concept thus presents itself as one which inevitably will 
remain contestable, as well as integral for an understanding of legitimacy. 
2.3.5 Security and Defence 
Security and defence concerns, the final dimension of the legitimacy question to be 
applied to the EU, have been debated in the post-Maastricht era in terms of Title V 
of the TEU which sets out the 'Provisions on a Common Foreign and Security 
Policy. ' Basically, the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) was interjected 
into the TEU to supply a symbolic movement of intent among the member states to 
coordinate more closely security and foreign policy concerns. The 
50 
intergovernmentalist character of Title V, however, is indisputable, since the CFSP 
escapes any jurisdiction from the European Court of Justice and clearly the Council 
is that institution which has actual decision-making abilities. The specifics 
concerning the objectives of the CFSP are also quite tepid, and include: 
" to safeguard the common values, fundamental interests and 
independence of the Union; 
" to strengthen the security of the Union and its Member States in all 
ways; 
" to preserve peace and strengthen international security, in 
accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter as 
well as the principles of the Helsinki Final Act and the objectiN, es 
of the Paris Charter; 
" to promote international cooperation; 
" to develop and consolidate democracy and the rule of law, and 
respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms. 113 
Although the CFSP was intended to be one of the pillars of the Union, functionally 
speaking, it does not provide for any real effective power to be taken in the narne of 
the Union. The EU Presidency is to represent the Union concerning matters that 
reside within the CFSP, and member states are to inform and consult witil each 
other on questions and problems which arise in matters of foreign policy and 
security, but "[t]he TEU does not prevent or significantly discourage unilateral 
action by member states. " 114 In fact, the wording concerning what the common 
foreign and security policy is to include and a time frame for it are equally as vague: 
11... all questions related to the security of the Union, including the eventual framing 
of a common defence policy, which might in time lead to a common defence. " 115 
The language of Title V seems to reveal the difficulties of articulating and putting 
into practice any kind of common plan as it relates to issues of foreign policy and 
security. These are areas which both national leaders and citizens perceive to be 
national competencies, and although there can be said to be a degree of consensus as 
to the need to cooperate with member states in a world reflecting changing and 
possibly explosive events, coordinating a common foreign and defence policy will 
indeed be a formidable task. These matters directly challenge the nation-state's 
sense of sovereignty, and any EU policy which would encroach upon a nation-state's 
ability to act unilaterally in its defence would certainly be denied. Even in matters of 
foreign policy, the various members of the EU have diverse opinions as to hov., to 
confront conflicts on continental Europe as was evidenced in the inability of the EU 
113 Treaty on European Union, Title 5, Article J. 1. 
II 4jullet Lodge, The European Community and the Challenge ol the Future, OP. cit., p. 247. 
II 5Trearv on European Union, Title V, Article J. 4. (l). 
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to help end the conflict which raged in the former Yugoslav Republics. The 
difficulties in coordinating an effective and united stance on the Bosnian conflict is 
the most recent and blatant example of the failure of the EU to take a decisiVe 
position on a foreign policy issue and act upon it. All member states agreed that the 
Bosnian question needed to be confronted, but there was no effective coordinated 
action on the part of the EU -- in the name of the EU -- to confront this conflict 
which exploded in the middle of the continent and which saw the USA -- as opposed 
to Europe -- taking more decisive steps in initiating and in maintaining what Ls- still 
considered a fragile peace. 
Along with the CFSP, security matters have also to be examined as they relate to the 
Western European Union (WEU) which has been targeted as the future defence arm 
of the EU. 116 Presently, ten EU member states are full members of the NVEU 
(Sweden, Finland and Austria are still officially neutral); Denmark and Ireland are 
observer members; and as of 10 May, 1994, nine new associate partners have been 
included in the WEU -- three Baltic states and six Eastern/Central European 
countries. There has also been close coordination and communication between the 
WEU and NATO, but the WEU has been perceived of as an added strength to 
NATO rather than an eventual possible replacement of it. Close communication and 
coordination occurred between NATO and the WEU during the 1990-1991 Gulf War 
Crisis, when " ... the WEU played a role 
in attempting to work out an agreed 
European response by providing an umbrella under which states could contribute 
and in coordinating the activities of NATO's European members. " 
117 The WEU 
during the Gulf War also played a role in the naval embargo, and more generally 
reignited an interest in the WEU and its possible (and future) role in international 
affairs and European defence. 
Nevertheless, functionally, both the CFSP and the WEU do not wield power to make 
critical decisions under the auspices of a common European initiative. Geopolitics, 
diverse histories and particular national interests and concerns stand between 
member states to the degree which prohibits any kind of common position to be cast 
and acted upon militarily, at least in the foreseeable future. By examining the degree 
of legitimacy which is required for a Common Foreign and Security policy to 
develop, one might be induced to ask whether or not there are the necessary 
I 16The fifty-year term of the WEU Treaty comes to an end Iin 1998. This effectively necessitate.,, 
a re-evaluation of its future role within Europe. 
I 17Trevor C. Salmon, "The Union, CSFP [sic] and the European Security Debate, " in The 
Eut-opean Community and the Challenge of the Future, op. cit., p. 259. 
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prerequisites in the first place for such an endeavor. As Trevor Salmon has 
appropriately stated: 
The real issue, perhaps, is not institutional -- whether we have a joint 
integrated commands or corps, the lead played by NATO, WEU and 
the EU -- but whether there is an emergent identification of common 
political and security interests that guarantees unity. Effective 
institutions, alliances and policies in the CFSP area require potent 
military capability, a working consensus on the conditions under 
which the capabilities should be used and a credible willingness to act z! )
when agreed conditions exist. Do these exist? 118 
The underlying complexities of developing a coherent and constructive foreign and 
security policy for EU member states will also soon become further compoLinded 
since three new members joined in 1995. The accession of these states pose furthei- 
challenges in synchronisation and coordination for the EU. When and if nation- 
states from Eastern and Central Europe come to officially join as full members, 
further complications will be added to the already long list of obstacles stifling the 
development of a fully comprehensive security and defence policy for the EU. And 
when and if such a policy is eventually procured, the question of legitimising it will 
be one of decisive significance in elucidating whether or not such a policy can 
successfully secure peace for Europe in the next century. 
2.3.6 The 1996 Intergovernmental Conference 
The issue of EU legitimacy today, in all its five dimensions, is emerging as a 
determining element in grasping the significance of the EU and possibly its future. 
In the wake of the 1996 Intergovernmental Conference (IGC), much debate has 
centred around the issue of EU legitimacy and how this will affect the ways in which 
the organs of the EU should be re-evaluated in the future. The 1996 IGC is now 
well underway and the main issues which have been discussed in committees 
previous to the opening of the Conference have determined already much of the 
content and organisation of the Conference. What remains to be seen is what will 
emerge from the Conference and what changes will be made to the TEU and how 
this will affect the EU's sense of legitimacy. Already discussions abound and 
diverse opinions are being expressed, ranging from those advocating a radical 
restructuring of EU organs and more synchronised integration leading to a federal 
type system, to those calling for a two-tier EU with a core set of EU member states 
leading integration to be followed by other members as they catch lip. There are 
likewise those who are more skeptical and who claim that intergoverrinientalkm 
11 Ibid., p. 268. 
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should (and ultimately will) be the guiding ideological force behind a larger EU. 
However, this IGC may last for as long as two years during which time %'ariou" 
events may occur which makes it impossible for any predictions to be ventured ýit 
this point. 
The EU as an evolving modern political, social and economic form rernains 
unprecedented, and as a harbinger in its field, acts as an engaging vehicle for 
observation and investigation. In studying the issue of legitimacy within an ELI 
member state, it is imperative to first explore the EU itself and elucidate the issues of 
legitimacy involved therein. This exercise can facilitate a keener understanding of 
legitimacy within member states and between the EU and a member state. 
2.4 Nation-State vs. Supranational Union 
One way to examine the national vs. the supranational debate that has begun to 
occupy social scientists is to focus on the struggle between national sovereignty on 
the one hand, and increasing areas of EU competence on the other. However, what 
must be kept in mind is that the European Parliament (EP) does not possess the 
powers of a national parliament (despite the increase in areas in which the EP can 
voice its opinion provided by the Treaty of European Union) and thus still remains to 
this day mostly an advisory organ. 
Despite, however, the limited functional powers of the EP, a glance at the legitimacy 
question currently reveals that indeed a new conflict can be observed which involves 
a tug of war, basically over the question of power and control between the EU 
institutions and those of nation-states. On a different level, it appears that a new set 
of relationships have evolved between national actors and supranational actors vying 
for political power and a chance to influence the policy-making/decision-making 
process. It does not appear to be a question, however, of who is losing sovereignty 
to whom (not a zero-sum relationship) but rather a reshuffling of the very rules 
themselves. For example, at times national leaders find themselves wearing two 
hats: a national and a 'European' and are asked to act in both capacities. Certainly 
the Council of Ministers and their close advisers have found themselves in this 
position. Various organised interest groups within EU member states as well may 
today lobby Brussels with as much determination as they do their own national 
parliaments if they believe that this will influence policy decisions. Where the seat 
of power and control lies seems to be shifting back and forth and at different levels 
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(from national to supranational and then back from supranational to regional) and at 
different times. 
An immense debate has thus been ignited as to whether the nation-state is being 
overtaken by the drive of supranationalism or whether it has maintained its steadfast 
position despite the pulls and pushes being felt from internal pressures as well as 
those emanating from the global environment. It is impossible to get into any detail 
about the particulars of this debate here, but this issue will be brought up again in 
Chapter Eight which will be concerned with the case of Greek national security and 
defence. 
The new competencies that the EU hopes to acquire by implementing TEU policy 
objectives obviously challenges the existing conception of national sovereignty as 
we have come to understand this idea in this century, but this debate has just begun, 
and it does not seem likely that any drastic or definitive measures will be taken by 
the EU in the immediate future. This sensitive area will require much more 
contemplation and negotiation before any real agreement can be reached among EU 
member states as to an effective Common Foreign and Security Policy, for example. 
2.5 The Greek State 
The last two sections of this introductory chapter will endeavor to provide a general 
introduction to the modern Greek State and some background concerning Greece and 
the EU as well. Part 11 of this study will be devoted to the case of Greece where 
these questions will be explored in detail. The point here is to introduce specific 
features of Greece and its relationship with the EU for readers unacquainted with the 
modern Greek state and with modern Greek history. 
An important date that is celebrated in Greece today as a national holiday is 25 
March 1821 which marks the beginning of Greece's successful struggle for 
independence from Ottoman rule. Greece is the only EU member today that has an 
historical origin and influence from an eastern empire which makes her markedly 
different in many ways from her EU partners. These and other idiosyncrasies will be 
elaborated on in the second part of this study. For now, let it suffice to introducc 
various themes which will be picked up later on. 
In 1828 the independent Greek state was officially declared. but at its inception the 
Greek state encompassed less than a third of the Greek population which wa,. -, 
scattered throughout the Balkan region (and still under Ottoman rule). Although 
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Greece adopted a mode of westem constitutionalism as its form of govemment, 
problems would appear at the start, as it became clear that it would be very difficult 
to graft on to a Greek traditional society modem (western) values. Greece had quite 
distinct experiences and values stemming from Ottoman rule which would be 
difficult to reconcile with western practices. In many cases in fact, practices of the 
past did not disappear but rather took on a modern disguise. The patron-client 
system which still persists in Greece today, for example, is one of the legacies from Zý 
Ottoman rule that Greece has inherited. As Richard Clogg has explained: 
Patronage had originally developed as a kind of defence mechanism 
against the harshness, and particularly the arbitrariness, of the 
Ottoman system of government. There was a need for patrons and 
protectors to mediate with the Ottoman authorities and to mitigate the 
capriciousness of the judicial system. Many Greeks regarded the 
impositions of the new state as scarcely less oppressive than those of 
the Ottomans and values and attitudes shaped under Ottoman rule 
persisted into the independence period. Patronage, indeed, proved 
wholly compatible with the formal institutions of parliamentary 
democracy. The local kommatarkhis or political boss simply took the 
role of the Ottoman aýa. Until modem times a parliamentary deputy 
has seen it not only as an obligation but as the indispensable 
precondition of political survival to secure favors for his voters. 119 
These aspects of the patron-client system, when seen in conjunction with the main 
characteristics of the Greek nation-state, provide some clues as to the distinctiveness 
of the Greek case and the question of legitimacy. One of the paradigms which has 
been used to explain the particularities of southern European states is that of 
patrimonial authority 120 which is based on the work of Max Weber and taken up by 
Richard Morse. Basically, the notion of patrimonialism is derived from one of 
Weber's ideal types of authority, namely, traditional authority. In his writings 
concerning the types of legitimate domination, Weber outlined several types of 
traditional authority, the three main ones being Gerontocracy, Patriarchalism and 
Patrimonialism. 121 As Weber wrote: 
Patrimonialism and, in the extreme case, sultanism tend to arise 
whenever traditional domination develops an administration and a 
military force which are purely personal instruments of the master. 
Only then are the group members treated as subjects. 122 
II 9Richard Clogg, A Concise Historý, of Greece, op. cit., p. 63. 
120S,, t, Jamcs Kurth, op. cit., pp. 54-60 for a detailed discussion of patrimonial authority. 
12 1 Max Weber, Economy and Society, Vol. I, Guenther Roth & Claus 'ýN'Ittich cds. (LA. 
California: University of Califor-nia Press) 1978, pp. 23 1 -24 1. 
1221bid., p. 231. 
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He goes on to define more specifically what he means by patrimonial authority a 
little later on in the passage: "Where domination is primarily traditional, eVen though 
it is exercised by virtue of the ruler's personal autonomy, it will be called patrimonial 
authority; ... - 
123 James Kurth argues that "[a] corollary of patrimonial authority is 
patron-client politics. A patrimonial state can be seen as a great pyramid of patron- 
client chains, culminating in the top patron, the patrimonial ruler. " 124 
It seems important to explain the characteristics of patrimonialism here, since many 
writers analysing the modem Greek state have argued that Greek institutions and 
practices have reflected many of the typical characteristics of a patrimonial state. 
For example, the modem Greek state is a highly centralised state, where the main 
social, political, and economic decisions are taken in Athens by the prime minister 
(which in Greece is usually the leader and president of the majority party in 
government) and a small group of cabinet ministers. Since the central government is 
primarily responsible for dispensing state resources, the patron-client system is 
easily perpetuated. State owned utilities and industries provide a stronghold for the 
central government, which wields a great deal of political power in decision-making. 
The state apparatus in Greece thus includes a huge bureaucracy (which will be 
discussed in some detail in Part 11) where government officials place their loyal 
cadres in positions in return for their votes. Although modem governments over the 
past fifteen years from both of the main political camps -- PASOK and New 
Democracy -- have continuously stated that they will rid Greece of these traditional 
(and corrupt) practices, they continue unabated and thus have resulted in stifling the 
growth of modem socio-economic and political structures of the state. 125 
Another theoretical paradigm used to explain southern European politics and 
economics is based on an idea of dependency and underdevelopment (sometimes 
referred to as delayed development 126), where southern European social, political, 
and economic structures are analysed behind a backdrop of retarded growth. The 
main argument espoused by these authors is that during the 19th century, southern 
1231bid., p. 232. 
124James Kurth, op. cit., p. 55. 
125For a discussion of this problem of Greek inertia, see Lisa Dominguez, "Greece in the EU: 
Awkward and Backward, " Paper published in the Proceedings of the Annual Conference of' the 
Political Studies Association, (Belfast: Political Studies Association) 1995. 
126See, for example, Alexander Gerschenkron, Economic Backwardness in Historical 
Perspective (Cambridge Mass: Cambridge University Press) 196-1. There are many authors who have 
written on this subject, including Latin American and central American authors such as Fernando 
Henrique Cardoso, Andre Gunder Frank, and Enzo Faletto. For the most comprehensive analysis of 
Greece from this perspective, see Nicos P. Mouzells, Modern Greece -- Facets of Underdevelopment, 
(UK: MacMillan Press LTD) 1978. 
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Europe did not industrialise as quickly as the rest of western, Europe, and in some 
cases like Greece, barely industrialised at all. When compared to the northern states 
of Europe at the time, such as the UK and Germany (which had developed industries 
and a strong economic base to sustain further growth), southern Europe was just 
beginning to experience a move towards industrialisation but certainly at a 
procrastinated pace. Southern Europe, including Greece, witnessed a much slower 
development of industry as well as a much slower development of civil society and 
its accompanying structures and institutions. Thus in an attempt to speed up the 
process of industrialisation when it did begin to occur, the state took on the role of 
the main motor steering the process. With the state as the deus ex machina and as 
the main employer, southern Europe forged ahead in an attempt to catch up with the 
rest of western Europe. As has been mentioned for the case of Greece: 
... the state took on the function of promoting economic development, 
and attempted to encourage capital investment in Greece. It did so by 
both creating the necessary general conditions, and also by intervening in 
the economy in particular areas. 127 
What has occurred in modern Greece, then, is that the state has increasingly become 
more powerful and less limited in its scope due to a lack of organised interests and 
organisations (apart from political parties) that could act as a counterbalance to the 
state. When disagreement or disenchantment with central governmental policics 
occurs in Greece, for example, protesters immediately take to the streets, as the 
legitimate channels of communication between government and the public are 
extremely limited. Hence the traditional institutional arrangements and structures in 
Greece, and the lack thereof of modern expressions of civil society have left a 
vacuum between the state and the public which creates formidable problems for 
both. 
Concomitant to the remarks made about the particulars of the Greek state, some 
historical description of the events which transpired in Greece just before democracy 
was restored in 1974 seems likewise valuable here for comprehending the nature of 
party politics in Greece today. Party politics in the post- authori tari an era will again 
be taken up in Chapter Five of this study, but here a brief overview of the post- 
World War Two era in Greece will set some more of the backdrop for such a 
discussion and supply additional information concerning the political environment in 
Greece in the modern era, particularly the bi-polar nature of party politics in Greece. 
- 
I-2713eate Kohler, Political Forces in Spain, Portugal and Greece, (Butterworth & Co. Pubs. ) 
198112, P. 97. 
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During the course of the Second World War Greece found itself under the leadership 
of loannis Metaxas who effectively set up a dictatorship in Greece mirroring a more 
general political climate of anti-democratic regimes which had engulfed much Of 
continental Europe at the time. However, as distinct from its counterparts in 
Germany and Italy, the Metaxas dictatorship "... altogether lacked the dynamism of 
German Nazism or Italian fascism. Rather it was an authoritarian, backward-looking 
and paternalistic dictatorship, overlaid with a patina of quasi-fascist rhetoric and 
style ... - 
128 
The Metaxas dictatorship clearly lacked political legitimacy, but it also %vas bereft of 
social legitimacy as well since it had no real popular base of support. The most 
inspiring feat of the Metaxas regime was its ability to ward off Italian forces on 28 
October 1940 (henceforth celebrated in Greece as a national holiday, "OXF Daý) 
which invaded from the north through Albania. The ability of the Greeks to resist 
the Italian forces was a decisive moment for the Metaxas dictatorship but had more 
far-reaching affects on the course of the Second World War and on the fate of the 
territories on the Greek-Albanian border (which were considered by Greeks to 
constitute northern Epirus). 
The most devastating and perennial effect of the war for Greece, however, would be 
the invasion by Germany in April of 1941 and the occupation that followed. The 
resistance movement that formed in Greece to oust the Germans, Italians and 
Bulgarians, EAM -- the National Liberation Front, and its army, ELAS -- the 
National People's Liberation Army, would be decisive in structuring the political 
climate at the close of the war. EAM was a resistance movement that began under 
the leadership of the communists in Greece who had as an immediate goal liberation 
and as a protracted political objective free elections and possibly seizure of power. 
EAM eventually grew into a movement of liberation which would gain the support 
of non-communists and indeed a large percentage of the Greek people as well. In 
this sense EAM was able to gain a sense of social legitimacy among the Greek 
populace who perceived EAM/ELAS as their salvation. At the close of the war, 
however, political chaos ensued in Greece as there arose the question of which 
political actors would be recognised as legitimate contenders in governing Greece. 
The Allied powers decided that Georgios Papandreou, who had formed a 
govern ment- i n-exile, and who was known for his anti-communist stance, should be 
acknowledged as Prime Minister. Henceforth Georpos Papandreou began to form a : _1 
128Richard Clogg, A Concise Histoty oj'Greece, op. cit. p. 119. 
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national government which was to have the representation of all the resistance forces 
and political actors in Greece. EAM/ELAS by this time was a2ain almost 
exclusively composed of its original communist membership as others who had 
joined the organisation during liberation disassociated themsel\'es once the war 
ended. This meant that EAM/ELAS was a formidable communist actor which had 
become more radicalised at the close of the war. The atmosphere was ripe for a 
confrontation between these forces and those of Georgios Papandreou's fragile 
government backed by British forces who feared a communist take-over of Greece. 
On returning to Athens, Georgios Papandreou found a country devastated by war, 
famine, and disease as well as a hostile political environment including the ELAS 
forces which initially refused to disarm. In December of 1944 a battle ensued (the 
Dekemvriana) between ELAS forces and Georgios Papandreou's government backed 
by the British. This incident was indicative of an era of hostilities and factionalism 
characteristic of Greek politics which would permeate the entire post-war era. The 
climax of these hostilities would be the Greek Civil war lasting froin 1946-1949 
which was waged between the forces of the Right (backed by the LISA) versus the 
Left (communists). This was by far the most atrocious and barbaric internal battle 
which witnessed the fighting of Greeks against Greeks. Although clearly a 
polarisation of politics had begun in Greece at the beginning of the 20th century 
culminating in the National Schism of 1915-1922, the Greek Civil war was perhaps 
the most decisive event which stained the post-war era in Greece -- affecting the 
political party system, shaping and molding the political culture of the country, and 
embedding an unprecedented degree of bitterness and anger among Greeks. 
Thus while the rest of Europe was recovering and reconstructing from the Second 
World War, Greece was engaged in a civil war which delayed the process of post- 
war reconstruction and permanently left its mark on the political environment in 
Greece. The entire post-war era in Greece reflected an anti-communist stance (and 
thus Greece was center stage to the Cold War) which resulted in the Greek 
communist party being outlawed from 1947 until 1974. The United States took over 
where the British left off in ensuring that Greece would not fall under the grip of 
communism, and thus in 1952 Greece became a member of NATO although she 
could not accurately be described as either north Atlantic in a geographic sense nor 
did she share a great many other features held in common with other alliance 
members. 
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In 1967 another episode in Greece's tumultuous political history occurred when King 
Konstantine accepted as a fait accompli Colonel Papadopoulos's seisure of power 
and soon a military junta was formed which would again aggravate and further ignite 
hostilities in Greece. The dictatorship has been described as essentially symbolising 
a forlorn and anachronistic attempt to stem the pace of political and social 
change, ... 11 
29 although ironically the junta inadvertently would subsequently propel 
the modernisation of the country and in its aftermath a democratic system would be 
firmly re-established with the 1975 Constitution. However, the dictatorship 
represented a 'formal' legitimacy crisis which profoundly affected the political 
culture of the country. Two years prior to the dictatorship a political crisis befell the 
Greek state when Georgios Papandreou's Centre Union Party came at odds with 
King Konstantine 11 precipitating a call for elections which never took place since on 
21 April 1967 a coup occurred and a junta was established with Colonel 
Papadopoulos as leader. Political party polarisation would continue to be 
characteristic of the post-junta era, although political parties in Greece did create a 
united front against the Colonels when they were in power. It has only been since 
1974, when democracy was restored in Greece, that political stability has assumed 
control and calmed political animosities. The Constitution of 1975 cemented a 
democratic (politically legitimate) political system in Greece which has provided 
Greece with democratic governments for the past twenty-odd years. 130 It is within 
this political historical context that the role of political parties in modem Greece 
must be understood. 
2.6 Greece and the EU 
Greece has been described as a 'difficult' EU partner and has clearly had to face a 
series of political, social and economic challenges by being a member of the 
Community. The following table traces the progress towards Greece's entry into the 
Community as a full member. One may be struck by the fact that it took nearly two 
decades for Greece to become a full member, but it must be remembered that Greece 
experienced a military dictatorship from 1967 to 1974 which effectively brought 
Greece's relationship with the Community to a standstill. 131 
129Richard Clogg, Parties and Elections in Greece, (London: C. Hurst & Co. ) 1987, p. 211. 
130For a discussion of democratic consolidation in Greece in the post-authoritarian era see P. 
Nikiforos Diamandouros, "Regime Change and the Prospects for Democracy in Greece: 1974-1983, "
In Transitions From Authoritarian Rule, Guillermo O'Donnoll et. al. eds., (Baltimore/London: The 
John Hopkins University Press) 1986, pp. 138-209. 
131See Loukas Tsoukalis, The European Community and its Mediterranean Enlargement, 
(London: George Allen & Unwin) 1981, for an overview of Greek accession to the Community as 
well as comparisons with Spain and Portugal. 
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DATE EVENT 
Nov. 1962: Greece became an associate member of the EEC (the first 
country to do so). The agreement was concluded on 9 
July 1961 (Treaty of Athens), and went into effect on I 
November 1962. 
April 1967: Greece's agreement with EEC was frozen due to a 
rrfilitary coup which brought in a m=ilitary dictatorship 
from 1967-1974. 
1976: Negotiations were re-opened between Greece and the 
EEC 
1979: 191 Greek MP's voted for Greece's accession to the EEC 
I Jan. 1981: Greece entered the EEC as its 10th member 
Table 2.4 Greece's FrogressTowards Entry Into the Uommunitv 
Negotiations for Greek entry into the EEC as a full member back in the 1970's was 
seen by the Greek government at the time (led by Konstantinos Karamanfis who held 
the post of prime minister from 1974-1980 and then president from 1980-1985) as a 
way of securing parliamentary democracy as well as basic democratic principles 
(freedoms and rights, for example) in Greece. 132 It was believed that the process of 
democratic consolidation would be augmented and safeguarded with Community 
membership. What needs to be emphasised, however, is that this was a political 
decision taken by Kararnanlis, considered to be one of Greece's charismatic leaders, 
which at least in the beginning, was not greeted with wholehearted enthusiasm by all 
political actors within Greece. 133 Initially, then, the economic repercussions of 
Community membership took a sideline to the political importance ascribed to 
Community accession. 
Entry into the EEC was likewise perceived as a way to help deal with the Cyprus 
issue and more generally with security threats emanating from Turkeý'- On 20 July 
1974 Turkey successfully launched an attack in the northern part of the island of 
132See S. Verney and T. Couloumbis, "State-International Systems Interaction and the Greek 
Transition to Democracy in the Mid-1970's, " In Encouraging Democracy: Tile International Context 
of Regime Transition in Southern Europe, G. Pridham ed. (London: Leicester University Press) 1991, 
pp. 103-124. 
133For instance, PASOK initially espoused an anti EC stance, that is, before attaining po%%er in 
1981. The Communist party of Greece, the KKE was likewise anti-EC as they still are today, 
although they no longer openly challenge Greece's membership in the Community as they have done 
in the past. 
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Cyprus. Since that day, Cyprus has been divided into two parts with Turkey 
occupying nearly 40% of the island to the north. The hostility and animosity that 
still brews between Greece and Turkey regarding the Cyprus invasion is quite real, 
even after some twenty-odd years of Turkish occupation. Therefore it seems 
reasonable to assume that national security was a decisive reason for Greece entering 
the EEC and remains a continuing concern for Greeks up to the present. 13 4 
Furthermore, economic concerns weighed into the decision to join the Community, 
i. e., concerning Greece's economic development, although these do seem to have 
been secondary to the political and military considerations which were 
paramount. 135 
After Greece's official entry into the Community in January 198 1, dissenting voices 
were heard from PASOK136 and KKE (a Greek pro-Soviet type Communist Party) 
who publicly disapproved of Greece's membership in the Community and who 
began to adamantly express their dismay at the fait accompli. One of PASOK's 
campaign slogans leading up to the October 1981 national election was EOK KAI 
NATO TO IAIO ITNAIKATO "European Community and NATO: The Same Syndicate. " 
Thus when PASOK came to power in October 1981 the question arose whether 
Andreas Papandreou's government would try to remove Greece from the EEC. This 
would not be the case, although the relationship between Papandreou's government 
and the Community was a rocky one at its inception. 
The past fifteen years of Community membership for Greece (which have been 
mainly under a PASOK government) has indeed seen a variety of vicissitudes and 
wavering degrees of social and political legitimacy for the European project. A 
134For several interpretations of Greece and EC/EU membership supporting this assumption, see 
P. C. loakimidis, "Greece in the EC: Policies, Experiences, and Prospects, " In Greece, the New 
Europe, and the Changing International Order, Harry J. Psomiades and Stavros Thomadakis, eds. 
(NY: Pella Publishing Co. ) 1993, pp. 405-420; Panos Kazakos (in Greek) "H EU68a AvdpEaa ai 
Evacogd, rw" icat r1ept0coptonoiqcrTj -- Entkoyeq yta 'rTjv En6gevq Aeicaeria art; 
EU, qvoicotvo, rticg; 1Xgcyet;, " In H EUd3a Hpq; ro 2000, FIX. Karaoý)Xqq, T. rtavvi";, n. 
Kaýdxo;, entp., (A"va: ncuraýýaq) 1988, a. 516; and Yannis G. Valinakis, "Security Policy, " In 
Greece and EC Membership Evaluated, Panos Kazakos and P. C. loakimidis, eds. (NY: St. Martin's 
Press) 1994, pp. 199-214. 
135p. C. loakimidis, "Greece in the EC: Policies, Experiences, and Prospects, " In Greece, the 
New Europe, and the Changing International Order, op. cit., p. 406. 
1361n 1980 PASOK had called for a referendum to be held on Greece's membership in the 
Community. But at that time, Karamanlis was president, and only the president had the authority to 
call a referendum. Obviously, since Karamanlis had practically risked his political career to get 
Greece into the EC by I January 198 1, he was not about to accept PASOK's call for a referendum. 
Once in power, PASOK abandoned such demands, and slowly drifted away from its anti-European 
stance and adopted a much more conciliatory position vis-i-vis the Community. 
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glance at party politics during the last fifteen years reveals part of the story as to why 
this has been so. 
After having campaigned on an anti-EEC anti-NATO platform, once beina elected 
into office in October 1981, PASOK made an abrupt about-face and dramaticallN, 
discarded its anti-European and anti-American campaign rhetoric and became a 
wholehearted supporter of Community operations. By its second term in office in 
1985, PASOK was negotiating with the Community for more funding foi- 
programmes designed to enhance Greece's economy and infrastructures (INIPs -- 
Integrated Mediterranean Programmes), both of which were (and still are) in need of 
vast improvements. Yet despite the modernist and socialist ideology Andreas 
Papandreou supposedly espoused when in power from 1981-89, PASOK continued 
to perpetuate patron-client practices and did not produce the modem metamorphosis 
of the Greek state as was originally promised. As James Petras, et al. ha\'e 
appropriately noted: 
PASOK sacrificed its historical role as an innovating force in order to 
consolidate a powerful electoral constituency. The extension of the 
patrimonial state was the main factor leading to Greece's descent to 
the bottom rung in the European econorn-Ic hierarchy. 137 
As for the New Democracy (ND) party under which Greece originally negotiated 
entry into the Community, there has been a consistent support of the European 
project by both Konstantinos Karamanlis and Konstantinos Mitsotakis who were the 
leaders of the party throughout the past two decades. Miltiades Evert, the most 
recently elected leader of ND also fully supports European Union goals and has 
continued the party's tradition of being pro-Europe, pro-federalist. The other 
political parties which have had representation in the Greek parliament in the last 
fifteen years, albeit a few seats, KKE and SYNASPISMOS (a Greek Coalition of the 
Left party), have been less supportive of European Union policies. KKE has been 
that party which has openly stated that Greece should not be participating in such a 
community which it believes represents capitalist imperialism par excellence. The 
KKE's position concerning Community membership however, has mellowed over 
the years, and as Susannah Verney has noted when discussing the KKE and the 1984 
Euroelections "... it seemed that the KKE was able to operate according to the rules 
of the parliamentary game without inevitably being incorporated into the logic of the It7 
137James Petras. et. al., "Greek Socialism: The Patrimonial State Revisited, " In Afediterranetin 
Pw-w1oxes, James Kurth and James Petras, eds., (Providence, Rhode Island: Berg Publishers) 1993, p. 
161. 
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system. "138 Political Spring, a breakaway conservative party led by Antonlos 
Samaras which participated in the 1993 election for the first time, has expressed its 
support for European integration. However, this apparent divisiveness among Greek 
political parties was not enough to hinder the vote for approval of the Maastricht 
Treaty which took place on 31 July 1992 resulting in 286 "yes" votes. eight "no" 
votes (which came from the KKE MPs and one from OtKoMyot Evc(?,, kaicTIKOi -- an 
Ecological Alternative party which had one NIP in parliament at the time'), one 
"present" and five "absentees. " 139 
Popular support (i. e. social legitimacy) for European integration over the past fifteen 
years has also fluctuated. During the process of negotiation in 1979-1980, Greeks 
appeared to be quite enthusiastic about joining the EEC as a full member, although 
the reasoning behind this support has been variously interpreted. Many believe that 
Greeks saw the Community as a panacea for their economic dilernmas (a notion 
which was not discouraged by Greek politicians), or as a way to ensure democracy in 
the country for the future. Others perceived the Community as a way to modemise 
and finally identify Greece as part of the it, est. Still others saw in the Community 
the opportunity for Greece to rid itself of domination by the USA and become more 
autonomous. Certainly the generation which experienced the military junta frorn 
1967-1974 wanted to secure a democratic future for Greece, and the EEC, with this 
prerequisite, seemed to be a way to ensure that. Likewise EEC membership was a 
way for Greeks to identify with the modern western world. As Richard Clogg has 
noted: 
An unspoken assumption underlying the enthusiasm of many Greeks 
for Europe was that membership would somehow place the seal of 
legitimation on their country's somewhat uncertain European identity: 
after all they habitually spoke of travelling to Europe as though 
Greece did not form part of the same cultural entity. 140 
Therefore there is evidence to support the notion that there have been diffuse and 
sometimes even contradictory reasons behind Greek membership in the Community 
which affects the study of legitimacy in Greece, since it is very difficult to pin down 
and clearly define what (and just how influential) these reasons are. There still 
remains a degree of ambiguity and controversy surrounding Greece and its 
138Susannah Verney, "To Be or Not to Be Within the European Community: 'Tbe Party Debate 
and Democratic Consolidation in Greece, " In Securing Democracy: Political Parties and Democratic 
Consolidation in Southern Europe, Geoffrey Pridham, ed., (London/NY: Routledge) 1990. p. 217. 
139p. C. loakimides, (in Greek) Evpwirai'x-6 HoAirzx-ý Ewwq, (A"va: eepýxlo) 1993, (Y. 479. 
140Richard Clogg. A Concise Historý- of Greece, (UK: Cambridge University Press) 1992, p. 
177. 
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membership in the EU and this issue will be brought up in Chapter Four of this 
study. 
Empirical data gives one insight concerning public opinion in Greece as regards the 
European Union. Since entry into the community in 1981. Greeks have 
consecutively shown a high level of support for the Community. Nevertheless, 
during the last five years (1990-1995) EUROBAROMETER polls reveal that there has 
been a slow upward trend in the percentage of Greeks who have doubts about 
Europe and thus a slow declining support for European integration can be 
observed. 141 This decline in support for European integration in Greece, however, 
is not an isolated phenomenon, since in general public support for European 
integration has fallen over the past half-decade. As commented by 
EUROBAROMETER itself, "... for the fifth time in a row, the EUROBAROMETER 
standard indicators of support for the European Union have generally fallen. " 142 It 
should be noted, however, that still an overwhelming majority of Greeks when asked 
believe that EU membership for Greece is "a good thing" (64%), and likewise 
believe that Greece is benefiting from this membership (69%). 143 Greeks also 
perceive the Council Presidency as very important, as evidenced during the i-nost 
recent Greek Council Presidency held from January 1994 to June 1994 when 82% of 
those polled expressed the opinion that the EU presidency is "important. " 144 
Any contemporary discussion of legitimacy requires one to explore the relations 
between EU member states and EU institutions and processes. For the case of 
Greece, this is particularly pertinent since Greece has had a strained relationship with 
the Community/Union and has often been at odds with her various policy 
mechanisms and proposals. An exploration into EU policy-making and decision- 
making processes, which is the topic of the next chapter, further uncovers some of 
the dilemmas of legitimacy for the EU which will complete the first part of our 
discussion here. 
14 1 See EUROBAROMETER#39, June 1993 p. 14. See also EUROBAROMETER#43, p. xvill. 
Although one needs to use caution and not jump to hasty and sometimes what may be false 
conclusions when employing data from EUROBAROMETER surveys, the surveys do have a degree of 
reliability as many questions are repeated over again in consecutive surveys occurring every six 
months, thus generating data for comparison over time. 
142EUROBAROMETER #40, December 1993, p. 12. 
143EUROBAROMETER, #4 1, July 1994, p. 10. 
1441bid., p. 26. 
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Chapter Three 
POLICY-MAKING AND DECISION-MAKING 
IN THE EUROPEAN UNION 
3.1 Introduction 
There can be little doubt that part of the problem of studying the question of 
legitimacy and how this relates to the EU policy-making and decis-ion-illaking 
processes is that the decision-making body which wields the most power, the 
Council of Ministers, conducts most of its activities behind closed doors. Little if 
any documentation is available as to what goes on in Council meetings and how 
agreements are brokered. What is documented are final decisions that the Council 
makes and the amendments and suggestions that the Commission, the European 
Parliament (EP) and other actors have made along the way. Yet in some ways the 
difficulties one encounters gathering information about the decision-making 
processes in the EU is the very crux of the legitimacy problem of the EU made 
manifest. 
This chapter seeks to further an understanding of the EU and the question of 
legitirnacy by examining the policy-making and decision-making processes within 
the Union today. The issue of transparency and secrecy will be explored by 
primarily relying on official EU documents which have attempted to respond to the 
public demand for more access to the EU decision-making processes. The Social 
Agreement as outlined in a Protocol annexed to the Treaty on European Union 
(TEU), European Monetary Union (EMU), and migration/immigration issues have 
been selected here as key policy areas which demonstrate various difficulties and 
obstacles which the EU has encountered in creating common policy and demonstrate 
the complexity involved in attempting to achieve such goals. Each of these policy 
areas also sheds light on the various aspects of the question of EU legitimacy and are 
intended to act as a complement to the remarks made in the previous chapter. 
One of the primary obstacles within the process of policy-making which the EU has 
to face is having supranational institutions along with intergovernmental institutions 
involved in the process. In the EU today, there can not be said to be a unified system 
of policy-making. The EMU is a case in point where one witnesses economic or 
fiscal policy-making, indicative of intergovernmental ism, and monetary policy- 
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making, indicative of supranationalism. 145 These two decision-making methodý, I 
when mingling and operating simultaneously within the EU can complicate and 
often muddle decisions taken. Yet at present there appears to be no way of getting 
around this dilemma, since both intergovernmentalism and supranationalism remain 
characteristics of EU processes and this will probably be the case for some time to 
come. 
3.2 The Policy-Making and Decision-Making Processes in the European Union 
When one investigates the way policy is made and vital decisions are taken in the 
EU today, one can feel quite bewildered at the multiplicity of methods and actors 
involved in the processes at work. 146 National representatives, EU representatives, 
EU officials and technocrats, and a collection of individuals and organisations which 
seem to hover between the two, in some way or another are all involved (in differcm 
ways and to differin degrees) in the process of policy-making and in the decisions 95 
that are taken. The two main official procedures by which policy is currently inade 
in the EU, the co-operation procedure and the co-decision procedure wei-c introduced 
in the Single European Act (SEA) 147 and the TEU, 148 respectively. 149 Basically, 
both of these procedures give the EP several opportunities to review and comment 
on certain Commission proposals before they are finally voted on in the Council. 
There remains, however, the additional difficulty of deciding what activity will pass 
through which procedure of dec i sion -making. Even the European Commission 
Report on the Operation of the European Union admits: 
There is no apparent logic in the correlation between the various 
procedures and different fields of activity: -- three different procedures 
apply in the three equally important sectors of agricultural policy, 
transport and the internal market (the consultation, cooperation and 
codecision procedures respectively) ... 
150 
145Francis Snyder, "EMU -- Metaphor for European Union? Institutions, Rules and Types of 
Regulation, " In Europe After Maastricht, Renaud Dehousse, ed., (MUnchen: Law Books in Europe) 
1994, p. 64. 
146There are some twenty odd ways by which decision-making can occur in the EU presently. 
147COmmission of the European Communities, Single European Act, Title 11, "Provisions 
Amending the Treaties Establishing the European Communities, " Article 6. 
148Coninlission of the European Communities, Treat), on European Union, Article 189b of the 
EC Treaty. 
149See Neill Nugent, The Government and Politics of the European Union, 3rd edition (London: 
MacMillian Press) 1989, for an overview of policy processes in the EU in the post- Nlaastricht era. 
150European Commission. Report on the Operation of the Trealy on European Union, 10 Maý 
1995. Brussels SEC(95) 73 1, p. 25. 
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Documents and pronouncements come pouring out of the EU in the form of 
I regulations, ' 'directives, ' 'decisions, ' 'recommendations and opinions'. 151 Thereare 
also other 'communications' and 'memoranda. ' But in the end it is still the Council of 
Ministers whose members have the power to accept or reject a Commission 
proposal. Lurking behind these official procedures -- which on the surface may 
appear to allow into the decision-making process more feedback and voices from the 
Commission and the EP -- hides the practical reality that the Council still has the last 
word. This is where a great deal of the institutional or structural legitimacy problem 
fformal' legitimacy in Weiler's terms) lies for the EU. The fact that the EP is 
located in Strasbourg and not in Brussels creates a physical distance which matches 
the EP's formidable lack of political power within the decision-making processes. 
There has been much discussion within Brussels over the bargaining process which 
occurs among the members of the Council of Ministers in the process of reaching 
compromises, the so-called wheeling and dealing among European leaders behind 
closed doors, the minutes of which are restricted from public access. Obviously 
there is no official documentation describing this, although all are aware that it goes 
on. The member state holding the Council Presidency may initiate several informal 
discussions among Council members as well, such as lunch or drinks to address 
certain issues. These informal gatherings, however, can and often do generate 
informative exchanges and tactical maneuvering goes on by members of COREPER 
(Committee of Permanent Representatives), who are member states' permanent 
delegates to the EU and who do most of the busy work for the Council. COREPER 
committees members meet weekly and iron out agreements before the ministers 
come to attend meetings, so much so that often agreements are actually reached in 
COREPER meetings and then are simply officially agreed upon in Council 
discussions. 
However, contentious issues and those of paramount importance are decided upon 
by the Council itself, some of which can be said to be decisively shaping the future 
of Europe. Deals are constantly being negotiated which help maintain a delicate 
balance of interests among member states. To refer to a Greek example, it is now 
widely recognised that Andreas Papandreou agreed not to veto Spanish and 
Portuguese accession to the Community in 1986 with the understanding that the 
Community would guarantee the go-ahead for the Integrated Mediterranean 
15 1 Commission of the European Community, EEC Treaty "Provisions Common to Several 
Institutions, " Article 189. 
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Programs (IMPs) which were applicable for the whole of Greece. proN-1ding 
Community funding for specific projects in less developed areas throughout 
Greece. 15 2 Many other such significant decisions and compromises are said to 
have been determined by the Twelve (now Fifteen) member state leaders in prlN% 
talks. This type of decision-making obviously feeds directly into the question of 
legitimacy by uncovering where it appears to be most lacking. The link between the 
Council and the EP appears to be structurally the weakest one, and although attempts 
have been made to inform and consult more with the EP, not much qualitatiVe 
change has occurred in this extremely lopsided relationship which heavily favours 
the Council over the EP. It remains to be seen whether the upcoming 1996 
Intergovernmental Conference (IGC) can suggest and get implemented any 
substantial changes to EP competencies. 
3.3 Secrecy and the Issue of Transparency 
The issue of secrecy and transparency has come to the attention of EU officials more 
pronouncedly in the past few years, and perhaps more so particularly since I January 
1995 when Austria, Sweden and Finland joined the Union. Necdless to say 
Denmark and Holland have continuously pressed the Community that it needs to 
further open the door of the Community to allow for more openness. However, new 
members with different democratic traditions and models of policy-making have 
vociferously voiced their disenchantment with the EU policy and decision-making 
processes and have stated that the EU needs to become more open and disclose more 
regarding how decisions are taken, and made more accessible to those who wish to 
put forward their opinions about specific policy issues and concerns. 
It appears that secrecy is also being registered as a problem by EU citizens to Mr. 
Jacob S6derman, 153 the EU's first official ombudsman, a position which ýý'as 
created in the TEU to allow European Union citizens to register their complaints 
relating to EU institutions to an independent arbiter. Along with favouritism, 
secrecy is the major complaint being lodged against all three EU institutions. Mr. 
S6derman in his first report remarked that "... complaints so far received mainly 
151See Loukas Tsoukalis, The New European Econonzy, (NY: Oxford Universitv Press) 1993, p. 
58 who refers to this incident more diplomatically by stating that "... [the] IMPS were ... seen as a 
compensation to the existing members of the Community of Ten for the expected negative economic 
effects of the accession of Spain and Portugal. " See also John Pinter, European Conim lift ity: The 
Builefing of a Union, (Oxford/NY: Oxford University Press) 1995, p. 175 where the author makes the 
same acknowledgment. 
153Sec Financial Tintes. "Britons Take Their Troubles to the EU's Ombudsman, " 23 Februarv 
1996, p. 2. 
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concerned transparency or the reluctance of Commission and Council to provide 
documents to journalists and MEPs. " 154 The most numerous complaints have been 
from the British, with the Germans and Spanish coming second and third. and those 
least likely to criticise are the Luxembourgers. 
The Declaration on the Right to Access to Information, annexed to the TEU 155 was 
the first in a string of official declarations to be made by the EU addressincy the issue 
of access to information and transparency. Basically this declaration simply stated 
that the issue of transparency was considered to be important and recommended that 
the Commission submit to the Council a report (in 1993) which could sugc., est %VýIVs 
of enhancing public access to the institutions of the Community. The Birmingham 
Declaration: A Community Close to its Citizens which was adopted on 16 October 
1992, more affirmatively asserted the Communities intentions to open up its doors 
by announcing that "We must: ... -- make the Community more open, to ensure a 
better informed public debate on its activities; ... - 
156 The Birmingham Declaration 
further goes on to suggest that Foreign Ministers should suggest ways of possibly 
opening up some Council discussions; it promotes further cooperation between the 
EP and national parliaments; and it reaffirms the EUs commitment to the principles 
of subsidiarity. The "Conclusions of the Presidency" of the European COLincil in 
Edinburgh, which took place on 11-12 December 1992 as well "reaffirms its 
commitment at Birmingham to a more open Community" and basically reiterates the 
Community's intentions to try to increase and develop means by which to achieve a 
more open EU environment. 157 
These declarations and pronouncements basically paved the way for the Council and 
the Commission to lay down an official Code of Conduct which would outline the 
means by which individuals and institutions could petition the various EU 
institutions for access to documents. The Council Decision of 20 December 1993 on 
"Public Access to Council Documents" 158 and the "Code of Conduct Concerning 
Public Access to Council and Commission Documents" 159 of 31 December 1993 
154"Britons Complain Most, " The European, EP News, 12-16 February 1996. 
155TreatY on European Union, "Declaration on the Right to Access to Information, " p. 229. 
156Birininghani Declaration: A Community Close to its Citilzens, adopted on 16 October 1992. 
157See European Council in Edinburgh, 11-12 December 1992 "Conclusions of the Presidency, " 
particularly point number seven entitled, "Openness and Transparency. "
158Council Decision of 20 December 1993 on "Public Access to Council Documents, " Official 
Journal of the European Communities, No. L 340/44,20 December 1993, Commission Document 
93/7 31 /EC. 
159"Code of Conduct Concerning Public Access to Council and Commission Documents" 
Official Journal of the European Coninium ties, No. L 340/43,31 December 1993, Commis-sion 
Document 93n301EC- 
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were the two official statements that emerged. Both documents give specific details 
about the process of how one applies for access to EU documents, and how the 
applicant will be able to view such a document, etc. The most engaging article of 
the Council Decision for the discussion here pertains to the Exceptions under which 
access to documents can be refused. Article 4 of the Council Decision on "Public 
Access to Council Documents" clearly states that: 
1. Access to a Council document shall not be granted where its disclosure 
could undermine: 
the protection of the public interest (public security, international 
relations, monetary stability, court proceedings, inspections and 
investigations), 
the protection of the individual and of privacy, 
the protection of commercial and industrial secrecy, 
the protection of the Community's financial interests, 
the protection of confidentiality as requested by the natural or legal 
person who supplied any of the information contained in the docurnent 
or as required by the legislation of the Mernber State which supplied 
any of that information 160 
This same set of exceptions are likewise found in the Code of Conduct which also 
states that "They [the institutions] may also refuse access in order to protect the 
institution's interest in the confidentiality of its proceedings. " 16 1 The sarne 
statement is found in the Council Decision with a slight change of wording to refer 
directly to "access to a Council document" replacing the institutions. A glance at the 
list of exceptions indeed seems comprehensive and even without knowledge of the 
specific legalities involved, it appears that the Council and the other EU institutions 
have a variety of legal escapes and loopholes to avoid approving access to 
Community documents which for one reason or another they do not wish to have 
disclosed to the public eye. A great many of these exceptions appear to be 
protectionist and one wonders whether the EU is simply trying to hide behind a 
confidentiality clause to escape public scrutiny. 
The same list of Exceptions and similar language found in the Code of Conduct and 
the Council Decision is also incorporated in the Commission Decision of 8 February 
1994 on "Public Access to Commission Documents" 162 which adds nothing really 
160Council Decision of 20 December 1993 on "Public Access to Council Documents, " Article 4. 
161 "Code of Conduct Concerning Public Access to Council and Commission Documents, '' 
Exceptions. 
162COmmis, ion Decision of 8 February 1994 on "Public Access to Commission Documents, 
"Official Jow-nal of the European Communities, No. L 46/58,18 Februar, v 1994. Commission 
Document 94/901ECSC. 
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new to the two previous documents addressing the same issue. The same procedures 
for applicants applies in the Commission Decision of 1994 and the Exceptions are 
identical to those of the previous official documents. 
An action brought on 19 May 1994 by John Carvel and Guardian New, "papers 
Limited against the Council of the European Union163 brought into the public vle%k, 
the very issue of access to Council documents and under what situations they should 
be denied. The Guardian refused to accept the Council decision ýk'hich denied them 
access to the minutes of several Council discussions on various topics and thus 
brought the Council to the Court of First Instance of the European Communities. 164 
The Guardian contended that the Council's refusal to allow them access to the 
various documents that they had requested violated all of the fundamental rights that 
the EU had declared concerning access to the documents of the institutions of the 
European Union, and in the case literature they cite the 'Declaration on the right to 
access to information' annexed to the Treaty on European Union, the 'Birmingham 
Declaration, ' etc. right down to the Codes of Conduct of the Council and the 
Commission. 165 Their main argument, very similar to that mentioned here, is that 
"Exceptions to the fundamental principle of 'fullest possible' and 'widest possible' 
access must be construed and interpreted narrowly. " 166 It seems clear even to the 
layperson that there must be a more specific delineation of the Exceptions under 
which the Council can refuse access to their documents for any meaningful 
interpretation to be applied in such cases. 
Thus in an attempt to respond to public demands for more transparency of EU 
activities, both the Commission and the Council have failed to produce an official 
document which could truly disclose some of the mystery behind how decisions are 
arrived at, particularly by the Council which appears to be that EU institution most 
cloaked in secrecy. Certainly this would enhance the Council's image and increase a 
sense of its legitimacy, both in a political sense by allowing for public scrutiny and 
thus some degree of accountability, and in terms of social legitimacy by enabling 
citizens to understand how and why the Council makes its decisions as it does. 
163Action brought on 19 May 1994 by John Carvel and Guardian Newspapers Limited against 
the Council of the European Union, Qjj7cial Journal of the European Communities, No. C202113,21 
July 1994, Case T- 194/94. 
164ýffie Guardian had requested the preparatory reports, the minutes, attendance and voting 
records of the Justice Council of 27 and 30 November 1993: the minutes of the Agriculture Council 
of 24 and 25 January 1994, and the preparatory reports, minutes and voting records of the Social 
Affairs Councils of 12 October and 23 November 1993. Ibid. 
1651bid., set, especially "Pleas in law and main arguments adduced in support. " 
1661bid. 
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Hence despite these official pronouncements allowing for public access to EU 
documents, neither the minutes of Council meetings nor the Council debates over 
Commission proposals are made public. Even Council sessions which disculss 
proposals which have already been sent to the EP for review are still not open to 
public scrutiny. The fact that decisions are taken within the Council secretively 
unquestionably appears to be part of the legitimacy dilem-ma for the EU. 
A recent Commission Report entitled "Report on the Operation of the Treaty on 
European Union, " of 10 May 1995 has again addressed the issue of Democracy and 
Transparency in the Union. 167 After discussing the institutional features Of the 
Maastricht Treaty, this report goes on to explain what the TEU introduced 
concerning the decision-making process, mainly the co-decision procedure and 
qualified majority voting in a number of new fields of EU activity. Under the 
heading title 'More Transparency' this Commission report directs its remarks to the 
principle of subsidiarity enshrined within the TEU as a way of bringing the Union 
closer to its citizens and then moves on to the more contentious issue of access to 
information. In the section of the report relating to the Council and access to 
information, the report claims that although the Council's "... debates are still held 
behind closed doors ... exceptions are now provided for, notably, in the form of open 
debates and publicity and explanations of Member States' votes. "168 The report 
likewise states that there have been twenty-two public debates in the Council, and in 
two adjoining annexesl69 lists the Council Presidency's since 1993, the number of 
debates that were held during each presidency, the date that these public debates 
were held and their content. To take the case of the Greek Presidency during the 
first half of 1994 as an example, there were three public debates held. The first 
public debate, held on 7 February 1994 was the "Presentation of Greek Presidency's 
work programme; " the second, on 14 February 1994 discussed the "Presentation of 
Greek Presidency's work programme in economic and financial rnatters; " and the 
final debate, on 21 February 1994 was concerned with "Proposals on agricultural 
prices and related measures for 1994/95 - Presentation by the Commission. " It 
appears that none of the above topics were particularly lively subjects for debate and 
as the report itself admits: "Open debates have tended to be about subjects on which 
WlEuropean Commission, Report on the Operation of the Treaty on European Union, 10 Nlaý 
1995, Brussels SEC(95) 73 1. 
1681bid., p. 33. 
1691bid., Annex 10 and 11. 
74 
a consensus existed. Requests for open debate on other subjects, have failed to 
secure the required unanimity. " 170 
Lastly, the Commission Report cites two-hundred sixtý, requests received by the 
Commission for access to institution documents as of 22 March 1995 and announces 
that 53.7% of these have been accepted, 17.9% have been rejected and 28.417c have 
been treated as invalid. 171 The grounds given by the Commission for withholding 
the documents which were denied are outlined in Annex 13 of the report, the largest 
percentage owing to 'Confidential discussions. ' The report concludes in its overall 
assessment on openness and transparency that "A great deal remains to be done, 
especially in the Council, which must be more open in its legislative function. - 172 
This seems like an understatement, but one which at least reveals that the issue of 
openness and transparency has come to be recognised as an important one within the 
EU. If the Council and the other EU institutions hope to acquire the degree of 
legitimacy that they will ultimately require to further along the integrative process, 
then the issue of transparency and secrecy will have to be addressed and answered 
on a level which will satisfy the public response for information about EU activities. 
3.4 The Social Chapter 
As mentioned in the previous chapter, the European process of integration has had 
difficulties in incorporating a social component into its formal structures and thus 
has been unable to successfully create a so-called 'common European social space. ' 
The TEU was able to incorporate a notion of common citizenship in functional 
terms, but failed to add anything novel to the 1989 Social Charter. The TEU's hopes 
of revising the Articles of the EEC treaty that had to do with social policy never 
materialised. Those who were hoping for more decisive pronouncements 
concerning social policy were indeed disappointed. 
However, the most devastating blow to the idea of a'common' social policy was the 
British refusal to accept any of the amendments proposed for the TEU, thus 
effectively crushing any hope of incorporating a Social Chapter into the treaty. The 
resounding statement that "The United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern 
Ireland shall not take part in the deliberations and the adoption by the Council of 
Commission proposals made on the basis of this Protocol and the abo%, e mentioned 
1701bid., p. 34. 
17 1 Ibid., p. 36. 
1721bid., p. 37. 
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Agreement, " 173 slammed the door on any possibility of formulating and 
implementing a truly 'common' and meaningful social policy. Since the provisions 
of the Agreement on Social Policy have been placed in a Protocol annexed to the 
Treaty, they are not legally part of the TEU and do not therefore change or replace 
the social provisions found in the EEC Treaty. Politically speaking, the decision to 
place the Agreement on Social Policy in an appended Protocol was one taken so that 
the British would agree to sign the TEU. The British refusal to agree to the social 
provisions was based on an argument, which is still being disputed, that these 
provisions would be too costly for the British economy to bear. But beneath the 
rhetoric the more significant issue is whether or not a precedent has been set with the 
British opt-out. Thus the more serious dilemma which the EU has now to face is 
whether or not other member states, when and if they do not agree with a particular 
policy issue, will cite the British example to justify a conspicuous stance. 
Potentially, this type of action could lead to innumerable dilemmas for the EU and 
the policy-making and decision-making processes. As it is, the rules for qualified 
majority voting had to be altered in the Protocol, stipulating that 44 out of 66 votes 
were required for proposals to be passed as opposed to the 54 out of 76 when the 
British were included. 174 
One of the most serious problems currently facing the EU is rising unemployment 
rates which represent the largest percentage of unemployed in Europe since the era 
of the Great Depression. In Germany alone some 4.1 million people are unemployed 
(10.8% of the population, 16% in the former East Germany), while the EU average 
unemployment rate is still hovering around 11%. 175 One of the groups who have 
been hardest hit by unemployment are young people, with some 16.5 million of them 
unemployed throughout the EU. The problem of unemployment is one of the most 
serious challenges facing the EU and certainly one area which has been the focus of 
joint social policy. The 1993 EU Commissions' "White Paper" on Grmt, th, 
Competitiveness, Employment was the first real concerted effort to discuss the EU', s 
competitiveness and directly addressed the problem of unemployment. Since then, 
several docurnents have set out to reaffirm the principles of the White Paper, 
including the Council Resolution of 6 December 1994 which clearly states the need 
173Protocol on Social Policy, Annexed to the Treaty on European Union, 1992. 
174Note: with the inclusion of Austria, Finland and Sweden into the EU on I January 1995 the 
numbers for qualified majority voting have changed, but the TEU obviously was referring to a 
Community of Twelve. 
175The unemployment rate figures for some member states is staggering. Spain currently has the 
highest unemployment rate of EU members at 24.417c. See Eurostat, (Luxembourg: Office for 
Official Publications of the European Communities) 1995. p. 154. 
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for improving the EU's competitiveness and for increasing opportunities for creating 
more jobs throughout member states-176 A European Commission document 
entitled 'Social Europe' which outlines a medium-term rolling social action 
programme for 1996-1997 lays out a plan for social policy in the Union. The 
programme discusses such issues as how to best promote employment schemes in 
the Union, training, mobility of the labour market, and equal opportunity and social 
protection policy. 177 Concerns such as worker's rights to fair pay, better protection 
for workers, health and safety on the job, equal pay and opportunities to work 
between the sexes, parental leave, are addressed. There are indications, then, that the 
EU is attempting to forge a common stance on social policy. 
However, despite the obvious recognition among member states for the need to 
cooperate to face such serious problems as swelling unemployment and lackluster 
schemes of competitiveness, politically sensitive areas remain, and these are where 
Council unanimity are still required. As the Agreement on Social Policy points out, 
these areas include: 
social security and social protection of workers; 
protection of workers where their employment contract is terminated; 
representation and collective defence of the interests of workers and 
employers, including co-determination, 
conditions of employment for third-country nationals legally residing 
in Community territory; 
financial contributions for promotion of employment and job-creation, 
without prejudice to the provisions relating to the Social fund. 178 
A great many areas of social policy are still very much considered to be national 
competencies, and the reluctance expressed by the citizens of EU member states as 
revealed through EUROBAROMETER surveys to have the EU take on some of these 
competencies seems to verify that phenomenon. Issues such as the right to strike or 
to impose lock-outs and the question of pay are still firmly in the national domain. 
The legitimate arena for such discussions appears to continue to inhabit the nation- 
state, although such aspects of consultation between management and labour are to 
be enhanced by the Commission as stipulated in Article 3 of the Agreement on 
Social Policy. 
176See European Communities, Council Resolution of 6 December 1994 on Certain Aspects for 
a European Union Social Policy: a Contribution to Economic and Social Convergence in the Union, 
Official Journal of the European Corninunities, No. C 368/6, -13 December 1994. 
177European Commission. Social Europe 3194, (Luxembourg. Official Publications of the 
European Communities) 1995. 
178,4greenient on Social Policv. Annexed to the Treaty oil European Union, Article 2(3). 
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Nevertheless social policy remains a policy area dominated by nationalist sentiments 
and one which has most certainly experienced a set back since the British opt-out of 
the Social Chapter. Decisions concerning social policy will most probably remain Z7 
heavily influenced by intergovernmentalism, as member states and their citizens 
seem reluctant to relinquish a great deal of decision-making over to EU institutions, 
at least at present. 
3.5 The European Monetary Union (EMU) 
The EMU is a policy area where both supranational and intergovemmental models 
of policy and decision-making occur and this duality inherently creates difficulties in 
making decisions. The EMU is also considered to be the 'centerpiece'of the EU and 
has been partially selected because it is controversial and contentious. Most recently 
the EMU has become surrounded by uncertainty, and in the current 1996 IGC, it 
appears to be that policy area which can ultimately propel integration or precipitate a 
crisis of huge proportions. 179 Thus the remarks which will be made here will be 
limited to bringing up some of the issues surrounding the EMU as they are seen to 
inform the discussion of legitimacy. 
Perhaps one of the most obvious observations one can make about the EMU and 
legitimacy is that in light of market uncertainties and a mercurial global economic 
environment, it appears nearly impossible to forecast an -v 
economic targets and 
believe that by a certain date they can be achieved. Much discussion recently over 
whether the economic targets as prescribed for EMU are attainable have actually 
turned the discussion around questioning how the numbers were determined in the 
first place. One side of the argument claims that if only one or two member states 
can actually meet the EMU criteria by 1999, is seems absurd to go ahead with so t'cw 
members. Thus the question arises as to why not change the economic criteria to 
adjust to the economic reality that EU members are facing. Those on the otherside 
fiercely defend the EMU criteria, and proclaim that any change in the figures would 
I 791t is very difficult to remark intelligibly upon the EMU with any degree of certainty or 
definitiveness since at present there is much discussion in Europe today as reflected in the press about 
whether or not the economic targets as they are set out presently in the TEU can be met by a fair 
number of EU members by 1999. Hans Tietmeyer, the head of the German Bundesbank remarked at 
a conference in Frankfurt in early February 1996 that "Monetary union, once started, must not go off 
the rails. If necessary, a delay in timing would be less problematic than a later derailment. " See 
"Tietmeyer Says EMU Stability Essential, " Financial Tinies, 14 February 1996, p. 2. 
In light of most recent economic forecasts at the time of this writing, it appears that even 1--rance 
and Germany may have a great deal of difficulty meeting the TEU criteria for monetary union. The 
EMU at present seems to be the principal topic of discussion in European forums everywhere, %%Ith 
the Eurosceptics on the one side declaring that EMU is an impossibility. and the defender,, of the 
1-. uropean project on the other maintaining that EMU can and must be attained. 
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unravel the entire scheme of EMU and set the wrong precedent. No changes or Z1_ 
compromises should be allowed, since this would undermine the entire EMU 
project. In an environment where these ideas are being flung around. when even the 
I experts' can not seem to agree on the future course for the EML', the citizens of 
member states are understandably bewildered, and are certainly less inclined (if they 
ever were) to support such an endeavor. Hence part of the problem of legitimising 
the EMU to citizens is the degree of conjecture and ambiguity surrounding the entire 
project. Discussions currently about altering the criteria of EMU to a EU 
population, a substantial portion of which does not know what the criteria are in the 
first place, reveals the EU's failure to inform the public about the debates. The 
general public remains confused and perplexed and hence is unlikely to support such 
a policy. This goes back to what has been said in the previous chapter of this study 
about the 'information deficit' which has accompanied the 'democratic deficit'of the 
EU, both of which, albeit in different ways, feeds into the issue of legitimacy of the 
EU. Several EU member leaders are toying with the idea of calling a nation-wide 
referendum if and when the time comes to join EMU and implement a common 
currency. 
Deteriorating economic conditions of EU member states has also spawned debates 
about a two-speed Europe, where member states who can meet the EMU criteria pull 
ahead and leave behind those who have failed to keep apace. Objections to this plan 
have no less come from those who are farthest from meeting the economic criteria, 
for example Greece, who rejects outright any idea of a two-tier Europe which would 
relegate it to secondary status. However, in more realistic terms, there certainly 
remains the possibility that the more economically well-off EU members will forge 
ahead thus precipitating an even more highly noticeable dichotomy within the Union 
along economic lines. This most certainly will not augur well for relations among 
EU member state leaders nor for relations among their member citizenry. In terms 
of the process of policy-making and decision-making, innumerable dilemmas can 
arise when the topic of economic policy comes to the discussion table if there are 
several members following EMU and several who are trying to get in. An 'us' 
against 'them' syndrome could occur which could certainly weaken the institutional 
operations of the EU along with it its degree of social legitimacy. 
A glance at the construction of the EMU and its impending implementation as set 
out in the TEU calling for a European Central Bank, fixed exchange rates, and a 
single currency is indeed the most ambitious supranational economic package that 
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the Union has thus far devised. It is also perhaps the most difficult economic 
endeavor and that one which poses the most challenges for member state 
governments. Another question which is being asked is whether the EMU requires a 
single fiscal policy, and if so, how to legitimise this to citizens. 
EMU implies on the one hand that member states will relinquish their right to make 
integral micro and macro economic policy, thus largely losing national sovereignty 
over this critical policy area. On the other hand, through the development of a single 
currency, national governments will have to be much more accountable to their 
citizens for their country's national deficit. However, the question that is not often 
brought up by those promoting monetary union is how will the EMU be sold to 
member citizenry. The underlying assumption seems to be that national 
governments are in the end responsible for lending credibility to the EMU and to 
selling it at home to their citizens. As John T. Woolley has aptly expressed when 
discussing the European Monetary System: "EMS institutions did not possess any 
inherent credibility; they acquired credibility because of the demonstrated 
willingness of participating governments to bear political costs. - 180 
The implementation of the EMU will inevitably mean that new financial institutions 
will be finally put in place. One of the most discussed of late is that of the 
development of a European Central Bank (EuroFed) as envisioned in tile TEU. One 
of the advantages of an independent European Central Bank (ECB) which has been 
cited is that the ECB will be less subject to political pressures and this will enable it 
to be more objective in forming sound policies. The disadvantage, of course, is that 
it may not be able to carry out policies if these are extremely unpopular. And then 
there is the question raised above, which reiterated in another form is: can a EuroFed 
really operate without a single European economic and finance ministry? The 
EUroFed will have a mandate to maintain price fixing and will invest much power in 
a governors board, made up of representatives from member central banks, and an 
executive board, consisting of six members: a President, a Vice-President and four 
other members, for eight-year non-renewable terms. These individuals are to have 
no national allegiances but have to be nationals of member states, and will be 
appointed by the European Council. The least democratic aspect of the executive 
board is that this group of individuals will be totally independent of any other 
European institution and in effect dernocratically accountable to no one. Paul Hirst's 
18OJohn T. Woolley, Tolicy Credibility and European Monetary Institutions, " in Euro-Politics, 
Alberta M. Sbragia, ed., (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institute) 1992, p. 166. 
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comments concerning the ECB support this assumption quite adamantly. He 
remarks: 
... the idea of an 'independent' central bank at the EU level is absurd. Unlike the Bundesbank, which is a broadly representative institution, 
such a bank will lack legitimacy. That lack will be reinforced by its divorce from wider economic policy-making and by its tendency to set 
constraining conditions for the latter. The effects of 'independence' 
would be to allow unaccountable officials to dictate economic policy, at a 
time when the central organs of the EU will still lack legitimacy and 
citizen identification. The result could all too easily be a disaster for the 
process of building support for EU economic and political 
integration. 181 
The issue of a common currency has also witnessed more philosophical discussions 
about money and its symbolic representation of the nation. MoneN, has in effect a 
national, cultural identity attached to it and many have prophecised that this is not 
going to be easily replaced by the 'Euro. ' Any currency likewise has a political 
identity, and a single currency can not be maintained without support by political 
leaders and by citizens. In other words, and to use the terminology which has been 
adopted in this study to re-examine the question of legitimacy, the single currency 
specifically, and the EMU more generally, needs to be perceived of as politically and 
socially legitimate if it hopes to be successfully adopted and maintained. 
3.6 The Case of Migration and Immigration Policy: What Has Been Decided so 
Far, How, and by Whom 
Migration and immigration policy has been selected here for discussion primarily 
because it is an area representative of both intergovernmental ism and 
supranationalism, although clearly the former far exceeds the latter. It in addition has 
become more of a concern for EU members since the collapse of Soviet communism 
and the break-up of the Eastern bloc in Europe which has resulted in an increase of 
immigrants and migrants wishing to enter EU member states. Therefore new 
challenges face EU member states as East-West migration has reached new levels 
and the rising number of asylum-seekers (which Germany primarily has had to 
contend with) is growing daily. Under these circumstances, migration and 
immigration policy in member states has become increasingly reactive and 
defensive, as the case of Athens' response of sending back Albanians coming over 
the mountains into northern Greece in Chapter Eight of this study will reveal. 
18 1 Paul Hirst. "The European Union at the Crossroads: Integration or Decline? " In Democrac 
- N, and Constitutional Culture in the Union of Europe, Richard Bellarný, ed. et. al. (London: Lothian 
Foundation Press) 1995. p. 49. 
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However, before the momentous events took place in 1989 in Eastern Europe, it was 
the Single European Act that initially advanced coordination of migration policy Z-- 
among member states since at least in theory, internal movement of "goods. persons, 
services and capital" was to be made effective. Back in 1986 an Ad Hoc Group on 
Immigration was established to deal with matters of migration and immigration, 
consisting of a group of ministers and senior civil servants. The areas of concern for 
the group were substantially broadened in 1991 to include such topics as- 
harmonisation of admission policies; a common approach to the problem of illegal 
immigration; a policy on the migration of labour; the situation in third countrv 
nationals; and an investigation into developing a broader migration policy in 
general. 182 
Nevertheless in response to the events in Eastern Europe after 1989 a plethora of 
activities and organisations examining migration problems in Europe have been 
mobilised. Some of these include pre-existing organisations such as the 
International Organisation for Migration and the United Nations High Commission 
for Refugees. Several new organisations have emerged which have concerned 
themselves with particular features of the immigration problem such as: the 'Vicnna' 
Group, which grew out of the Council of Europe Ministerial Conference on the 
Movement of Persons from Central and Eastern European Countries which took 
place in Vienna in January 1991; the 'Berlin'Group, which emerged from the Berlin 
Conference on European Cooperation to Prevent Uncontrolled Migration held in 
October 1991; and the 'Budapest' Group which came about in February 1993.183 
Yet despite these organisations and the flurry of activity they have supposedly 
generated in dealing with mass immigration, policy towards immigrants has become 
increasingly more defensive and reactionary, especially by those EU members 
cxperiencing the most direct affects of immigration. The expression 'Fortress Europe' 
which was one originally used to refer to the Community's restrictive trade laws with 
non-member states and the so-called economic fence that the Community was 
building around its borders, now has become relevant for issues of migration and 
immigration. Policies being developed are increasingly focusing on how increasing 
checks on external borders can help keep 'undesirable' and 'unwanted' individuals 
out. Therefore there is a definite shift in perspective towards immigration and 
security, particularly as regards illegal immigration. Presently, there is no common 
182Sarah Collinson, Be 
, yond 
Borders: West European Migration Pollcy Towards the 21st 
Centuq, (London: Royal Institute of International Affairs) 1993. p. 41-42. 
1831bid., p. 4 1. 
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migration/immigration policy as such in the EU, rather there are I cooperative 
agreements' and 'cooperative arrangements' which have become more restrictive and 
defensive in nature towards immigrants/migrants from the East. There remains a 
nebulous understanding of what "an area without internal frontiers" actually means 
in practice as well. 184 
Title VI of the Treaty on European Union on 'Provisions on Cooperation in the 
Fields of Justice and Home Affairs' was the EUs attempt to establish a foundation 
for cooperation among member states in a variety of areas. Article K. I enumerates 
the areas which should be regarded by member states "... as matters of common 
interest. " 185 The list is quite comprehensive and includes such items as asylum 
policy, immigration policy and policy regarding nationals of third countries, judicial 
cooperation in civil matters, customs cooperation, and so on. Howe\, er, the bulk of 
the decision-making for most policy areas remains within the Council, and all of 
Title VI is outside the jurisdiction of the European Court of Justice. As Malcolm 
Andersen, et al. have rightly pointed out: 
... 
from the point of view of the citizen, the principal drawback of Title 
VI is that it is deliberately insulated from democratic control by the 
Parliament and from judicial review by the Court. 186 
Looming beneath the surface of Title VI is a lack of transparency and accountability 
concerning the decision-making process which could surface at any time, 
particularly as more coordination is planned embracing more policy areas. 
Article K. 1(9) of Title VI calls for: 
police cooperation for the purposes of preventing and combating 
terrorism, unlawful drug trafficking and other serious forms of 
international crime, including if necessary certain aspects of customs 
cooperation, in connection with the organization of a Union-wide system 
for exchanging information within a European Police Office 
(Europol). 187 
Europol is still officially operating at present as the European Drug Unit, however, 
since Europe's leaders have not been able to finalise the convention to get Europol 
184,, 
... [n]o agreement 
has been reached on the secufity measures which are recognized as being 
necessary, both for abolishing the internal frontiers and for harmonizing the systems of checks at 
external frontiers. " EU Commission, Report on the Operation of the Treat), on European Union, p. 8. 
1 85Treai), on European Union, Title VI, Article K. 1. 
186Malcolrn Andersen, Monica den Boer and Gary Miller, "European Citizenship and 
Cooperation in Justice and Home Affairs, " In Maastricht and Beyond, Andre", Duff ed. et al. 
(London: Routledge) 1994, p. 118. 
187Treat. N- on European Union, Title VI, Article K. ](9). 
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up and running, while Britain refuses to allow the European Court of Justice to have 
the right to oversee the organisation. In the meanwhile, activities such as 'immigrant 
smuggling' where desperate migrants pay unscrupulous individuals huge surns of 
money to get them smuggled into a EU member state has become big busines,, - in 
Europe. 188 It is believed that hundreds of thousands of unsuspecting migrant-, ý are 
smuggled into the EU each year while activities such as prostitution and 'slave 
labour' have flourished. 
Perhaps the most coordinated (to-date) activity addressing imnugration as well as 
policing and customs is what is know asThe Schengen Agreementwhich originally 
began with five member states: France, West Germany, Belgium, Luxembourg, and 
the Netherlands in 1985. Much discussion surrounds the Schengen agreement since 
it is widely recognised that it was negotiated in secret and that the proceedings did 
not involve consultation with either the European Parliament nor with national 
parliaments in member states. Today there are ten Schengen members, Italy joined 
in 1990, Portugal and Spain in 1991, Greece in 1992, and Austria in 1995. 
Primarily, Schengen has as a goal to complement existing treaties and international 
agreements relating to policing, immigration and customs. The ultimate purpose 
behind Schengen is to abolish checks at common EU borders, a priori having 
established a comprehensive and integrated system of monitoring surreptitious 
individuals. 189 The agreement went into force in March 1995, but only seven 
members -- Germany, the Netherlands, Spain, Portugal, and the Benelux states have 
abolished border checks on travellers between their countries. France at present 
refuses to implement Schengen. The Schengen Agreement has devised a common 
visa policy and a common asylum policy for its members. One of the most 
controversial aspect of Schengen is SIS -- the Schengen Information System -- 
which is a communications system which has information on wanted criminals and 
suspects, 'undesirable' aliens, missing persons, etc. When completed, this database 
will store some one million names of individuals which member states should be on 
the look-out for. However, in the absence of any legal body to take responsibility 
188See The European, "Europol Warns on Trade in Migrants, " 1-7 February 1996 and "Tangled 
Web of Human Smuggling, " The European, II- 17 April 1996. 
189A Conference of Schengen members which was to be held in early March 1996 has been 
postponed due to an inability of some members (France and the Netherlands) to agree upon certain 
aspects of a drug law thus creating further setbacks to the agreement. See "EU Open Borders Pact 
Dealt New Blow, " Financial Tinies, 15 February 1996, p. 2. A recent wave of terrorism in Europe, 
particularly in Britain and in Spain, has likewise dampened hopes of fully implementing Schengen. 
Issues such as extradition and judicial cooperation remain disputed among Schengen members, most 
recently between Spain and Belgium over suspected Basque terrorists. See "Terror Wave Nlay Block 
Open Borders, " The European, 22-28 February 1996, and "Spain Gets Tough Over 'ETA Pair, ' The 
European, 29 February-6 March 1996. 
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for particular actions or for that matter to enforce or interpret the Schengen 
agreement, there is much left up to individual member states and their differing legal 
systems and traditions to sort out. This deficiency has no less created a problem of 
democratic accountability. As John Benyon et al. have appropriately noted: 
The Schengen agreement fails to meet standards for the ideal prototý'pe in 
the arrangements for democratic accountability. Each of the level" of 
administration is directly responsible to that immediately superior to it 
and at the top the ministers are responsible to their own national 
parliaments. However, there is no provision for public accountability or 
redress for citizens of Schengen countries, or for persons from outside 
Schengen countries. 190 
Obviously in the absence of a common immigration and migration policy, Schengen 
has filled a gap in the area of transborder cooperation as regards policing and matters 
of surveillance. What remains in dispute is whether the Council of Ministers which 
acts as the Executive Committee is the appropriate forum for decision-making and 
implementation. 
The fact remains that it is nearly impossible to develop a means to efficiently police 
external borders to the degree that no illegal transborder crossings occur. For a 
country like Greece, which has hundreds of miles of sea border, it is indeed a 
formidable feat. The country's mountainous terrain in the north likewise hinders 
totally effective policing of borders. Given the sheer number of asylum seekers and 
immigrants wishing to enter EU member states, it is as well unrealistic to assume 
that a percentage of these individuals will not be seduced into attempting to enter 
into EU member states illegally. The root cause of immigration, such as economic 
imbalances among the states of Europe that have become glaring since the fall of 
Soviet communism need to be examined for any real solution to be found, but this is 
beyond the scope of discussion here. 
3.7 Conclusion 
Both this and the previous chapter have attempted to elucidate the various aspects of 
the European Union which have relevance to the question of legitimacy. The 
previous discussion applying the five dimensions of the legitimacy question selected 
here for examination revealed where the Union is most bereft of political legitimacv I 
in the operation of its institutions and where it lacks social legitimacy in its Zý 
190John Benyon, Lynn Turnbull, Andrew Willis and Rachel Woodward, "Understanding Police 
Cooperation in Europe: Setting a Framework for Analysis, " In Policing Across National BoIllidaries, 
Malcolm Andersen and Monica Den Boer eds., (London[NY: Pinter Pubs. ) 1994, p. 56. 
85 
unsuccessful attempts to inspire a common European social space. This chapter has 
focused on the process by which policy and decisions are taken, stressing that the 
attempts to create more openness and transparencý, of EU operations has not lent the 
degree if legitimacy to the EU that was intended by those promoting the European 
project. The 'democratic deficit' and the 'credibility gap' still loom large within the 
Union. The various policy areas which were selected for discussion here have 
aspired to interrogate specific dilemmas facing particular policý' fields. The 
Agreement on Social Policy, EMU, and migration and immigration issues are 
likewise areas of concern which will help to enlighten a discussion of the case of 
Greece which will be the focus of Part 11 of this study. 
This brief overview of some of the concerns of the EU as they feed into the question 
of legitimacy should by no means be mistaken for a comprehensive study of the 
phenomenon of legitimacy and the EU. That would require a study unto itself. The 
purpose here has been to extract some of the features of the legitimacy question as Cý 
they are played out in the EU to make more explicit the dynamics involved in the 
relationship between Brussels and member states. 
The next endeavor of this study will be to apply the five aspects of legitimacy 
discussed above and in the previous chapters to the case of an EU member statc -- 
Greece. The hope is that this will make more concrete an analysis of legitimacy as it 
pertains to the particulars of the case of Greece. 191 
191 The reader should note that the order that has been selected for applying the dimensions of 
legitimacy to the European Union is not the same order which has been selected for their examination 
of the case of Greece. This has been done consciously and for a particular purpose. The reasoning 
behind this primarily rests on the belief that the European Union, as neither a state nor a supranational 
structure. has very specific characteristics unique to it which creates the necessity for one to apply the 
five dimensions in a way which can best facilitate an examination of the question of legitimacy. -Ilie 
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Chapter Four 
GREEK CIVIL SOCIETY 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter enters into less charted territory by attempting to examine the concept 
of civil society as it can be applied to the case of present-day Greece. Greek- socletN, 
today is an amalgamation of characteristics from its Ottoman past as well as more 
modem features. It seems fruitful, therefore, to begin first by recalling the traces of 
the Ottoman legacy that are still quite recognisable within contemporary Greek 
society. Greece's membership in the EU and its effects on Greek society will also be 
investigated to show the ways in which EU membership has influenced the Greek 
social environment. The last part of this chapter will remark upon the complex 
relationship between the individual and society in Greece so as to make more 
perceptible the distinctiveness of the Greek people. The underlying intention is to 
reveal the dynamics which are involved in civil society in Greece which can help 
better to explain the question of social legitimacy. 
4.2 The Ottoman Legacy and the Greek State 
The birth of the Greek state which took form by 1830, ushered in an era of 
liberation and state formation for the Balkan region. What was unique about this 
movement of liberation and state formation in Greece and in her Balkan neighbours 
was that the states that were initially formed contained only a fraction of what some 
might regard as their true ethnic and linguistic populations. The original Greek state, 
for example, began with only a small percentage of the Greek-speaking people who 
were to be found throughout the southern Balkan region and the Near East, and of 
the territories that were historically perceived to be Greek. Romania, Serbia, and 
Bulgaria, which also formed into independent states during the nineteenth century 
also began with limited populations, although their 'people' were not as scattered 
about as the Greeks were. (Today Greece has a large diaspora population as many 
Greek neighbourhoods, filled with Greek immigrants, are to be found in cities 
throughout the Arnericas, Europe, Asia, Australia and Africa). It should come as no 
surprise then, that one of the guiding ideological forces of the newly independent 
Greek state was to be the Meydkq lka -- roughly translated as 'Great' or 'Grand 
Idea' -- which had as its main goal the uniting of all Greek-speaking people into the 
Greek kingdom. The Great blea envisaged Constantinople as the principle city CW 
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which would act as a beacon for the Greek kingdom that was to bring together all 
Greek-speaking populations. I This vision, however, was effectively crushed by 
1922-23 when Greek armies were driven out of Smyrna by Turkish forces (this 
historical event referred to as the Mt-Kpa(TtctTt)cý Kc(Tc(cTTpooj -- 'Asia Nlinor 
catastrophe'), and mandatory population exchanges with Turkey would again 
reshuffle nearly one million Greeks from Asia Minor to parts of the Greek state 
proper. 
The Greek state thus must be understood and analysed today in light of its historical 
ties with its Ottoman past which was characteristic of what Max NVeber identified as 
I traditional' forms of authority -- sultanism and patrimonialism. 2 These types of 
agrarian, pre-modern societies which were under centralised political regillies 
developed certain 'defence mechanisms' to deal with their despotic, corrupt rulers. It 
is important to recall this, because even after gaining its independence, Grecce 
continued many of the traditional practices that it had acquired under nearly four 
centuries of Ottoman rule. Some of these practices -- such as that of suspicion and 
distrust of political authorities and of the state, the use of patron-client networks and 
the extended family -- emerged under Ottoman rule and became incorporated into 
the socialisation process which was passed down to future generations. Thus 
although Greece became a parliamentary democracy after independence, its social 
and cultural environment was a product of its eastern heritage and these 
characteristics make it distinct in many ways from its EU partners. Thus traditional 
social arrangements, such as clientelist networks, underwent adaptations with the 
emergence of parliamentarism after Greek independence, but they did not disappcar 
from the political and social arena. The intention in the analysis which follows is to 
expose where these traditional features appear to fill in the gaps of legitimacy within 
the political and economic environments. At the same time the discussion will 
exhibit how they create tensions, resistance, and obstacles for the modernisation 
process and for the adoption of a more 'rational' (in a Weberian sense) mentality in 
Greece. 
As mentioned briefly in Chapter Two of this study, 3 the Greek state has been 
examined in light of two theoretical paradigms, patrimonialism and 
See L. S. Stavrianos, The Balkans Since 1453, (NY: Holt, Rinehart and Winston) 1958, pp. 209- 
299; and Richard Clogg, A Concise Histon, of Greece, (Cambridge: Cambridge Univers, ty Press) 
1992, pp. 47-99 for historical accounts of this era of nation building in Greece. 
2Max Weber, Econom 
iv and 
Society, Guenther Roth and Claus Wittich, eds., (Los Angeles, 
California: University of California Press) 1978, Vol. 1. pp. 231-241. 
3See Chapter Two in this study, especially 2.5 The Greek State. 
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underdevelopment. Although distinct in many ways, these theories and their 
conclusions are not mutually exclusive-, on the contrary, one can utilise both 
theoretical frameworks which often complement each other. Obviously the former 
framework emphasises socio-cultural variables in its analysis. ýý'hile the latter 
underscores the economic determinism associated with Greece's development, or 
rather its lack thereof. For the purpose of examining the Greek state and civil 
society, therefore, observations and explanations from these two theories will be 
drawn upon. The relationship of state and nation (Ovo; -- ethnos) in Greece will be 
discussed when examining security and defence issues in Chapter Eight of thi-, ý'. 
study. As will be later revealed, this relationship has contributed to an embodiment 
of the notion of ethnos into the modem Greek state in a far-reaching manner which is 
also tied into the question of legitimacy. An explanation of the idea of nc('Tpt5a 
(patreda -- roughly translated as homeland, referring to a paternalistic attachment to 
one's country and more particularly to one's particular locality) will likewise be taken 
up in Chapter Eight. 
4.3 The Greek Civic Environment 
When compared with her northern EU partners, Greece has an undeveloped, weak 
civic environment. This can be partially explained historically due to the fact that 
Greece did not experience the effects of 19th century liberal theory which introduced 
modern civil society (and its structures and institutions) to the rest of western 
Europe. 4 Isolated as she was nestled within the Ottoman Empire, Greece initially 
remained relatively unaffected by the movements of the Renaissance and the 
Enlightenment which were spreading their ideas across western Europe. 
Furthermore, it was not until the early twentieth century that Greece would begin to 
effectively industrialise and thus develop the accompanying western structures and 
institutions (and even then in a dysfunctional, contorted form). The middle class, 
farmers, and budding entrepreneurs in Greece throughout the 19th century as well as 
into the early part of the twentieth century (and many could claim this is still true 
today) remained dependent on the omnipresent state -- not the developing capitalist 
market -- for their survival. 
5 The state thus formed into a giant patron-client 
4See P. Nikiforos Diamandouros, "Greek Political Culture in Transition: Historical Or .I ky. gins, 
E-volution, Current Trends, " In Greece in the 1980's, Richard Clogg. ed., (London: MacMillan) 1983, 
pp. 43-69. 
5See Nicos Mouzelis, Modern Greece: Facets of Underdevelopment, (NY: Holmes & Meler 
Publishers, Inc. ) 1978, especially pp. 3-29, and his "Modernity, Late Development and Civil Soclcty, " 
In Civil Societ 
, v, 
John Hall, ed., (UK: Pinter Press) 1995, pp. 224-249. See likewise the seminal Nvork- 
by L. S. Stavrianos, The Balkans Since 1453, op. cit., especially pp. 467-482 for a discussion of 
Greece from the end of the nineteenth century to just before the First World War. 
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mechanistic network, employing huge numbers of individuals who would support 
those in power with their votes. 6 Hence according to many who have studied and 
analysed the Greek state at its inception, the role that the state had as one of the main 
employers perpetuating patron-client relationships hindered the general economic 
development of Greece, and certainly stifled (and perhaps eN, en suffocated) the 
development of other voluntary institutional forms and structures which could have 
acted as counterbalances. 7 
Other determinants which indirectly remain responsible for the retarded growth of 
Greek civil society immediately subsequent to Greek independence are the result of 
exogenous economic and political factors which have often had repugnant effects. It 
must be kept in mind that Greek internal affairs have been very much affected by 
foreign powers (in the early stages of Greek independence and up to World War 
Two primarily by the British, and in the post-World War Two era by the 
Americans). 8 Due to Greece's geographical location, she has always been vicwcd as 
an important country strategically by the west, acting as a democratic stronghold in 
southeastern Europe. Numerous historical examples can be recalled to testify to the 
fact that due to foreign pressures, Greece's domestic politics and hence society has 
been decidedly influenced by international actors, this being particularly evident 
during the years 1832-1923,9 so much so that Greece's national sovereignty was 
made ambiguous. Therefore one needs to consider how foreign policy matters have 
indirectly intervened in the development of Greek society, as political leaders in 
Greece have frequently been preoccupied with foreign policy issues which become 
intertwined with domestic concerns. As will be discussed subsequently in this study 
in Chapter Seven, the Greek economy and Greece's economic development (or 
underdevelopment) has also been decisively influenced by the influx of foreign 
capital. 
617or example, during the decade of 1870, Greece had (among every 10,000 residents) 
approximately seven times more civil workers than did the United Kingdom. These statistics found 
quoted in Nicos Mouzelis, (in Greek) "To Kpd-to; ITi1v YaTepq Avdnii-)ýTj: IGTOPI. Ký; KW 
11)yKP1T1K6q AtaoTdoei. q. " EAAqviK4 EmOe(ýpqorq 17oAirix-tjý Eirlar4, ui7;. (AOýva: Ocpýkto) 
lavoudpio; 1993, (Y. 73. 
7See Nicos P. Mouzells, Politics lit the Senzi-Periphery: Earl ,v 
Parliamentarism and Late 
Industrialisation ill the Balkans and Latin Anterica. (London: MacMillan) 1986. 
8For an historical explanation of how foreign powers have affected Greek internal affairs, see. 
Theodore Couloumbis, John Petropoulos, and Harry Psormades, eds. Foreign Interference ill Greek 
Politics, (NY: Pella Publishing Co. ) 1976. See also Susannah Verney and Theodore Couloumbis 
"State- International Systems Interaction and the Greek Transition to Democracy in the mid- 1970s, " In 
Encouraging Dernocrac. v, Geoffrey Pridham ed., (NY: St. Nlartin's Press) 1991, pp. 103-124. 
9Theodore Couloumbis, John Petropoulos, and Harry Psomiades, eds. Foreign Inicrference ill 
Greek Politics, op. cit.. esp. pp. 35-46. 
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Following from the above discussion, it is possible to enumerate at least four 
features central to an analysis of civil society in Greece. 
(1) As mentioned in Chapter Two, Greece continues to be characterised by a highly 
centralised state in which the central government holds the reigns of power and 
assigns and distributes precious state resources, which continuously feeds the patron- 
client system. Since the locus of power is at the centre, it is here where the decision- 
making process occurs and where the negotiations and deal-making takes place. As 
will be discussed in the next chapter, Greece's centralised administration is also 
mirrored in the structure of the political system (for example, a unicameral 
Parliament, the absence of 'separation of powers' and of 'checks and balances, ' 
executive -- Prime Ministerial dominance over the legislature). Recent attempts at 
decentralisation have not as yet been successful at functionally devolving power to 
local governmental units. 
(2) There are entrenched patron-client networks still in operation today which 
Greece inherited from her Ottoman past which have resulted in a commingling of the 
1private' vs. 'public' spheres. Structurally, (on a 'macro' level) this can be seen 
through: (a) church and state which are not separate -- the Greek Orthodox religion 
is taught in the public schools in Greece, thus Hellenism is still identified with 
Orthodoxy; and (b) various civil laws, which although radically restructured in the 
1980's, 10 are still indicative of gender inequalities which perpetuate the patriarchal 
nature of Greek society. On a day to day basis (micro-level), one witnesses this 
'commingling' of the private vs. the public spheres in public offices -- banks, tax 
offices, etc. -- and through public services -- utilities and hospitals, for example, 
where preferential treatment is dispensed to those who have a 'messo' (literally 
translated as a go-between, meaning a connection or personal contact) who can 
expedite the bureaucratic red tape which results in delays and squandered time. The 
large number of self-employed in Greece as well indicates this coalescing of private 
and public domains, in which family businesses are still very widespread in Greece. 
1017or a description of Family Law 1329/83 that was passed by PASOK eliminating the npoiKa 
-- dowry. legalising civil weddings, etc., and Family Law 1483/84 which outlined the specifics of 
tparental' leave, see Laura Cram, "Women's Political Participation in Greece Since the Fall of the 
Colonels: From Democratic Struggles to Incorporation by the Party -State? " Democratization, Vol. 1, 
No. 2, Summer 1994, pp. 229-250. For another overview of the social policies undertaken during 
PASOK's tenure in power in the 1980's, see Adamantia Pollis, "Gender and the Social Change in 
Greece: The Role of Women, " In The Greck Socialist Experiment, Theodore C. Kariotis. ed., (NY. 
Pella Pub. Co. ) 1992. pp. 279-303. 
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(3) There is immature associational and interest group formation II partIN'duetothe 
over-riding position that the political environment (i. e. the political party system) 
has over the social in terms of organisational power. As Sotiropoulo.. ", ha, ý 
accurately described: 
There are only a few ethnic and linguistic minorities in Greece; the 
church is bound to the state; voluntary associations are sparse and social 
service organizations are sanctioned by the state-, gender groupings, peace 
movements, and environmental groups do not enjoy a long life, and they 
usually fall under the tutelage of one of the political parties. In short, 
many private or independent associations and institutions in Greece are 
unable to support a strong civil society. 12 
The development of 'horizontal' organisations in Greece which could break the 
patronage networks has been slow. As to the cause of this, there are varying L_ 
opinions: on the one hand it has been argued that because political parties play the 
central role in society, 'horizontal' organisations are frail and short-lived; on the other 
hand, in the absence of interest and associational groups, political parties have taken 
on the role of being the main instrument for communication between social forces 
and the state. In the former argument the political party system is seen as the cause 
hindering the development of such organisations; in the latter argument, the absence 
of such organisations has precipitated the al I -encompassing role of political parties. 
Viewed together, however, these two positions appear to be two sides of the same 
coin, and their conclusions are in fact quite complementary. 
(4) The state bureaucracy, best characterised as a bloated public sector, is an 
administrative state apparatus which serves the government (the party) in office and 
which simultaneously perpetuates the patrimonial nature of the Greek state. 13 Since 
each party that comes into office places into the bureaucracy its own people (which 
I ISee Dimitri A. Sotiropoulos, "A Colossus with Feet of Clay: The State in Post- A uthori tari an 
Greece, " In Greece, The New Europe, and the Changing Inteniational Order, Harry J. Psomiades and 
Stavros B. Thomadakis, eds., (NY: Pella Publishing Co. ), 1993, especially pp. 49-52. 
121bid., p. 5 1. See also Laura Cram "Women's Political Participation in Greece Since the Fall 
of the Colonels: From Democratic Struggles to Incorporation by the Party-State? " op. cit., who 
explores the issue of women's participation in Greece through political parties and in her conclusion 
suggests that "In some respects then the women's organisations may have damaged their own cause as 
women are increasingly joining the new women's sections of the major parties rather than the broader 
women's organizations. " p. 246. 
13Christos Lyrintzis has labeled this relationship between the bureaucracy and party patronage as 
'bureaucratic clientelism' which he explains is " .. a 
distinct form of clientelism and consists of 
systematic infiltration of the state machine by party devotees and the allocation of favors through it. 
It is characterised by an organised expansion of existing posts and departments in the public sector 
and the addition of new ones in an attempt to secure power and maintain a party's electoral base. " 
"Political Parties in Post-Junta Greece: A Case of 'Bureaucratic Clientelism'? " ýý'cst European 
Politics, Vol. 7, No. 2, April 1984. p. 103. 
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means it creates more positions in the bureaucracy since a majority of public sector 
jobs are permanent positions), it has become nearly impossible for the bureaucracy 
to formulate a plan for modernisation and put it into practice in the time period 
during which that party holds the reigns of power. The irony is that the bureaucracy 
creates more bureaucracy and an endless spiral is formed which means that it has 
been very difficult to consolidate and manage. The Greek state started out with a 
plump, hydrocephalic bureaucracy which continued patron-client relationships as 
opposed to creating an independent bureaucratic structure (ý la Weberian model) that 
could become part of a modem institutional -structural formation. 14 
A unique characteristic of the Greek public sector and of citizens' desires to become 
part of it which captures the essence of the matter is that "... Greece is the only 
capitalist economy in Europe in which the vast majority of its youth aims at a 
nonproductive position in the public sector ...,, 
15 Citizens find public sectoi- 
positions alluring as they provide for job security, which means that they are not 
easily made redundant; they have attractive health and social welfare benefits, 
standard vacation time, standard working hours, etc., and they are not under any 
pressure within the work environment to produce. All these appear to make the 
public sector appealing, even though salaries are not as high as in the private sector, 
and there are certainly not many (or any) opportunities which allow for individual 
innovation or creativity. 
Based upon these aforementioned four points one can arrive at some tentative 
conclusions. 
First, the avenues by which political participation occurs in Greece is through 
political parties which are the main actors in the absence of interest groups and 
voluntary associations. The political party as a political structure within the Greek 
political system in the post-junta era has taken on exaggerated proportions. This is 
partially historically explainable and partially understandable due to modem political 
leadership which has done nothing to eradicate party rivalry and indeed often feeds 
on and enhances it for its own political purposes. As has been mentioned in regards 
I 4Dimitris Sotiropoulos again discusses the relationship between the Greek bureaucracy and 
political parties in Greece in a more polished form found (in Greek) in "KpaTticý I-paoEloKpaTia Kai 
I1oXtTtKd K6ppaTa (YTT1 Mc-canoXureu-rticý EXXd8a: Mia Y-Xýaq Avtcyopponiaq. " EAArjvix-ý 
E, TiOe6pr7orrj 17611 riic4; Exiarýpq;. (AOýva: E)F-pýkto) OKT6PP1Oq 1993, o. 83-100. In English see 1ý 
his empirical study of Greek bureaucrats and politicians "Bureaucrats and Politicians: A Case Study 
of the Determinants of Perceptions of Conflict and Patronage in the Greek Bureaucracy under 
PASOK rule, 1981-1989, " British Jounial of Sociology, Vol. 45, No. 3, Sept. 1994, pp. 349-365. 
15Janies Petras, et. al. "Greek Socialism: The Patrimonial State Revisited, " In Ah, diterraneall 
Paradoxes, James Kurth and James Petras eds. (Providence. Rhode Island: Berg Publishers) p. 170. 
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to the penetrating role of political parties and how this has affected civil society. 1. ... 
Greek civil society is weak because it has itself been permeated by party politics and, 
as a result, the state cannot count on civil society to fend off political parties. " 16 
Second, although there remain formidable problems in enhancing a society such as 
the Greek one which consists of an uneasy coexistence of certain congenital 
traditional features along with evolving modem characteristics, the reality is that 
modern Greek governments have done nothing substantial to transform onerous 
socio-economic structures which perpetuate the existing patrimonial state. Neither of 
the two main political parties have effectively put into practice a successful 
modernisation programme to bring about real structural change. Instead, they have 
created institutional changes, as PASOK did in updating civil laws in the 1980's, but 
"[t]he institutional changes were shallow and fragile, specially as they were imposed 
from above by party-state bureaucracies rather than organically developed from 
below by the independent will and participation of the people. " 17 Thus the 1980's 
and 1990's have been decades where the existing (traditional) social, political, and 
economic structures persist despite promises made by governments to change the 
status quo. Both PASOK and New Democracy have periodically promised that 
public sector jobs will be based on examination, i. e. meritocracy, for example, yet 
promoting one's own public employees --those who are of the same party that is -- 
still goes on in practice. In April of 1995 examinations for public sector jobs saw a 
50% turnout only (of those who originally signed up to take the examinations), and 
as was commented in the press at the time, perhaps this was because the public was 
not convinced that there would be a merit system after all in determining public 
sector positions, even though examinations were held. 
The Greek educational system is another structure which is in need of vast 
regeneration. 18 Antiquated means of teaching are still employed within a system 
which emphasises passive learning, memorisation, and the status quo. Instructors at 
university require their own texts as requisite reading and often do not introduce 
other works or materials by other scholars. Bereft of both intellectual stimuli and the 
necessary physical resources such as adequate university classrooms, computer 
technology, library facilities, etc., the Greek university environment has been unable 
1613imitris Sotiropoulos, "A Colossus with Feet of Clay: The State in Post-Authoritarian 
Greece, " op. cit., p. 5 1. 
17Jarnes Petras, et al, op. cit., p. 189. 
18See OECD Examiner's report, Educational Polic ,y 
Revieiv. - Greece, April 1996, requested bý, 
the Greek government, which confirms some of the observations made here about the need to 
introduce structural changes into the Greek educational system. See especially Part V of the report 
"Needed: A Strategy for Change. " 
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to assist in the process of socialisation which could eradicate undesirable 
characteristics of society such as intolerance, rigidity, formalism and arrogance. The 
fact that the constitution does not acknowledge private educational institutions 
operating in Greece at the tertiary level is another indication that changes are needed. 
What has occurred in the field of education in the absence of a sufficient number of 
places at the state run universities is that other institutions of higher learning have 
emerged to fill in the gaps. While a few of these private educational institutions are 
serious centres of learning, the vast majority are out to seek profit without a 
fundamental concern for the quality of education they provide. At present in Greece 
there is no organisation, voluntary or state run, that is overseeing what these 
institutions are teaching which could act as a vehicle for accreditation thus requiring 
certain educational standards. Such examples as these visibly lay bare the clairn for 
renovating Greek structures and institutions. 19 
Hence the stale environment in Greece can be attributed to modern governi-nents 
throughout the past fourteen years -- regardless of which party has been in power -- 
which have not modernised Greek state infrastructures resulting in Greece finding 
herself in one of the most disadvantaged positions economically among her EU 
partners. Modem governments' inability to activate the process of modernisation can 
partially explain the low level of social legitimacy, using Weiler's definition of the 
term, 20 felt among citizens for recent governments. This is a socio-cultural factor 
which weighs heavily into the question of legitimacy in Greece. 
Third, the former Byzantine regime and its patrimonial character and "... the 
conception of the self held by the Greek Orthodox Church -- a conception based 
mainly on mystical experience-21 are two factors, according to Charalambis and 
Demertzis, which have prevented the formation of a modern understanding of 
citizenship in Greece. 
19What needs to be also mentioned is that Greece has not fully implemented EU Council 
Directive of 21 December 1988 "on a general system for the recognition of hIgher-educatIon diplomas 
awarded on completion of professional education and training of at least three years' duration. " 
(89/48/EEC), Official Jounial of the European Conintunities, No L 19/16,24 January 1989. An action 
was brought against Greece by the Commission on 27 July 1993,93/C 244/08, for not implementing 
this directive, and it went to the European Court of Justice, Case C-365/93,23 March 1995, who 
found that Greece failed to fully implement the Council Directive and thus failed to fulfill its 
obligations under the EEC Treaty. 
20See Chapter One in this study. 
21 Dimitris Charalambis and Nicolas Demertzis, "Politics and Citizenship in Greece: Cultural and 
Structural Facets, " Jounial of Modent Greek Stu&es, Vol. 11, No. 2. Oct. 1993, pp. 2 19-240. 
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The role of the Greek Orthodox Church in society indeed continues to be a dynamic 
one. As was mentioned previously, church and state in Greece are united. 2' and the 
Greek Orthodox religion is taught in public school, from grammarschool through to 
the end Of XI)KF-tOV (in other words, up until uniý, ersity level education). On ones' 
identification card (, raur6TqTa -- taftotita) there remains a description and place for 
religion. Unless otherwise specified, Greek Orthodox is almost alývays 
automatically placed in the description slot. The constitution protects Orthodoxy by 
defining it as the official religion of the country. Priests' salaries as well are derived 
from the national budget since by law they are 'public' workers. What also must be 
kept in mind when discussing religion is that there is a very high level of religious 
homogeneity in Greece today. 23 This does not mean that there are not ethnic and 
religious minorities residing in Greece at present, but they make up a very small 
percentage of the overall population. The Greek Church (EKKkTJ(Yic( --'Ekllisia') is a 
very important and integral institution in Greek society, and plays a decisive and 
defining role for the Greek people. 24 The Orthodox Church has taken on a secular 
role at times as well, for example from December 1944 to September 1946, 
Archbishop Damaskinos of Athens served as avrtPaatkF-u'; - regent - until the 
arrival of King George 11. A second example is that of Cyprus, when Archbishop 
Makarios III acted as Archbishop and president of Cyprus from 1960-1977. There 
are many who are of the opinion that in fact the church has acted as a legitimating 
force for the political regime in power by supporting the status quo. 25 The Church 
openly supported the military junta in Greece from 1967 to 1974, which revealed 
most pronouncedly its authoritarian political leaning. The leader of the military 
junta, Colonel Papadopoulos, in an attempt to solidify his position with the church, 
forced the then archbishop to resign and replaced him with the choice of the Palace, 
Archbishop leronymos Kotsonis in 1967. Several other bishops were likewise 
ousted and replaced with more pro-junta religious personnel. When Papadopoulos 
was replaced by Brigadier Dimitrios loannidis in 1974, Archbishop leronymos was 
forced out, and the new military leader replaced him with Archbishop Seraphim of 
Athens. 
22Thc 1975 Constitution of the Hellenic Republic, Section 11 Relations of the Church and State, 
Article 3. 
23Grcece has the highest level of religious homogeneity within the EU, with 98% of the 
population identifying itself as Greek Orthodox. EUROBAROMETER #42, Spring 1995, B. 61. 
24See Theofanis G. Stavrou, "The Greek Orthodox Church and Political Culture in Modern 
Grecce. " In Givece Preparesfor the Tivent 
- y-first 
Centuq, Dimitris Constas and Ilieofanis G. Stavrou 
eds., (Baltimore and London: The John Hopkins University Press) 1995, pp. 35-56. 
25See Adaniantia Pollis, "Eastern Orthodoxy and Human Rights, " Hunian Rights QuarterlY 15 
The John Hopkins Univcrsity Press, 1993, pp. 339-356. 
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Hence Eastern Orthodoxy as a religion. reinforcing spiritualism and mysticism. 
negating the idea of individualism26 while exemplifying devotion to God. is seen to 
be in contradistinction to the modem western rational world ý, iew of natural rii! ht, 
and fundamental freedoms. Religion, therefore, appears to be one of the traditional 
characteristics of Greek society which most pronouncedly has been used to reveal 
the schism between East and West, between Greece's traditional herita(ze and its 
striving towards acquiring a European identity. In response to the EUROBAROMETER 
question of "Whether you do or don't follow religious practices, would you say that 
you are ... ?" 93% of those polled in Greece answered 'religious' as opposed to 'not 
religious, ' 'an agnostic, ' 'an atheist, ' or 'don't know. 27 Greece had the highest 
percentage of those who responded 'religious, ' followed by Portugal and Ireland, 
respectively. However, ones' relationship with religion and with God (or some other 
force) is a very personal and private affair, and sweeping generalisations of how 
Greeks have internalised Orthodoxy and how this has affected their views would be 
bereft of meaning (that is a vast topic which cannot be explored here in any depth). 
Having said that, however, it is clear that Eastern Orthodox dogma is in stark 
contrast to the worldly natural rights and freedoms that were espoused during the era 
of the Enlightenment and which became part of modern constitutional frameworks. 
Therefore, any analysis of Greek society cannot ignore the role of the Greek 
Orthodox religion and its impact on the individual and on society as a whole. 
However, it would be equally as erroneous to assume that Greek Orthodoxy cannot 
be reconciled with the features of present day society. There are those who are of 
the opinion that several main tenets of Orthodoxy, such as those of understanding 
relationships of love, love of God, and ones' person -- np6awno (as opposed to 
individuation, meaning viewing individuals as entities) and that of society, are 
indeed reconcilable with those features promoting the modernisation of Greek 
society. 28 
Whatever one's interpretation of the role of Greek Orthodoxy in society, what 
remains undisputed is that it plays a defining role for a large percentage of the Greek 
population. It continues to influence the political culture of the country and colours 
discussions on a variety of social issues. Church authorities are very vocal and their 
commentaries often appear in the mass media reflecting the views of the Church. 
26"In Eastern Orthodoxy there is no individualization of the person. Except for gender, humans 
are undifferentiated; there is no recognition of individual personality. Persons are 
interchangeable parts of the mystical unity of the religious community ... " Ibid., p. 343. 27See FUROBAROME7ER #42, Spnng 1995, B. 61. 
28For a provocative discussion of the Enlightenment and Orthodoxy, see Nicos Mouzelis (in 
Greek) "AtaoKmiap6; Kai wop0o&oýia, " TO BRMA. Nt, -', E. TqX4ý;, 21 IVIdiou, 1995, mB1 -132. 
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Nevertheless the massive influence the Church has had on Greek society in the past 
is no longer apparent in Greece in the 1990's. HoweN, er, its ability to determine 
public opinion and to contour civil society should as well not be oN'erlooked nor 
underestimated. 
4.4 How EU Membership Has Affected Greek Society 
The question of how Greece's membership in the Union has influenced Greek 
society has most recently begun to preoccupy Greek scholars who have attempted to 
establish the ways in which Greek society has either been 'favourably influenced' or 
'adversely affected' by the European integrative process. As a fifteen yeýli- time 
period has now elapsed since Greece first entered the Community, opinions can be 
obtained from various sources -- academic, political, business -- which seem to 
either declare that Greece's membership in the EU has been its saving grace, or 
contrarily, has resulted in Greece's social disintegration. 29 
For example, there is one point of view which claims that EU membership has once 
and for all placed Greece within the 'western' world, and thus has positively 
identified her with the west, not only geographically but socially, politically, and 
economically as well. As Arghyrios Fatouros has written: " ... entry in the EC 
provides a final answer to the age-old question, whether Greece belongs to the West 
or the East -- ... Greece has aligned itself with rationality and individualism as 
against organic community processes and spontaneous, if not irrational, urges. " 30 
For authors like Fatouros, the dilemma over whether Greece belongs to the East or 
the West has finally come to an end, and Greece's Eastern tradition is not perceii, ed 
as contradicting western modernisation or western values but instead "... is seen 
rather as an element that enriches (or can enrich) Greek society and life. "3 I 
However, the mere fact that this question is still being discussed and argued seems to 
reveal that there are still discrepancies and different interpretations as to exactly how 
Greece is (and should be) identified. 32 Additionally, it can be said that belonging to 
an organisation such as the EU may be symbolic of adopting new values, but 
29For an analysis of these two conflicting cultures found within Greek society, see P. Nikiforos 
Diamandouros, "Politics and Culture in Postauthoritarian Greece, 1974-91: An Interpretation, " 
Richard Clogg, ed. Greece, 1981-1989: The Populist Decade, (NY: St. Martin's Press) 1993, pp. 1-25. 
30Arghyrios A. Fatouros, "Political and Institutional Facets of Greece's Integration in the 
European Community, " In Greece, The New Europe, and the Changing International Order, op. cit., 
p. 23. 
311bid., p. 35. 
32For a very polemic essay on Greece and her sense ofidentity see Nikolaus Wenturi" "Political 
Culture. " In Greece and the EC Membership Evaluated, Panos Kazakos & P. C. loakimidis eds., (N)' 
St. Martin's Press) 1994, pp. 225-237. 
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substantive evidence of these new values being adopted and operationalised is also 
required. 
Positive responses to EU membership have as well come from those who see 
Greece's membership in the EU as a way of forcing constructive reform,, within 
existing Greek structures that would not easily occur otherwise. As Stavros 
Thomadakis has remarked concerning the Greek public sector: 
... the Greek public sector will increasingly have to operate in an 
environment where its performance will be measured by not only a domestic 
but also an international yardstick. Thus under the influence of increasing 
mobility, it will come under pressure to provide goods and services also 
offered by public sectors of more advanced economies in Europe. 33 
The notion here is that Greece will have to abide by a higher standard of liý, inc, -- 
those of the more advanced European partners, and thus in one way or another will 
be forced to reform the public sector (and other infrastructures) so as to meet the 
requirements for EU integration. Although this appears to be a plausible argument, 
if one observes the economic realm where numbers can sometimes facilitate explicit 
comparisons, the somber reality is that Greece is still very far away indeed t'rom 
reaching economic integration, no matter how integration is defined. 34 Greece 
unfortunately also has not upgraded social services and in general the overall 
organisation of the public sector continues to operate in the same manner as it has in 
the past. Thus the process of change in Greece has met up with many obstacles, both 
from those who are opposed to change because it is perceived of as foreign, and 
from those who fear that it will create innumerable disruptions to a well-established 
way of life. Resistance to change continuously arises from a large number of Greek 
citizens who are directly dependent on the state for employment, for example. That 
Greece has been affected in many ways by policies decided on in Brussels and 
Strasbourg and continues to be affected is not doubted. What seems presently 
unrealistic is to assume that simply as a consequence of EU membership, Greece 
will metamorphose into a modern western state on par with her north European 
partners. In other words, indigenous forces need to match exogenous forces 
promoting change for progress towards modernising the Greek state to Occur 
successfully. The case of Greece's underdeveloped civil society and its relationship 
with the EU may be important in another way, however -- that which concerns 
33Stavros B. Thomadakis, "European Econornlic Integration, The Greek State, and the Challenges 
of the 1990s, " In Greece, The New Europe, and the Changing International Order, op. c1t., p. 360. 
34Despite the fact that Greecc's inflation rate fell below 10% in May 1995 for the first time in 
twentv-two years. 
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further enlargement of the Union with members from Eastern and Central Europe 
joining. When and if the Union expands towards Central and Eastern Europe. the 
case of Greece may prove salutary for those countries which have passed through 
similar historical experiences (i. e. other Balkan countries). 
A consideration of popular responses to EU membership reveals there is certainly a 
sizable percentage of the Greek population which believes that EU membership will 
secure for Greeks civil liberties that would otherwise not be assured by the national 
government. European Union membership is also seen as a way to bring to Greecc a 
higher social status within Europe and within the international arena, as was 
mentioned above. EUROBAROMETER surveys confirms Greeks' belief that EU 
membership is 'a good thing' and they believe likewise that their country has 
benefited from membership. However, somewhat ironically, at the same time, when 
asked how much they felt they knew about the Maastricht Treaty, for example, 671/c 
of those asked admitted they 'knew just a little' or 'heard of it, but nothing else. '35 
What can be surmised from these surveys is that Greeks support the EU, but they 
appear to be unsure of what it is they are supporting. In other words, a majority of 
the Greek population is not informed (or worse still is ill informed) about EU 
policies and processes. Too few Greek political authorities know the details of the 
Agreement of Social Policy and what that entails, for example. The general public 
knows little or nothing about these issues, as they are little discussed in the 
Parliament and only superficially in the press. There is also a percentage of the 
Greek population that views the EU as a panacea for the countries economic woes, 
and thus they somewhat blindly support the EU simply for the monetary resources 
which Greece receives from the EU and carry the hope that the EU will somehow 
rectify Greece's economic difficulties. It has become somewhat common knowledge 
in Greece that a few individuals have made huge sums of money using EU funds in 
ways not intended by those who have dispensed the funds. This illicit use of EU 
money initially created obstacles in Greece receiving funds through the Second 
Community Support Framework for 1995-1999.36 
35EUROBAROMETER, No. 38, December 1992, p. A24. See also EUROBAROMETEP, No. 39, 
June 1993, p. 54 where 74% of Greeks did not feel well informed about the EC. The same question 
six months later in EUROBAROMETER, No. 40, December 1993, sees 78% ot'Greeks feeling not well 
informed about the EC. The percentage of not well informed Greeks has remained high, while 
perceived benefit for Greece plummeted 10 percent (from 7917c to 69%) in the Jul), 1994 
EUROBAROMETER surveys. 
36The Greek Sunday newspaper TO BHMA, reported that after investigation into hov" Greece 
spent the First Community Support Framework -- the Delors I Package, the investigative commission 
of the EU supposed]\ requested that some 120 million drachmas be returned to the Community 
coffers, as EU programmes in Greece were not implemented in keeping with Community policý' and 
law. See To BIIMA 'rqý, Eup67rrj, ý, 14 May 1995, p. E I. Unfortunately, the findin, _-s in this article 
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The focal point of discussion here which arises as concerns Greece and the EU is 
whether or not EU membership for Greece confers a degree of legitilnacýy that the 
Greek state would not have on its own. This remains a disputed point, as there are 
those who may be described as 'pro-Europe, ' who have argued that yes. indeed. 
Greece's membership in a European community has dragged it out of its previous 
weary political, social, and economic condition and required her to aspire to 
European standards (of living, of production, of growth, etc. ). This in turn is seen as 
giving it a degree of social legitimacy, in the sense that improved performance in a 
European Union carries with it clout in such other activities as diplomacy with other 
non-EU members. This results in Greece being viewed in a more favourable light by 
its citizens, thus increasing societal acceptance of governmental activities. 
On the other end of the discussion, there are those who believe that EU membership 
for Greece has just exaggerated her distinctive socio-cultural characteristics as a 
country and has more pronouncedly revealed that Greece is quite unlike her ELI 
partners, historically, geographically, in terms of economic development, as regards 
her foreign policy with neighbouring countries, etc. 37 The argument here is that 
Greece is not part of the core and will remain outside not only because she cannot 
possibly reach the levels of production, and in general of development, which her 
northern partners now enjoy, but also owing to the perennial legacies of Greece's 
heritage which have infiltrated the modern Greek state. Thus in this way, Greece 
does not gain legitimacy by being in the Union; on the contrary, her dissimilar socio- 
cultural features simply become more conspicuous when they are compared with 
those of her EU partners. 
Furthermore, the remark by Thomadakis that Greeks continue to "... look to Athens, 
not Brusselles, as the arbiter, manager, and regulator of social, economic, and 
political affairs in the country-38 may well be more revealing than first appears. 
Although certainly Greeks have come to realise that EU membership is affecting 
them via various policies which are being decided in Brussels, they nonetheless 
continue to perceive that at the national level they can make their grievances known, 
were based on an internal document (confidential) which means that it is unavailable for public 
viewing since it is officially 'unpublished. '
37"... Greece's 'Eastern' historical and cultural legacies make the incorporation and assimilation 
of fundamental European norms an agonizing enterprise. Many Greeks view the EC 
primarily in economic terms -- ... while remaining oblivious to more sweeping ramifications. 
... For 
Greece to psychological ly and culturally accept a European identity necessitates a 
massive transformation of its world view. " Adamantia Pollis, "Eastern Orthodoxý, and 
Human Rights, " op. cit., p. 355. 
38Stavros B. Thomadakis, op. cit., p. 360. 
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and that there they can affect the decision-making process (through the existing 
structures and mechanisms, i. e., the political party system). Therefore the fact that 
Greeks perceive their country as benefiting from EU membership, and the fact 
likewise that they support integration in general terms, does not necessarily translate 
into a high degree of legitimacy for the institutions of the EU (as in the sense of 
formal legitimacy in Weiler's terms). Neither does this enthusiasm that Greeks have 
for supporting European integration mean that they have been persuaded to believe 
that issues such as education, cultural policy, and worker rights should become EUT 
competencies. 
EUROBAROMETER surveys register some noteworthy opinions held among tile Greek 
general public which also shed further light on Thomadakis's remarks mentioned 
above. In answer to the question whether they believe national issues influence the 
vote at European elections or European issues, 85% of Greeks responded 
'national. '39 Additionally, well over a majority of Greeks believe that tile European 
Parliament should be given more power (57%)40 and should 'play a more important 
part than it does now' within the EU. 41 These figures represent the highest 
percentages among the EU general public. Consequently, the Greek general public 
appears to be neither convinced that the EU should become the repository for 
competencies considered to be within national jurisdiction, nor are they satisfied 
with the way the organs of the EU are operating today. 42 As will be cited in the 
next chapter of this study, Chapter Five, there is also a very high level of 
dissatisfaction among the Greek population as to the way democracy works in their 
own country and in the EU. 43 Interestingly enough, however, these views do not 
seem to come into contradiction with the fact that Greeks in general terms see the 
EU as "a good thing" as mentioned previously. 
39EUROBAROMETER, No. 4 1, July 1994, p. 6. 
401bid, p. 6. In answer to the EUROBAROMETER question: "As a European citizen, do you feel 
that the European Parliament protects your interests, " a combined 5317( of Greek polled answered "not 
very well, " (40%) or "not at all well. " (1317c) EUROBAROMETER, No. 42, Spring 1995, B. 28. 
Conceivably, viewed together these public opinion polls could be interpreted to mean either of two 
things: that Greeks feel that the EP does not have enough power to protect their interests', or 
contrarily, that even if given power the EP would still not be able to protect their interests. 
41EUROBAROMETER, #43, Autumn 1995, p. B. 49. SiXty-txvo percent of Greeks polled voiced 
their desire for a more decisive role for the EP within the European Union. 
42Discussions about the use of a referendum in deciding further changes and amendments to the 
TEU are beginning to surface in Greece. In May of 1995, KKE party leader Aleka Paparega 
requested that any changes proposed at the 1996 IGC should be put to a vote to the Greek people for 
their approval. See also, Roy Watson's "Referendums For All, " The European, 12-18 %lay 1995, p. I 
for details about the idea of a possible EU-wide referendum for proposed changes to the Maastricht 
Treaty. 
43Sce also in this study Chapter One 1.2.2 Democracy. 
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4.5 The Individual and Society 
An additional aspect of concern for those inquiring into how Greek society fit's into a 
European context has focused on the Greek personality and the Greek character. 44 
Adapting to European standards and norms are considered to be somewhat of an 
enigma among a sizable portion of the Greek populace as these supposedlý corne 
into contradiction with established (tradition) norms and practices in Greece (i. e. 
come into antithesis with what it is to be a 'Greek'). Seen in this way, attitudinal 
changes will need to accompany legislative changes for Greeks to perceive their 
position in the EU and the process of modernisation as beneficial and desirable. -4ý 
Remarking on what he believes are the particular characteristics of 'Greekness"46 
Constantine Tsoucalas writes: 
Greeks think they are authentically 'Greek' when they sing, dance, dream, 
laugh, feel, give, make love, or fight, eventually when they are clever, 
successful, or shrewd at the expense of others or the collectivity, but 
never when the 
,ý 
pursue, materialize, or submit to rational collective or 
societal goals. 4 
Tsoucalas's remarks can be interpreted to mean that Greeks never fully adopted 
western norms and patterns of behaviour such as the 'Protestant ethic' and other 
characteristics of free market societies. Hence Greece may have embraced western 
parliamentary democracy and a so-called free market system, but it has continued to 
cling to its premodern forms which include clientelist patterns of relationships and 
social organisation and have been resistant to the implementation of modernising 
forces. 48 Whether these characteristics, and in general whether the nature of 
441t seems worth mentioning as well that EUROBAROMETER #42, Spring 1995 recorded that 
91% of Greeks polled answered that they were 'very proud' or 'fairly proud' to be Greek, the second 
highest percentage in the EU after Ireland (93%). 
45See, Constantine Tsoucalas "Greek National Identity in an Integrated Europe and a Changing 
World Order, " In Greece, The New Europe, and the Changing International Order, op. cit., pp. 57- 
78. 
46See also Adam Ferguson, An Essay on the History, of Civil Society , where 
Ferguson, when 
discussing commerce and trade remarks about the Greeks by writing: "If their animosities were great, 
their affections were proportionate: they, perhaps, loved, where we only pity; and were stern and 
inexorable, where we are not merciful, but only irresolute. After all, the merit of a man is determined 
by his candour and generosity to his associates, by his zeal for national objects, and by his vigour in 
maintaining political rights-, not by moderation alone, which proceeds frequently from indifference to 
national and public interests, and which serves to relax the nerves on which the force of a private as 
well as a public character depends. " p. 199. 
47Constantine Tsoucalas, "Free Riders in Wonderland; or, Of Greeks in Greece, " In Greece 
Preparesfor the Twenty-first Centurý-, op. cit., p. 200. 
48See P. Nikiforos Diamandouros' discussion of the 'underdog culture' and the 'modernizing 
culture, ' "Politics and Culture in Postauthoritarian Greece, 1974-91: An Interpretation, " op. cit. For 
an historical explanation of their derivation, see L. S. Stavrianos, The Balkans Since 1453, op. cit., pp. 
esp. 269-299, who discusses the 'two Greek worlds': that of the Thanariotes' and of the Greek 
peasants. 
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Greekness can be reconciled with the prerequisites for modernisation remains a 
contentious issue. As has been discussed above, there are varying opinions as to 
whether or not Greek society can develop along lines in keeping with those outlined 
by those promoting the European project. For many this question was answered the 
moment Greece joined the Community and pledged to integrate and coordinate its 
policies and practices with those of its European partners. For others, the integrative 
process has been viewed as a painful and perturbing one, especially for the Greek 
people who have found themselves tom between wanting to experience a European 
standard of living and all that entails while at the same time seern unwilling to cut 
their ties with past practices which are inconsistent with modem demands. 
One particular group within Greek society which has been cited as that one which 
best encapsulates this antithesis is that of the new middle class. The rise of a new 
middle class in Greece --sometimes referred to as the nouveaux riches -- during the 
decades of the 1970's and 1980's were those who were most against 'footing the bill' 
of modernisation. As Petras, et. al. have written: 
Nourished on the myth of being an outsider, it [the new middle class] had 
consumed beyond the productive capacities of the state. Believing that Its 
private gains were simultaneously social gains for everyone, it perceived and 
aggressively presented any serious revenue-raising by the state as an attack 
on "the people. " This blindness on the part of the new middle class virtually 
precluded that the bourgeois republic would be able to ground itself on the 
same social content as the postwar regimes of Northern Europe. 49 
Thus this new middle class wanted to reap the benefits of consumerism and the other 
privileges that this brings with it, but not pay the costs (taxes) that this 
necessitates. 50 They were unable or unwilling to see that long-term economic 
growth requires long-term planning and some sacrifices on the part of all. Rather, 
this new rising middle class wanted short-term immediate economic solutions to the 
country's economic dilemmas which did not have short-term solutions. The 
economic dilemmas that Greece was facing by the middle of the 1980's -- a huge 
public debt and an equally large trade deficit, an ever growing imbalance between 
consumption and production, stagnation in investments -- were deep-seated 
structural economic defects that required innovative and forward-looking planning 
and steady and unswerving implementation on the part of government. To anyone 
who wished to observe the reality, these problems found within the economic sphere 
Could not be answered overnight. Yet the new middle class blinded itself to reality 
49James Petras, et. al., op. cit., p. 175. 
501bid., pp. 174-175. 
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and continued to demand goods that were out of the range of the state's capacity to 
produce unless extensive restructuring of state infrastructures occurred. 
Put bluntly, no government during the past fifteen years has been willing to pay the 
possible political costs involved in developing a macroeconomic programme which 
would demand higher production and industrial development as well as a tightenin'. 1 
of the belt in public spending and consumption. It is important to also emphasise 
that this phenomenon cuts across the political party spectrum in Greece. Therefore 
neither from government (from the political leadership of the country) nor from the 
nouveaux riches (who were reaping the rewards of the new consumerism) nor on a 
grassroots level has there been a sign that Greece is prepared to establish and put into 
practice a macroeconomic policy for modemising Greek society and its economy 
which will allow her to get in synchrony with her EU partners. Major structural and 
attitudinal changes are required in Greece before such necessary changes can be 
initiated by government, effectively implemented, and accepted by the Greek people. 
This is indeed a formidable feat but one which is attainable if there is a political 
leadership in Greece which accepts the challenge and has the creative ability to blend 
Greece's traditional features with the demands beckoning from the twenty-first 
century. 
Any discussion of the relationship between the individual and society in Greece 
requires one to again recall the experiences from Greece's past which have laid the 
foundation for modern Greek political culture. The fact that the notion of society as a 
collectivity is weak in Greece today, for example, is partially explicable when one 
recalls the sense of distrust that Greeks had for their Ottoman rulers and more 
generally their suspicion of authority figures and the ensuing reliance this created on 
farrfily members (and the extended family more generally) who were perceived to be 
the only individuals whom one could really trust. Under those circumstances, the 
concept of society, and the social did not develop as it did in northwest European 
states where notions such as the'common good' and 'community' had developed. Put 
differently, the social space in Greece did not have a civic nature to it, and this 
created an environment where individuals were out for themselves, acting 
impetuously, not necessarily taking into consideration what affects their actions 
might have on other members of society. This phenomenon is discernible in 
contemporary Greece within the economic sphere. For example, by looking at the 
percentage of self-employed, the largest percentage among EU member states, 
(approximately 50% of the employed population) one witnesses Greeks preferring to 
be their own bosses, running their own businesses and in continuing to partake, to a 
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degree, in nepotism. The extent to which tax evasion continues to be practiced 
among all social strata is another glaring demonstration of Greek's lack of respect for 
state authorities which will be taken up in Chapter Seven. The lack of organised 
interest groups and voluntary associations as well reveals that Greeks are disinclined 
to cooperate in modern collective organisational forms. 51 This has hindered the 
modernisation of Greek society and created obstacles (and sometinies even 
misunderstandings) between Greece and her EU partners since Greece's social space 
remains influenced by these traditional forms of social behaviour. Thus this 'free 
rider individual ism'5 2 as it has been identified by Tsoucalas, has been used to 
partially explain why Greeks have been unable to integrate into the EU at the pace 
that was originally intended. Yet at the same time, Greeks have very strong ties 
within the nuclear and extended family, and these bonds have been passed down 
from one generation to the next. It is very common for unemployed members of the 
family to be living at home, being supported by other family members. Young men 
doing their mandatory military service are subsidised financially by other family 
members, as are those who are studying at university. This supportive role of the 
family (both financially and morally) is a characteristic feature of Greek society, as 
parents continuously strive to have their children enjoy a better standard of living 
than themselves. 
Hence one observes quite strong ties which Greeks have with family members and 
relatives, yet this sense of concern remains mainly within the confines of one's own 
family and friends. Once one is removed from this sphere and enters the realm of 
relationships outside the domestic (for example, employer - employee relations, 
relations between public workers and the general public), there is a marked 
attitudinal and behavioural difference in terms of human relationships. Here one 
witnesses abrupt, impersonal, and often rude behaviour. This schizophrenia which 
Greeks apparently possess is difficult to explain to non-Greeks and often perplexing 
for Greeks themselves to comprehend. The result is a lack of a civic spirit in Greece 
and a form of distorted rationality which acts as a bulwark against change. It is not 
an exaggeration, then, to declare that Greek political culture is "... a culture marked 
by sharp and profound discontinuities over time.,, 53 
51 See Constantine Tsoucalas, (in Greek) " 'Týapnacýý&; ' IT9 X6)pa cwv 0aupd-low. Flept 
EXXývwv YTqv Ekkd8a. " EAArjviK4 E; ri0eojpr7arr7 HoAmK4ý E; ricrr4pr7I, -. (AOýva: E)F-pb. io) 
lavowipioý 1993, a. 9-52. A shorter version of this for an English speaking audience is found in 
Greece Preparesfor the Twem)-first Centuo-, op. cit. 
521bid., pp. 24-25. 
53P. Nikiforos Diamandouros, "Greek Political Culture in Transition: Historical Origins. 
Evolution, Current Trends, " op. cit., p. 44. 
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4.6 Conclusion 
Based on what has been discussed thus far, one can deduce that the problem of 
developing a modem Greek civil society is structural on one level, and attitudinal on 
another. For an understanding of how the lack of civil society feeds into the 
question of legitimacy in Greece, both of these levels need to be taken into account. 
It can be argued that in fact the lack of modem features of civil society and the 
continuation of traditional practices in Greece create barriers for Greeks in accepting 
and adapting western values and norms. This can result in a rejection of social 
policy initiatives at an EU level (for example, improving the quality of employee 
training, or devising new approaches to management in the public sector, both of 
which in Greece have met up with some resistance on the part of those involved) 
which are perceived as acceptable and quite welcome by other EU member citizenry. 
The paradox appears when EU policy proposals, which are not perceived as 
acceptable to Greeks crop up, and this is when Greeks retrieve their traditional past 
to legitimise their distinct (differing) position. But at the same time, these 
traditional practices domestically hinder the internal modernisation process in 
Greece and create problems for the national government which constantly needs to 
legitimise its actions domestically. 54 
Structurally, therefore, the Greek centralised state continues to play the dominant 
role in the allocation of state resources. It has come to be perceived of as the 
legitimate organ for dispensing these economic resources, and this practice has 
continued to fuel patron-client relationships. The lack of what can be considered 
standard western institutions and organisations of modern civil society within 
Greece55 has meant that the political party system continues to be perceived as the 
54jUrgen Habermas' discussion of the Legitimation Crisis (London: Heinemann Educational 
Books) 1973, may be partially applied to the case of the Greek state and its high level of intervention 
in the economic sphere which necessitates legitimacy of its actions but difficulties arise when one 
attempts to apply Habermas's theory literally to Greece. See welfare state discussion in Chapter One 
ofthis study. Since Greece can not be described accurately as a modern developed capitalist society 
as Haben-nas outlines, one must be careful in applying his analysis to the case of Greece. See also, 
JUrgen Habermas, Communication and the Evolution of Soclet , y, 
(Boston: Beacon Press) 1979, esp. 
ch. 5 "Legitimation Problems in the Modern State, " where he notes that "problems of legitimacy are 
not a speciality of modern times. " p. 181. Placed within this Haben-nasian discussion, the nature of 
the Greek state can be perhaps better examined. 
551n examining the particular structural and cultural characteristics of Greek society and how 
these influence the issue of legitimacy, Charalambis and Demertzis have commented that 
"Legitimacy is secured through procedures that lie outside the typical institutional context because the 
rational institutional context is applied to a society whose communicative core is the interpersonal 
client relationship rather than the labour market in the modern sense of that term. " Dimitris 
Charalanibis and Nicolas Demertzis, "Politics and Citizenship in Greece: Cultural and Structural 
Facets. " op. cit., p. 227. '17his can be cited as a distinctive aspect of legitimacy in Greece which 
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legitimate communicator between citizens and government. Since other interest 
groups and associations have been slow to form (or because the political party 
system has not allowed them to form) the political party system maintains its 
disproportionate share of power and influence within Greek society. UnI ess 
political party activities can be counterbalanced by other organisations and structures- 
-- not affiliated or under the tutelage of any political party -- practices such as those 
of rouspheti (favours granted by politicians to citizens in return for their vote at 
election time) will continue. 
For those who have supported Greek membership in the EU, the partial solution to 
Greece's structural problems lay within the Community. Basically, the argument 
that is promoted is that as European integration progresses and deepens, so too will 
the necessity for Greece to align its infrastructures and patterns of social behaviour 
with those of its EU partners. As the privatisation process is furthered along in 
Greece, and the state lessens its tight grip over the economic sphere and becomes 
less of an employer, the development of other organisations and associations will 
come into existence. This is seen as a way for traditional practices such as those 
found within the Greek patrimonial state to be gradually replaced by modern 
conventions which will be self-legitimising as they will arise from the bottom up, as 
opposed to being mandated by the state (from the top down). Therefore, patrimonial 
practices and patron-client relations may slowly give way to more impersonal 
relations as privatisation results in the gradual reduction of state owned firms and 
utilities. 
On an attitudinal level, (which is very subjective and thus difficult to outline and 
generalise about), Greeks possess certain socio-cultural characteristics and traits 
which distinguish them from other European Union citizenry and which can be 
interpreted as being in contradistinction to the prerequisites of modernisation. The 
case of Greek Orthodoxy has been cited here as an example of a religious dogma 
which has been rendered incompatible with some of the fundamental concepts on 
which western societies are based and which came to be established during the era of 
the Enlightenment such as those of personal freedoms and natural rights. This has 
been perceived as a hindrance to the development in Greece of basic principles and 
attitudes which are quintessential for the integrative process and for further 
coordination and synchronisation among EU member states. 




Attitudinal reorientation is naturally that which is most difficult to inspire. For ý"uch 
changes to occur within Greece, Greeks need to become much more aware and 
informed about the EU and its processes and policies and the affects of these on their 
lives. Clearly the educational system as a force involved in socialisation needs to 
take an active role in the dissemination of information and in introducing and 
encouraging thought and contemplation geared towards opening up Greek society. 
The various means of mass communication have the power to act as a transmitter of 
images and information which could allow for more focused debates and exchanges 
of ideas. Greeks need to find a way to utilise constructively their traditional socio- 
cultural characteristics, rather than perceiving them as anathema to modern westcrn 
values and norms. In this way, the contradictions which supposedly arise between 
Greece and her western allies will not lead to social legitimacy problems either with 
the EU or at home. 
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Chapter Five 
DEMOCRACY IN GREECE 
5.1 Introduction 
The central aim of this chapter is to remark upon the functional operation of 
democracy in Greece in order to examine its degree of political and social 
legitimacy. To facilitate a survey of the democratic process, a brief look at how the 
Greek political system functions will be attempted by investigating the main 
branches of government. Since political parties in Greece are considered to be 
extremely influential political actors, perhaps even the most influential, special 
attention will be drawn to them, in particular to their role within the political system 
as well as within the Greek political environment at large. A brief discussion of 
political culture in Greece will follow to make explicit the socio-cultural dynamics 
that are operating within Greek society which complement the remarks made in the 
previous chapter. In view of the fact that it is impossible to produce a comprehensive 
examination of the Greek political system in just one chapter, the post-authoritarian 
period (post- 1974 to the present) will be singled out as the era under consideration in 
this analysis. Finally, popular attitudes expressed towards how democracy operates 
in Greece will be explored in the final part of this chapter by relying on 
EUROBAROMETER surveys to more conclusively illustrate how the degree of popular 
legitimacy can be ascertained. 
5.2 Formal Legitimacy 
By sketching out an analysis of the functions and structures of the political 
systen, 56 in Greece, one can observe how the centralised nature of the Greek state 
and its operation is reflected in the structure of the political system (see Diagram 5.1 
The Greek Political System). At the core of the system, the three structures which 
predominate over policy-making and implementation and which make up the 
central administration are the Prime Minister, the legislature and the bureaucracy. 
The Prime Minister in Greece is a functional head of government who wields a 
great deal of decision-making power. As a result of the 1986 constitutional revision 
to the 1975 Constitution which reduced the functional powers of the President of 
56Sce Gabriel Almond and G. Bingham Powell, Jr., Comparative Politics Toda ' v, 
(Glený iew, 
Illinois: Scott, Foresman and Co. ) 1988, esp. chapter one on which the diagram here of the Greek 
Political Si-stent is loosciv based. 
ill 
The Greek Political System 
(formal aspects of legitimacy) 
President (symbolic head) 
policy-making and 
implementation takes place 
almost exclusively here at 
the core 
/ 
judiciary (Areos Pagos) 
Prime Minister (powerful functional head) 
Legislature (unicameral 300 member Parl., 
however the cabinet is the real policy-maker) 
Bureaucracy (huge public sector) 
From the International Environment: 
Influential Actors 
(1) European Union 
(2) Balkan neighbours 
(3) other international organisations (UN 
and NATO) 
Interest Articulation 
(1) political parties 
(2) Greek Orthodox Church 
(3) trade unions 
(4) other interest groups 
Diagram 5.1 The Greek Political System 
the Republic, the position of Prime Minister has been further enhanced, although the 
role of the President of the Republic remains vital as a 'regulator of the system' -- 
, pj_)OgtGTý;, ro, ) noXjr6, ')garoq., 57 The Prime Minister is to confer regularly with the 
President and keep the President informed of the state of the nation. The leaders of 
the opposition parties in Greece also meet with the President and discuss issues of 
national importance. 
It is noteworthy to remark upon the newness of the June 1975 Hellenic Constitution, 
(the fourth one in this century) and its 1986 revision. Significant as well is that 
57Aristoboulos Manesis, (in Greek) HEvvraypanic4 AvaOeojpr7o77 rov 1986, (OEGC; akOviKtj: 
IIctpa'rqpqTý; ) 1989, a. 30. Professor Manesis believes that although the powers of the President of 
the Republic were reduced as a result of the 1986 constitutional revie, ý, this does not mean that the 
role of the President has been reduced in importance, since the 1975 constitution invested a great deal 
of trust and responsibilities in the office of the President of the Republic for a system which is defined 
as a Presidential Parlianientar), Republic. Thus the 1986 revisions of the powers of the President 
must he understood in these terms. 
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Portugal adopted a new constitution in 1976, and Spain in 1977. The southern EU 
members thus share this similarity which stands in stark contrast to the other EU 
member-states, who have more senior and seasoned constitutions. Furthermore the 
constitutions of Greece, Portugal and Spain have been revised in the interim, 
amendments being perceived of as necessary for the smooth operation of 
government. This has no less helped to bolster the formal dimension of legitirnacy 
in these southern member states in their respective post- authoritarian eras. In the 
case of Greece, a national referendum on 8 December 1974 on the question of the 
future role of the monarchy in Greece preceded the adoption of the new constitution 
which further lent formal legitimacy to the ensuing constitution. As 69.217c voted 
against the restoration of the monarchy, the June 1975 constitution was indeed 
perceived of as a major event marking the return of democracy in the country and a 
break with past political practices. 
More generally speaking, the political system in Greece has been described as a 
centralised unitary system indicative of 'executive dominance., 58 One can certainly 
come to this conclusion by observing the overwhelming degree of power that the 
Prime Minister and his cabinet has in policy and in decision-making. The core of the 
political system is where power is concentrated and where the party in government 
holds the reigns and initiates policy-making. 
The unicameral 300-member parliament is composed of representatives from 
Greece's thirteen administrative regions which are divided into fifty-five prefectures 
-- vopot (which are further broken down into 5ýgot --municipalities) which have 
effectively no real independent power of decision-making. These local units act in 
an advisory capacity59 as opposed to making independent decisions concerning their 
localities, and hence continue to operate under the auspices of the core 
administration. It has only been since the October 1994 local elections that members 
58See Arend Lijphart, Thomas C. Bruneau, P. Nikiforos Diamandouros and Richard Gunther, 
"A Mediterranean Model of Democracy? The Southern European Democracies in Comparative 
Perspective, " West European Politics, Vol. 11, No. 1, Jan. 1988, pp. 7-25 for a comparison of the 
political characteristics of Italy, Spain, Portugal and Greece. Although these authors state that there 
have been attempts to view these four Southern European countries as being similar enough to 
warrant comparative studies, these authors do not believe that a 'Mediterranean model' of democracY 
can be developed since these countries " ... are not sufficiently similar to each other nor sufficiently different from other democratic regimes to fit a distinctive model of democracy. " Ibid., p. 7. 
59For a thorough analysis of prefectures in Greece and more generally the process of 
decentralisation in Greece see Susannah Verney and Foul] Papageorgiou, "Prefecture Councils in 
Greece: Decentralization in the European Community Context, " In The Regions and the European 
Community, Robert Leonardi ed., (UK: Frank Cass) 1993, pp. 109-137. See also Susannah Verney, 
"Central State--Local Government Relations, " In Greece and EC Mernbership Evaluated, Pýinos 
Kazakos &, P. C. loakimidis, eds., (NY: St. Martin's Press) 1994, pp. 166-180. 
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of prefecture councils (vogapXta-Ka augoo'oXtco, the so-called second tier of 
government, have been directly voted in by the public (supposedly keeping within 
the EU's principle of subsidiarity which aspires to bring government closer to the 
people). However, the prefecture councils as yet do not wield any real power since 
these local governmental councils still rely on the central government as their source 
of revenue (i. e., as yet do not have the power to collect local taxes, although this 
issue has now arisen and is being considered), 60 thus the promises of decentralising 
the political system and devolving powers to local administrative units in Greece 
made by both of the major parties --New Democracy and PASOK -- have not come 
to fruition. It should also be noted that local officials have become susceptible to tile 
same party patronage system as their counterparts in the central government. The 
fact as well remains that these local units have not yet developed the necessary 
organisational structures which could make them effective, and these certainly 
cannot form over night. There are some signs, however, that the prefecture councils 
may be given a degree of decision-making concerning their localities'61 but this will 
take time, a great deal of organisational restructuring on both the central and local 
levels, and will and detennination for successful implementation. 
As a forum for debate and discussion, the Greek Parliament (Bouxý) is dominated 
by exchanges between the party in government and the opposition, conducted mostly 
by party leaders. The voting in of new laws usually follows along the traditional 
party line route, MP's maintaining strong loyalty to their parties. The present 
parliament has representation from four political parties: PASOK (the majority with 
170 seats), New Democracy, Political Spring and KKE. As will be discussed below, 
the electoral system favours heavily the two larger parties at the expense of the 
others. However, since party loyalty is enduring, and owing to the fact that the 
601t should be mentioned that at the time of this writing there have been discussions taking place 
by political leaders concerning what the role of the prefecture councils should be, and views have 
been expressed that they should be given economic and administrative power to influence decisions in 
their localities. See for instance, TO BHMA, "Ava&dTaýrl (YT-qv Tonticý gou(yicE, " 10 Mapriox) 
1996. 
61 Development Minister Vasso Papandreou in a Press Conference held on 14 February 1996, 
before her address to the Federation of Greek Industries (SEB) General Council, stated that the 
present PASOK government headed by Kostas Simitis will promote devolution and regional planning 
in industry. To this end, on 5 March 1996, the cabinet decided to propose a measure to abolish the 
political position of Administrative Regional Director for Greece's thirteen regions and instead %vill 
create a post of general director to be filled by civil servants. This measure is perceived of (by the 
current government of Kostas Simitis) as a way to enhance local governmental power at the 
prefectural level. This amendment is to be discussed in Parliament on 22 April 1996 as put forth by 
the Finance Ministry. Athens News Agenc 
- N, 
Bulletin, 6 March 1996. Nevertheless, there are vast 
differences of opinion as to the pros and cons of the proposed amendment. For additional discussions 
for and against the abolition of administrative regional directors see for example, the Greek 
newspaper H KAeHMEPINH, 6 Anpikiou 1996, a. 4 and 0 Oz KovqAii ic6ý TqXv6p6, uoý. 4 Anptkiox) 
1996. 
114 
Greek political system is characterised by a dominant executive (Prime Minister). 
the role of the Parliament has been rele ated to a large degree to that of a 'chatting 9 Zý 
chamber. ' Such important issues as the national budget witness only a general 
debate in Parliament about the state of the economy as opposed to detailed 
discussions about the specifics included. All the details are worked out by the 
various cabinet ministries concerned, mostly behind closed doors. and then simply 
presented to the Parliament for a vote. 62 Thus the Parliaments legal role in votina in 
of laws is fulfilled, but its more 'democratic' and 'representative' functions of 
representing the public interest and contemplating legislation have become 
diminished. 
The third main actor within the core, the bureaucracy, which has been mentioned 
briefly in Chapter Four of this study, is an administrative state apparatus which has 
been traditionally used by the party in government as a means to perpetuate the 
patron-client system to maintain its position in power. It is expanded in size beyond 
its abilities to be efficient and unorganised to the extent that is cannot be of any real 
service to the public. The bureaucracy has thus not developed into an autonomous 
structure which can constructively participate within the system. However, as a 
structure within the political system under the reins of the party in government, it has 
played an important role in acting as a core institution supporting the government in 
power. 63 
The judiciary which is elsewhere a vital structure responsible for checks and 
balances within western democratic political systems, has not assumed that role in 
Greece to the extent that it has in many of her EU partners. The judiciary as a 
political structure in Greece has not enjoyed that degree of independence that 
judiciaries have traditionally enjoyed in other western democracies. In practice, 
party politics has seeped into this structure as well, and even the highest court in 
Greece, the 'Apeto; 111ayo; -- Areos Pagos (composed of a President, six vice 
presidents -- who head each of the six major departments, and forty-eight public 
prosecutors) has not been able to remain depoliticised. Hence the judiciary has not 
been able to operate effectively as a review mechanism of government activities 
which could help to keep in check the central government. 64 Absent as well froin 
62Note the contrast here of legislative bodies: the US Congress has been wrangling over the 
national budget for 1997 and a 'balanced budget' law for nearly half a year. 
63See Minas Sarnatas, "Debureaucratization Failure in Post- Dictatorial Greece: A Soclopolitical 
Control Approach, " Journal of Modern Greek Studies, Vol. 11, No. 2, Oct. 1993, pp. 187-213, for a 
discussion of why the Greek public sector has been unable to 'debureaucratize. ' 
64As Nicos C. Aliviiatos has remarked when discussing the role of judges in Greece: "In Greece, 
since the end of the nineteenth century, the judges (all judges, of all jurisdiction, rank and degree) are 
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the Greek judiciary is an independent constitutional court (as found within the 
German political system, for example) to review legislation for its constitutlonal, tN'. 
The mechanism which primarily reviews administrative actions for their 
constitutionality and investigates allegations of abuses of power by the 
administration is the Council of State -- DogfýoOkEto T71; EntIcpC(Txic(; 65 (based on 
its French counterpart the Conseil dEtat), while it is left up to the Areos Pagos to 
utilise its powers to judge a law (de facto) formulated by the Prime %Iinister or bv 
one of his cabinet ministers as unconstitutional. 66 
Inputs into the core of the Greek political system primarily are channeled through 
structures such as political parties, the Greek Orthodox Church, trade unions and 
other interest groups which act as a vehicle of interest articulation. These channels 
of interest articulation, however, have varying degrees of influence within the 
political system as they developed at different times and in different ways. Political 
parties have traditionally been the most prominent of all, and because of this their 
role within the system will be examined below in some detail. As was mentioned in 
the previous chapter of this study, the Greek Orthodox Church has played a very 
prominent and perennial role in Greek politics, often taking on a secular as well as a 
religious role. Trade unions and other professional and issue-oriented groups have 
attempted to influence the policy-making process within the Greek political system 
with varying degrees of success. However, there have been few independent 
organisations or interest groups to develop and survive for any real length of time in 
Greece. An ecological, environmental group -- OtKok6yot EvaXXCEICTIKOi gained 
popularity quickly in Greece in 1989 which allowed it to obtain one representative in 
parliament, but it just as rapidly thereafter disappeared from the political scene. 
Several women's organisations (The Federation of Greek Women and the Union of 
Greek Women) were established in Greece in the post-junta era which were able to 
further women's rights issues in the 1980's, but became engulfed and absorbed by the 
party-state once PASOK came to power in 1981.67 Hence, many of the 
supposed to review the constitutionality of legislation. ... However, whenever important political 
issues are involved, this obligation is perceived in a very restrictive and scholastic fashion. " Nicos C. 
Alivizatos, "The Presidency, Parliament and the Courts in the 1980s, " In Greece and ECMernbership 
Evaluated, op. cit., pp. 65-77. 
65The Council of State in Greece is made up of a President, five vice presidents, thirty-seven 
councilors, forty-five assistant judges and forty investigators. See 1975 Greek Constitution, Article 
90 in Aristoboulos Manesis, (in Greek) To 1ývra)tua rov 1975, (OF_, jaaXoviKq: EdKKo-uka) 1978, a. 
122-124. 
66See The 1975 Constitution of the Hellenic Republic, Section V The Judicial Powcr, Chapter 11 
Organisation and Jurisdiction of the Courts, Article 95 iA, 4 A-4, te, ioo- 
671-aura Cram, "Women's Political Participation in Greece Since the Fall of the Colonels: From 
Democratic Struggle to Incorporation by the Party-State? Dernocrati. - ItIZ, ation, 
Vol. 1, No. 2. Summer 
1994, pp. 229-250. 
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organisations that do form have not escaped affiliation with one of the major 
political parties which means that they have not been able to form into independent 
'institutional' or 'associational' groups and hence can best be described as 
'nonassociational' groups. 68 
Several important actors from the international environment affecting the Greek 
political system are the European Union, Greece's Balkan neighbours, and 
international organisations such as the United Nations and NATO. Foreian powers 
such as the USA have also been most influential in Greek politics in the post-junta 
era. These international actors have historically been very decisive in influencing 
the political environment in Greece. As was mentioned in the previous chapter of 
this study, Greece's membership in the European Union has been the topic of much 
contemporary discussion, and there are varying opinions -- both positive and 
negative -- as to the ways in which Greece has been affected by EU membership. So 
too are there multitudinous voices expressing opinions about whether or not the 
United Nations has had a felicitous affect in solving the Cyprus issue. Controversý' 
surrounding Greece's participation and role within NATO and most recently Greece's 
full membership in the Western European Union are two other concerns which feed 
into questions of security and defence which remain sensitive issues for Greece. 
Turmoil in the former Yugoslavia, constant skirmishes with Turkey, 69 and tensions 
arising in its relationship with Albania has meant that Greece continues to be 
preoccupied with its neighbours and questions of national security. 
Hence an investigation into the structures of the Greek political system and the 
nature of its operations allows one to remark on the formal aspects of legitimacy. 
First, the centralised quality of the Greek state has meant that the Prime Minister and 
his cabinet70 have predominated over the core, and together with the parliament and 
68See Gabriel Almond and G. Bingham Powell, Comparative Politics Today, op. cit. pp. 66-70 
for a description of the various types of interest groups. 'Anomic' and 'nonassociational' groups are 
those which are described by these authors as groups which are not well organised, arise 
spontaneously due to frustration or other strong emotions felt by citizens to something that has been 
proposed by government, and then basically disappear from the political scene. Political parties, the 
Greek Orthodox church and trade unions and professional associations can best be described as 
'institutional' or 'associational' groups as they are formal, organised, powerful organisations whosc 
voice and opinion can affect policy-making. 
69To he discussed in Chapter Eight of this study. 
70Nikolaus Wenturis, when discussing Hellenic political culture and the role of opposition 
parties in parliament has remarked that: "This great deficiency in checks and balances characteristic 
of the political systern in Greece means that the decisive and classical separation of powers also 
hardly works since the parliamentary majority (that is, that of the party which has the responsibility of 
governing at any one time) is closely tied to the government, and it is the cabinet which carrics out 
most of the legislativc function by taking it away from the natural legislative organ, the parliament. " 
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the bureaucracy can be said to monopolise the process of policy-making and 
implementation. Second, although the President of the Republic has an integral 
function as a symbolic head representing national unity, the effectiý, e powers at the 
disposal of the President are limited. Third, the judiciary led by the Areos Pago', 
does function as a limited check on the core. However, Greece'. s riaid constitution 
and the fact that the Areos Pagos does not operate totally independent of the party 
system (since party politics continues to plague its personnel and its operation) has 
meant that it cannnot act as effectively as a counterbalance to the powerful core. 
Fourth, inputs into the system from various groups such as political parties and trade 
unions play an important role in channeling public opinion, yet they number few, are 
generally entangled in party politics, and continue to form part of the patron-client 
networks. Independent pressure groups have grown laggardly and tend to be 
ephemeral. Therefore although the Greek system operates according to the rule of 
law as a parliamentary system, and in that sense fulfills the requirements of 'formal' 
legitimacy, there remain doubts about the question of democratic accountability, 
about decentralisation, and about citizen's opinions and interests being heard by 
government. What stands out about the Greek case is its lack of popular structures, 
its highly centralised nature, and the continuation of traditional clientelist practices 
from the past. 
An additional feature of the political system as it relates to the question of legitimacy 
which needs to be considered is the problem with the electoral system in Greece and 
its frequent modification for political party gain. Here it is necessary to add that 
foreign powers have historically been very influential in determining the electoral 
system in Greece in the post-World War Two era. As Beate Kohler has noted: 
After the end of the Second World War, following strong pressure by the 
American government, Greece introduced an electoral system that was 
designed to produce parliamentary majorities. The object was over- 
representation of the strongest party in F arliament in order to increase the 
stability of the system of governmea. 
In 1952 the electoral law was changed in Greece, basically so that the Communist 
Party in Greece (KKE) could not come to power. Commenting on this observation, 
Pridharn and Verney have remarked that "[a]n element of continuity between the pre 
- and post- dictatorship periods has been that every electoral law passed between 
See, Nikolaus Wenturis. "Political Culture, " In Greece and EC Membership Evaluated, op. cit., p. 
232. 
71 Beate Kohler, Political Forces in Spain, Greece and Portugal, (Butterworth & Co. Pub,, ) 
1982, p. 103. 
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1952 and 1985 sought to rule out the possibility of coalition government to avoid 
the Communist Party as a government partner., -72 
What is worth commenting on regarding the electoral system is that Greece has a 
Proportional Representational (PR) system which has at times set very high 
threshold levels for the awarding of seats in the national Parliament which benefits 
the larger parties while discriminating against the smaller ones. For example, in 
both the 1981 and 1985 national elections in Greece, higher-seat tier allocation was 
awarded to the parties which had received at least 17% of the national vote. In the 
1985 election, this resulted in PASOK being awarded 53.7% of the seats in 
Parliament having won only 45.8% of the national vote while the smaller parties 
were awarded 4.3% of the seats in Parliament with 13.4% of the national vote. 73 it 
must be remembered, however, that PASOK modified the electoral laws (to what 
became known as 'reinforced PR' -- F-vt(yXupe'vil cwa; ýoyti-cý) before the 1985 
elections when it realised that it would not retain its seat in power with the existing 
electoral system. This discriminatory threshold level was done away with before the 
June 1989 election. Hence one of the obvious problems is that the electoral system 
in Greece is not equitable in the sense that it is not unbiased in its distribution of 
seats in Parliament as it disproportionately favours the larger parties. Furthermore, 
any government that comes to power can modify the electoral system to its liking. 
The electoral modifications that were in force for the most recent national election 
(1993), for instance, required a party to receive at least 3% of the national vote to be 
awarded seats in Parliament. This was implemented to ensure that one party would 
be awarded a majority of seats to form a government. Thus the electoral system has 
reflected a larger problem within the Greek political environment, that of creating 
and maintaining stable government. 
Stable government (lasting the full four-year term) in the post-junta era has indeed 
been difficult for Greece. 74 More recently, from 1989-1994 there were four 
elections with four administrations, including a conservative-communist coalition 
(New Democracy and Synaspismos75 from July to October 1989), followed by an 
72Geoffrey Pridham and Susannah Verney, "The Coalitions of 1989-90 in Greece: Inter-Party 
Relations and Democratic Consolidation, " West European Politics, Vol. 14, No. 4, Oct. 199 1, p. 46. 
73Michael Gallager, ed. et. al. Representative Government in Western Europe, (McGraw Hill, 
Inc. ) 1992, p. 158. 
74A look back to the nineteenth century reveals this quite clearly: from 1870-1875 there A-cre 
four elections with nine administrations. Richard Clogg, A Concise Historýl of Greece, (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press) 1992, p. 62. 
75Synaspismos was a coalition of the left parties which joined KKE (the Communist Party of 
Greece) with the Greek Left in 1989. The Communist Party of Greece thereafter broke off on its 0ý% n
again after the 1990 election and in the 1993 election received 4.5417( of the vote and nine seats in 
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ecumenical government (from November 1989 to February 1990 consistingg of all 4-- 
three major parties -- PASOK, New Democracy and Synaspismos), followed by a 
win for New Democracy in March 1990 which did not serve out its full four-Near 
term. This resulted in another election witnessing the return of PASOK to power in 
1993 with Andreas Papandreou again as Prime Minister. The formation of two 
governments made up of more than one party during 1989-90 is a rarity in Greece, 
however, since Greece comes fairly close to being described as a two-party sYstem if 
one looks at the number of times modem governments have been formed composed 
of a single party only. 
5.3 The Role of the Political Party Within the Greek Political System 
Of the political structures found within the modern Greek political system, that one 
which has accrued an overwhelming degree of political power and hence of 
importance is the political party. A separate study would be necessary to adequately 
discuss and analyse the role played by political parties within the contemporary 
Greek political system. 76 Hence the discussion here of the political party system in 
Greece will be limited to a focus on how it fits into this study's investigation of 
legitimacy. 
Political parties, and in more general terms the political party system, has been the 
main vehicle generating political legitimacy in the Greek political system in the post- 
junta era. Parties (as political structures within the political system) have been 
primarily responsible for the rather smooth transition to democracy after 1974, and 
for creating an atmosphere securing democratic consolidation within Greece after the 
fall of the Colonels. Yet Greek political parties continue clientelist practices and 
therefore cannot be accurately defined as modernising forces (i. e. innovational) in 
the sense that many traditional practices from the past have proved to be enduring 
characteristics. Political parties have thus maintained certain practices from the past 
(and until most recently much of the same leadership as well) but have like-wise 
Parliament. Synaspismos received 2.94% of the vote and no seats in Parliament since it did not attain 
the 317c minimum required for seat allocation. 
76There are various contemporary studies of particular political parties in Greece and studies 
concerned with a specific time period of Greek political history and the role of political parties 
therein. Some of these include: Richard Clogg, Parties and Elections in Greece, (London: C. Hurst 
,, ý, Co. ) 1987; Kevin Featherstone and Dimitrios K. Katsoudas, eds., Political Change ill Greece 
Be re and After the Colonels, (NY: St. Martin's Press), 1987, esp. Part Two "The Pam System"; fo 
George Th. Mavrogordatos, Stillborn Republic. Social Coalitions and Part), Strategies in Greece, 
1922-1936, (Berkeley, CA: University of Cal. Press) 1983; MIhalls Spourdalakis. The Rise of the 
Greek Socialist Pan)% (London: Routledge) 1988; and Konstantinos Ifantis, "From Factionalism to 
Autocracy: PASOK's De-Radicalization During the Regime Transition of the 1970s, " 
Democratization, Vol. 2, No. 1. Spring 1995, pp. 77-89. 
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introduced and adopted contemporary features so that an amalgamation of the old 
and the new has occurred. This can be said to be the dynamic role that political 
parties ave played in the post- authoritarian era in Greece. 
If one was to scratch beneath the surface of political parties in Greece, and observe 
their internal operation and particularly how the decision-making process takes place 
within parties, the conclusion may be that parties cannot be said to interriallý, operate 
'democratically. ' Initially it may seem bewildering and most certainly contradictory 
that political parties in Greece have proved decisive in maintaining a democratic 
system in the post- authoritarian era in Greece while at the same time not reflecting 
these principles in their internal operation. Yet this lends proof for the nced to 
consider the socio-cultural and historical characteristics which constitute all 
understanding of legitimacy in Greece. Crucial for comprehending how Greek 
political parties function is understanding that political party leaders have an 
overwhelming amount of power (and usually the final say) to make important 
decisions concerning the party. Thus political parties in Greece have often been 
described as 'personalistic parties, 77 or as 'leader dominated parties. '78 The May 
1995 election of a new President of the Republic is a good example of party leader 
domination as the political party leaders made the choice of a candidate for Prcsident 
(without being formally required to consult or inform other party members first), and 
the MP's of that party were expected to support that candidate blindly. As much as 
charisma was considered in the past to be important, so too is it today considered a 
natural (and perhaps even necessary) trait of party leaders. 79 The leader of the party 
almost always becomes automatically 'President'of the party and is invested with an 
enormous (and largely unchecked) degree of power to make decisions concerning 
the party and its membership. During PASOK's tenure in office in the 1980's, (a 
party which has espoused a so-called socialist ideology) decisions were being made 
by Andreas Papandreou and the central committee without a great deal of 
consultation with other local party units. It has only been recently (since PASOK's 
re-entry into power in 1993 under pressure from dissenting PASOK party members) 
77See Dimitri A. Sotiropoulos, "A Colossus with Feet of Clay: '17he State in Post- Authori tari an 
Greece, " In Greece, the New Europe, and the Changing International Order, Harry J. Psomiades and 
Stavros B. Thomadakis eds., (NY: Pella Pubs. ) 1993, pp. 43-56 for an investigation into the role of 
political parties and the state in Greece. 
78Yannis Papadopoulos in, "Parties, the State and Society in Greece: Continuity within Change, " 
West European Politics, Vol. 12, no. 2,1989, pp. 55-71, has produced an examination of the 'state- 
party-society relationship' in Greece in an attempt to explain how parties have or have not contributed 
to stability of the political system. He also mentions the role of charismatic leadership and its 
relationship to regime stability. 
79Andreas Papandreou has been frequently described as charismatic by both his supporters and 
adversaries alike. 
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that a party Congress and convention were called to effectively discuss the PASOK 
platform, and indeed differing views are surfacing as to the way decisions are being, 
taken and in general how the party has been operating as well as the future direction 
that the party should take. New Democracy as well has recently (in 1993) called a 
general party congress to discuss the party's platform and its future direction under 
new leadership, as has Synaspismos (in March 1996). 
Additionally what needs to be considered for a discussion of legith-nacy and the 
political party is the relationship of the political party as a political structure to that 
of the state. What one witnesses in Greece is that party concerns get transferred to 
the state level and become state concerns when that party is in power. 80 This 
phenomenon occurs mainly due to the interdependency of political parties and state 
mechanisms, this again being a remnant of Greece's Ottoman past. Political parties 
have used state mechanisms to maintain their position in power through patron-client 
practices and as a result, state structures have become highly politicised. The case of 
the Greek bureaucracy being penetrated by party politics, examined briefly in the 
previous chapter of this study, is a prime example. 
The political party, therefore, has power insofar as it is the vehicle by which social 
forces are streamlined through to the state. Of all the voices of interest articulation, 
the political party clearly has maintained the most prominent position. However, it' 
other structures (interest groups, organisational groups, etc. ) and mechanisms were 
able to successfully compete with political parties (or at least to add additional 
voices and opinions) there is the possibility that political parties would not continue 
to enjoy the same privileged and commanding position as they do today within the 
Greek political system. Their ubiquitous nature as political actors estranged from 
civil society while monopolising the avenues for political articulation may be 
changing as the character of political parties change. 8 1 Nevertheless this 
presupposes major structural changes within the political parties themselves, 
between political parties and the state, as well as changes in political attitudes and 
current patterns of political behaviour. 
One of the possible solutions to the problem of political legitimacy as it concerns the 
political party system which has been proposed is that of promoting coalition 
80For a structural functional analysis of the Greek political system and the role of political 
parties therein, see Nikos Georgarakis, (in Greek) "K6pp(iTa K(xi. KoppctTticý ATJPoKpaTia 
flpoijno0iýaei; EvaWCiTO)Gq; KCR NopponoiTlcryl; (YTTI MeTa&K'raTOPIKý FUd8a, " In HEAý. rjviK-ij 
HoA i ri vý Ko vA ro 6pa Xýpepa. N iKo; AepepTýý; (enip. ) (AOýva : 08xxyuýciý) 1994, o. 253-286. 
81Sce, Peter Mair, "Political Parties, Popular Legitimacy and Public Privilege, " West European 
Politics, Vol. 18, No. 3, July 1995, pp. 40-57. 
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governments, where no one party can gain the majority of seats in parliament. 82 
This argument posits that this will require parties to cooperate with one another and 
thus put pressure to bear on parties to open up political discourse which could 
possibly lead to wider changes within the political system affecting more generally 
the political environment in Greece. However, this assumes that political parties will 
agree upon a standard electoral system which cannot easily be modified, and also 
supposes that coalitions will not lead to a de-stabilisation of the political system if an 
effective coalition cannot be formed. Hence there remains the danger that forced 
coalitions can lead to more political instability and a de-legitimation of the system. 
The two coalition governments that Greece formed in 1989 cannot be used as a basis 
for generalisation about coalition governments in Greece, since they were formed for 
a very particular reason and there duration and purpose were clearly delineated at the 
start. In other words, they did not form as natural coalitions, but came together 
knowing well that they could not jointly agree on policy-making for a full four-year 
term. Nevertheless, there remains the possibility that the adoption of a standard 
electoral system which can escape the whimsical modifications of the particular 
party in power can lead to coalitions in Greece in the future and possibly promote 
wider structural changes. 
With both Konstantinos Mitsotakis stepping down as leader of the New Democracy 
party and Andreas Papandreou forced to relinquish his position as Prime Minister 
due to illness, there are signs that the old vanguard of these parties is slowly being 
replaced by younger individuals who are not directly tied to Greece's post-war past. 
Certainly the two main political parties appear to be undergoing leadership changes 
which might bring about other transformations as well. Voters have revealed their 
dissatisfaction with both of the main political parties and this message is beginning 
to be received by the parties. 83 However, it seems premature to speculate at present 
as to the types and the extent of changes which will occur within Greece's two main 
political parties and whether or not they will be able to develop into truly unfurled 
and innovative political actors. What is noteworthy, however, is that these dramatic 
82Sce Ale xandros- Andreas Kirtsis, (in Greek) "rloktTticý Nogigo7roi9crTl Kai OlKovopK& 
EicavyXpovicTpO;, " In H EAAd8a 17pog ro 2000, KacaoUil;, M., I-tavviTCTq;, T., Kaýdico;, Il. 
(vnip. ) (AOývct: flanaýhcril) 1988, a. 17-34. 
The case of Italy has shown that coalition government is a difficult and often frustrating exercise 
and it does not always work well. 
83See the Greek newspaper TO EONOY., 17 and 18 April 1995 for a two-part opinion poll ýý hich 
was conducted by ALKO in the Attica region from 5 to II April 1995 which revealed voter 
dissatisfaction with the present political parties. For example, a majority of those polled expressed 
the belief that none of the present political parties can solve the major social, economic and national 
dilemmas that the country is currently facing. See particularýy "K6ppa nou M77opEi va A6act 
Aý(Tet; ava Topka 136cyq: Yývoko. " 18 AnpikioL) 1995, cy. 15. 
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changes within the two main parties are occurring without any evident disturbances 
to the Greek political system as a whole. That is, the political system has been able 
to accommodate change and this adds further evidence to the argument that Greece 
has become 'democratically consolidated. - 84 
There remains likewise the possibility that new political parties mav emenze in 
Greece which are neither oriented towards the right or left but rather are more 
technocratic and issue-oriented in character. As the new generation reconciles itself 
to the realities of the twenty-first century and as the rifts from the past slowly fade 
along with past animosities, new political arrangements may emerge which could 
usher in a new era in Greek politics. In the 1990's, for example, there appears to be 
little difference between the two main parties' stance concerning major policy areas, 
while as at the beginning of the 1980's the disparities between the parties was great. 
Necessary economic measures required for EMU convergence and privatisation 
schemes are two major policy areas where both PASOK's and New Democracy I ,, 
position fundamentally differ little if at all, although opposition to policy continues 
to be launched by the various parties against that one which is in power. 
5.4 Political Culture 
Systematic investigations into the characteristics of political culture85 in modern 
Greece began to absorb social scientists in the latter half of the 1970's, a time period 
in Greek history which witnessed a return of democracy to Greece and more 
generally signaled the inception of democratic consolidation and stability for a 
country which had experienced a historically tumultuous half century. By the 
1980's, analyses of Greek political culture had come to the foreground of discussion, 
particularly after Greece joined the Community in 1981 as a full member. Today 
there are various individuals within the social sciences who continue to analyse and 
examine the characteristics of political culture in Greece, and variegated works can 
be found throughout these fields. 86 
84See Richard Gunther, P. Nikiforos Diamandouros and Hans-Jijrgen Puhle. eds., Tile Politics of 
Democratic Consolidation: Southenz Europe in Coniparatii, e Perspectii-e, (Baltimore and London: 
The John Hopkins University Press) 1994. 
85See Nicos P. Mouzelis, "Greece in the Twenty-first Century: Institutions and Political 
Culture, " In Greece Preparesfor the Twent 
, y-first 
Centun% Dimitri Constas and Theofanis G. Stavrou 
eds., (Baltimore and London: ne John Hopkins University Press) 1995, pp. 17-34. 
86For a comprehensive overview of the various theories and works which have been produced 
recently dealing with Greek political culture, see Nikos Demertzis (in Greek) "Eiaaywyý (YTTIv 
Ekkijvi. Ký Ho)ýiTiKý KoukToiýpa. OF_wpTjTtKd Kai Epr, uvqTi. Kd ZqTýPa-rct. " In H EAAT7%, t K4 
17oAirlh-q KovAro6pafquepd. (entp. ) NiKo; Acpeprýýq. (AOýva: 08uoaýa; ) 1994, (5.7-39, and "l-I 
EniXEKTtKiý Flapd8oayj Tq; EUtIviKii; FlokvriKý; Kox)XTOýpa, " 0.41-74, which include', an 
excellent bibliography of readings at the end. 
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One of the ways in which political discourse has been characterised in Greece has 
been that of 'a-political, hyper-politicisation. '87 The latter part of this description 
refers to a general political climate of euphoria in Greece and symptoms of mass 
participation of the populace within the political environment in Greece. Greeks 
often have been characterised as Tanatical'88 when it comes to their political 
attitudes and personal beliefs. During election time, Greece is coloured with a sea of 
campaign posters and banners which stretch across the country. Discussions on 
television, in the press, in tavernas and kafenia (coffee houses, frequented, in 
villages, mostly by males), in buses and taxis cover the main campaign issues, and 
everyone seems to have an opinion as to which are the promises being espoused by 
the candidates and which are the policies that these candidates will really implement 
when elected into office. 89 EUROBAROMETER surveys confirm that Greeks have a 
high level of interest in politics (nationally and at the EU level), 90 and one could 
hence assume that this would be reflected in the number of institutional and 
structural vehicles to facilitate this interest and enthusiasm. Yet in practice, the 
87See Mihalis Spourdalakis, (in Greek) "EXXdSa 2000: Ap6novraqro-oq Kapiro-6; Tq; 'A- 
1`10XMICA; T1CeP-rI0X1Tt1C07C0i1J";, "' In H EU68a 17poý; ro 2000, KaTooA%, HX., rtavvt'-roi1;, T., 
Kaýdico;, n. (e7rtg. ) (AOAva: nanaýTlorq) 1988, a. 108-118. 88The Greek translation of the term fanatical -- oavaTtim; is used to describe those persons 
whose actions and beliefs are not the consequence of any rational or logical understanding of people 
and events but rather who have strong emotional ties to a political party or particular leader, either 
because of devastating experiences from the past (i. e., human atrocities which occurred during the 
Greek Civil War -- 1946-1949 -- between factions of the Left versus those of the Right) or due to 
other socio-cultural factors which have created animosities within the political environment that breed 
irrational, illogical behaviour. The leaders of the major political parties in Greece up until 1993, 
Konstantinos Mitsotakis and Andreas Papandreou, had careers stemming back to the pre-junta era. 
Andreas Papandreou has remained party president of PASOK since 1974, and despite an ignominious 
reputation associated with a series of scandals that occurred when his party was in office from 198 1- 
1989, he was again placed in office in 1993. Both Andreas Papandreou and Konstantinos Mitsotakis 
came from families which actively participated in the political life of the country and which have 
symbolised the bi-polar political party forces in Greece. Thus the political party leadership in Greece 
has been partially responsible for the continuation of bitterness felt between the Left and Right in 
Greece (personal attacks are often publicly lodged by one political leader against the other, for 
example) since they have not engaged in a type of political discourse which could help eradicate 
fanaticism and replace it with conscious choice based on rational calculations. 
89Greeks passionately defend their views about politics and often a casual conversation turns 
into a controversial debate, each defender vehemently contending that the candidate that s/he is 
supporting is the best choice. 
90See graph elaborated by Charalambis and Demertzis of EUROBAROMETER surveys from 
1983,1988,1989,1990 concerning political interest in Europe, Journal of Modem Greek Studies, 
Vol. 11, No. 2, Oct. 1993, p. 232. According to these surveys more than half of the Greek population 
have expressed an interest in politics generally (54%) and even more so in matters related to the 
Community (67%). Charalambis and Demertzis note that self-employed professionals exhibit the 
most interest in national politics (70.2%). See also Nikos Demertzis (in Greek) for a discussion of 
political culture in Greece during the decade of the 1980's, "H EUqvtk-4 noXvnxA Kovkro-6pa arn 
Aexwda rou '80, " In EkAoyiq Kai K6ppara aTq AeKaeria Tov '80, (mctg. ) XpýaTo; AVptv'[; A;. 
Hkia; NticoXaic6xo-oXo;, (A(Mva: GqLikto) 1990, a. 70-96. 
This high level of interest in politics could be operationalised to get citizens more informed of 
EU policies and processes as mentioned in the previous chapter, but as yet Greek politicians do not 
seem able to capitalise on such a fact. 
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political party remains the main structure that acts as a communicator between the 
public and government, such that the phenomenon of 'a-political' is as well 
descriptive of the arena of political discourse in Greece. 91 The Greek political 
system has been quite slow to develop other channels of communication which could 
serve as a link between the public and the state. There are numerous historical and 
socio-cultural explanations that can be recalled to elucidate this phenomenon. a, 
were mentioned in the previous chapter. Under authoritarian Ottoman rule, for 
example, any autonomous or independent associations which formed were conceived 
of as a threat to the state and were immediately crushed. Whatever other collective 
bodies or organisations formed were immediately put under the control of the state. 
Therefore interest groups and voluntary associations can be said to " ... lack the aura 
of popular legitimation. -9 2 The formation of independent or voluntary 
organisations, divorced from state control, are a relatively new development within 
the Greek environment and one which have not yet fully matured. 
For the casual observer, it may appear odd that trade unionists or irate agriculturists, 
or most recently milk farmers, turn first to the streets in the form of protesting and 
striking as a means of revealing their disenchantment with proposed governmental 
policies rather than trying to negotiate their position with government officials, 
which usually precedes more drastic measures like demonstrating. Seen as a last 
resort in many northern EU member states where organised interests either lobby or 
partake in other forms of structured communication with government officials, 
striking and protesting has been adopted as a standard and acceptable means by 
which to dramatically express disapproval of government policy proposals or 
decisions in Greece in the absence of other formal means. 
As was discussed in the previous chapter of this study, Chapter Four, Greece has a 
powerful centralised state apparatus and a weak civil environment characterised by 
structural deficiencies. This has created a void between the public and the state 
which is one of the dimensions involved in the legitimacy question. Other structural 
weaknesses related to legitimacy in Greece can be found within the political 
environment which have already been explored in this chapter. A conscious effort 
has been made to balance these formal aspects of legitimacy (re: concerning the 
political system and its operation and the question of democratic accountablllt\-) 
91 Milialls Spourdalakis, (in Greek) "EUd8a 2000: ApýnovTa; Tox)q Kapnoýý rqý 'A-FIAITIKý; 
YnEp-FIoXtTtKonoiYjaTj, ý, '" op. cit. 
92George Th. Mavrogordatos, "Civil Society Under Populism, " In Greece 19NI-89: The Populist 
Occaile, Richard Clogg. ed., (NYALondon: St. Martin's Press) 1993, p. 49. 
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against socio-cultural factors which have been touched upon in Chapter Four and 
which will be recalled throughout Part 11 of this study. Placed within a political 
context, a look at the socio-cultural characteristics of Greek society help to make 
more complete an examination of the question of legitimacy. 
The role that the mass media has come to play in Greek society and their degree of 
influence on opinion formation has grown immensely throughout the past decade. 93 
The media in Greece have contributed to the political culture of the country and have 
reinforced party dominance of the political environment by often acting officially or 
unofficially as the mouthpiece of political parties. Until the 1980's, the printed 
media were the dominant voice of mass communication in Greece. It has only been 
since 1989 that private television channels have come into operation. What 
distinguishes the media in Greece from the media found in her northern EU partners 
is its lack of impartiality in presenting news and information. The three state-owned 
and operated television channels (ETI, ET2, and ET3) have acted as a channcl of 
communication for the party in government and much of their personnel changes as 
the party in government changes. The major private television channels and many of 
the innumerable small local television channels which have literally mushroomed 
since 1989, for the most part express a particular political party perspective and more 
times than not have fallen into the same trap of partisanship. In fact, the small group 
of individuals who monopolise the printed media are the same ones who have 
expanded into television broadcasting. Since the costs of operation and initial 
investment in television are huge, only whose with substantial capital can venture 
such an endeavor. What is noteworthy, then, as concerns the media and political 
culture in Greece is that unlike other western countries Greece has " ... no examples 
or a tradition of financially or politically independent media. "94 More importantly 
for a discussion of legitimacy, the media's infiltration of party politics has impeded 
democratic discourse and thus has hindered the development of a civic culture along 
western lines. 
Of the institutions and structures which can be found within the political 
environment in Greece that have likewise played a dynamic and decisive role in 
politics are trade unions, including those of civil employees, industrialists, students, 
93The role of the mass media in Greek society is a subject unto itself which will not be elaborated 
on in this study. The author, however, hopes to include in future research of the question of 
legitimacy the'mass media dimension. '
94Manolis E. Paraschos, "The Greek Media face the Twenty-first Century: Will the Adam Smith 
Complex Replace the Oedipus Complex? " In Greece Preparesfor the Ttt, en 1). -first Centurý-, op. cit., 
p. 254. 
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and farmers. It is important at the start to emphasise, however, that the major trade 
unions which have formed into federations (the largest being FTEE --GSEE. the 
General Confederation of Greek Workers and Employees)95 have been historically 
under the tutelage of the main political parties in Greece and are dependent on state 
subsidies which means that the state directly intervenes in trade union affairs. The 
GSEE, which represents approximately 90% of current trade unions in Greece, has, 
been the arena for numerous party rivalries played out within this so-called 
autonomous actor. First, from 1936 to 1974 the communist party was not legallý 
allowed representation in the GSEE. This in and of itself created resentment from 
this political camp which was purposefully excluded from the organisation. Second, 
the Executive Committee of GSEE has in particular been the scene of party disputes, 
most pronouncedly in 1985 when Andreas Papandreou instituted austerity measures 
creating a rift within the GSEE resulting in two Executive Committees in operation 
simultaneously, one pro-PASOK and one anti-PASOK. Effectively this has meant 
that unions and federations such as the GSEE have not been able to play an 
independent role in Greek politics, but instead have traditionally been under the 
umbrella of one of the main political parties which have greatly influenced their 
actions and policies. 96 This has resulted in an absence of independent interest 
groups which could act as a counterbalancing weight to the party and to the state. 
The inclusion of self-ruling pressure groups and interest groups that are found within 
most pluralist democracies in western Europe, that middle layer composed of 
organisations found between citizens and the state which acts as a cushion for both, 
is conspicuously missing from Greek society. To put it another way, utilising the 
terminology employed by Almond and Powell's analysis, 97 the avenues for input 
into the political system in the form of interest articulation are few and far between. 
This hollow has become more visible to both Greeks and Greece's EU partners in the 
last decade, and although there are some signs that things may be slowly changing in 
Greece, there has been little room allowed for the formation of independent 
organisations and interest groups by both the state apparatus and political parties 
who look upon the formation of these organisations as a severe threat to their 
95See Rossetos Fakiolas, "Interest Groups: An Overview, " In Political Change ill Greece Before 
and After the Colonels, Kevin Featherstone and Dimitrios K. Katsoudas eds., (NY: St. Martin's Press) 
1987, for a general survey of interest groups in Greece. See also 'lliomas W. Gallant, "Collective 
Action and Atomistic Actors: Labor Unions, Strikes, and Crime in Greece in the Postwar Era, " In 
Greece Preparesfor the Twent)-first Centuq, op. ct . t., pp. 149-190. 
9613eate Kohler has summed up the major dilemmas of Greek trade unionism succinctly bý 
noting that: "[t1he greatest weakness of the Greek trade union movement lies in the fragmented nature 
of its organization and in its part), political structure. " op. cit., p. 139. 
97See Gabriel Almond and G. Bingham Poýýcll, Jr. Comparative Politics Today, op. cit., for a 
comprehensive analysis of political systems. 
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existing power. It needs to be stated, however, that the rules of the game as applied 
on a Greek political level are not the same rules which are being played out on a EU 
level, and this realisation has now become obvious to those involved in both arena. s. 
Hence Greek society has not been able to develop the requisite structures which 
could lay the foundation for a political environment in which constructive dialogue 
and an exchange of views can take place. A lack of both political accommodation 
and collective bargaining thus appear to be aspects involved in formal legitimacy. 
Party animosities have perpetuated mud-slinging which still occurs among political 
party leaders which feeds old rivalries stemming back to the civil war era in post- 
World War Two Greece (1946-1949) and from the military junta (1967-1974). The 
exclusion of the Left from legitimately participating in politics after the Greek Civil 
war, and the humiliation of the Right during the immediate aftermath of the M-ilitary 
junta, created a series of tensions within the Greek political environment as well as a 
severe polarisation of party politics, which was mentioned in Chapter Two of this 
study. It has only been since the mid- 1970's that both ends of the political spectrum 
have been legally incorporated into the political system. The communist parties 
were legalised in September 1974 when Konstantinos Karamanlis came to power as 
leader of the newly formed conservative party New Democracy after the fall of the 
junta. However, political discussions among politicians quite often are still 
opportunities for personal attacks, as can be witnessed daily on Greek television 
programmes where such discussions frequently turn into shouting matches where the 
moderator of the programme assumes the role of a referee. The absence of a 
constructive discourse among political actors and between the government and 
citizens has led to a general feeling of disgust among the Greek public who do not 
perceive democracy working satisfactorily in their country. These two features of 
the political environment in Greece likewise feed into the issue of legitimacy. 
However, it must be mentioned likewise that although party animosities continue, 
there remains a general recognition among all political actors that the parliamentary 
system is the legitimate forum for such discussions. There are no attacks being 
lodged by the political parties against the type of political system-, opposition to the 
government in power may at times be biting, but it remains within the confines of 
the system. This too holds true for public discontent, which although at times is very 
vocal, should not be misinterpreted to mean that the public wants a different systeni 
-- they simply want their system to work more efficiently, more effectively, and 
ultimately more democratically. 
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5.5 How Greeks View Their Political System 
A final area of investigation which will be explored here to elucidate the question of 
legitimacy involves attitudes and beliefs held among the Greek populace towards the 
operation of democracy in their country. 98 Whether or not citizens are satisfied with 
how their political environment operates and other conceptions held by Greeks 
concerning the political life of the country can give insight into the social aspects of 
legitimacy. Again, one must be clear by what is meant by 'how democracy operates. ' 
This is not to be misinterpreted to mean that the Greek public prefers a different 
system than the parliamentary system which is currently in place. What is under 
question and investigation here, is the extent to which the Greek public feels that the 
democratic process is functioning as it should within the parameters of the 
parliamentary system. 
EUROBAROMETER surveys confirm that Greeks (along with their Mediterranean EU 
partners) are cynical about how their political decision-making process occurs, and 
thus with how democracy functions in Greece. As was mentioned above, the Greek 
political system operates under the rule of law as ascribed to a parliamentary 
democracy and in that sense can be described as, and is perceived of as politically 
legitimate by both political actors and citizens. However, a glance at public opinion 
polls reveals a different perspective on the functioning of democracy from the point 
of view of Greek citizens. 99 
98See Chapter One 1.2.2 Democracy in this study for a more general discussion of democracy 
and its relationship to the question of legitimacy. 
"The following diagram is based on EUROBAROMETER surveys taken from EUROBAROMETER 
Trends 1974-1993. May 1994, p. 24; EUROBAROMETER #41 July 1994. #42 December 1994, and 
#43 Autumn 1995. The percentage of not veo, satisfied and not at all satisfied ý% Ith the %ý ay 
democracy works in Greece were added together. The remaining percentage consists of those who 
were either very satisfied or fairly satisfied (or who had no reply) with the way democracy works in 
Greece. 
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Diagram 5.2 Satisfaction With Democracy 
One noteworthy observation based upon this data (and presented in Diagram 5.2) 100 
is that the last six years (1989-1995) have seen a rise in the percentage of the Greek 
population which is not very satisfied and not at all satisfied with the way 
democracy is operating in Greece. Before 1989, for every dissatisfied citizen there 
was a citizen who was satisfied. However, the situation changes dramatically in 
1989, where for every satisfied citizen there are two who remain dissatisfied. 
Therefore, from 1990 to the present, for every satisfied citizen there are two (and 
some) who are dissatisfied with the operation of democracy in the country, and this 
is indeed a dramatic jump. Although it would be spurious to draw too many 
conclusions from this data, one can venture to state that there appears to be a 
noticeable increase in the percentage of Greeks who are not content with the 
functioning of the democratic process at home. 
As to the possible explanations for this disapproval held among Greeks towards the 
operation of democracy, one can draw attention to a series of political scandals 
which occurred within the domestic political environment over that time period. 
10ONote that this diagram is my own representation of those who are not satisfied and not at all 
satisfied with the way democracy operates in Greece using the EUROBAROMETER surveys 
mentioned in the previous note. 
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First, there was the Koskotas bank scandal and the corruption allegations lodged 
against Andreas Papandreou and PASOK MP's in 1989-1990. Second. the OTE 
(National telephone company) scandal occurred (reminiscent of the American 
Watergate) involving New Democracy leader Konstantinos Mitsotakis and 
allegations of illegal wiring taping, as well as the cloud covering the privatisation 
sale of AGET-Heracles (the cement company) in 1993. To add to these there has 
been a general climate of recrimination between the two party leaders since 1989 
which has served to cultivate a climate of disgust and mistrust among the Greek 
people towards the political leadership of the country. Certainly these have affected 
the way in which Greek citizens view the political leadership of the country and in 
turn this partially influences their opinion about the extent to which the system 
functionally reflects democratic principles. 
Furthermore, as was demonstrated in the first part of this study, the European Union 
has developed competencies in decisive areas of policy-making. Greece's 
membership in the EU needs to be pulled into the discussion here in investigating 
satisfaction with democracy since more competencies have been transferred to the 
EU. 101 Thus the EU as an international actor has affected perceptions of democracy 
both at home and at an EU level, and as has been mentioned previously, citizens are 
hesitant to have policy decisions taken jointly with the EU in such areas as social 
welfare, education, cultural policy, etc. 102 As the decision-making process 
continues to take place at a distance, whether at an EU level or at another higher 
level, citizens may continue to voice dissatisfaction with the democratic process 
which appears to be moving further and further away from their control. As the 
process of decentralisation in Greece has not yet been successful in bring citizens 
into the decision-making process by giving them an avenue to voice their opinions, 
and since the centralised administration continues to monopolise policy-making 
decisions, Greeks may continue to feel dissatisfied with how democracy operates in 
their country as they feel far removed (both literally and metaphorically) from where 
decisions are being taken. This no less is a question of democratic accountability: 
the locus of decision-making is moving from a national level to an EU level without 
the accompanying degree of accountability at that level. Thus the lack of effective 
structures of (and avenues for) interest articulation within the Greek political system 
10 1 For an interesting study of the views of regional elites as to the affects that the Single Market 
Initiative would have on their regions which sheds some light as to the opinions of Greek sub-national 
elites, see Robert Leonardi and Shari Garmise, "Conclusions: Sub-National Elites and the European 
Community, " Regional Politics and Policy, Vol. 2, Spring-Summer 1992. pp. 247-274. 
102See in this study the sections on the welfare state found in Chapter One 1.2.3 Die Welfare 
State and Chapter Two 2.3.3. 
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(and as has been demonstrated at the EU level as well) which has become more 
visible in the last half-decade may be partially responsible for lower levels of 
satisfaction with the way democracy has been operating. Likewise the lack of 
information and understanding about the EU processes and policies adds to the 
confusion. The public reads in the press or is informed through other forms of mass 
media that certain criteria must be met for EU monetary integration for example, but 
are not given the details as to how and why and in what way these are to be met. 
This likewise breeds discontent and misinterpretations about intended policies and 
their outcomes. This lack of an effective debate can be partially understood due to 
the fact (stated previously) that the press is dominated by political parties which 
mostly reflect partisan positions rather than the issues themselves. 
Although a discussion concerning satisfaction with the operation of democracy in a 
particular nation-state seems to naturally lend itself to making conclusions about the 
level of social legitimacy therein, one must be cautious and not simply assume that 
there is a direct correlation between level of satisfaction with democracy and level of 
social legitimacy. This relationship is not a zero-sum relationship, but as this study 
tries to demonstrate, what is involved is a more complex combination of elements 
which include political, economic and historical socio-cultural factors which weigh 
into this equation. Having stated that however, steadily rising levels of 
dissatisfaction with the way democracy operates along with disenchantment with 
one's life changes and economic prospects certainly do not forebode well for the 
future. Thus the indicators of sati sfaction/di ssatisfact ion with the operation of 
democracy expressed by citizens and its affects on the political life of the country is 
one of the variables that needs to be considered when examining social legitimacy. 
5.6 Conclusion 
The principal purpose of this chapter has been to focus on the political environment 
in Greece to explore the contours of the Greek political system and its surroundings 
to make some observations about formal and social legitimacy as they have been 
defined in this study. Beginning with an examination of the formal structures of the 
Greek political system, this chapter explored the particular characteristics of Greek 
political structures and their functions. 
A glance at the political party system has demonstrated that party cleavagcs and 
party polarisation has left a tenacious imprint on the political party system. Political 
parties continue to play an integral role in lending legitimacy to the Greek political 
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system yet their exalted position as the main vehicle of interest articulation has 
suffocated the development of other interest groups which could possibly open up 
more channels of communication between citizens and government. AdministratiVe 
structures, such as that of the bureaucracy, need to become autonomous of party 
politics and develop their own identity to be able to function effectively. This 
depolitisation of state structures and organisations (such as the GSEE) could 
possibly provoke more extensive renovations within the political system generally. 
The adoption of a fixed electoral system could also add a more stabilising. 
democratic element to the political system. 
What stands out about the Greek example is that modern Greek political life is very 
much a synthesis of Greece's past traditions along with new forms which have been 
adopted, transformed and appropriated within the contemporary Greek environment. 
Greek political culture has often been described as a culture in transition, that is, a 
political culture in the process of moving from its traditional past on to new pastures, 
taking various practices from the past and embracing new conventionalities. 103 
This has created a multi-faceted political environment with many patterns and forms 
which are distinct to the country and its people. What has been highlighted here 
however, is that the apparent interest and enthusiasm which Greeks possess for 
politics needs to be placed within a political context which witnesses an absence of 
constructive and democratic political discourse. Additionally, serious structural 
deficiencies and weaknesses within the political system have hindered interest 
articulation by not providing for vehicles of effective communication of citizens' 
interests into the decision-making process. The outcome has been spontaneous 
expressions of disapproval of proposed government policies in the form of strikes 
and demonstrations of one kind or another, whether that be milk farmers throwing 
milk in the streets to protest the lowering of prices or agriculturists placing their 
tractors in the middle of the road and closing off traffic on the main national 
motorway. 
Lastly, a look at public opinion as expressed through EUROBAROMETER surveys 
shows that Greeks have been increasingly more dissatisfied with the way democracy 
operates in their country. Some of the possible explanations for this increase in 
dissatisfaction have been mentioned, and although one may be inclined to directly 
associate an increase in dissatisfaction with how democracy operates with a decrease 
103See Nikos Demertzis (in Greek) ''H EXXTjvtxý floki. Ttxý Koukro, ýpa a-rTjAf-KaF-TiUCO-U, 80. " 
In Eh-AoYF; x-ai K6ppara 0717 AE'Kaelria rov '80, op. cit. for a provocative discussion of whether or 
not it Is still fruitful to look upon political culture in contemporary Greece as in transition. 
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in a sense of social legitimacy, there are various other factors which need to be 
considered before such a conclusion can be drawn. Certainly, however, this rise in 
dissatisfaction does signal a warning sign which needs to be carefully contemplated 
in an examination of legitimacy. 
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Chapter Six 
THE GREEK WELFARE STATE 
6.1 Introduction 
Attention in this chapter is turned to examining the welfare state as it relates to tile 
central focus of this study, the question of legitimacy. GOsta Esping-Andersen's 
regime type cluster scheme -- further expanded by Stephan Liebfried -- 
characterising Greece within the 'Latin rim' countries as a 'rudimentary' type of 
European welfare state will begin a discussion of the Greek welfare state. A brief 
look at the Greek state and its ubiquitous role within Greek society ývill follow to 
draw out Greece's distinctive welfare state characteristics. The next section will 
further discuss some of the particularities of the Greek welfare state while the last 
part of this chapter will investigate the private versus the public debate over social 
welfare in Greece. The ultimate goal behind this partly theoretical, partly descriptive 
analysis of the welfare state is to position Greece within these debates and seek out 
how these feed into the question of legitimacy. 
As was discussed in Chapters One and Two of this study, the debates surrounding 
the modern welfare state are variegated and numerous. In contemporary discussions 
describing the basic responsibilities of the modem welfare state, the most frequently 
cited of these are: (a) providing for a minimum standard of living for all citizens-, (b) 
participating in the process of social reproduction; and (c) providing for basic social 
services such as education, health care, and social security. The means by which the 
above are to be achieved is through policy-making, usually involving the state as the 
main actor and to varying degrees private organisations and agencies. Ramesh 
Mishra defines the welfare state as: 
A liberal state which assumes responsibility for the well-being of its citizens 
through a range of interventions in the market economy, e. g., full 
employment policies and social welfare services. The term includes both 
the idea of state responsibility for welfare as well as the institutions and 
practices through which the idea is given effect. 104 
104Ramesh Mishra, The Welfare State in Crisis, (NY: St. Martin's Press) 1984, p. xi. Sec esp. 
the first chapter of the book, "The Lost Legitimacy, " for Mishra's account of what led to the 
legitimacy of the welfare state in the post-war era and his argument in favor of a contcmporar', 
corporatist' -- 'inteizrated' welfare state. I 
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Richard Rose separates welfare state attributes into two categories: "social benefits 
that are state-based or market-based"105 and those which are 'political' and include 
such issues as who is entitled to civil and political rights. The welfare state has also 
been interpreted as laying a foundation and a basis for consensus building. The idea 
here is that certain welfare state policies, for example, those which provide for a 
minimum standard of living, tend to create a basis for unity and consensus among all 
social strata in society, although different social strata have diverse reasons and 
interests for having such welfare policies. This can be related to the case of Greece, 
where one finds quite a high level of social agreement as to the need for social 
security policies which are considered to be responsibilities of the state. The state 
thus acts as that mechanism which tries to even out inequalities -- in an attempt to 
avoid social conflict -- by instituting welfare policies. 106 
The central question that needs to be posed for the purposes of this study, howeN, cr, 
is whether this does in fact create social legitimacy for the system. In other words. 
do welfare state policies -- acting as mechanisms which supposedly even out social 
inequalities and irregularities as well as setting a basic standard of living -- enhance 
the degree of social legitimacy for the system? Furthermore, where does Greece fit 
into this discussion? Has her laggardly development of a welfare state substantially 
affected the degree of social legitimacy for the operation of government? Equally as 
pertinent for a discussion of legitimacy is the reverse question: Does a debilitated 
welfare state translate into less social and political legitimacy'? As has been 
mentioned previously in this study, the term crisis has often been employed in a 
variety of ways and by various authors to describe the present state in which modern 
welfare states find themselves. All means will be utilised in this study to avoid a 
misconstruing of the idea of crisis (with its various meanings and interpretations) 
with a waning of social and political legitimacy. The intention here is to focus on 
the political and social dimensions of legitimacy, and not confuse that with the 
prolific literature written on and describing crisis. 
105See Richard Rose, "Bringing Freedom Back in, " In New Perspectives on the Welfare State in 
Europe, Catherine Jones ed., (London: Routledge) 1993, pp. 221-24 1. 
106Maria Petmezidou-Tsouloubi has elaborated on this point in her work concerning social 
policy. See (in Greek) Koiv(oviKi; Avia6rr7reý K-al Koi v(ovi ic6 HoAi n x-4 (AOýva: EýdvTa; ) 1992. 
Gosta Espin is! - Andersen is representative of an analyst who believes that the welfare state is not 
merely involved with the issue of inequalities but rather he has more forcibly argued that: "The 
welfare state is not just a mechanism that intervenes in, and possibly corrects. the structure of 
inequality-. it is, in its own right, a system of stratification. " See Gosta Esping Andersen. The Three 
worl(js of Welfare Capitalism, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press) 1990, esp. chapter one. 
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6.2 Greece as a 'Rudimentary' Welfare State 
One way of placing the Greek welfare state within a European Union context for 
purposes of analysis is to utilise the work of Gosta Esping- Andersen. Es-ping- 
Andersen has established a means by which to categorise European welfare states in 
an attempt to remark on their differences and similarities. 107 By focusing on state, 
market and family relationships and their interconnectedness as they relate to the 
welfare state, Esping-Andersen has outlined three regime-type clusters which he 
labels the 'liberal' welfare state, the 'corporatist' welfare state, and the 'social 
democratic' welfare state 108 (see Table 6.1). None of these three regime-types alone 
adequately describes the case of Greece as a welfare state (and this holds true for the 
other southern European member states). Nonetheless his work has laid a 
framework for a typology of European welfare states which has been taken up bY 
other analysts who have further elaborated on his scheme. 109 
Regime Type Clusters Characteristics 
UK Canada 'liberal' welfare state (USA 'modest social insurance plans , , , Australia) predominate, ' benefits provided by the 
state are minimal; the market is to 
subsidise private welfare which the state 
does not provide 
'corporatist' welfare state (Austria, France, state more active as a provider of welfare 
Germany) which goes back to the historical precedent 
from the time of Bismarck that the state 
granted certain social rights to its citizens 
'social democratic' welfare state universalism and decommodification of 
(Scandinavian countries) social rights; state acts to promote equality 
and certain standards that go beyond 
simply the minimal needs of citizens 
TABLE 6.1 Gosta Esping-Andersen's Three Regime-Type Clusters II IJ 
107See in this study Chapter One, 1.2.3 and Chapter Two 21.3.3 for previous discussions of the 
welfare state. 
108Gosta Espi ng- Andersen, The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism, op. cit., pp. 26-29. 
109See Francis G. Castles, "Welfare State Development in Southern Europe, " We. Nt European 
Politics, Vol. 18, no. 21, April 1995, pp. 291-313 for a discussion of a time-series model of social 
insurance growth which compares Greece, Portugal and Spain with other advanced nations using 
OECD data. 
II OTable based on Gosta Esping-Andersen's three regime-týpes found in The Three Worlds o 
Welfare Capitalism, op. cit., pp. 26-29. 
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It has been Stephan Liebfriedl II who has enhanced Esping- Anderse n's reginie-type 
cluster scheme to include a fourth regime-type, what he labels 'Latin rim countries' 
which include Spain, Portugal, southern Italy, Greece, and to a much lesser extent 
France. 112 The characteristics of 'Latin rim' welfare states are distinct from those 
which Liebfried labels Scandinavian welfare states, the Anglo-Saxon countries, and 
the 'Bismarck' countries in many ways. Table 6.2113 lists the particular 
characteristics of 'Latin rim' countries as Liebfried explains them and as they are 
here interpreted as applying to the case of Greece. 
'Latin Rim' Countries As Applied to the Case of Greece 
(a) no right to welfare is given (a) however, in Greece the state acts as 
employer by way of a large public 
bureaucracy 
(b) older traditions of welfare exist (b) clientelist practices as a legacy of the 
past and its affects on how the state is 
perceived; the role of the church and 
family in society 
(c) different labour market structures: (c) applies to the case of Greece which still 
strong agricultural bias has approximately 1/4 of its labour 
force involved in agriculture 
(d) do not have full employment tradition (d) characteristic of Greece; has the largest 
percentage of self-employed among 
EU member states 
(e) welfare state of institutionalised (e) Greek governments continue to 
promise promise welfare (structural) reforms 
which are implemented at best only 
partially 
TABLE 6.2 Uharacteristics ot'Hudimentary' Weltare States: 
The Case of GREECE 
What Liebfried has basically done is build upon Richard Titmuss' 'institutional' 
# redistributive' and 'residual' models of welfare to create his scheme. By 
distinguishing four social policy regimes, Liebfried hopes to reveal that EU i-nember 
states have very different traditions of welfare which create formidable obstacles in 
any attempt to create a 'common' welfare state in Europe. In fact Liebfried remains 
III Stephen Liebfried, "Towards a European Welfare State? " In New Perspectives on the Welfare 
State, Catherine Jones, ed., (London: Routledge) 1993, pp. 133-156. 
1 12What Stephen Liebfried is attempting to do, to use his own words, is to explore "... the 
interfaces between poverty, social insurance and poverty policy. The different consequences which 
the introduction of a basic incorne scheme under each regime might have'' is his basic aim. op. cit., p. 
139. 
11 3This table is based on Stephen Liebfried's types of European ý, %-elfare states, "Towards a 
European Welfare State? " In New Perspectives on the lVelfare State, Cathenne Jones, ed., op. cit., pp. 
139-143. See esp. his Table 7.3 on p. 142 which summarises this discussion. 
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very skeptical that the EU can implement a substantive EU welfare policy per ,, -e and 
argues that instead it will most likely continue to produce descriptive formulas 
regarding social legislation. 
Returning back to the case of Greece, one can observe that Liebfried's description of 
I rudimentary' welfare states does partially characterise the particular, ties of the 
country. Liebfried mentions that the older tradition of welfare tied to the role of the 
Catholic Church is influential in these welfare states, while clearly with Greece it is 
the Greek Orthodox Church which has played an integral role in Greek societv 
affecting notions of social welfare. Furthermore the Greek state's omnipresence in 
society has played a very influential role in shaping and determining the ideas of 
social welfare which have become deeply embedded within the Greck 
consciousness. The large percentage of public workers has meant that middle 
stratum interests and concerns have become cemented into the mentality behind 
social legislation that is produced concerning this group. Greece's idiosyncratic 
labour market structures are characteristically rigid: i. e., Greece has inflexible wage 
levels and her other capital market structures are quite fixed. 114 Labour market 
structures in other member-states began to undergo necessary adaptations in the 
1980's due to changes occurring in the area of production. As Lyberaki points out 
there are two major types of labour market flexibility which can be interpreted to 
roughly correspond with Esping-Andersen's regime type clusters mentioned above. 
The first type is associated with the 'liberal' welfare state model while the second 
with the 'corporatist' and the 'social democratic' welfare models. As Lyberaki 
writes: 
The first type is purely defensive and attempts to lower wages and social 
benefits in order to meet the fierce competition poised by standardized 
products. The second type is associated with an offensive strategy, 
which seeks higher quality of products and worker's skills for the 
purpose of technological modernization in both the social and economic 
sense. 115 
Greece, for all intents and purposes, adopted neither of these types of labour market 
flexibility in the 1980's and has only recently (since 1990) begun to consider 
introducing certain revisions and adaptations of its labour market structures. The 
historical development of Greece's state structures have likewise created a unique set 
I 14For a discussion of Greece's market structures and institutions and how this has led to Greece's 
'divergence' or 'convergence' with the EU, see Antigone Lyberaki, "Grecce-EC Comparative 
Economic Performance: Convergence or Divergence? " In Greece, theVew Europe, and the Changing 
International Order, Harry J. Psomiades and Stavros B. 'Momadakis, eds. (NY: Pella Publishing Co. 
Inc. ) 1993. 
1151bid., p. 188. 
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of forces which have influenced the make-up of social policy for the country. 
Greece's political vicissitudes and her uneven and irregular economic evolution are 
additional factors governing the development and recent attempts at reformýing the 
welfare state. 
Thus the connections that can be made from the above discussion to our question of 
legitimacy are best summarised by reiterating several points. The first of these 
concerns the traditional role of the state and the church as a legitimating force behind 
state actions. The 'older traditions of welfare' that Liebfried discussions aIlLide to the 
prominent place that the Church has had in 'Latin rim' countries and in Greece the 
Greek Orthodox Church has helped to legitimate state policies and social 
programmes. 116 Secondly, the Greek public bureaucracy, by employing a large 
workforce, has perennially satiated a large percentage of the population while 
creating social policies based on and reflecting very much the interests of the middle 
stratum. The particulars of the labour market and Greece, and how this feeds into 
legitimacy will be discussed in some detail in the following chapter of this study. 
Let it suffice here to repeat that Greece's still sizable agricultural base and the large 
percentage of self-employed entrepreneurs reflects the absence of a full employment 
tradition in Greece. That the state continues to promise certain welfare provisions 
which it is incapable of effectively providing perhaps is the most outstanding 
deficiency of the system, and here is where there appears to be declining levels of 
social legitimacy for the Greek welfare state. Greek citizens have come to 
acknowledge that the state cannot make good its promises to provide a level of 
services which are expected yet they are reluctant and fearful of having these fall 
into the private domain. Thus a dilemma has arisen: on the one hand there is 
recognition of the Greek states' inability to supply requisite welfare provisions, yet 
on the other hand there remains an unwillingness to have private organisations and 
agencies take on what have been traditionally considered state responsibilities. 
6.3 The Major Antithesis: An Omnipresent Greek State Yet Simultaneously a 
Weak Welfare State 
Traditionally, Greeks have expected the government in power to administer social 
provisions since prinza facie when the centralised Greek state was initially formed, 
it was that structure which was able to dispense state resources to individuals found 
among the various social strata within Greece at the time. In the absence of other 
I 16Perhaps this helps to explain why in Greece issues such as those of abortion and divorce have 
not involved public controversy between church and state as compared to the disagreements that have 
raged between the Roman Catholic Church (personified in the person of the Pope) and those countries 
where Roman Catholicism is predominant. 
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structures or institutions the state was the provider of resources and its 'clients' were 
the citizens who supported it with their votes in return for generous remittances. 
That the state owned and operated the major banking centres in the post-World War 
Two era (the National Bank of Greece and the Commercial Bank became 
responsible for 90% of Greece's savings during that time) 117 -- further served to 
feed the notion that the state was that structure which could unabatedly provide 
financially for those citizens who would support the government in pow, ei- at the 
polls. 
Additionally, in Greece particularly so at the beginning of the twentieth century, the 
state directly took on functions of the capitalist market (for example, by setting 
prices on a variety of basic commodities, establishing salaries and salary increases 
for all public sector positions, and by investing in almost all areas of industry) as 
industrialisation and its accompanying capitalist structures and institutions 
developed belatedly. 118 Capitalism and its labour market structures in Greece 
developed half a century behind that of the nation-states in northern Europe. In fact 
in many ways Greece still has precapitalist structures and practices. This has resulted 
in the state acting not only as a regulator of the capitalist system in Greece (guiding 
the invisible hand) but also as the major force steering and leading the system 
(replacing the invisible hand with state directives). 
What likewise needs to be considered is that there has been a huge influx of foreign 
capital into the Greek economy, a practice that climaxed in the 1950's and the 1960's 
which boosted the Greek economy substantially then while creating an economic 
dependency on the infusion of this exogenous capital. After some thirty odd years 
since this surge of foreign capital into the country, one still witnesses in Greece the 
reliance on foreign money, whether that be in the form of loans, or through 
multinational corporations investing in Greece, or more recently through the 
European Union by way of a variety of channels and mechanisms. 119 Greece today 
still relies largely on foreign capital, even to subsidise welfare state policies at home. 
This has created an economic dilemma for Greece the extent to which has often been 
underestimated and is certainly underplayed by each government that comes to 
power. 
117Nicos P. Mouzelis, Modern Greece: Facets of Underdevelopment, (UK: Macmillan Pubs., 
1978), p. 25. 
11 81bid.. p. 27. 
119For example, the Objective One Funding plans, the Struciural Funds, and the First and 
Second Community Support Frameworks (Delors I and 11 Packavcs). 
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A further aspect to the discussion of the welfare state which needs some clarification 
is a distinction between the sporadic and favouritist practices of the government in 
power (which has resulted in the politicisation of welfare state practices-) and that of 
welfare state policies de jure. The former was very widespread in Greece at the 
beginning of the twentieth century and can still be detected today. The latter. the 
development of welfare policies and a plan laying down the structures of the welfare 
state through the enactment of laws, did not transpire until way into the post-World 
War Two era. The National Health Care plan (IKA), for example, was not put into 
effect until 1937, and even then a majority of the Greek population (67%) was not 
covered under the plan. 120 Today there are some 370 different insurance 
organisations operating in Greece (basically established along one's line of work, for 
instance there is one for public workers, one for bank employees, one for farmers 
and agriculturists, and so on) some eighty of which provide full health care which 
includes hospital i sation. 121 The remaining organisations have differing policy 
coverage, which may include disability pay, worker's compensation, and retirement 
pay. However, what is absent is a general basic minimum standard of coverage 
which all insurance organisations must provide. Even more importantly, absent is a 
uniform state policy determining and setting out the states' contribution to these 
various insurance organisations, which are all subsidised by the central government, 
but to varying degrees. This has resulted in a very unequal and lopsided distribution 
of health care in Greece today. 
In the post- authori tari an era, Greek governments (even those of ND, a conservative 
party), have continued to dispense copious benefits to particular groups within 
society in the form of money which the state cannot afford which reinforce social 
inequalities without addressing citizens' real needs and which create huge deficit 
dilemmas for the state. Political parties, each vowing to provide better benefits and 
improved services, have coloured discussions of the welfare state along political 
party lines. This 'welfare greed' approach disguises the real concerns and creates 
controversy around the issues rather than trying to outline a comprehensive plan for 
welfare which could be discussed and debated meritoriously. For example, inflation 
during the past fifteen years in Greece has hovered between 16% to just recently in 
February 1995 to around 8.4% (still the highest inflation rate among EU members). 
This has necessitated governments to continue to raise the amount of money given to 
retirees, however, this has not helped eradicate the problem of poverty of the elderly. 
120Maria Petinezidou-Tsouloubi, (in Greek) Kowcom,, ý, - A V1C6MrE, - Kai Koiv(! MKýHOAInKý, 
(AOýva: gdvTa; ) 1992, a. 126. 
12 1 Ibid., p. 126-127. 
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No long term programme has been sketched out to try to deal with the reality that 
longevity has created new concerns as to how to sustain an older population which 
can no longer contribute to the GDP- 122 Welfare state structures such as those of 
education and health care (i. e. social services) continue to be inadequately organised 
and are insufficient today to sustain Greek citizens' needs. Much of what the state 
cannot provide has been taken up by other structures, mainly the family, for example 
(mentioned previously in this study), which often acts as both monetary and health 
care provider for the elderly and subsidises other family members who are 
unemployed, serving in the military, attending university or disabled. There are few 
if any other voluntary associations or organisations that operate in Greece to 
supplement state welfare services. 123 
6.4 The Particularities of the Greek Welfare State 
A recent look at the literature written on the Greek welfare state reveals that it has 
been characterised and interpreted in a variety of ways, depending upon ones initial 
theoretical and political perspective. Most certainly, however, the Greek welfare 
state has been described as underdeveloped, whether structurally in functional terms 
reflected in policy theory or via a systems approach, particularly so when Greece is 
compared with north European nation-states. For example, Greece is considered: (a) 
less industrialised, and lacking heavy industries, while maintaining an agricultural 
orientation; (b) less indicative of post-Fordism; (c) lacking proletarianism, while 
composed of a middle stratum in society which includes a large percentage of public 
workers who have a privileged position concerning access to welfare benefits. 124 
Nevertheless one must consider that welfare state provisions were never adequately 
122When comparing OECD countries, Greece spends more of its GDP on pensions than any 
other country. See Georgios Provopoulos and Platon Tinios, "Pensions and the Fiscal Crisis of the 
Greek State, " In Greece, the New Europe, and the Changing International Order, Harry J. Psomiades 
and Stavros B. Thomadakis eds., op. cit., pp. 325-349 for a discussion of social security spending in 
Greece which focuses on pension spending. For exact numbers see (in Greek) Ynoupyeio Eevlicý; 
OiKovogiaq, Rpocwpivoi EOviKol Aoyaplaauoi i7jý EUdSag, 'UiVaKa; 9: E(Yo8a Kat Uo8a rwv 
Opyavio-g6v KotvwvtKA; Aaodktarl; ano TpgXojoF-; Euvakkayý;, " (3.28, (AOýva: Een. ) 1989. 
123For example, absent in Greece are voluntary organisations such as shelters for battered wives, 
free clinics for narcotic addicts, voluntary fire fighter associations, or literacy programmes which are 
found in many western nation-states that have achieved a degree of decentrallsation at which level 
many of these organisations develop and operate. Absent as well are organisations such as consumer 
protection agencies. The current Development Minister, Vasso Papandreou, has just recently 
announced that the present PASOK government is looking into this issue, as plans are underway for 
the development of a consumer protection department which will have centres in cities and 
prefectures. Athens News Agencýy Bulletin, 13 March 1996. 
1 24For an in depth analysis of the characteristics particular to the Greek welfare state, See (in 
Greek) E)Wd; Mako, ýTa;, "XCOPIKý Aopý Kat Koivwvticý Ata8tKa(yia a"v (Yn)avdnTVýTj TOIJ 
KpCiTO; f1p6voia;, " o. 273-325, in RpoflA4, gara Avdirrvýrjý rov Kpdro; 17p6voia; cTrqv, E;. Ad6a 
(AOýva: KCiVTCX; ) 1988. See likewise (in Greek) EdPpa; Popn6kq; Kai %ItXdkq; V_ý. Tao, _-, 
H 
Koi v(ovi x-4 RoAi n K-4 Wrd z7lv Kpio7l rou Kpdroý; 17p6voi a,.;, (Ocoaakoviicij: Flapa-rqpTITýq) 1995. 
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and efficiently developed in Greece in the first place. In the first decade of the post- 
World War Two era when northwest European nation-states began to develop the 
structures and institutions of a modem welfare state, Greece suffered through a civil 
war and a politically unstable era which hindered the development (and even stifled 
the discussion of) the prerequisites necessary for a Greek welfare state. Greece wa. ', 
busy trying to make amends with a society which had been tom apart by the Second 
World War and then shortly thereafter further divided by an even more ý'iclous and 
savage civil war. Other social factors that inhibited the development of a Greek 
welfare state concern the large migration that occurred in the 1950's and 1960's in 
Greece which meant that a large percentage of the more skilled labour force left the 
country. Additionally, the working class in Greece in the post-civil war era was 
unable to exercise pressure on the state to bring about extensive social reform. Basic 
social policies such as establishing a poverty line and a basic level of subsistence did 
not come about. Welfare state provisions and social programmes did not begin to be 
effectively formulated and implemented in Greece in fact until the post- 1974 era, a 
time when the first signs of a coming world economic recession was on the horizon. 
The dictatorship also inhibited construction of a welfare state, since income 
distribution continued to be extremely unequitable and clientelism was reinforced. 
Indeed Greece's clientelist system and the lack of a social democratic tradition have 
also stunted the growth of welfare state structures. Greece's highly centrallsed state 
as mentioned in the previous two chapters, has resulted in policy decisions being 
taken almost exclusively at that level, and the second tier of government is a recent 
development which has yet to bear fruit. Thus welfare state policies continue to be 
made at the core by the party in government, continuing their politicisation and their 
association with the party state apparatus. 
Partially as a result of this retarded growth of welfare state structures, and partially 
due to a socialisation process which emphasises family and friendship ties, other 
societal institutions and structures have supplemented and in some cases replaced 
those of the welfare state in Greece, particularly the extended family, organisations 
and clubs (11)'Uoyot) formed among those from the same birth place, or based on 
some other demographic similarity. Therefore informal structures in Greece have 
played a role in providing for some of those who fall between the cracks125 of the 
Greek welfare state. However, this phenomenon appears to be in the process of 
1250r as Albert Weale has stated when discussing the possibilities of EU social policies, such 
policics must be developed to avoid citizens slipping through the holes of the 'social safety net'. See 
Albert Weale. "Social Policy and European Union, " Social Polic), and Administration, Vol. 28, No. 1. 
March 1994, pp. 5-19. 
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modification, as demographic changes brought on by ý, ariations in the labour market 
have resulted in a disintegration of the traditional extended family, and economic 
hardships have meant that family members are continuously experiencing growing ZI ýý Z4 fiscal problems. Supporting (financially, as well as by providing shelter for) an 
elderly grandparent or a cousin out of work -- something which one once did not 
think twice about -- is becoming less apparent in Greece, particularly so in the major 
metropolitan cities of Greece today. 
In an attempt to remark more intelligibly upon the Greek welfare state and 
government policy-making as it relates to our discussion of legitimacy, a 
chronological periodisation follows, beginning with the immediate post-authoritarian 
era in Greece from 1974 up to 1981, which marks the beginning of a new political 
era in modem Greek history. This is followed by a consideration of welfare policy 
during the era of PASOK under the leadership of Andreas Papandreou (1981-89), 
followed by a look at what awaits in the 1990's. 
1974 to 1981 
Government welfare policies in the post-1974 era can be said to have received ýI 
degree of social legitimacy for the newly democratic system which emerged after the 
junta but this was a type of social legitimacy turned inward 126 characterised, for 
example, by changes which occurred in the public sector through the development of 
health care and education, better pay for public workers, loans for those wishing to 
buy their own home, etc. Therefore, in one respect, the state began to be perceived 
of as socially legitimate, but by a particular middle stratum in society that saw itself 
directly benefiting from these provisions. 127 This stratum (which was privy to these 
welfare state provisions) was composed of public workers, individuals in the 
banking industry, those employed in the armed forces, and a portion of the petty 
bourgeoisie. However, it seems no longer useful to utilise the original Marxist class 
terminology for contemporary analyses. This also holds true for the classical 
explanations of Taylorism and post-Fordism which were not indicative of Greek 
society in the immediate post- 1974 era since Greece's labour market. labour force 
and production process were distinct from those of northern European states. I thus 
agree with Nicos Mouzelis who has maintained that neither Greek contemporary 
126See (in Greek) OWdq MakoýTaý, AqgýTpTj; Oucov6pou, "Etaaywyý KpdTo; Ilp6volcE;: To 
llp6runo'xat 9 Myjvucý Dc8oXý Tou" op. cit., esp. pp. 32-37. 
127See (in Greek) Ayjpý'rpq; Oucov6pou, "Iýavjga yýý Kal Ka'rotKiu, ý oTq MF-TanoýXAUCý 
EXX68a. " in I7po#A4, uara Avd; zTvýq; rov Kparo; Hpovola, ý arrlv &; dg5a. Owdc- Nlaý. oikac. 
AIJPýTPTJ; OIKOv6pou (emp. ) (AOýva: RdvTa; ) a. 57-113. 
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industrial nor social structures are indicative of post-Fordisin. 128 James Petras has 
best summed up the Greek political reality when remarking that: "Greek pofitic*ý 
today is not divided by horizontal classes but by rival vertical patronage machine', 
that mobilize voters through state networks in office and through pseudopopulist 
appeals out of office. "129 Nevertheless welfare state policies in Greece in the 
immediate post- authoritarian era were very much provided through an impetus on 
the part of the middle stratum in society. This stands in contrast to northern 
European states which had strong blue collar working classes which pre., "sed for 
social welfare policies in the decades following the close of the Second World War. 
More generally, this era was an era of consensus building in Greece after a 
tumultuous political epoch in modem Greek history, and both the forces of the right 
and left in Greece shed their extreme political positions and entered a political arena 
which was attempting to develop a politically legitimate forum for debate and 
reconciliation (particularly during Konstantinos Karamanlis' tenure in power). Thus 
social and political legitimacy was developing for a political system which was 
beginning to institute democratic practices. The state thus was seen in a i-nore 
favourable light, and was perceived of as that mechanism which could dispense 
welfare provisions to a population which had been exhausted financially and 
physically from war and which felt it deserved compensation. 
Clearly then, the immediate post-authoritarian era in Greece was one which 
witnessed a welcomed return of democracy to the country and this provided the 
background and the necessary support for the state to step in and begin creating the 
basis for a welfare state. The bulwark that had developed against the colonel's 
dictatorship created a consensual political climate which promoted democracy while 
proving conducive to such actions on the part of the state which would reflect 
democratic principles and provide much needed social services for citizens. 
Therefore positive expectations of what the state could provide its citizens in terms 
of welfare benefits were built up during this era, yet succeeding governments would 
not be able to shape a climate of realistic expectations of what the state ill practice 
could provide. 
128See Nicos P. Mouzelis, "Greece in the Twenty-first Century: Institutions and Political 
Culture, " In Greece Preparesfor the Twentyfirst Centitn', Dimitri Constas and Theofanis G. Stavrou, 
eds., (London and Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press), 1995, pp. 17-34. 
129James Petras, "The Contradictions of Greek Socialism, " In The Greek Socialist Experiment, 
Theodore C. K-ariotis, ed., (NY. Pella Pub. Co. ) 1992, p. 126. 
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1981: The Beginning otthe Populist Decade'in Greece 
The decade of the 1980's, having been described as the 'populist decade' in 
Greecel, 30 fundamentally left its mark on the political, social and economic life of 
the country. In PASOK's first four-year term in power, welfare state 
dispensation 131 increased substantially in Greece, 132 but at the expense of creating a 
huge public debt requiring further reliance on foreign capital, mostly in the forril of 
high interest loans. Furthermore, although the amount of money being dispensed to 
the public from state coffers increased, this had only short-term effects since 
inflation was very high and structural and long-term changes to the welfare state 
system (which were sorely needed) did not occur. 133 As a result, indecision 
concerning the foundation and the future of the welfare state in Greece -- the real 
conundrum -- continued (and still continues) unresolved. Thus instead of utilising 
populist backing and widespread political support to reform the state and implement 
major changes to the patron-client system, PASOK defaulted on its promises of 
akkayfl -- change and fell into the same trap as its predecessors of dispensing 
favours in return for loyal support. 
Likewise it is worth recalling that from 1981 Greece was beginning to receive 
sizable amounts of money from the European Community134 which were earmarked 
for social welfare reforms of the state administration which had as a goal to upgrade 
and help modernise Greece's administrative system. It should likewise be 
remembered that this was the era of the new consumerism in Greece and a time 
when a growing class of nouveaux riches came into existence. Again, a period of 
heightened expectations as to what the state could provide its citizens in terms of 
welfare benefits was augmented by PASOK, resulting in a transient legitimacy for 
government actions which would fade with the onset of austerity measures instituted 
in PASOK's second term in office. 
130See the various essays in Richard Clogg, ed. Greece 1981-89 The Populist Decade, (NY: St. 
Martin's Press) 1993. 
13 1 And a great deal of civil law reform took place as well affecting social programmes and 
social policy. 
132See figures frorn the Greek Ministry of the National Economy (in Greek), Tnol)pyF-io HvIKý; 
Oticovopia;, flpoawpivoi EOviKoi Aoraplaupoi r7ý EUd8aý, "I'livalca; 6: Tpýxol)GE; Aandvc; 
'rou Ailpocriou yta Aya0d icat TnTjpeaiF-;, " cy. 25, (AOýva: Yxn. ) 1989. 
1331nflation ranged between 20.7 % to 17.9% from 1981 to 1984. See James Petras. et. al., 
"Greek Socialism: The Patrimonial State Revisited, " In Mediterranean Paradoxes, James Kurth and 
James Petras, eds.. (Providence, Rhode Island: Berg Publishers) 1993, esp. Table 6 on p. 21 S. 
134Funds from the Community continued throughout the 1980's and have done so likewise into 
the 1990's. The European Social Fund (ESF) which was part of the First Community Support 
Framework for Greece from 1989-93 allotted 1,728 million ecus to Greece. Set, Commission 
Decision 30 March 1990 (90/203/EEC) Official Jour7ial of the European Communities, No L 106/26, 
20 April 1990. 
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One of the few positive consequences of PASOK's first tenure in power in the 1980's 
was its ability as a movement to incorporate into the political arena social groups and 
portions of the population which had remained outside of the Greek political 
environment since the close of the Second World War. As Christos Lyrintzis has 
remarked: "... the populist mode of political participation adopted by PASOK had a 
positive side, to the extent that it incorporated into the political system social strata 
that were politically marginal during the postwar period. " 135 However. Lyrintzis as 
well goes on to further note that there was a "... negative side to the sarne process, 
namely that PASOK incorporated these groups into politics by maintaining their 
dependence on the state and by exacerbating the inadequacies, inefficiencies and 
irrationalities of both the political system and the state apparatus. " 136 Henceonthe 
one hand, social legitimacy for the PASOK government could be said to have been 
enhanced by its ability to bring into the political system once marginalised groups, 
yet on the other hand, once these groups were brought in, they fell victim to the same 
overpowering inept bureaucratic state apparatus which remained unchanged and thus 
these groups became quickly 'disenchanted' with the operation of the administration. 
At the same time Greece's economic performance failed to match expenditure 
demands. Therefore although certain welfare provisions (and civil law reform) 
increased during PASOK's first tenure in power, these were soon overshadowed by 
the realisation that these provisions were dispensed at a severely inflated cost to the 
state and to citizens which would have devastating economic repercussions oil the 
macroeconomic life of the country. 137 More importantly, structural reform which 
was most needed did not occur which further set back the process of modernisation 
and modification of the public sector. 
PASOK's return to power in October 1993 (after a short absence filled by the New 
Democracy party from 1990 to 1993 which experienced dilemmas and tenacious 
popular opposition when attempting to curtail welfare state policies) under an ailing 
Andreas Papandreou (both physically and in terms of popularity) experienced severe 
difficulties in facing the challenges raised by the first years of the decade of the 
1990's, and at the same time keeping its promises of providing generous benefits to 
its citizens. Papandreou's plans of revamping the welfare state fell by the wayside as 
135Christos Lyrintzis, TASOK in Power: From'Change'to Disenchantment, " in Richard Clogg, 
ed. Greece 1981-89: The Populist Decade, op. cit. p. 36. 
1361bid, p. 36-37. 
137A debate in Greece among academics and commentators on the PASOK era is still raging 
ovcr whether PASOK was in practice considering the demands of the less well-off who desperately 
needed welfare provisions or whether this government, just as those of the past, continued to perceive 
the middle stratum in society as the largest group whose demands should be the central focus of 
policy-niaking. 
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the state debt grew, as the clock further ticked toward the realisation of the EMU 
and as plans continued towards the achievement of a common European currency. 
The real dilemma for Greece is how to keep up with her EU partners who haN, e set as 
a goal the achievement of a monetary union and at the same time juggle pres.. "Ing and 
urgent domestic concerns. 
The 1990's 
The 1990's is a decade which is witnessing thus far the shrinking of the welfare state 
worldwide and in the case of Greece one can observe increases in the percentage of 
welfare state costs being taken on by citizens, while provisions continue to be 
dispensed under the inefficient control and administration of the state. Increases in 
the percentage of money taken out of one's pay for IKA (the National Health Care 
system which is near bankruptcy) and other state-run insurance plans (TEBE, for 
example, another insurance plan covering those who own small businesses and who 
are free-lance, which is also running in the red) have meant that a larger chunk of 
one's salary is being used to subsidise welfare state policies which the state finds 
increasingly more difficult to fund. In Greece, retiree funds are often being paid out 
to senior citizens with borrowed money. 138 The state coffers continuously show 
deficit and the forecast for the future continues to be as equally as challenging. The 
real problem however, is not simply that more money is being pulled out from one's 
pay, (although this certainly has created personal fiscal hardships) but that this 
money is not being utilised appropriately by the state to: (a) institute a higher quality 
of health care; (b) resurrect and revitalise an educational system which is archaic and 
inappropriate in today's global world environment; and (c) re-examine and determine 
appropriate means to provide for an increasingly larger percentage of elderly 
persons, as the demographics of the country continue to change. 139 Hence the real 
dilemma for the Greek welfare state continues to be how to create a more coherent 
and long-term social policy programme addressing citizen needs and requirements. 
138See Georgios Provopoulos and Platon Tinios, "Pensions and the Fiscal Crisis of' the Greek 
State, " In Greece, the New Europe, and the Changing Intemational Order, Harry J. Psomiades and 
Stavros B. Thomadakis eds., (NY: Pella Publishing Co., Inc. ) 1993, pp. 325-349, particularly Table 4 
Social Security Finances and the Public Sector Deficit (% of GDP) p. 345. These authors discuss the 
1982 government decision that increased the amount of money given to those receiving IKA pensions 
but which did not correspondingly increase the amount of money being taken in by the government to 
subsidise this increase. Therefore, "... [t]he resulting deficit was financed by bank borroý% ing, thereby 
creating further burdens for the future. " Ibid.. p. 333. 
139The aging of Greece's population is occurring more rapid]), than in any other member state of 
the EU. For comparisons of EU member-states, see European Commission, Greece: Coninfunit ,V Support Framework, 1994-99, (Luxembourg: Official Publications of the European Cummunities) 
1994, p. 11. 
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Since taking on the position as Prime Minister in January 1996, Kostas Simitis, a 
fifty-nine year old, known to be a moderniser within the PASOK party, has pledged 
to revitalise the Greek state and its institutions by introducing incremental, 
methodical changes. 140 A transformation of state str-uctures will undoubtedly allow 
for the more efficient operation of the welfare state in Greece, and give Greece the 
opportunity to gradually bring her standard of living up to par with that of her EU 
partners. The operating costs of the welfare state in Greece, for example, are huge 
while the distribution of money and resources to individuals and to the various social 
policy areas (re: education and health care) are not commensurate. These types of 
disparities and irregularities found within the welfare state must be addressed and 
solved for a more evenhanded and equitable system to emerge which will allow for a 
greater sense of legitimacy to be perceived concerning their operation. 
6.5 Public Versus the Private Debate: Who is to Pay for What 
Since 1990 the public versus the private debate in Greece began at full speed, and 
discussions have focused on proposals for semi -pri vatising some of the traditionally 
state run and administered utilities and industries in Greece. As has been mentioned 
previously in this study, the Greek government has owned and operated all the major 
utilities in Greece, including the National Telephone Company (OTE), the National 
Electric Company (AEH) and the National Water Supply Company (EYAAFI). This 
has resulted in the build up of a massive, clumsy public bureaucracy discussed in 
some detail in the Chapter Four. 141 The particularities of the Greek welfare state 
mentioned above, especially the dominant role played by the central government in 
dispensing welfare provisions, help to illuminate some of the specific dimensions 
involved in the public versus the private debate as concerns the case of Greece. 
Discussions concerning what should be the role of the state in providing for basic 
welfare services and what should/can be left up to citizens is innately attached to the 
original notion held widely in Greece that the Greek state has a responsibility to 
provide (and in the past has provided) basic social services for citizens, regardless of 
the continually rising costs to the state, the poor level of services provided, and 
irrespective of the economic deficits that the state might incur in the long term as a 
result. The fact remains that the state has proved itself unable to utilise efficiently 
the substantial amount of revenue it collects from citizens and employ it effectively 
140See Press Briefing by Prime Minister Kostas Simitis before the local and international pre"s 
corps at Zapeo Megaro, Athens, 29 February 1996. 
14 1 As has been discussed in Chapter Four of this study, the Greek bureaucracy is characterised 
by mismanagement, inefficiency, and wastefulness. 
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in providing a respectable level of services. But the problems of the welfare state in 
Greece (and elsewhere for that matter) cannot and should not be investigated solely 
by measuring the amount of social expenditure by the state. This reveals N'ery little 
about state structures, their interconnectedness, historical experiences. and other 
factors which weigh into an explanation of the welfare state and which certainly are 
tied into the question of legitimacy. 
Although governments throughout the past decade (both PASOK and ND) haN, e 
come to reckon with the reality that the state must at least partially sell off public 
utilities to the private sector to make them more efficient and more importantly in 
keeping with EU regulations calling for increased levels of competitiveness of 
industries, 142 they have been unable to implement such goals in practice. Much of 
the hesitation on the part of both of the major political parties stems from the fear of 
the political cost this might have which could result in that party's loss at the polls in 
the next election. Pledges made to partially pfivatise utilities have just recently got 
underway but not without a great deal of protest from public workers. For example, 
PASOK in 1994 promised to sell off 25% of OTE -- the National Telephone 
Company -- to the private sector while floating stock on the Athens Sofokleos Stock 
Exchange. However, the government changed its mind at the last minute with a 
banal excuse that they were not getting the price they wanted for the OTE stock. 
The underlying reason, perhaps, was that the President of the Republic had to be 
voted in by May 1995 by the parliament otherwise a general election would have 
been called. Therefore, fearful of the possible political cost this would have, 
PASOK under Papandreou backed out of partially privatising OTE during that 
particularly sensitive political interval. 
Under continuous protest from OTE employees, and after more than two years of 
discussion and deliberations, the current PASOK government under Kostas Simitis 
has successfully secured parliamentary approval for the flotation of 6% of OTE 
equity with a possible additional 2% to be placed in the private domain. Public 
offering began on 26 March 1996. Approximately 6% (4,014,384 out of 
24,014,384) of shares issued have been made available to OTE employees and 
pensioners, with the remaining open to public purchase. The plan has callcd for 
initial shareholders to be given one free share for every ten (up to a total of one- 
142For example, the European Commission had continuously urged Greece to privatise the state- 
owned Hellenic and Neorion Shipyards, and in March of 1993 the Council of N. 1inisters gave Greece 
an ultimatum: either privatise the shipyards or shut them down. After much ado, the shipyards were 
finally sold oft' to a private company and the Commission officlaIlly closed its investigation. See 
European Report, I November 1995 p. 4. 
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hundred free shares per shareholder), provided they keep their shares for one-and-a- 
half years commencing from the time OTE has entered the Athens Sofokleos Stock 
Exchange. 143 
Another controversial issue concerning privatisation which has arisen concerns the 
Hellenic Shipyards of Skaramanga (valued at some 180 billion drachmas) which the 
Papandreou's PASOK government considered semi-privatising (approximately 49c/"e 
was to be sold to private investors while the remaining 51 % was to be kept under the 
state's jurisdiction). 144 Plans to float another 25% of the Public Petroleum 
Corporation (DEP) was also on PASOK's list of things to be done but these 
continued to be surrounded by political controversy and indecision on the part of 
government. Public workers continuously objected to moves of privatisation, as fear 
of job losses came on to centre stage. Talks have continued between the present 
PASOK government under Kostas Simitis and GSEE -- (GSEE, the General 
Confederation of Greek Workers and Employees) in an attempt to alleviate fears and 
ward off possible objections to government plans which have in the past resulted in 
strikes and demonstrations. 
However, for the process of privatisation to continue in Greece, as has become 
necessary if Greece is to meet EMU criteria which require that government deficit 
not exceed 3% of GDP and government debt not exceed 60% of GDP, structural 
changes are required including the updating of the constitution. A Greek Supreme 
court in two plenary sessions held on 7 and 14 March 1996 found that the dismissal 
of more than 5,500 AEH workers who had served for two years was invalid and that 
by law these workers must be reinstated. 145 This necessitated a re-evaluation of 
AEH rates since the government had not calculated the cost of paying these workers. 
Nevertheless one must recall that there continues to be a formidable economic 
stronghold by the central government in Greece, resulting in market mechanisms not 
functioning as they do in other EU partners which have less direct government 
intervention in industry. Greece has labour market structures which need to be 
considered as they concern the welfare state. For example, agriculture still continues 
to play a vital role in the Greek economy which is heavily subsidised by the 
143Athens News Agenc 
,v 
Bulletin, 8 March 1996. 
144The controversy over semi-privatising the Hellenic Shipyards of Skaramanga precipitated the 
resignation of Kostas Simitis who then held the posts of Minister of Industry, Trade and Technology 
from October 1993 to September 1995. Prime Minister Andreas Papandreou thereafter Conducted a 
cabinet reshuffle which stirred many feathers among PASOK MP's and party members alike. 
145See The 1975 Constitution of the Hellenic Republic, Part 111, Section 6, Chapter I'l. Article 
103(4) which refers to civil servants whose " ... posts shall 
be permanent so long as the posts exist. " 
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government and the EU CAP -- Common Agricultural PoliQ,. The lack- of heavy 
industry and the lack of large sized firms in Greece. the proliferation of ýmall 
businesses and entrepreneurial tradesmen, and the small percentage of wage-eamers' 
have all influenced the development of the Greek welfare state. Greece's lar2e 
public sector, while, on the one hand acting as a counterbalance to unemployment, 
has inhibited and acted as a bulwark for change which is a prerequisite for improved 
welfare state provisions. 
These particularities of the Greek welfare state have to varying degrees swýiyed the 
tide of welfare policies. The question which now needs to be asked is: in light of 
governments privatisation plans, what popular response will emerge and how will 
this affect political and social legitimacy? As evidenced thus far, those workers 
directly to be affected by privatisation plans are bucking the tide, but beyond the 
political rhetoric there appears to be an underlying recognition that Greece's 
membership in the EU is necessitating her to align her economic indictors (inflation, 
public debt and deficit) with those established by the TEU. Thus economic 
synchronisation required by the EMU means a cutting down on governinent 
expenditures and more profoundly a restructuring of welfare state policies. Those 
adhering to the 'modernising culture' in Greece have come to reckon with this reality, 
while those of the 'underdog culture'146 continue to resist these changes and this has 
resulted in very mixed attitudes towards EU plans affecting welfare provisions. On a 
larger scale, one could argue that global competition and the enhanced role of the 
world market have equally put pressure on nation-states today to reform and 
reconsider welfare state policies. Whether citizens are informed of these realities 
and how they come to reckon with them will no less partially affect whether or not 
they perceive domestic restructuring as legitimate or not. How the government in 
Greece will go about introducing and formulating welfare reform, and who will be 
involved in the decision-making process will fundamentally affect whether or not 
these changes will be perceived as legitimate. Conceivably, if the government 
continues to monopolise welfare state restructuring while keeping it at a centralised 
level, and does not partially concede decision-making to a second and third tier of 
government, then conflicts and controversy seem inevitable. A depolitisation 
process also needs to transpire to remove discussions of welfare from the political 
party level to a level of debate which will allow various actors and interests to bc 
heard. Hence if welfare reform, including the idea of privatisation. is opened up to a 
146As described by P. Nikiforos Diamandouros, "Politics and Culture in Postauthoritarian 
Greece: An Interpretation, " op. cit., pp. 1-25. 
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larger forum and gets untangled from party politics, then it appears that political and 
social legitimacy can be negotiated on firmer grounds. 
6.6 Conclusion 
Having considered numerous facets of the welfare state debate, one can now return 
to the original questions asked at the beginning of this chapter whose explanations 
are interrelated and overlapping. Restated they are: Does the Greek welfare statc bly 
way of its structures and social programmes and policies -- such as those attempting 
to even out inequalities and securing a basic standard of living -- enhance social 
legitimacy for the system? Has Greece's retarded development of a welfare state 
affected (and if so to what extent) the degree of social legitimacy for the state and 
more generally for government? 
Beginning with the first query, it has become clear based upon the preceding 
discussion that the Greek welfare state's present basic framework and structures are 
inadequate for meeting the needs of its citizens. The social programmes and policies 
that were devised primarily in the post- au thori tari an decade (particularly after 1975) 
and subsequently were conceived of and implemented via the state apparatus which 
had not acquired the requisite level of organisation and efficiency to be able to 
provide an acceptable quality of social services. Hence on one level, one can 
conclude that due to the state's ineptness regarding its organisation of social services, 
and acting as a'mechanism of stratification' in terms of social policy being produced, 
the state was unable to even out any inequalities found among the social strata in 
Greek society. The problem presently lingers on as a basic standard state policy vis- 
a-vis the various state subsidised insurance programmes has still not been devised. 
As a result this has created feelings of dissatisfaction on the part of citizens who do 
not perceive the state as fulfilling its obligations in providing social services to 
sustain a basic standard of living. A sense of failed expectations is therefore 
prevalent among a sizable percentage of the Greek population. That the state has 
fallen short of its obligations, however, does not mean that the general public is 
willing to have the private sector pick up what the public sector can no longer 
manage, and thus here lies the real enigma. A legitimacy gap has opened up 
between the state and citizens regarding social provisions, and it doe', not appear that 
the private sphere is perceived of as a domain which can be utilised to rescue the 
state. 147 A traditional mind set still prevails among the Greek people that social 
1471t secms worth mentioning here that the EU is as well not perceived of as a replacement of 
dic state, cspecially as conccrns social ýýclfare policies. As has been mentioned previousl". in 
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provisions are the responsibility of the state, and it is here where they should remain. 
Yet the state presently appears unable to reorganise and reform its structures and 
policies (which would mean a major rearranging of the present system necessitatino 
a devolution of power to localities -- in other words, decentralisation) to meet the 
challenges of the next millennium. At present, worries abound as to whether Greece 
will be able to meet the required economic synchronisation policy which is 
demanded by the EU which necessitates not only a readjustment of various 
economic indictors, but a major overhaul of the social and economic framework of 
the country so as to meet these criteria. These principal transformations are needed 
if such ambitious goals as those laid out in the TEU are to be met. Yet the various 
governments which have been formed either by PASOK or New Democracy appear 
unwilling to risk the political fallout that could occur if such a programme of change 
was to be implemented. 
Furthermore, the question of social legitimacy as it concerns the attenuated Greek 
welfare state needs to be seen in conjunction with other social structures such as the 
family, and civil society with its informal organisations. The Greek family structure 
has been traditionally indicative of strong relational ties which has often meant that 
family members and relatives have tended to their own -- ot &KOI. 4a; -- who are 
unemployed, studying at university, or elderly. However, as the family structure in 
Greece is undergoing a transformation, a degree of family nuclearisation, as is 
likewise the case in other European nation-states, it seems precarious and unwise to 
assume that the family as a social structure will be able to continue subsidising its 
family members as it has done in the past. Other informal organisations such as 
11AXoyot -- clubs -- have also contributed to aiding those in need yet as the older 
generation passes on and the new generation of Greeks become more cosmopolitan, 
these organisations appear to be fading out. This also feeds into the discussion in 
Chapter Four of this study of civil society. As was suggested there, Greece's weak 
civil society and heavy reliance on state structures has hindered the development of 
vehicles of communication between citizens and government. It has likewise created 
a void between the state and citizens as this relates to the issue of social services and 
who is to continue to provide them. Can the state be reasonably expected to continue 
providing these services in light of its present inefficiency? In the absence of an 
agreement as to what other structures (private or voluntary) could take up social 
services, is a legitimacy dilemma brewing with possible unforeseen consequences9 
Can the Greek populace be convinced that the state cannot continue to be the locus 
Chapters One and Two in this study, EUROBAROMETER studies continue to reveal that citizens are 
not willing to see the EU help coordinate what are considered to be national responsibilities. 
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and repository of social welfare provisions as things now stand" Will they be 
willing to see the public bureaucracy shrink decisively (which will mean that jobs 
will be lost) and undergo vast restructuring including modemising public offices 
(i. e., installing computers, supplying them with other necessary technology, which 
will mean retraining and replacement of public workers)? The reply to these queries 
may possibly elucidate and reveal the level of social legitimacy felt towards the 
Greek welfare state presently and possibly even give clues as to what forebodes for 
the future, but are beyond the scope of this study. 
Finally, in a world of globalisation and advanced technological development, nation- 
states whose structures and institutions are not fully developed and which are not 
functioning capably are becoming more susceptible to problems of legitimacy. As 
society becomes more porous, and citizens become more informed, the state's 
deficiencies become more glaring. This phenomenon appears in Greece, although 
the level of technological development has not reached that of her northern EU 
partners. Be that as it may, Greek citizens are now beginning to connect to 
international information centres and are becoming much more exposed to 
advancements and new innovations which are shaping their views of government 
and the state. Greece's membership in the EU, as has been touched upon throughout 
this study, has influenced Greek society decisively and as more EU member 
citizenry travel to Greece and likewise as more Greeks travel and work (and attend 
universities) in EU member states, attitudes and impressions of state structures and 
how they should function are dramatically altering. This inevitable comparison of 
state operations and functions can cultivate dissatisfaction among citizens as to their 
own state's dysfunction, which is what is occurring in Greece today. The notion of 
the Greek state as a welfare state is thus undergoing a transformation in the minds of 
Greeks today who are re-evaluating what they now expect from their modern 
ii, estern state that claims to share with its northern European Union neighbours a 
common vision of the future. If the social, political, and economic goals as defined 
in the TEU are to become a reality in Greece, then the Greek state has a major task 
ahead in reforming its state structures and suitably modifying the political culture of 
the country to enable such changes to take place. It remains to be seen as to which 
Greek government will be able to implement such a necessary metamorphosis. The 
one thing that seems certain is that an understanding of the question of legitimacý' 
will help facilitate the ways in which such vital changes should occur. 
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Chapter Seven 
THE GREEK ECONOMIC ENVIRONMENT 
7.1 Introduction 
Perhaps more than any other dimension of legitimacy discussed thus far in thllý 
study, the topic of economic growth and development is that one ý%-hich 
quantitatively reveals how Greece has been affected by exogenous actors and forces. 
Of all the areas of state policy-making, Greek fiscal and monetary policy, 
particularly in the post-TEU era, has been steered and directed toýý'ards meeting the 
criteria for European Union monetary convergence. Much of the discussion here 
concerning the Greek economic environment will thus be directed at exploring the 
ways that Greece has attempted to meet the challenges laid out at Maastricht and the 
successes and failures of these attempts as they reveal clues to the issue of political 
and social legitimacy. 
What needs to be made clear at the start is that no direct correlation should (or in this 
study will) be made between higher and sustained levels of economic growth and a 
higher and sustained level of legitimacy. Certainly economic efficacy -- and how 
citizens perceive this -- is a factor that needs to be considered when examining the 
level of legitimacy felt towards a particular government and a political system. 
Nevertheless one must be cautious and not fall into the trap of creating the equation 
economic performance and efficiency equals political and social legitimacy for the 
system. Such an equation oversimplifies the complexity of the issue of economics 
and legitimacy, and this chapter will attempt to elucidate the various facets (socio- 
cultural and other) involved in economic growth and development as they pertain to 
the question of legitimacy as has been defined in this study. 148 
148When discussing the Greek dictatorship of 1967-1974 in Greece, Nancy Bermeo accurately 
eniphasises the point made here of being cautious about drawing conclusions about economic 
performance and legitimacy. When remarking about the Colonels regime she has made an important 
observation: "It is instructive to note that the regime's extremely low level of popular support 
coexisted with a relatively good economic performance. ... The Greek case suggests that though 
money can probably buy votes, legitimacy is harder to come by. " 
Later in her essay, she suggests that "[tlo understand why the colonels failed to legitimate their 
rule or to achieve even a temporary sense of regime consolidation, we must turn away from the 
measures and language of political economy. We must turn instead to the historical study of political 
institutions and to the extraordinarily difficult study of political culture. " See Nancy Bermeo, 
"Classification and Consolidation: Some Lessons From the Greek Dictatorship, " Political Science 
Quarterl. y, Vol. 110, No. 3, Fall 1995, pp. 435-452. 
It might also be noted that the Colonels were not at all interested in broad based economic 
prosperity, as OECD Economic Surveys of the period indicate. Prosperity was delivered to ver). few, 
as such things as taxes, for example, were very regressive. 
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There also prevails a notion within much of the popular literature written on Greece', 
support for European integration that as long as Greece continues to receive a sizable 
amount of financial assistance from the EU, Greek citizens and goN, ernments will 
continue to wholeheartedly support the EU integrative process. Although there 
certainly appears to be some evidence to sustain this assumption, one should be 
cautious in presupposing that as long as Greece continues to receive funds from the 
EU, she will steadfastly support Europe's integrative process and accept its decisions 
as afait accompli. EUROBAROMETER surveys (as discussed previously in this study) 
as well as a variety of other sourcesl49 reveal that Greek citizens, as detectable 
particularly during the past six years (1989-1995), continue to increasingly sho'x 
disapproval of their politician's actions and this extends to decision-makers in 
Brussels and Strasbourg as well. The February 1996 protests by Greek milk farmers 
organised by PASAGES, the Panhellenic Confederation of Agricultural 
Cooperatives, have included as part of their demands that the Greek go\, ernment 
request from the EU an immediate increase of 150,000 tonnes of Greece's quota for 
cow's milk as well as measures for the reduction in the cost of production for milk. 
Prime Minister Kostas Simitis has attempted to make plain that a reduction in the 
cost of production for milk is prohibited by Community law, and that an increase in 
the milk quota by 125,000 tonnes would be sought this year (in 1996). 150 Such 
examples reveal that it would perhaps be wise to seek beyond the rather simplistic 
notion that money can continue to be the sole (or most outstanding) factor which 
underlies Greek support for the European project. In any event, it is clear that there 
will not be a Third Community Support Framework for Greece, and although 
structural funds will continue to be dispensed to Greece and other lesser developed 
EU members, there is a finite amount of funding which can be dispersed to EU 
members in need of economic assistance. In light of this reality, it is even more 111- 
considered to assume that once the money stops coming from EU coffers, so will the 
support for all its endeavors. It is worth reiterating here likewise that Greece's initial 
decision to enter the Community was a political one, with economic concerns 
considered secondary. 
149See the International Research Associates fiftieth anniversary survey entitled "Europeans: 
Citizens of the World, Consumers of the World, " which questioned some 18,000 people in twentN - 
one European countfies about a range of issues. One of the findings of the survey was that Greeks are 
among the citizenry of Europe who are the most worried about their country's future and sho%% 
disapproval of their politician's decisions and actions. See Birna Heigadottir, "Survey Gives 
Politicians Nul Points, " European, 25 Oct. - I Nov. 1995. 
1501t should be recalled, however, that Greece has sought such increases for milk quotas in the 
past, and unfortunately they were unsuccessful. In 1995 Greece sought an increase In an additional 
1.15,000 tonnes of milk from the EU which "could not be accepted for economic and political 
reasons. " See European Bulletin of the European Union, (4 /1994), 1.3.113, p. 44. 
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Another point which should be mentioned at the start is that the economic domain is 
one indicative of rapid and often unpredictable change. In today's evolving and 
fluctuating global market it has become nearly impossible to foreshadow what bodes 
for the future in any definitive way. One can only speculate as to the possible path 
that lies ahead concerning the economic life of any one country. Equally conjectural 
for EU member nation-states is the ambiguity surrounding European Monetary 
Union and the outcome of such an ambitious economic endeavor as has been 
emphasised in Chapters Two and Three of this study. This leads to another set of 
possible economic scenarios which are even more difficult to fathom at present. 
With these precautions in mind, this chapter sets out to explore the realm of 
economics as a dimension involved in political and social legitimacy. By taking the 
case of Greece, a country which has been labeled the 'poorest' among the fifteen 
present members, 151 the intention is to elucidate the particulars of the economic 
domain as they feed into the issue of legitimacy. The first part of this chapter steps 
back into the decade of the 1980's to get a glimpse as to what transpired within the 
economic environment and the legacy of the PASOK era from 1981-1989. Next, EU 
convergence criteria are reviewed and Greece's particular economic circumstances 
are discussed concisely in light of this macroeconomic forecast. The First and 
Second Community Frameworks are likewise briefly considered. Lastly, some 
mention is made of the role of the underground economy in Greece and how this 
affects political and social legitimacy. Several concluding remarks follow at the end 
of the chapter. 
7.2 A Brief Look Back at the 1980's 
Before discussing Greece's economic environment and prospects for the 1990's, it 
seems pertinent to precede such a discussion with a very brief -- and by no means 
comprehensive -- explanation of what occurred in the previous decade, the 1980's. 
This is particularly integral for understanding Greece's present economic situation, 
and thus aids one in grasping what Greece's inherited economic dilemmas from the 
previous decade are. 152 This may also assist in bringing to light how the PASOK 
movement was very much a populist movement (or as some have remarked a 
151See (in Greek), "H EU68a FlapagEvei Tj (Dr(oX6TF-pqrwv'I5', " TO BHMA, 29 lavo-L)apiol), 
1995. 
152Stavros B. Thomadakis and Dimitris B. Seremetis have produced a comprehensive analysis 
of fiscal structures and management during the era of PASOK in the 1980's which partially addresses 
the issue of legitimacy as well. See Stavros B. Thomadakis and Dimitris B. Seremetis, "Fi"Cal 
Management, Social Agenda, and Structural Deficits, " In The Greek Socialist Experiment, Theodore 
C. Kariotis. ed.. (NY: Pella Pub. Co. ) 1992, pp. 203-255. 
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'pseudopopu list' movement) 153 and one that left an indelible mark on the social 
make-up of the post-authoritarian era in Greece. 
To be concise and summary, the PASOK era from 1981-1989 began as one that 
promised to bring in profound structural development to the country and pledged to 
modernise Greek society and its economy. 154 Andreas Papandreou's PASOK party 
was voted into office on a powerful populist mandate in 1981. In his initial one- 
hundred day programme, Papandreou and his cabinet were to beZgin an 
unprecedented metamorphosis of the socio-economic institutions of the country and 
bring in at last akkayý -- change. However, as James Petras, et. al. haN, e accurately 
remarked: "The economic structures that Andreas Papandreou decided to prop LIP 
and legitimise during the first three months of his term in office were those of a 
capitalism lacking technological innovators and heavily dependent on state subsidies 
and overseas capital. " 155 
The first three years in office revealed that PASOK had accomplished very little if 
anything in the way of restructuring the economy and society. 15 6 In fact the 
inflationary policies that were pursued by the central government as well as the 
hiring of thousands of public workers into the central government resulted in a fiscal 
crisis for the state and further expanded a bureaucracy that was already overbloated 
and inefficient. No stabilisation programme for the economy had been implemented 
as was originally promised, nor did it appear that decentralisation and worker 
management schemes that were to be initiated would materialise. Instead, inflation 
hit 20% in 1983 and the infrastructures of the state went unchanged while tax 
evasion and economic inequalities flourished. Greece found herself politically and 
economically isolated from her European partners with a mammoth public debt 
15317or example, see James Petras, "The Contradictions of Greek Socialism, " In The Greek 
Socialist Experiment, op. cit., pp. 97-126. 
154See Michalis Spourdalakis, The Rise of the Greek Socialist Party, (London/N)'ý Routledge) 
1988, for an analysis of why PASOK failed to live up to its political and social promises. For a very 
recent overview of the PASOK era under Andreas Papandreou from 1981-89, see Susannah Verney, 
"The Greek Socialists, " In Political Parties and the European Union, John Gaffney, ed., (London and 
New York: Routledge) 1996, pp. 170-188. 
155James Petras, ed. et. al., "Greek Socialism: The Patrimonial State Revisited, " In 
Mediterranean Paradoxes, James Kurth and James Petras, eds., (Providence, Rhode Island: Berg 
Publishers) 1993, p. 169. This is one of the most comprehensive and accurate assessment, of the 
PASOK era and why it failed to achieve its outlined economic and social goals. 
156See Christos Lyrintzis, "PASOK in Power: From 'Change' to Disenchantment, " pp. 26-46, 
and George 111. Mavrogordatos, "Civil Society Under Populism, " pp. 47-64, In Greece 1981-69. - The 
Populist Decade, Richard Clogg, ed., (NY: St. Martin's Press) 1993. These two essays assess 
PASOK's populist tenure in office and its affects on Greek civil society. 
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which necessitated an increase in public sector borrowing requirements, 157 a growth 
in GDP of 0.39% and rising unemployment. Worse still, PASOK proliferated 
traditional clientelist practices and the patrimonial nature of the state while 
cultivating a false impression among the nouveaux riches that the state would foot 
the bill for massive consumerism and thus an unprecedented overexpansion of fiscal 
finances occurred. 158 
It seems worth remarking here as well that one of the major ironies of the Grcek 
party system (and the ability of party leaders to breed a form of unhealthy populism) 
is revealed in the fact that PASOK as a party experienced unprecedented popular 
support in its first term in office, a time when the economy of the country was falling 
into disarray and Greece's economic indicators were continuously implying that the 
country was heading for a major fiscal crisis. However, since public spoils were 
being apportioned out to loyal party cadres, and thus portions of the population were 
being economically satiated, no one seemed to be willing to confront the realisation 
that the state coffers were going bankrupt and that an enormous public debt was 
accumulating. 
Most observers agree that by 1985 Greece had reached a critical economic juncture 
and in its second term in office PASOK proposed a new stabilisation programme 
which basically introduced austerity measures to consolidate the public debt and to 
bring down inflation. This shift in economic policy got the support of the EC 
Commission, 159 but it was clearly a move away from PASOK's so-called 'socialist' 
populist policies on which it had been voted into power. PASOK had been 
continuously warned by the Community to abandon its protectionist policies which 
primarily took the form of restrictions on imports in its first term in office, and once 
the Single European Act was enacted in 1986, PASOK had no choice but to abide by 
the rules regarding "the liberalization of capital movements. "160 As the 1989 
national elections crept closer, however, PASOK retreated from its stabilisation 
programme for fear of the political cost this would have. In short, by the end of its 
157As Antigone Lyberaki points out, Greek public sector borrowing requirements shot up from 
I ION, of GDP in 1981 to 18.417c in 1989. And this was occurring at the same time that a mismatch 
between production and consumption was transpiring. See Antigone Lyberaki, "Greece-EC 
Comparative Economic Performance: Convergence or Divergence? " In Greece, the New Europe, and 
the Changing International Order, Harry J. Psomiades and Stavros B. Thomadakis eds., (NY: Pella 
Publishing Co., Inc. ) 1993, pp. 179-216. 
158James Petras ed. et al., op. cit., pp. 174-175. 
159Greece received from the Commission a loan to implement its stabilisation programme of 
approximately 1.7 billion ecu. 
160Sijjg1e European Act, Title Il Provisions Amending the Treaties Establishing the European 
Communities, Section 11, Subsection I -- Internal Market, Article 16. 
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second term in office, PASOK had reversed what gains had been made by the 
stabilisation programme of 1986-87 and as it perceived its position in power waning. 
began employing patronage tactics to try to hold on It its crumblin(j popularity. 
In summary, the PASOK era had a devastating affect on the macroeconomic life of 
the country which experienced one of the worst economic record, of all member 
states in the decade of the 1980's. 161 Greece drifted econon-&ally further awav from 
her Community partners and her dismal economic performance increasnglY and 
adversely affected her relationship with Community authorities who looked upon 
Greece as that country which could jeopardise plans for the completion of the 
internal market. The legacy of the PASOK era resulted in a huge public debt and 
other deep-seated macroeconomic (structural as well as social) predicaments. It is 
thus with this background in mind that one needs to examine the economic 
environment which prevails in the 1990's. What transpired in the 1980's likewise 
helps to explain the difficulties in succeeding governments to implement an 
economic plan which has included much tighter control of public monies and a 
consolidation of state intervention in the economy. The attitude that the PASOK 
government buttressed during its tenure in power was that money would continue to 
gush from the public bankrolls to loyal acolytes in return for their political support. 
This irresponsible use of public funds and the proliferation of clientelist practices 
perpetuated traditional customary habits and augmented Greece's distance from the 
process of modernisation. 
7.3 EU Convergence Criteria: What Hides Behind the Numbers 
One of the main challenges facing the Greek economy (and the other EU member 
nation-states as well) in the post-TEU era is that of attempting to meet the necessary 
requirements for EU economic convergence. 162 Whether or not Greece will be able 
to satisfy these prerequisites largely depends upon how determined Greek 
governments are in the 1990's to outline a stem economic programme and enforce it 
despite resistance which is emerging from that portion of the Greek population 
which feels that it will be most detrimentally affected. Greece at present is not a 
161See statistics compiled by the Greek Ministry of the National Econorriv, (in Greek) 
11j)oa(Wi voi E0vtKoiAoyqpiaquoi n7ý EU65a;, (AOýva: Ma*io; ) 1987. 
162See the plethora of articles in the press concerning this issue including Kerin Hope, "On 
Course for Convergence, " Finwicial Times, 14 November 1995, p. 111. See likewise the discuvoon in 
Chapter Three in this study. 3.5. 
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member of the EMS (European Monetary System), although there i, "" mounting 
pressure from EU authorities that she become one. 163 
To refresh the reader's memory, 164 and to facilitate a discussion in this chapter of 
whether Greece can meet the requirements of EU economic synchronisation and if 
not what the consequences might be, the four main criteria as outlined bN. the 
Maastricht agreement for economic convergence are: (1) government debt not 
exceeding 60% of GDP; (2) government deficit not exceeding 3% of GDP, (3) 
inflation rate not more than 1.5% above the average of the three members with the 
lowest rates; and (4) exchange rate stability based upon the performance of the 
member state currency over a period of two years prior to the final assessment. The 
final stage of European Monetary Union (EMU), the preparation of which is 
presently taking place, is scheduled to begin in 1999.165 However, to reiterate, at 
present there remains disagreement as to whether these target dates can be met, and 
discussions continue concerning the pros and cons of monetary union and various 
predictions can be found in the press and in the relevant literature discussing the 
future course and timetable for the EMU. The most controversial issue continues to 
be the viability of developing a single European currency and opinions abound as to 
how, when, and if such a goal is desirable and/or feasible given the diverse economic 
backgrounds and uneven levels of development of EU member nation-states. 
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 
Real GDP growth % 1.5% 2.0% 3.0% 3.5% 4.0% 4.0% 4.0% 
Inflation % 15.3% 12.6% 7.5% 6.0% 4.5% 4.4% 4.0% 
Current account balance -2.6 -2.1 -1.8 -1.4 1 -0.7 -0.2 0.5 
General gov't balance -14 -10 -7 -4.4 -1.6 -0.8 -0.2 
Primary balance 0.6 5 6.7 7.6 8 8.2 8.1 
lGeneral gov't debt 1 1091 1081 105 101. 
. 
94.31 87.51 
TABLE 7.1 Greece's Economic Plan (1992-1998) 100 
163See George S. Alogoskoufis, "Greece and European Monetary Unification, " pp. 163-178 and 
Lucas Papademos "European Monetary Union and Greek Economic Policy, " pp. 125-16-1, In Greece, 
the, New Europe, and the Changing International Order, op. cit., which discuss the pros and cons of 
Greece participating in the ERM. 
164Note 89 in Chapter Two of this study first mentions these four economic criteria found in the 
Protocol on the Excessive Deficit Procedure, Article 1, and Protocol On the Convergence Criteria 
Referred to in Article 109j of the Treat), Establishing the European Coinniunity, Article I and Article 
3, annexed to the Treaty on European Union. 
1651-he 1997 date has since been dismissed as unfeasible. 
166Table taken from Panos Kazakos, "Introduction, " Greece and EC Mernbership Evaluated, 
Panos Kazakos & P. C. loakimidis, eds., (NY: St. Martin's Press), 1994, p. 22 whose source is the 
IMF. For more precise data concerning economic indicators for Greece, see, IMF: International 
Financial Statistics, September 1995, pp. 264-267. 
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Table 7.1 outlines an economic plan that was first considered to be an attainable 
economic set of fiscal goals for the Greek economy. However. this was a very 
ambitious fiscal projection and thus it goes without saying that none of the targets set 
out for the first two-year period, 1992-1994, were even marginally met. In the 
second quarter of 1994, the Greek Ministry of the National Economy came out with 
a new, revised Convergence Programme for 1994-1999 (Table 7.2). The targets for 
this programme, although likewise ambitious, appear to be far more attainable if a 
strident implementation of fiscal policies is carried out. Table 7.2 represents the 
amended Convergence Programme (that has met the approval of EU authoritles) 
which has become the basic guideline for Greece's national budget until 1999. It is 
worth noting that this revised convergence plan was formulated under a PASOK 
government which again attained power under the leadership of Andreas Papandreou 
in October 1993. 
1 
1994 1 1995 1 1996 1 1997 1 1998 1 1999 
Annual growth rates 
GDP market prices 1.1 1.2 1.7 2.6 3 3.5 
Fixed investment, total 
Public investment 6 8 9.5 11 12 14 
Private investment 2.5 0.9 3.5 6.81 8.4 10.1 
Private consumption 
deflator 
10.8 7.9 6.1 3.1 3.5 3.3 
Short-term interest rate 1 18.51 14.11 10.6 
. 
7.1 6.8 1 6.2 
Per cent of G DP 
General gov't 
Net borrowing 13.2 10.7 7.6 4.2 2.4 0.9 
Primary surplus 1.3 3.5 4.9 5.1 5.4 6.1 
Debt 1 112 1 115 1 115 1 113 1 101 103 
TABLE 7.2 The Greek Convergence Programme 1994-99 1 ID I
The most obvious question that arises is: what happens if these actual targets are not 
achieved? Much obviously depends upon how strict (and determined) the 
government is on meeting its objectives, and what form of elasticity has been built 
into these indicators so as to allow for some inevitable slippage. 168 However, it is 
generally recognised that there is very little room for maneuvering, and this means 
1670ECD Economic Sun, e. vs, February 1995, p. 26. 
168For example, National Economy Minister Yiannos Papantoniou in March 1996 announced 
that Greece will still aim for an inflation target of 5% by the end of 1996, even though February and 
March saw an increase in current inflation rates. Athens News Agency Bulletin, March 1996. 
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that the macroeconomic plan must be adhered to tightly. 169 There can be no doubt 
that if Greece does not stick to the plan, unforeseeable consequences can evolve 
which could jeopardise Greece's economic position within the EU (i. e., the monev 
she receives from the EU via a variety of funding programmes). As the OECD 
report for 1995 has succinctly stated, "... there is not really any other solution if 
Greece is to continue along the path towards integration and play a full part ill the 
construction of Europe. " 170 
One of the most pressing dilemmas for the Greek economv is that it is saddled with a 
huge public debt (approximately 117% of GDP171) which appears to be self- 
generating, as governments' prodigal spending, although being curtailed sornewhat 
recently, still goes on unabated. However, the more serious problem is not that the 
government continues to pursue policies of fiscal overexpansion but that revenues 
collected by the state are not being productively utilised. In other words, Greece has 
not been able to develop an appropriate fiscal management programme and 
successfully stick to it. This reality has been driven home by the European 
Commission but also by the OECD172 which has made similar observations. The 
public sector also has still not been able to organise and synchronise its operations. 
Additionally, Greece's loss of fiscal reputation in domestic and international markets 
in the past sixteen years has affected private investment in the country, both from 
indigenous private investors and prospective ones from abroad. As Stavros B. 
Thomadakis has bluntly put it: "... the erosion of fiscal reputation undermines the 
effectiveness of economic policies. " 173 That private investment in Greece has been 
detrimentally affected by the inefficiency of the public sector is perhaps the more 
serious problem, as often rules are rather arbitrarily applied. These types of practices 
can certainly inhibit private investment in the country which in turn can affect the 
growth of the Greek economy in years to come. These practices likewise dilute 
citizens' sense of political legitimacy for state actions. 
169See statements made to the press by Prime Minister Kostas Simitis after a meeting concerning 
the Greek economy which stressed the point that there must not be deviations from the convergence 
programme as outlined, 20 April 1996. 
1700ECD Economic Surveys, February 1995, p. 67. 
17 1 Ibid. 
172See OECD Economic Sun, eys, 1992. particularlý "Ill. The Changing Role of Government and 
Structural Reforms, " pp. 55-75. 
173Stavros B. Thomadakis, "European Economic Integration, the Greek State, and the 
Challenges of the 1990s, " In Greece, the New Europe, and the Changing International Order, op. ci . I., 
pp. 364-365. 
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An additional obstacle that has to be confronted by Greek governments is that 
Greece has continued to borrow money (in the form of loans) from abroad to be paid 
back with swollen interest rates. Greece receives a sizable amount of money from 
the EU in the form of net transfer payments and grants, and through a variety of 
programme schemes (for example, through the Integrated Mediterranean 
Programmes and through agricultural subsidies via the Common Agricultural 
Programme -- CAP) as well as through the Community Support Framework 
programmes (which will be taken up in the proceeding discussion). 174 However. 
even though an appreciable influx of money is derived from the EU, Greece 
continues to borrow money from elsewhere, and as Panos Kazakos has noted, this 
has been sizable. He writes that: "[t]hrough further borrowing from abroad, Greece 
accumulated debts reaching nearly 120 per cent of GDP (1992), producing 
considerable debt-servicing costs. " 175 
The economic indicators likewise reveal that Greece's level of productivity continues 
to be low. 176 However, as positive figures are now being recorded (Greece was 
registering negative productivity growth in the decade of the 1980's 177) this is an 
indication that the Greek economy is beginning to show signs of growth. 
Nevertheless, Greece has experienced the highest inflation rate among EU member 
nation-states. For approximately fifteen years, Greece had a double digit inflation 
rate averaging around 18%, and it was only in 1994 that inflation decreased to 
10.9%. More specifically, in September 1995 inflation dropped to 8.4%, after 
falling in the summer of 1995 to a single digit for the first time in twenty-three years. 
Projections for the end of 1996 forecast inflation to further decrease (to 7.3% by the 
end of 1996 and then to 4.7% by the end of 1997), 178 although recent commentaries 
in the Greek press and in the mass media suggest that the latter figure may be a bit 
too optimistic. Nevertheless, even with inflation rates having considerably 
174Despite the influx of money from the EU, Greece has still not been able to sustain growth 
rates and increase substantially investments in the country. T. Georgakopoulos explains this in the 
following statement: "Although budgetary transfers to Greece have indeed been considerable, their 
impact on the economy was probably less pronounced since they mostly constituted consumption 
resources which, of course, increased consumers' welfare and loosened the country's balance of 
payments constraint, but contributed much less to investment and growth. " T. Georgakopoulos, 
"Fiscal Policy, " In Greece and EC Membership Evaluated, op. cit., p. 24. 
175Panos Kazakos, "Introduction, " Greece and EC Membership Evaluated, op. cit. p. 16. 
176See Eurostat, (Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities) 
for comparisons among EU members. 
177Si, t, lVorld Tables 1995, Published for the World Bank, (Baltimore/London: The John 
Hopkins University Press) 1995, pp. 308-311. 
178SI, e, (in Greek) TnoupyElo EOvticý; OtKovopiar, TpiXovaE; EýrAi, "ei;, vai 
1`7POOIVK,, ýý CT77v In 
F-AArIvix-4 h-at ril . -AiEt9v4 
OiKovopia, (AOAva: AnpiXtoq) 1996. 
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decreased in 1995 and 1996, "... inflation would [still] remain more than twice as 
high as the European Union average. " 179 
The unemployment rate in Greece in 1995 registered roughly 10%; 180 this ficrure, 
however, disguises massive underemployment. The question of unemployment in 
Greece has to be understood in relation to the regional disparities of the countrý, and 
the patriarchal nature of society. Today in Greece there are still more women 
unemployed than men although more women joined the workforce in the decade of 
the 1980's, particularly in the professions, 181 and continue to do so today, and 
unemployment rates in the two major cities, Athens and Thessaloniki, are far higher 
than they are in the outlying areas. However, one must likewise take note of the 
demographics of the country and consider that a great majority of the Greek 
population is confined to the two major cities. The EU European Social Fund (ESF) 
has provided Greece with funds for developing training schemes for the young (for 
those under 25 such as the 'Youthstart' programme) and for the unemployed. 
Likewise money has been provided through the ESF for the training of civil servants 
and for employees from the public sector. These programmes have had mixed 
success and have met up with obstacles found within the very nature of the Greek 
labour market as mentioned in the previous chapter of this study (i. e., a large 
percentage of self-employed, few large firms involved in industry, and so on). 
Of the positive achievements attained during the past fourteen years has been the 
governments attempts to successfully reform the financial markets. Under severe 
pressure by the EU to liberalise its economic environment, Greece was forced to 
reform its financial markets. As the OECD report for 1995 remarked: "... the 
authorities embarked resolutely along the path of reform as of 1987. Interest rates 
were decontrolled and banks' investment ratios abolished, controls on capital 
movements were removed and most of the regulations restricting financial 
institutions activities were lifted. "182 Greece's bond market, although still 
underdeveloped, is another indication that the drachma is beginning to stabilise. 183 
The creation of the Athens Sofokleos stock exchange and the initiation of a stock 
exchange in the northern city of Thessaloniki to begin on a trial basis in April 1996 
1790ECD Economic Surve 
, vs, 
February, 1995, p. 16. 
180ynoup7E, -g Kai I7POOMK4ý; cMv &ArJVIKý Kai to EOvticý; Oiicovopiaq, Tpg; rowe I 
rr7 AieOvij OiKovopia, op. cit., a. 7. 
18lSee Nota Kyriazis, "Feminism and the Status of Women in Greece, " In Greece Preparesfor 
the Twent 
i 
N-first Centurý,, Dimitri Constas & 'Meofanis G. Stavrou eds., (Baltimore and London- The 
John Hopkins University Press), 1995, esp. pp. 286-289. 
1820ECD Economic Sun-eys February, 1995, p. 66. 
183See "Greece's Fixed-Rate Placing Well Received, " Fitaincial Times, 23 Oct. 1995 p. 26. 
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is yet another sign that Greece has made some strides towards building up its 
financial structures. However, even though substantial progress has been made in 
this direction, state intervention in market mechanisms still continues and much 
structural and social attitudinal change needs to take place before Greece can attempt 
to keep apace of EU economic synchronisation and claim that it has 'liberalised' its 
economic sphere. 184 
Seen on a wider angle, and for our purposes here, the question of whether or not the 
Greek economy can adjust and redress its imbalances has potentially far-reaching 
consequences which affect the notions of social and political legitimacy, and this 
goes beyond the particular government that happens to be in power at the time. The 
decade of the 1990's has thus far revealed that both of the major parties in Greece 
today that have been able to form a government, New Democracy and PASOK, have 
had to construct a macroeconomic plan leading to EU economic synchronisation. 
This has meant that no matter which party forms a government, Greece will be 
judged on how well it can meet these economic criteria, what structural changes will 
take place to facilitate such an economic plan, and what will this rnean for the 
population who will be experiencing the pushes and pulls required for the successful 
implementation of such a plan. In other words, the degree of social and political 
legitimacy felt for Greek governments' ability to economically catch up with the rest 
of its EU partners rests on a number of things: (a) whether Greek governments in the 
1990's can effectively steer the economy towards convergence, (b) what structural 
changes will take place to allow this to happen; and (c) what will citizens have to 
bear in the way of tax hikes, higher telephone, electricity, and transportation costs, 
and more generally a spiraling cost of living while figuring a way to make these 
politically and socially acceptable. That a larger chunk of one's salary is being taken 
out for health care costs (for the National Health Care plan -- IKA, for example) has 
already been mentioned briefly in the previous chapter of this study. In light of the 
reality that the cost of utilities continue to increase while plans of privatisation are 
slow to be implemented as service continues to be uneven and unpredictable; 
recognising that the welfare system is unable to provide basic services for needy 
citizens and the elderly, this coupled with austerity measures that are required to 
meet the above stated budget -- all these paint a bleak picture indeed. Protests and 
ob . ections to austerity measures and plans of semi-privatising national utilities and J 
industries are part of the present political climate. However, there is also a 
the full effect of the reforms will not be felt unless market participants adjust their 
behaviour and in particular, the role of government, both as a user and as manager, is reduced. " 
OECD Economic Sun-eys, February 1995, p. 66. 
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recognition among a sizable portion of the population that realises that 'Greece is 
once again at a crossroads' and that if she wants to follow her EU partners and not be 
left behind she must readjust and realign her economy and get in synchrony with 
other EU members. To many the convergence programme is perceived to be 
Greece's last chance to redress lingering macroeconomic imbalances and decisively 
get on course with other EU partners. 
There are those who accept that the path towards EMU is fraught with difficulties 
and that there are sacrifices that must be made to ensure a healthy macroeconomic 
life for the country in the future. Yet likewise there are those ývho refuse to accept 
change and stubbornly cling to their ideals and their vision for the countFy which 
may not be in keeping with the realities of a global economic market and the 
challenges that this poses for any one country. The question of legitimacy as 
concerns the economic environment must thus consider these socio-cultural 1'eatures 
of legitimacy in its investigation of such a phenomenon. 
A glance at Greek public opinion from 1994 to 1995 towards issues surrounding 
European Monetary Union such as that of a single currency and the creation of a 
European Central Bank reveal that an overwhelming number of Greek citizens who 
were asked appear to be pro-EMU. Table 7.3 records Greek public opinion towards 
issues concerning the EMU such as that of a single currency and a European Central 
Bank. Nevertheless Greek public opinion clearly does not favour a 'two-tier' or a 
'two-speed' Europe. Greeks are very weary of the possibility of being relegated to a 
secondary status within the Union, as are other member states who appear distanced 
from EMU criteria. Likewise, as with other EUROBAROMETER surveys utilised, one 
must be cautious as to the conclusions that are drawn from these surveys, as 
underlying factors such as why Greeks favour the formation of such economic 
institutions, how well informed Greeks are as to how these economic institutions 
will operate as well as what their influence on the Greek economy are, are not 
considered within the surveys. 
YEAR Single Currency Euro-Central Bank 
July 1994 65% 'for'21% 'against' 69%'for' 13%'against' 
Spring 1995 69% 'for' 18% 'against' 75% 'for' II (I'o 'against' 
I ALItunin 1995 1 67% 'for' 19% 'against' 1 76% 'for' 817c 'agains 
Table 7.3 Greek Public Opinion Towards Issues Concerning the EMU185 
185EUROBAROMETER Surveys, #41 July 1994. #42 Spring 1995, and #43 Autumn 1995 
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Additionally, what must be taken into consideration are the First and Second 
Community Support Framework (CSF) programmes for Greece, the former spanning 
the years 1989-93, the latter from 1994-99. Both CSFs were allotted to Greece bV 
the EU as a means to redress Greece's economic distance from her EU partners with 
the intention of primarily steering funds towards projects to enhance the structural 
and institutional development of the country. The primary objective of the CSFs 
have been to facilitate an expansion of Greece's economy and to help create the 
necessary infrastructures of the state. The four main goals of the programmes as 
cited by the EU are: "(i) the construction of basic infrastructures, (ii) the 
development of human resources; (iii) the competitiveness of the economic fabric, 
[and] (iv) the reduction of regional disparities. " 186 The European Commission has 
noted likewise that Greece has not utilised the potential workforce of the countrý', 
and has emphasised that the unequal distribution of services and the huge gap that 
has developed between the two main cities on the mainland -- Athens and 
Thessaloniki -- and the rest of the country need to be bridged. As was mentioned 
previously, Greece has experienced difficulties in absorbing CSF funds appropriately 
and in fully exploiting them for the purposes for which they were intended. The 
EU's macroeconomic appraisal of the first CSF noted such difficulties, 187 as have 
subsequent reports. 188 
The success or failure of Greece to utilise these funds soundly, however, likewise 
reveals part of the dilemma inherent in the structures of the Greek state itself. The 
state's inability to fully appropriate EU funds from the CSFs has occurred because of 
the very reason that they were established in the first place: the Greek state lacks the 
necessary structures and institutions to propitiously apply the funds. As the 
European Commission has appropriately noted regarding the period 1989-93: 
"[s]tructural inefficiencies and an unstable macroeconomic environment have been 
the main impediments to higher growth and employment in Greece. " 189 Promoting 
adequate levels of investment on the one hand while attempting to concomitantly 
cultivate a sense of professionalism and a modern business ethic on the other has 
been an arduous and uphill task. Persistent attitudes and traditional patterns of 
behaviour stand in the way of structural change, and in many ways are more 
186European Commission, Greece, Communit 
,v 
Support Framework 1994-99. (Luxembourg: 
Office for Official Publications of the European Communities) 1995, p. 19. 
1871bid. 
188See remarks made by Ernesto Laniaburu, General Director of the Commission's 16th General 
Department and head of a Commission delegation to oversee the Second CSF, on his visit to Athens 
on I March 1996. -Ithens News Agenc ,v 
Bulletin, 3 March 1996. 
189European Commission, Greece, Community Support Framework 1994-99, op. cit. p. 19. 
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impervious to the modernisation process which Greece is now attempting to 
undergo. Hence the successful implementation of the Second Support Framework 
rests upon the governments ability to allocate EU funds in the most suitable wav as 
well as encouraging and providing the fertile environment for the development of 
independent social and institutional organs to support such projects which can 
possibly assist in ushering in modern patterns of behaviour. The difficulties with 
absorbing funds from the CSFs thus reveals the fact that problems which arise in the 
economic arena in Greece are innately wrapped up with political and social issues 
which cannot be separated out from such a discussion. Put differentlY, Greece 1.11 
clearly a case where economic dilemmas are inseparable from political and social 
dilemmas. 
7.4 The Underground Economy 
One of the features that has been identified within the Greek economic environment 
as inhibiting economic growth while perpetuating illegal activities is that of the 
underground economy, referred to as well as the 'hidden' or 'black' economy. 190 
What one witnesses in Greece is massive and widespread tax evasion, among self- 
employed professionals, retail-trade entrepreneurs, handicraft enterprises and retail 
shops alike. Members from all social strata, in other words, partake in tax evasion. 
This has meant that the state has been unable to effectively develop and implement a 
tax policy that would curtail tax evasion. There are some (like Stavros Thomadakis) 
who believe that this has occurred because governments have not kept in tune with 
changes that have transpired within Greek society affecting the economy, such as the 
rise of the self-employed in urban areas. 191 Thomadakis has remarked that: "... a 
chronic decline in the ability to impose and collect taxes undermines the fiscal and 
financial legitimacy of the state; ... it damages its ability to undertake economic 
actions and to use those actions as a tool for macroeconomic management. " 19'ý 
Thomadakis goes on to remark on another very significant consequence of the state's 
inability to control tax evasion, mainly that "... the effectiveness of tax law 
implementation is a signal of how effective the state is as a regulator. " 193 In 
190J. 1. Gershuny and R. E. Pahl have described the underground, hidden or black economy as 
"production, wholly or partly for money or barter, which should be declared to some official taxation 
or regulatory authority, but which is wholly or partly concealed. " J. 1. Gershuny and R. 1- Pahl, 
"Britain in the Decade of the Three Economies, " In The Experience of Work ed. by C. R. Littler (UK: 
Gower) 1985, p. 248. 
19 1 Stavros B. Thomadakis, "European Economic Integration, the Greek State, and the 
Challenges of the 1990s, " In Greece, the New Europe, and the Changing International Order, op. ci . t., 
p. 305. 
1921bid., p. 366. 
193112id. 
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practical terms this means that the state's inability to formulate and enforce its tax 
laws has led to the continuation of economic inequalities and unjust practices which 
directly feeds into the issue of legitimacy. Those who are law abiding, and in effect 
carry the burden of tax paying, become resentful of those %kho manage to cunningly 
dodge and inexcusably elude the law. More importantly, the state is perceiN-ed of as 
being inept in compelling observance of its own laws, and this potentially can lead to 
a disturbing level of distrust of the state on the part of citizens. 
Although the PASOK government promised to crack down on tax evaders when in 
power in the 1980's, it has only been since 1990 that Greek governments haý'e 
attempted to substantially reorganise the income tax system and pass a series of 
reforms concerning tax laws. Most recently (in 1995) a property tax law was 
implemented establishing that one must declare their property (private home and/or 
other land) on their annual income taxes and for the first time agriculturists aild 
small farm owners are also being required to declare their properties. 194 Official 
receipts must be given to customers from retail and wholesale shops from an 
automated register (hand written receipts are no longer valid). Despite these 
attempts to monitor individual income more efficiently, the Greek income tax system 
remains unequitable and tax evasion continues to be widespread. Those who can be 
classified as professionals (particularly doctors and other medical professionals as 
well as those practicing law) often do not produce a receipt for services rendered or 
dispense receipts for less than the amount which they actually charge. As it is very 
difficult to monitor such practices, more often than not these private practicing 
professionals get by without declaring all their income. 
Greece has likewise experienced difficulties in introducing and implementing the 
value-added tax (VAT, known in Greek as (DFIA) which was first introduced in the 
1986 budget and applied in 1987. Initially there remained disagreements and 
discrepancies as to what the rates should be. As T. Georgakopoulos mentions: 
The tax was initially introduced at three rates: a low rate of 6 per cent 
on food and some other necessities, a large number of raw materials 
and on most services, all of which comprised more than 50 per cent of 
total consumers' expenditure; a high rate of 35 per cent on certain 
luxury products, covering less than 10 per cent of total consumers' 
194This law has been implemented based on a type of assessed income scheme, particularly for 
the self-employed who are considered to be the worse tax evaders. However, as Alex Papadopoulos 
remarks, the problem of tax evasion is partly attitudinal: "The Greeks' unwillingness to pay income 
taxes stems partly from a conviction that they get little in return. Businessmen complain that instead 
of being used to fund public investment, tax receipts pay the salaries of an ineffectual civil serý ice or 
disappear into the black hole of the public debt. " Alex Papadopoulos, "In Pursuit of Tax E,, aders. " 
Financial Tinies, 14 November 1995, p. 11. 
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expenditure; and an intermediate rate of 18 per cent (reduced soon to 
16 per cent) on all other goods and services. 
Most recently there has been a wider standardisation of VAT in Greece and the 
eighteen per cent figure has been adopted for most categories. However. although 
the VAT has made less complex indirect taxes in Greece, it has not contributed to 
reducing tax evasion to the extent that was initially hoped since the administration 
and implementation of the tax has been difficult for Greek authorities to achieve. T. 
Georgakopoulos has remarked that: "For although this tax is a truly simple tax for 
each taxable person to apply, considered as a system in total, it is very difficult to be 
administered, in view of the large number of taxpayers, most of which are small 
firms with poor bookkeeping, and where checking meets with difficulties. " 196 
Having recognised these difficulties, however, one must also mention that in the past 
three years (1992-1995) there has been a purposeful effort made on the part of 
government to more efficiently organise and oversee the implementation of VAT 
through the use of computers which have been utilised to monitor individual 
economic activities via an A(DM (ApiOýw; (Dopokoyti-coiý Mýqrp6ou -- an individual 
tax number). Since the Ministry of the Economy began to employ computerisation 
as part of its organisation, it has been able to conduct audits of small firms and 
companies and thus catch tax evaders more capably. Nevertheless the 
computerisation process is still very incomplete in Greece, particularly in areas 
outside the two main urban centres -- Athens and Thessaloniki -- where old practices 
continue and where the state has still to technologically employ a more sophisticated 
system of reviewing economic activity. 
The underground economy can also be seen operating through the practice of 
moonlighting, particularly among salaried employees in the public sector, but by 
other professional groups as well. It is common for one to witness public teachers 
acting as private tutors for students who want to pass the difficult state university 
entrance exams; or public tax officers working in the afternoons as tax consultants in 
private firms and small businesses; or medical professionals working for the public 
hospitals during the day while having their own private practices in the evenings. 
The supplementing of one's income, while in and of itself not necessarily illegal, in 
Greece has added to the underground economy as a large percentage of it is 
unreported income. A sizable number of those practicing moonlighting do not report 
195T. Georgakopoulos, "Fiscal Policy, " In Greece and EC Membership Evaluated, op. cit.. pp. 
29-30. 
1961bid., p. 30. 
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their additional income (either they do not give receipts for services rendered &' 
mentioned previously, or do not give receipts for the full amount that they charCge), 
and it has been very difficult for governments to track this activity and to catch the 
culprits. Many believe that Greeks are able to sustain their lifestyles because they do 
partake in the underground economy, and some have gone as far as to state that the 
underground economy has inadvertently acted as a safely value for the national 
economy by fulfilling citizens needs which the state is incapable of satisfying. 
Thus the underground economy in Greece has led to undermining the legal economy 
and most especially this has occurred as regards the public sector and its social 
services. Public infrastructures continue unchanged as citizens seek out other ways -- 
often illegal ways -- to get what they need done, which can include bribing and other 
illicit activities. The underground economy in Greece is thus a way of life, and this 
undermines the state infrastructures, i. e., the public sector, which in turn 
detrimentally influences private investment in the country, both by indigenous and 
foreign actors. Finally, Greece's fiscal reputation is also shattered due to public 
sector inefficiency, this seen particularly among Greece's EU partners who look 
disapprovingly at how economic services continue to operate. 197 
7.5 Conclusion 
Having remarked (albeit briefly) upon the decade of the 1980's, Greece and EU 
economic convergence and the CSFs as well as some of the idiosyncrasies of the 
Greek economic environment as they are manifested in the Greek underground 
economy, several concluding thoughts seem warranted to ally these reflections and 
relate them to the question of legitimacy. 
First, it is not that Greece has the lowest GDP per capita among EU member nation- 
states which creates problems of legitimacy at home. Although certainly citizens 
judge their government's economic performance and criticise and make their 
evaluations as to the prevailing economic climate at the time, there is more involved 
in the issue of legitimacy. Economic efficiency is only one of many factors that 
needs to be considered when trying to uncover clues about legitimacy. The 
sociopolitical culture that prevails in a country is just as integral for an I 
197Greece remains very much a country dependent on tourism, and her historical , Itc,, and 
physical beauty attract vacationers from all over the world. However, after only a fcx short days in 
the country, tourists . N, ho come to visit Greece often become aware of the inefficiency of the public 
sector as the), interact with banks, transportation offices, etc. The variety of strikes that ()t'tcn take 
place during the summer holiday months for the --cry reason that then they can make their demands 
heard (and be met) by government, usually as well leave an unfavorable impression on tounsts. 
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understanding of what citizens perceive of as legitimate. The social attitudes that 
came to be formed about the role of the clientelist state in Greece and what it would 
dispense to whom which have been taking a modern guise throughout this twentieth 
century and which in the 'populist decade' of the 1980's reached a new apogee. have 
resulted in a portion of the Greek population unwilling to now pay the costs of 
rampant consumerism and stagnant productivity. This is most apparent among 
public workers who object to plans of privatisation as they fear that their jobs will 
become redundant, as was mentioned in the previous chapter. However, these 
attitudes are also found among a sizable portion of the population which clings to 
past practices and refuses to come to terms with new realities which FU integration 
necessitates. Greece appears to be a case where socio-cultural attitudes and habits at 
times play a more decisive role than economic indicators in so far as liow citizens 
formulate an opinion about government actions and policies. 
The younger generation in Greece, educated under different SOCio-economic 
circumstances than their parents and grandparents, can perhaps better corne to grips 
with the economic conditions which prevail in a global world environment. As the 
memories of Greece's post-war past fade, and old hostilities from the civil war era 
subside, there may be the possibility that attitudinal changes can take place to 
reorient a new generation of Greeks. Attitudinal changes as well may also occur 
once the old vanguard political leadership of the country is replaced by younger 
leaders, as seems to be now occurring, who can perhaps bring with them a new 
vision and insight change within the political parties themselves. Other structural 
changes within the state apparatus itself, for example the organisation and 
administration of the public sector, appear to be key for the auspicious completion of 
the modernisation process. 
Second, the underground economy in Greece has become the vehicle by which 
Greeks enjoy a standard of living that they have come to expect but which the state 
cannot provide them. By holding a second job, one which many times goes 
unreported, and by the exchange of services, one learns to get around the system to 
attain what it is they are after. These activities could range from negotiating a bank 
loan, to getting your vehicle passed through inspection, to getting something rolled 
through customs (a VCR, a computer), to securing a telephone line (which despite ZI) 
improvements in the system may still take months). The state's inability to provide 
timely and basic services has led to an underground economy which some speculate 
176 
may be at least or higher than 3017c of all economic activity in the countrN .. 198 The 
state needs to crack down on tax evasion and implement tax reforms if a more 
equitable distribution of income in the country is to occur. Yet at the same time, the 
underlying problem is that structural inadequacies remain and that the poor leN. Cl of 
services lead citizens to search for alternative options which feeds the underground 
economy. And in turn the underground economy breeds "private rationalities that do 
not add up to a developmental track for the national economy as a whole. " 199 
Third, for the Greek economy to get on track with EMU criteria, major structural 
changes need to occur which requires political courage and unswerving 
implementation on the part of Greek governments to implement the economic 
programme as now set out and to inform and educate citizens as to how that is to be 
achieved. Awareness of what the European Union is embarking on, and how this 
will affect citizens could raise the level of consciousness among a sizable portion of 
the population which still remains uninformed. The discussions concerning the 
Maastricht Treaty were confined to political party leaders with only a handful of 
discussions in parliament, without any information supplied by the state for citizens. 
Unfortunately, at present it appears that the same is occurring for the 1996 
Intergovernmental Conference (since there are no visible signs that any organised 
activities are occurring to spread awareness about the IGC, what this conference 
entails, and its significance for Greece and for the future of the Union). 
Structural changes which appear to be requisite for the country to enhance its 
economy include building the necessary economic infrastructures such as roadways, 
airports, an updated and modern telecommunication system, improvements in the 
water supply system, upgrading medical care and educational facilities and 
curriculum. A ma ority of projects in these areas have been assigned funds through 
the two CSFs. Greek governments have a responsibility to encourage industrial 
development and private investments, and achieve agricultural self-sufficiency 
which is attainable since approximately one-fourth of the labour force is still 
involved in agriculture. However, these necessary reforms require a government 
198This figure quoted by Yannis Stournaras, who was president of the council of economic 
advisers in the Greek Ministry of Finance under Andreas Papandreou. See "Belgiurn Blames 
Cultural Divide as Greeks Sell off Assets in Debt War, " European, 5-11 August 1995. Stavros 
Thomadakis confirms this estimate by claiming that by 1988 the underground economy was 31 % of 
the official GDP of the country. See Stavros Thomadakis, "The Greek Economý, and European 
Integration: Prospects for Development and Threats of Underdevelopment, " In Greece Preparesfor 
the Tiventy-first Centun,, op. cit., p. 113. 
199Stavros B. Thomadakis. "The Greek Economy and European Integration: Prospects for 
Development and Threats of Underdevelopment, " op. cit., p. I 15 - 
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which will determinedly push forward policies and reforms while relaying 
information and educating citizens of its plans. The Second Community Support 
Framework programme for 1995-1999 that has been assigned by the EU to Greece to 
create and build up the infrastructures of the state include a sizable amount of money 
to be spent on the creation and enhancement of road networks, including the Athens 
metro, the Spata airport, the Egnatia highway, and various rail links. Other areas 
designated funding for modernisation projects are in the health sector as well as 
those concerned with the environment and with ecology. The hope is that thousands 
of new jobs will come about as a result of these projects which will entail a great 
deal of physical construction. These various projects which have been earmarked by 
the EU for Greece are currently being carefully scrutinised by EU officials as well as 
by national authoritieS200 This could lead to the gradual adaptation of modern 
practices and forms of behaviour such as that of meritocracy which could result in a 
more sagacious use of Community money. The EU will no less continue to monitor 
how Greece spends the Second Community Support Framework to ensure that 
indeed funds are being channeled efficiently and prudently. 201 
These cautions come after the fallout from the First Community Support Framework 
of 1989-1994. During that time period, one which witnessed two coalition 
governments and three national elections in Greece, investigations conducted by the 
Commission revealed that a portion of EU funds were not spent in accordance with 
Community law. As it has been difficult to accuse any one particular government 
which was in power at that time, the finger of blame has been pointed at both major 
political parties and likewise at the coalition governments which were formed at the 
time as interim governments. As was mentioned in Chapter Four in this study, in 
May of 1995, the Commission demanded that some 120 million drachmas be 
returned to the EU coffers since no evidence could be provided by Greek 
governments as to how and where some of the money from the First Community 
Support Framework was spent. 202 Violations that were uncovered by the EU 
investigating commission ranged from an inappropriate monetary currency exchange 
from ecu to the Greek drachma which heavily favoured the Greek drachma, to 
20OThe present National Economy Minister, Ylannos Papantoniou, has stated that 7.9 million 
drachnias are to be spent on infrastructure projects in the next several years, and has declared that 
1996 will be the first year in which there will be complete absorption of Communitý funds. ., Athens 
News Agenc. ), Bulletin. 19 March 1996. 
201 An EU monitoring committee is responsible for collecting data concerning the various 
projects which have been approved for financing and interim assessments are hkeýý ise conducted to 
assure that the objectives of the programmes are being met. See Greece, Cornrnunit. ý Support 
Frarnework- 1994-99, op. cit. pp. 110- 112. 
202St, t, (in Greek) " ZTlTo-6v Him 120 At;. " TO BHMA TT'I; Ei)p6mil;, 12 i%lulou 1995. a. 1-2. 
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inappropriate programmes being funded, to machinery and other equipment bought 
with EU funds disappearing. 203 From past experiences, therefore, a more careful 
monitoring as to how and in what ways the Second Support Framework is spent has 
been devised by the EU204 in cooperation with Greek authorities and plans for 
developing a steering and administrative unit to oversee these funds has been 
brought up as a way to better control and monitor programmes cited for funding. 205 
It appears then that the economic environment in Greece and how it is perceived is 
of particular significance for the question of legitimacy. At the same time, socio- 
cultural characteristics that still predominate within Greek society continue to affect 
what Greek citizens perceive of as legitimate government actions and policies within 
the economic domain. This complex dialectical relationship of traditional habits on 
the one hand and modem practices that require assimilation on the other, needs to be 
reconciled so as to allow Greece to resolutely confront the economic provocation's of 
which the next century forewarns. Greece has to develop a complementary balance 
between the old and the new enabling her to keep abreast of the dynamic global 
economic environment and its needs while fitting this reality into her socio-cultural 
habitat. 
2031bid., p. 2. 
204And this monitoring process is in fact being enforced. On 30 April 1996, the EU Commission 
decided to hold off payment of the second part of a loan to the Greek national carrier Olympic 
Airways until the Greek government gives a full explanation as to why some of the requirements 
which had been previously agreed upon by the Greek government have not been carried out. More 
specifically, the Commission stated that: " ... the Commission 
is concerned that certain conditions 
stipulated as part of the original decision in October 1994 have not been fulfilled. In particular, the 
requirements that there be no further state aid and that the Greek government should not be involved 
with the management of the airline beyond its role as a company shareholder. " Athens News Agency 
Bulletin, 2 May 1996. 
205See (in Greek) "Tonaicko NreX6p aTo Mticpoc; 6nto, " TO BHMA Týq Eupd)xTjq, 15 
OK, rcoppiou, 1995, a. 1,4-5. 
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Chapter Eight 
GEOPOLITICS: ISSUES OF SECURITY AND DEFENCE IN GREECE 
8.1 Introduction 
The final chapter of this part of the study endeavors to explore the relationship 
between national security and defence concerns in Greece and their relationship to 
the question of legitimacy. Historically geopolitics has been a keen aspect of the 
strategically located modern Greek state making her the most straddled of ELT 
member states; a Mediterranean, a southern European and Balkan state at the same 
time. Straddling these various geographical identities, which have intimatcly 
affected Greece's sense of national (cultural) identification, has been indeed 
formidable. Since joining the Community in 1981 as a full member, Greece clearly 
has become a member of the west and for some, this has definitively answcred the 
perennial question as to how to define Greece and where she belongs. 206 But 
despite the fact that there does seem to be a consensus that Greece is now clearly 
part of the western world, Greece's border disputes with Turkey, her geographical 
proximity to the hostilities in the former Yugoslavia and her borders with former 
communist states have renewed discussions as to how and in what ways Greece is 
affected by her geographical location and how this relates to national security 
concerns. Thus events which have transpired in continental Europe in the past ten 
years (1985-1995) are of particular significance for a country such as Greece. 
There is no doubt that the rise of ethnic nationalism in the post-cold war era has 
affected Greece and the Balkan region. Along with the collapse of communism in 
the former Soviet Union has come a wave of immense remodeling, rearrangement 
and refurbishing of states and their societies once under the firm grip of that 
superpower. The transformations which have occurred suddenly and abruptly have 
also ignited ethnic nationalism in these states of Eastern and Central Europe and the 
Balkans, resulting in the creation of new independent states. In the case of the 
Balkans, it has resulted in bloody struggles rekindled from past animosities of 
religious and ethnic origin. Within the former Yugoslavia, the rise of ethnic 
nationalism as a force has caused a horrendous war among the various republics, 
each of which strives to attain what it believes historically belongs to itself. 
Certainly Greece has been substantially influenced by this tide of ethnic conflict 
206See the discussion in Chapter Four of this study. 
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immediately to its north. More specifically, the formation of an independent state 
now referred to as FYROM -- the Former Yugoslav Republic of Nlacedonia -- has 
brought the Yugoslav conflict into the Greek domestic political arena as one of the 
most pressing concerns of the country. Both western allies and EU partners alike 
wish to have peace in the region and do not want to see Greece entangled in any of 
these conflicts. 
The goal of this chapter will be first to introduce the particularities of national 
identity in Greece; second, to examine briefly Greece's relationships wIth Its Balkan 
neighbours (with some mention of Greek-Turkish relations) as these pertain to 
matters of security and foreign relations; and third, to investigate Greek attitudes 
towards a European Common Foreign and Security policy (CFSP) and towards the 
Western European Union (WEU). The focal point again will be the relationship of 
these with the topic of this study, the question of legitimacy. This thematic o%'crview 
can perhaps best clarify how security and defence is tied into the question of 
legitimacy in Greece. There appears to be an intangible, wafting duality of attitudes 
and emotions that emerges from investigating how Greeks perceive security and 
defence in their country and who should be responsible for it, and this phenomenon 
(acting as a leit motif throughout this chapter) will be brought to light as it nourishes 
the subject of legitimacy. 
8.2 Nationalism and National Identity in Greece 
Questions of nationalism and national identification in Greece, among other 
concerns, need to take into account the relatively high level of cultural and ethnic 
homogeneity in the country. According to EUROBAROMETER surveys, 98% of 
Greeks polled identified themselves as Greek Orthodox. Greeks' keen sense of 
national identification207 and religious homogeneity feeds into the legitimacy 
question in several ways. First, the notion of homeland (narpi5a -- patreda), and 
nation (60vo; -- ethnos)208 are deeply embedded in Greek consciousness. From the 
struggles in the 1820's to become an independent state and break free from Ottoman 
rule to the resistance movements that were formed to fight off foreign occupation 
207The percentage of Greeks who identified themselves as 'nationality only, in 
EUROBAROMETER surveys was 4617c, up 5 per cent from EUROBAROMETER survey #40, December 
1993. Only 2% of those polled identified themselves as "European. " This percentage is the smallest 
among those identifying themselves as 'European only' within the EU. See EUROB ARON i ETER #42 
Spring 1995. Figure 9.5. 
208Ninety-one per cent of Greeks polled expressed that they Nýere 'proud' to be Greek. 
EUROBAROMETER #42 Spring 1995, Table 9.7. This is the highest percentage among EU member 
citizenry after the Irish, of which 92% expressed they were 'proud' to be Irish. 
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during the Second World War, Greeks have explicitly and passionately demonstrated 
their affection for their patreda. Perhaps partially explicable due to continuous 
foreign involvement in the affairs of the country and owing to the recognition that 
diaspora Greeks were found (and some six million continue to be found) in countries 
scattered around the world, this sense of patreda and ethnos kept Greeks tied to 
their place of origin. The continuation of the use of the language and customs 
enabled diaspora Greeks to maintain an acute sense of Greekness. Second, within 
the country itself, there are intense sentiments of national identification which are 
often inappropriately aroused by politicians to further their own political purpose.,, 
(since these are emotional reactions they are often quite irrational as well). Greeks' 
cultural identification, heritage, and shared religious practices reinforce similarities 
which bind them to their patreda. As a result of this, Greeks tend to support state 
policies (, ro'uKpacoq -- of the state) which present an image of the country reflecting 
this Greekness. 
Evidence for this from recent events has been with the FYROM and the negotiations 
with the Skopje government for a solution as to the question of its official name. 
The desire on the part of the FYROM government to adopt 'Republic of Macedonia' 
as the official name of the newly formed breakaway republic of FYROM has caused 
much debate within Greece and has spurred passionate disagreements and 
discussions in the mass media and in the political arena more generally. 
Furthermore, the use of the Sun of Vergina and questionable irredentist language in 
the FYROM's constitution sparked off a lively debate between the two countries 
which saw much popular support on the part of Greeks for the diplomatic chill which 
occurred between Greece and the FYROM government. Likewise there has been 
considerable popular support in Greece for the Greek government's sympathetic 
stance towards the Serbians throughout the Yugoslav crisis. Serbians are perceived 
of as orthodox brothers, and were allies during the two Balkan wars and World War 
One; they likewise fought against German occupation with the same ferocity as the 
Greeks did during the Second World War. 209 
Hence there appears to be a sense of popular support and legitimacy for state policies 
when these are directly related to issues of national security or of historical or 
religious origin which reinforce territorial integrity and/or cultural heritage. The 
embodiment of the sense of ethnos -- nationhood within that of the state -- KpdTo; -- 
2091t is beyond the scope of' this study to invcstigate the enormous role that the mass media in 
Greece has played in fostering nationalist sentiments to the point of being hubris. It will ha%c to 
suffice to say here that their influence has been enormous and largelý uninvestigated. 
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has resulted in a rising degree of popular acceptance for policies that fortify and 
invigorate the image of the Greek ethnos personified in state actions. The cases of 
the FYROM and that of the Bosnian Serbs are two such examples. Foreign policV 
issues which have arisen in the aftermath of the breakup of the former Yul-joslavia 
may therefore be cited as instances which reveal that Greeks support state policies 
when they are presented as safeguarding the national image of the country during 
volatile periods in the Balkans. However, there remains much disactrcenient anion, -, 
Greeks as to how the most recent crises situations should have been dealt with, and 
here the various political parties have bickered relentlessly as to the most appropriate 
stance that should have been taken when the former Yugosla-,., Ia first began to break 
apart in 1991. Therefore, although a consensus has arisen as to the importance of 
Greece's national security during a highly unstable and unpredictable period in the 
Balkan region, there is much less agreement as to what particular posture Greece 
should have taken vis-h-vis conflicts which occurred on Greece's northern doorstep. 
Nonetheless this is a question of internal politics, and thus a separate issue from that 
of the feelings of legitimacy expressed by citizens towards issues of security and 
defence. The latter relies on Greeks' honed sense of national identification -- 
embodied in the state -- as a basis for what is perceived of as legitimate. 
2 10 
In his discussion of 'State-Civil Society Linkages: The Cultural Dimension,, 21 I 
Nicos Mouzelis describes as one of the features of 'late developing countries, 212 a 
seemingly contradictory set of attitudes held among the citizens of these late 
developers as regards the notion of homeland. His analysis of how citizens view 
their patreda is very much in keeping with what has been mentioned here about the 
Greek's sense of national identification. He writes: 
On the one hand, citizens unreservedly and in highly patriotic manner 
support the national ideals, to the extent of being ready to give their 
lives for them in case of war. On the other hand, the same citizens 
have no qualms whatsoever in robbing the state, either indirectly by 
evading taxes or directly by wasting or appropriating taxpayers' 
money, destroying the environment or fanatically promoting sectional 
interests that are detrimental to the interests of the majority of the 
population. The contradiction between this strong support of national 
21 OThc demonstrations held in Greece attended by over a million people in 1994 were 
expressions of Greek popular nationalist sentiments partially aroused by indigenous politicians, 
unfortunately. for their own political purposes, which meant that the demonstrations did not 
necessarily focus on the real issues at hand. 
21 'Found within, Nicos Mouzelis, "Modernity, Late Development and Civil Society, " In Civil 
Society, John Hall, ed., (UK: Polity Press) 1995, pp. 2-14-249. 
212For an explanation of 'late development' see Alexander Gerschenkron, Econoinic 
Backwardness in Historical Perspective, (Cambridge, Mass: Cambridge University Press) 1962. See 
also Chapter Two of this study, 2.5. 
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ideals and the total lack of civic spirit does not necessarily imply 
institutionalized hypocrisy. It rather indicates a more or less 
unconscious refusal to see the connections between different types of 
national interest; or perhaps the interconnections are made on the 
rhetorical level but not on the level of actual dispositions and first- 
order political practices. 213 
This attitudinal inconsistency is likewise repeated in other guises relating to securitv 
and defence matters. As will be discussed below, Greek views about a European 
CFSP (Common Foreign and Security Policy) and the WEU (Western European 
Union) also reveal a binary disposition to these joint ventures with EU membcr 
states, which is both nationalistic in nature yet reveals the need for Greeks to 
participate in and support European cooperation. Detecting the degree of social and 
political legitimacy for these organisations and planned policy areas thus becomes a 
multifaceted and intriguing exercise. Pinpointing exactly what it is that Greeks 
desire from the European Union is somewhat of an enigma, uiven the strong desire 
for the continuation of unilateral action on the part of the nation-state on the one 
hand, combined with clear recognition of the necessity for European collaboration 
on the other. 214 
8.3 Greece and its Balkan Neighbours 
Clearly Greece's Balkan neighbours are of eminent concern when discussing the 
matter of national security and defence. Yet the question of security and defence in 
Greece is perhaps most greatly influenced by its relations with its age-old rival to the 
east, Turkey. Greek-Turkish relations since 1974 have revolved around several 
disputes including: (a) the continuing Turkish occupation of northern Cyprus; (b) 
disagreements over the Aegean continental shelf and air space in the Aegean, Greece 
claiming it has a ten mile air space and a twelve mile territorial water boundary 
while Turkey disputes these demarcations; (c) human rights issues in Turkey and 
Greece and whether they are being violated (i. e. the Kurds, the Greek minority in 
Turkey, and the Muslim minority in Greece); and (d) Turkey's customs union 
agreement with the EU, effective I January 1996, leading to possible full 
213Ibid., p. 241. 
2 14Greece has most recently called for the continuation of unanimity in the decision-making 
process within the EU and believes that this principle should be adhered to in the upcoming 1996 
IGC. Greece as well supports the continuation of the national veto. See official position of the present 
PASOK government for the IGC, Prime Minister Kostas Simitis' address in Parliament 19 March 
1996. 
However, Greece likewise promotes a pro-federal Europe including a 'communitization' in 
certain policy areas. See Greek Foreign Minister Theodoros Pangalos' statement contributed to the 
meeting of the Intergovernmental Conference dedicated to the top ce Un on and the 
Owen" held on 22 April 1996 in Luxembourg. 
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membership in the EU in the near future. 215 The underlying concerns for Greece as 
regards its historical rival have likewise to do with the breakup of YugoslaN-ia and 
the fears of a spread of Islamic fundamentalism. A sizable Muslim community in 
western Thrace stirs uneasy feelings for Greeks who protest over Turkey'ý, 
accusations that the Muslim minority is discriminated against and that human right" 
violations are occurring. Greece denies these accusations and claims that the Greck 
Orthodox population in Turkey is the real victim of human rights violations, and that 
this Greek population in Turkey has been denied the right to use the Greek language, 
practice their religion, and have been stripped of property rights. 
The most recent skirmish with Turkey216 '17 January occurred over the weekend of A. 
1996 on the islet of Imia in the Dodecanese located in the southeastern Aegean close 
to the Greek island of Kalymnos, when some members of the Turkish newspaper 
Hurriyet removed a Greek flag from the islet and hoisted a Turkish one in its place. 
The National Defence Minister Gerassimos Arsenis the following day, on the 28th of 
January, instructed the Hellenic Navy patrol to put back the Greek flag. To be 
concise, this incident developed into a major dispute and put Greece and Turkey 
again on the brink of war. The question of Greece's sovereignty and its territorial 
borders with Turkey in the Aegean was again brought into question as the Turkish 
215For Greece's conditionality policy concerning Turkey joining the EU, see Prodromos 
Yannas, "The Greek Factor in EC-Turkey Relations, " In Greece and EC Membership Evaluated, op. 
cit., pp. 215-221. Turkey's accession to the EU remains a highly controversial issue in Greece, some 
believing that Turkey's entry into the EU will force the country to westernise, while others contend 
that Turkey has no business in the EU, and that if it were to join as a full member, other EU partners 
may find themselves in the awkward and unprecedented position of refereeing quarrels between two 
member-states. 
216The recent Aegean crisis over the islet of Imia has caused the Greek government to re- 
evaluate its position towards Turkey and its entrance into the customs union. Greece has vetoed any 
proposals for EU financial aid to Turkey unless they renunciate the use of threats of violence or use of 
violence, respect the principle of sovereignty and temtorial integrity, respect international law and 
treaties, and the relevant international practice. Greece was able to convince her EU partners that a 
text of 'common positions' was necessary to present to Turkey before the awarding of any financial 
aid, and this effectively led to the postponement of any action until an official Turkish response was 
received. The official text of the'common positions'as adopted by the EU Council is as follows: 
"As far as this issue is concerned, the Council has agreed that the following principles should 
apply: 
the renunciation of the use of force or the threat of force in the bilateral relations, 
the respect of the principle of sovereignty and territorial integrity, 
the respect of international law and Treaties and the relevant international practice, 
the identification of appropriate mechanisms, in accordance with international law for the 
peaceful resolution of disputes, in particular the ICJ or another judicial dispute resolution 
mechanism on which both sides could agree, 
the application of the principle of good neighborly relations, 
the pursuance of dialogue along the lines which have emerged in previous bilateral contacts 
which may contribute to the improvement of the bilateral relations as well as the 
establishment of a crisis prevention mechanism. " 
"'Me Council invites/calls upon Turkey to commit herself to these principles. " Athens N'evvsAgenc-v 
ButIctin, 26 March 1996. 
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foreign ministry claimed that the 1932 agreement between Turkey and Italy 
concerning the borders of the Dodecanese islands was invalid, and also claimed that 
the subsequent Paris Peace Treaty signed between Italy and Greece in 1947 
concerned the Dodecanese islands and left open the ownership of the adjoining 
islets. 217 Subsequently, however, both Ms. Ciller and Mr. Baykal stated that Turkeý' 
accepts the two aforementioned treaties but still claim that the former does not apply 
to Imia. 
The crisis was defused as a result of the United States taking the initiative to discLiss 
the issue with both Greece and Turkey which prevented the two NATO members 
from declaring outright war. This incident laid bare the inability of the European 
Union to take action concerning one of its member states and further revealed the 
European Union's inertia in matters of foreign poliCy. 218 Likewise the incident 
raised doubts about the notion of EU legitimacy as regards a policy area which it is 
supposedly trying to foster support from both national politicians and their citizens. 
Richard Holbrooke noted after the United States intervened in the matter to restore 
calm that while the USA was on the phone all night speaking to Athens and Ankara, 
Europe was sound asleep oblivious to the danger that was imminent within its 
borders. 219 The European Commission released a statement on 7 February 1996,220 
a week after the Imia incident occurred supporting Greece and its right of territorial 
integrity but this came de facto and was perceived as too little too late. As EU 
Commissioner Hans van den Broek admitted "the Council of Ministers, the most 
appropriate organ which ought to have taken a position on this, has not reacted. 11221 
Following the Imia incident, Prime Minister Kostas Simitis conducted a brief 
European tour stopping in Brussels, Bonn, and Paris from 21 to 23 February 1996222 
to inform his European counterparts of the severity of the recent Imia incident and 
called for a common recognition from Europe that such disputes should be referred 
217See statements made to this effect by the Turkish foreign ministry on 29 January 1996 by 
Deniz Baykal and subsequent statements made in a similar vein by caretaker Prime Minister Tansu 
Ciller to the international press on 30 and 31 January 1996. 
218EU Commission President Jacques Santer, when asked why the Commission did not take a 
more decisive stance on the Aegean crisis on January 1996, said that the Commission does not haNe 
any power over foreign affairs, and that only the Council of Ministers can make statements and 
decisions about foreign affair matters. See Jacques Santer's statement to the international press, I 
February 1996. 
219See "US Policies Aegean'While EU Sleeps', " Financial Times, 9 FebrWjrý' 1996. 
220Sce European Commission statement of 7 February 1996, Athens News Agency Bulletin, 8 
February 1996. 
221 Ibid. 
222While Prime Minister Kostas Simitis was on his European tour, Turkey decided to recall its 
ambassador to Athens back to Ankara for 'consultations. ' 
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to the International Court of Justice at the Hague where the rules of international law 
are employed as a vehicle of resolution, and that Greece was not prepared to 
negotiate bilaterally with Turkey border disputes which Turkey instigate. ". Prime 
Minister Kostas Simitis likewise called for the issue of external borders to be 
discussed at the 1996 Intergovernmental Conference and urged the EU to recognise 
that Greece's borders are the borders of the European Union. Simitis further urged 
his European counterparts to acknowledge the necessity for the further dcN, elopment 
of a common foreign and defence policy. 
Various other incidents have occurred between Greece and Turkey in the Aegean 
following the Imia crisis, including a skirmish between a Greek coast guard vessel 
and a Turkish vessel near the Greek island of Kastellorizo, on 22 April 1996. The 
Turkish vessel, after having refused to stop for a check by Greek authorities, wý111' 
chased by the Greek coast guard which fired warning shots that injured the captain 
of the Turkish vessel. An announcement by the Greek Merchant Marine MinistrN, 
later confirmed that the Turkish vessel had dropped off illegal Iranian immigrants on 
Kastellorizo (who were arrested by Greek authorities) and then fled back- into 
Turkish waters. The Turkish vessel's captain was later identified as a reputed, well- 
known illegal immigrant smuggler. 223 Two days later, on 24 April 1996, another 
Turkish speed boat was caught by Greek patrol authorities trying to transport illegal 
Iraqi refugees on to the Greek island of Samos. This time however, both the Turkish 
captain of the speed boat and the illegal aliens were caught and arrested. From 
1992-1995, some 22,900 illegal immigrants have entered Greece from Turkey and 
have been arrested by Greek authorities, approximately 5,300 entering from the 
islands and the sea regions. 224 
The most pressing, and perennial thorn in Greek-Turkish relations, however, 
continues to be the division of Cyprus. It is beyond the scope of this study to get 
into detail about what has transpired throughout the twenty odd years since the 
F-tcrpoký -- the 'invasion, ' as it is referred to by Greek Cypriots. 
225 The negotiating 
framework via which both sides have been carrying out talks has been the United 
223Athens News Agenc 
-v 
Bulletin, 23 April 1996. 
224As quoted by the Greek Public Order Ministry in April 1996 which accumulates data on 
illegal entry into Greece. 
225There is a plethora of commentaries on the Cyprus issue and more generally Greek-Turkish 
relations. For some of the most reputable (and recent) in English see Van Coufoudakis. "PASOK on 
Greco-Turkish Relations and Cyprus, 1981-1989: Ideology, Pragmatism, Deadlock, " In The Greek 
Socialist Experiment, Theodore Kariotis. ed., (NY: Pella Pub. Co. ) 1992, pp. 161-178, and hv, 
"Greece, Turkey, Cyprus and the United States in the Changing International Order, " In Greecc, the 
New Eurolm, and the Changing International Order, op. cit., 1993, pp. 391-420. 
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Nations Resolutions on Cyprus. These talks have had wavering degrees of success. 
and although from time to time there are signs of a breakthrough. there are also those 
who feel that the Cyprus issue and the current split of the island may in the end 
remain a fait accompli. In light of recent discussions concerning possible accession 
to the EU by Cyprus and Malta, the question of Cyprus has again come to the fore as 
a lingering dilemma. However, unsuccessful attempts by Greece to crystallise Ole 
gravity of the Cyprus issue to its European partners and the international communitý' 
alike, along with the forgone conclusion that the longer the island rernains split, the 
harder it will be for reconciliation to be reached as semi-permanent invisible as well 
as visible barriers have been created over two decades dividing the two communities, 
have resulted in the present status quo. 
One thing is quite clear, however, and it is that Greek Cypriots will never perceiN, e as 
legitimate the partition of Cyprus and thus cannot definitively accept the division of 
the island as final and terminal. The scars of the conflict are deep, and a recent 
outrage has again occurred opening up old wounds over the Turkish Cypriot leader 
Rauf Dentash's statement that 1,619 Cypriots who were listed as missing were in fact 
executed by Turkish paramilitary forces during the 1974 Turkish invasion of the 
island. The present Greek government along with the Greek-Cypriot government 
have considered bringing the issue up at the International Court of Justice at the 
Hague to have the act officially branded as a war crime. The destruction and 
violence lingers on in the memories of those who witnessed the invasion and its 
resulting partition of the island. Turkish armed forces in the north of the island serve 
as one of the most imminent security threats for Greece, and unless this Turkish 
presence is removed from the island, there appears to be no way that Greece can 
truly feel that her borders to the east are secure. 
Until the recent Dayton accord was reached which led to a peace initiate for Bosnia, 
Greece also experienced a period of heightened danger due to her geopolitical 
position in the Balkan region. Clearly the demise of communism in this post-cold 
war era has influenced issues of Greek national security and has somewhat 'dragged 
Greece back into the Balkans. '226 Nevertheless an occasion has likewise arisen 
which could allow Greece in her novel geographic position, as a kind of gateway 
between the EU (and the rest of the west) and these former communist states, to 
benefit financially, politically and geopolitically. As mentioned previously, the 
crumbling of the former Soviet bloc has precipitated concerns with Greece's 
226Richard Clogg. A Concise History of Greece, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Pres, 
1992, p. 206. 
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neighbours to the north -- the former Yugoslav Republics, particularly FYRONI and 
with Albania. 
One may recall that Greece imposed trade sanctions on FYRONJ in February of 1994 
in an attempt to put pressure on them to reconsider their choice of an official name, 
to protest at their use of ancient Greek symbols such as that of the Sun of Vergina on 
their national flag, and to show disapproval of their irredentist language that wa.. " 
found in parts of their constitution. Negotiations which occurred between Greece 
and FYROM led eventually to the lifting of the trade embargo (in October 1995, 
after nineteen months) with the understanding that the question of the narne ývMild 
be further discussed until a mutual agreement was reached, that the FYROM's 
national flag would not include the Sun of Vergina-, and that the questionable 
language from their constitution would be removed. However, it should further be 
recalled that the trade embargo that Greece placed on the FYROM was a unilateral 
action taken by Athens which witnessed the disapproval of Greece's EU partners. In 
fact, the European Commission, irate over Greece's conduct, brought an action 
against Greece on 25 April 1994 to the European Court of Justice. The Commission 
claimed that Greece had not appropriately justified its economic blockade of 
FYROM in terms of Article 223(lb) and 224 of the EC Treaty. 227 Second, the 
Commission did not find that the internal security of Greece would be at risk without 
the economic sanctions. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the Commission 
denied the assertion made by Greece that FYROM posed a national threat to Greece 
which could lead to war. 228 in the end, no action was taken against Greece, as the 
European Court of Justice later rejected the Commission action. However, this 
incident was enough to visibly reveal the differences of opinion held between Greece 
and other EU members as regards policies towards newly independently formed 
states in the Balkans. 229 This may disclose one reason why the desire to adopt a 
227Article 223(l b) of the EC Treaty states that: "Any Member State may take such measures as it 
considers necessary for the protection of the essential interests of its security which are connected 
with the production of or trade in arms, munitions and war material; such measures shall not 
adversely affect the conditions of competition in the common market regarding products which are 
not intended for specifically military purposes. it 
Article 224 of the EC Treaty reads as follows: "Member States shall consult each other with a 
view to taking together the steps needed to prevent the functioning of the common market being 
affected by measures with a Member State may be called upon to take in the event of serious internal 
disturbances affecting the maintenance of law and order, in the event of war, serious international 
tension constituting a threat of war, or in order to carry out obligations it has accepted for the purpose 
of maintaining peace and international secunty. " 
228See "Action brought on 25 April 1994 by the Commission of the European Communities 
against the Hellenic Republic, " Official Jounial of the European Communt ties, No C 174/10,25 June 
1994. 
221)See the various commentaries in European Report, (Brussels: European Information Service), 
including- "Greece/Macedonia: Day of Reckoning Draws Nigh for Athens, " I %pril 1994, 
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common foreign policy towards third countries (those outside the EU) may be inore 
challenging than was first thought, even by those who are presently promoting EU 
cooperation in ever-expanding policy areas. 
The changes that have occurred since the crumbling of Soviet communism have also 
affected other once Soviet bloc countries. The opening of Albania, considered to be 
the most closed of all communist countries, has had a tremendous impact on Greece. 
The influx of an estimated 300,000 Albanians into Greece has created pressing Lý 
demographic and social problems for the Greek state, including employment 
dilemmas as these destitute immigrants seek employment wherever they can find it. 
There is a perception that crime and other social ills have arisen as these immigrants 
arrive in Greece with little or no money and are immersed in a consumer society of 
which they know little or nothing about. It should come as no surprise, then, that 
some sixty-four per cent of Greeks polled expressed the feeling that there are "too 
many foreigners" in their country. 230 This display of xenophobia has been decisive 
in demonstrating Greece's attitudes towards these immigrants. The rather sudden 
immigration of ethnic Albanians and Yugoslav refugees into Greece, a country 
which has not witnessed foreign immigration in great numbers in modern times, has 
created a visible aversion to these immigrants. It is worth noting, however, that a 
definite distinction has been made between Albanians from northern Epirus and 
those from other areas within Albania, the former being perceived of as brothers 
while the latter simply as impoverished foreigners. The affiliation and sense of 
shared customs and religion with the 136peta HnF-tporF-; -- northern Epirotes -- 
places them in a favourable light with Greeks, who tend to empathise with forlorn 
immigrants and who perceive the northern Epirotes as their own. 
The influx of Albanians into Greece, coupled with various border incidents between 
the two countries that involved armed soldiers from both sides, led tensions to run 
high between the Greek and Albanian governments during the period 1991-1993. 
For their part, the Greek government began to deport illegal Albanians, carting them 
off to the Greek-Albanian border at night, only to see them back again on the Greek 
side the next morning. 231 The Albanian government claimed that their people were 
unfairly treated by the government in Athens and a tit-for-tat relationship developed 
between the two countries. Presently, however, an amicable relationship between 
"EU/GREECE: Commission Seeks Preliminary Injunction Suspending Embargo on FYROM, " 16 
April 1994; and "Cornmission Requests Court Order in Greece/FYROM Roýý " 27 April 1994. 
230EUROBAROMETER #42, Spring 1995, p. 69. 
23 1 The Greek-Albanian border is one of mountainous (the Pindus mountain range) and uneven 
terrain which makes it nearly impossible to monitor border crossings effectively. 
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the two countries has developed; 232 and most recently there are discuýsions in 
Greece about opening up Greek banks in Tirana to handle money exchanges between 
Albanian immigrants in Greece who want to have bank accounts in Albania. -1 
Greece has also allocated some 27.3 billion drachmas for a cooperation programme 
with Albania, known as INTERREG-PHASE CBC, which will involve both road 
construction and communication links between Greece and Albania via an 
underwater optic fiber cable. The hope is that eventually the communication link 
will be able to extend from central and northern Europe to the Eastern Mediterranean 
and the Middle East. 234 Greek President Kostis Stephanopoulos conducted an 
official two-day visit to Tirana, from 21 to 22 March 1996 to sign a friendship and 
co-operation treaty between the two countries. Nevertheless, the freeing of Albania, 
the poorest country in Europe, has created innumerable consequences for her 
neighbours, and Greece in particular has had to face a deluge of destitute immigrants 
on to her soil. 
The necessity for EU coordination in the areas of migration and immigration policy 
as discussed in Chapter Three of this study clearly emerges when discussing such 
issues of mass immigration and how they are to be confronted. As has been 
mentioned previously in this study, the lack of a common EU policy on immigration 
has resulted in various member states adopting their own means to confront illegal 
immigration which have for the most part been defensive and reactive. Greece has 
been no exception. However, in light of the fact that no long term plan has been 
discussed at an EU level, member states have been left to their own accord to deal 
with this pressing and ever-growing dilemma of illegal immigration resulting in 
short-term immediate actions on the part of member states which are myopic, and 
which ultimately do not effectively resolve questions such as asylum, illegal 
immigration smuggling, and border controls. Italy has had little success in 
controlling illegal immigrants even though they have adopted identity cards and 
employer sanctions, and Germany, which has been the largest receiver of asylum 
seekers, has also been forced to develop its own policy towards these immigrants. 
One of the paradoxes of Greek concerns with national security is revealed in Athens' 
apparent desire to get EU policy-makers more aware of and sensitive to Greece's 
2320n 13 December 1995, Greece and Albania signed a protocol defence agreement which 
establishes areas of cooperation between the two countnes concerning military training and as,, istancc 
as well as health care issues. 
233See Kerin Hope, "Policy Gap Weakens Balkan Tbrust, " Financial Times, 14 NovembCr 1995, 
P. 1. 
234Athens News Agenc), Bulletin, 19 April 1996. 
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geography. Greece presently acts as the southeastern border of the EU, and 
consequently this reality inherently affects issues of national security. The Greek 
government during the Imia crisis, as mentioned above, wanted recognition from her 
EU partners that Greece's borders are EU borders. Such an acknowledgment came 
via a European Parliament resolution of 15 February 1996 that included recognition 
that Greece's borders form part of the borders of the European Union. Security, in 
fact, is considered by Greeks to be one of the most important areas which should be 
of concern for the EU. 235 Yet at the same time, clashes have arisen between Greece 
and the EU, the EU objecting to Greek policies towards the FYROM as previouslý 
mentioned and towards Greece's sympathies with Serbia. In general, disagreements 
have arisen as to what posture Greece should present to her Balkan neighbours. All 
agree that Greece should promote peace in the region and use her strategic location 
to foster economic links with the west. Yet Greece's sympathies with the Serbs in 
Serbian conflicts with their neighbours, and the FYROM economic blockade, are 
two examples in which Greece's stance has been at odds with her EU partners. 
One of the most promising relations that Greece has developed in the post- 
communist era has been with Bulgaria, historically one of Greece's least friendly 
neighbours, and that country which shares the largest northern border with 
Greece. 236 Greek-Bulgarian relationships have blossomed into one of mutual 
understanding and respect for borders in the aftermath of the collapse of Soviet 
communism. This has led to economic cooperation between the two countries, 
negotiated and cemented by visits of heads of state between the two countries. 237 
As Kerin Hope writes: "Greece has agreed to open new border crossings with 
Bulgaria that will end the isolation of the Pomaks, a Moslem minority of farmers 
living on both sides of the Rodopi mountains, and give Bulgarian exporters access to 
235By analysing EUROBAROMETER surveys, for example from December 1992 to Spring 1995, 
what consistently appears as a matter of interest on the part of Greeks is that the EC/EU should 
concern itself with the security and defence affairs of its members. For various other analyses of 
Greek security and defence issues, See Thanos Veremis, "Defence and Security Policies Under 
PASOK, " pp. 181-189, In Greece, 1981-89: The Populist Decade, Richard Clogg, ed., (NY: St. 
Martin's Press) 1993; and (in Greek) Xpýaro; A. Poýdicyj;, "H EUd8a (jrqv Avaroxý -rol) 2 lou 
At6va: Eýwrcpticoi icat EowrcptKoi FIapdyovTc; iarq Aiaýi6powaq rq; AtF-Ovov'; 0ýcTqý TT1; 
Ekkd8a;, " In H EAAci(5a flpoý ro 2000, KaTaoýkqq, 1-tavviTuil;. KcEýdicoq FnIA., (AOýva: 
Flanaýýcyrj) 1988, a. 454-473. 
236Richard Clogg's "Greece in the Balkans in the 1990's, " In Greece, The New Europe, and file 
Changing International Order, Harry J. Psomiades and Stavros B. Thomadakis, ed., (NY: Pella Pub. 
Co. ) pp. 421-435, is both a brief historical account of Greece's relations with her Balkan neighbours 
and a look at what they may be like in the 1990's. 
237There has as Nvell been enhanced shipping, trading, and banking relations bemeen Greece and 
Romania since the fall of Soviet communism. Greek private investors have increased their economic 
activities in Romania resulting in Greek investments in the country continuing to grow rapidIN. 
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the Aegean ports of Kavalla and Alexandropoulis. "238 An oil pipeline agreement 
between Greece and Bulgaria (costing some $700 million) is to be built carrying 
Russian oil from the Bulgarian port of Burgas to the Greek northern port of 
Alexandropoulis. This will allow oil to bypass the busy Bosphorus sea. Likewise a 
sizable number of private business ventures have developed between Greek and 
Bulgarian entrepreneurs which has furthered trade and cooperative ventures between 
the two countries. However, it must be kept in mind that Bulgaria's recognition of 
an independent FYROM was received with dismay by the Greek government and the 
Greek public alike. 239 Nevertheless, Greece has since been able to cultivate friendly 
diplomatic and economic relations with Bulgaria which is hoped will act as a 
counterbalance to continuous tensions with Turkey. 240 
Other plans which are underway in Greece to further her relations with other 
neighbours include the building of the Egnatia Highway which is to run through 
northern Greece, from Alexandropoulis to the city of Igoumenitsa (on the island of 
Kerkira - Corfu). The northern Greek city of Thessaloniki is scheduled to be the cite 
of the Black Sea Development Bank to open sometime in 1996. The bank will be 
created to handle regional trade and investment and its eleven shareholders include 
Greece and Albania and all Black Sea countries. 
8.4 The Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and the Western 
European Union (WEU) 
Greece's most important links with Europe and the west which concern security and 
defence have been its membership in NATO (since 1952), the European Union, the 
United Nations and the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe 
(CSCE). 241 Although Greece does not presently have troops participating in UN 
peacekeeping forces, it participates in NATO exercises in the Aegean and has 
supported the principles that underlie the organisation. Greece's most recent 
achievement concerning security and defence and its move towards further 
238Kerin Hope, "Policy Gap Weakens Balkan Thrust, " op. cit. p. L 
239This holds true for the case of Belgrade's recognition agreement with the 'Republic of 
Macedonia'in April 1996. 
24OFor a discussion of Greece's stance towards its northern neighbours and more generally 
foreign policy issues, see interview with current Greek Foreign Minister Theodoros Pangalos (in 
Greek) in TO BHMA, 28 Iavouapiov 1996. 
241See Theodore Couloumbis' prolific work pertaining to Greek foreign policy and defence 
issues, including some of the most recent such as: "Greek-U. S. Relations in the 1990s: Back into the 
Future, " In Greece, the New Europe, and the Changing International Order, op. cit., pp. 379-390; 
"Introduction: The Impact of EC (EU) Membership on Greece's Foreign Policy Profile, " In Greece 
and EC Membership Evaluated, op. cit., pp. 189-198; and (in Greek) co-authored with Thanos 
Veremis, FUj7vwq F4wwpih-4 BoAinK-4 17pooxmKi; Prai 17poAAqpanoyoi, (AOýva: 1. ztbepýo 
1994. 
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participation in European schemes has been its successful abilitv to become a full 
member of the WEU in April of 1995,242 which, as mentioned previously in this 
study, is looked upon by some observers as the future defence arm of the EU. 2-43 
The theme of contrariness and duality of attitudes and beliefs that are indicative ol' 
Greek behaviour, as mentioned above, can be applied to the case of the CFSP and 
more generally to European Political Cooperation (EPC). 244 %lore specificalk, 
there have been concerted efforts by Greece to promote its security interests within a 
European framework and to get its European partners to agree on a more definitive 
role for the EU in addressing security concerns. The attempts on the part of Greece 
to get a more clearly articulated commitment from its EU partners was initiated in 
the discussions leading up to the Single European Act (SEA) of 1986,245 
particularly that concerning the wording of Title III of the SEA, "Treaty Provisions 
on European Cooperation in the Sphere of Foreign policy.,, 246 Nonetheless Greece 
was unable convincingly to cajole her EU partners that a firmer commitment for 
security and defence issues should be laid down. The inclusion of a CFSP in the 
signing of the Maastricht agreement, however, was a more positive move on the part 
of EU members to outline a more substantial plan for coordinated action in the areas 
of security and defence, and perhaps even leading in the future to a common foreign 
policy. But here again, the wording and objectives of the CFSP as outlined in the 
Maastricht treaty remain vague and nondescript under an indefinite time period for 
actual implementation. 247 
As mentioned above, Greece is currently attempting to get the 1996 
Intergovernmental Conference to examine issues of security and defence in Europe 
and to expand the notion of a CFSP. Greece has stated that it believes that the EU 
needs to more clearly and explicitly outline the objectives of the CFSP. For 
example, Greece has stated that a CFSP should include: 
242The protocol for the accession of Greece leading up to full membership was signed on 20 
November 1992. 
243See "Declaration on the Role of the Western European Union and its Relations with the 
European Union and with the Atlantic Alliance, " annexed to the Treaty on European Union. 
244P. K. loakimidis' study on European political integration includes a chapter on Greek 
perceptions of EPC and why Greece has pursued a pro-federalist stance towards security and defence 
issues. See (in Greek) Fl. K. lwaiceipi8q;, Evp(wraix-4 HoAii7x-4 Evwo77, (AOýva: Oepýkto) 1993, 
6181K(i "Keodkctto EMopo -- H EWbaicat q Eupwnaiicý Eve)cTq. " 
245See Yannis G. Valinakis, "Security Policy, " In Greece and EC Membership Evalual(d, op. 
cit., pp. 199-214, for a discussion of Greece's position regarding the CFSP and her stance towards 
EPC. 
246European Commission, Single European Act, Title 111, Article 30. 
247See Chapter Two 2.3.5 in this study where the CFSP is also bnefly discussed. 
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0 the respect of human rights and democratic freedoms; 
the guaranteeing of the EU's external frontiers and territorial integrity 
as well as the adoption of a 'solidarity and mutual defence assistance 
clause' ... 
the contribution of the Union to the prevention of conflicts and the 
consolidation of stability, particularly in the Countries of Central and 
Eastern Europe, the Balkans and the Mediterranean basin. 248 
Greece has made it clear that it supports further coordination and svnchroni., SýItlon 
with EU members in the formation of common security objectives and goals. 249 It 
seems clear that Greece feels more secure and less of a threat from its neighbOLirs 
(particularly Turkey) being in the EU. As Yannis G. Valinakis has aptly remarked 
when concluding his discussion about security issues and Greece in the EU: 
Being a member of the EC/EU, Greece enjoys the support of II 
important countries; ... it increases Greece's international position and 
provides this country with a feeling of security unknown before. 
Participation in the EC network also guarantees an increased and 
timely flow of information critical for foreign policy decision- 
making. It contributes simultaneously to the i-nodernization of 
Greece's foreign policy mechanism and bureaucratic structures ... 
250 
This positive Greek position indicates Greece's wholehearted support for European 
endeavors that seek to further enhance European security and defence cooperation. 
The pro-federalist stance has led many observers to pronounce Greece as one of the 
most ardent supporters of the European project. Therefore, based upon the official 
posture that the country has taken vis-a-vis European security and defence 
policies, 251 one could say that there is a substantial degree of legitimacy felt by 
Greece for these policies (both those presently being initiated and those 
implemented). Yet there appears to be another side to this phenomenon, lurking 
behind this apparent enthusiasm. 
The other side of the phenomenon pops its head up when one investigates the 
popular responses in Greece towards the CFSP. Initially there seems to be no 
contradiction to the official stance of the government: 70% of Greeks surveyed 
248Greek Memorandum. "For a European Union with Political and Social Content, " Athens, 22 
March 1996. 
249For a discussion of the pro-federal position that Greece plans to hold for the 1996 IGC, see 
European Report, 17 January 1996, and (in Greek) H. K. IcoaKF_tgi8Tj;, H AvaO, -6prjaq rrl,: 
2: vvOýx-ijl; rov Maastricht, (AOýva: OcpOao) 1995. 
'150Yannis G. Valmakis, "Security Policy, " op. cit., p. 211. 
251See "Greece Calls for More Mature Union on World Stage, " European Report, (Bru,,, selv 
European Information Service) 17 Januarv 1996. 
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responded that "The Member States of the European Union should ha-, c one 
common foreign policy towards countries outside the European Union. " Iý -) 
Likewise, some 73% of Greeks polled were in favour of the EU workin2 towards a 
common defence policy. These figures, however, differ substantially from the 
standard question asked in EUROBAROMETER surveys as to which areas of policV 
should be decided by national governments, and which should be decided jointly 
within the EU. Here some 75% of Greeks polled expressed the belief that 'defence' 
is a national issue. 253 Equally noteworthy is that 26% of Greeks , urveycd do not 
believe that "The European Union will act in common with respect to a militarN, and 
defence policy" by the year 2010.254 Therefore, although a majority of Greeks 
polled appear to be in favour of cooperating with EU member states to form a broad 
platform for a common foreign and defence policy, there remains a great deal of 
skepticism (revealed in a low expectation level) as to whether this can actually he 
accomplished in the foreseeable future. 
These findings reveal mixed attitudes towards issues of security and defence. From 
one direction, it is discernible that a majority of the Greek people would like the EU 
to concern itself with issues of defence and foreign policy, as these are considered to 
be integral for the security of the country. Geopolitically, then, Greeks like to see 
themselves clearly as part of the west, and would like to be able to rely on the 
European Union as a pillar of support for the country including those issues relating 
to security. (Greece has a history as a 'client state' and has often in the past had to 
rely on foreign powers to act as her protector). Given Greece's geographical 
positioning in the Balkans, this is suggestive of Greece's particular security concerns 
with her northern neighbours which have experienced momentous changes in the last 
few years, while clearly Greece's adversarial relationship with Turkey remains the 
more pressing security concern and the source of most imminent danger to its 
territorial integrity. The recent Imia incident again brought to the fore such a danger. 
Noteworthy as well is that since 1974, Greece spends the largest percentage of its 
GDP on defence than any other NATO member. 255 Thus Greece has much to gain 
economically if a European CFSP was put in place which could possibly givc relief 
252EUROBAROMETER #42 Spring 1995, Figure 8.2. p. B. 42. 
'1531bid., Table 8.1. 
2541bid., Figure 9.3. This is the highest percentage among EU member citizenry, even higher 
than the British 23%. This seems to reveal a great deal of skepticism held among the Greek people as 
to whether EU member states will be able to develop, and implement, a viable 'common' defence 
policy in the future. 
255See The International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Militar?. Balance, 1994-1995, 
(London: Brassey's) 1994, esp. pp. 52-54, for exact figures a, to the amount of money Greece has 
spent on defence from 1992 to 1994, for example. 
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to the Greek state coffers which have to bear the brunt of a huge defence spending LI 
budget. 
From another angle, however, there is a counter Greek public opinion which sees the 
sovereign repository for defence being that of the Greek nation-state. The nation- 
state continues to be perceived of as the primary legitimate actor when it comes to 
national security and defence. Therefore no matter what CFSP is adopted. there 
must remain a clause to allow for unilateral action. The Greek notion of homeland -- 
patreda, as mentioned earlier, is very powerful in Greece and this feeds into issues 
of security and defence which are considered to be national in character. Greeks' 
sense of national pride and cultural affinity remain firmly rooted in society and play 
a decisive role in public opinion. Therefore any attempts to create a CFSP must take 
into consideration cross-national cultural factors, institutional questions, and other 
firmly implanted ideological and attitudinal variables which influence opinion 
concerning a traditionally national responsibility such as defence. 
Seen beyond the particular case of the Greek nation-state, and perhaps of more 
importance on a wider level of analysis, it appears that globalisation and 
interdependence may necessitate cooperation and linkages which undermine some 
traditional areas of concern once thought to be the sole responsibility of the nation- 
state. But, when it comes to the thorny question of sovereignty and legitimacy, the 
nation-state still prevails over international organisations. Differing policy styles 
and policy processes as well as a host of other historical, institutional and cultural 
differences -- aspects of a nation-state which come about over time and which tcnd 
to be much more difficult to change -- create obstacles and formidable challenges for 
developing and implementing a coordinated and synchronised defence and foreign 
policy. 
These ambivalent attitudes felt towards a CFSP are also evident regarding the WEU. 
By attaining full membership in the WEU in April of 1995, Greece has achieved a 
major goal concerning participation in a defence organisation in", 'olving EU 
members. Although not part of the treaties at present, there is much discussion of 
the WEU entering within the legal framework of the EU in the near future, although 
at present it remains an independent international organisation. 
256 Greek foreign 
policy development and content could be substantially affected by membership in 
the WEU, and if nothing else, Greece will have to become responsive to a more 
256See Arie Bloed and Ramses A. Wessel, eds., "Introduction, "The Changing Functions of the 
lVestern European Union (ýVEU), (The Netherlands: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers) 1994. esp. pp. 
xxi%, -xxx. 
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diversified set of security and defence issues and to keep abreast and informed of 
other member's security and defence interests and concerns. From the perspective of 
those fully supporting WEU membership, the pro-Europe defenders, there is the 
belief that other WEU members will become equally as interested in the particular 
matters that Greece faces given the geographical positioning of the country. In any 
case the argument continues, this will allow for a larger international forum to 
discuss specific concerns such as the Cyprus issue. For example, at a ministerial 
meeting of the WEU on 19 June 1992, Central and Eastern European states 
(Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Poland and Romania) had representatives attending and indeed recently, as 
mentioned, these countries have become 'associate partners' of the WEU. From the 
perspective of those who are more hesitant to rave of the positive advantages of 
Greek WEU membership, comes skepticism (slightly reflected in Greek public 
opinion, revealed through the EUROBAROMETER surveys as mentioned above) as to 
what tangible results can emerge from WEU membership. Almost all agree that the 
WEU brings an added sense of security for Greece, but beyond the rhetoric some 
claim that little or anything will occur within the confines of the WEU to visibly 
solve any of Greece's outstanding differences with her neighbours. Once more, the 
issue of security and defence appears nestled in the arms of the nation-state and from 
where it attains its legitimacy. 
Obviously the fall of Soviet communism has affected international organisations 
such as NATO whose inception was in response to the creation of a Soviet 
superpower and the perceived threat this had for north-Atlantic states. NATO as an 
organisation has undergone, and continues to undergo, dramatic structural and 
ideological changes in light of world events which have occurred over the last ten 
years. A shift in emphasis from a defensive mode to one of cooperation and 
collaboration on more general issues of security and defence now prevails. Other 
international organisations are experiencing a similar redirection, and the WEU will 
nonetheless follow this move towards accenting its cooperative endeavors and 
enhanced interdependency among its members. This is all the more reason why the 
issue of legitimacy, and where citizens perceive it lies, needs to be investigated. 
An international organisation such as the WEU needs to acquire not simply a 
symbolic role but a functional and substantive one if it is to be perceived as 
legitimate. Neither the CFSP nor the WEU at present have proven themselves to be 
functionally effective organisations which means that citizens can not perceive them 
as politically legitimate. Greek citizens will have to be convinced with deeds and 
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not simply promises that a CFSP and the WEU will truly secure their territorial 
integrity when and if necessary and actively promote peace in Europe. 
8.5 Conclusion 
Based upon the above discussion, some concluding remarks seem to be in order to 
reiterate how the security and defence dimension of legitimacy is manifested in the 
case of Greece. Issues of security and defence in Greece remain a sensitive and 
primary concern for the country, particularly as new developments continue to 
unfold in the Balkans -- the 'powder keg of Europe. ' 
First, it seems evident that owing to her geography, Greece is required to maintain a 
multidimensional and multifaceted foreign policy, partially due to the country''S 
geographical location and partially because of membership of the European Union. 
This means that any cooperation with the EU in the form of a CFSP will have to 
continue to allow for a substantial degree of unilateral action and decision-making 
on the part of the Greek nation-state. Any other agreement with the EU will not 
receive the degree of legitimacy, either by the government in Athens (irrespective of 
which party is in power), nor with the Greek public at large which is required for 
such a policy to be effectively implemented. As a full member of the WEU, Greece 
is now in a position to make known her security and defence concerns and to 
internationalise such issues as the Cyprus issue and disagreements with Turkey in 
the Aegean. This could possibly expedite a peaceful and mutually agreed upon 
settlement to these outstanding issues. 
Greece likewise appears to be maneuvering to seek a more comfortable niche within 
the EU, so as to be able to keep her EU partners informed of and aware of the 
particular dangers and problems that the country faces while participating in EU 
endeavors for an integrated Europe. Prime Minister Kosta Simitis's recent tour of 
European capitals in the aftermath of the Imia crisis was indicative of one such 
attempt. This means that organisation and the development of necessary 
infrastructures of diplomacy and communication on the part of Greece to facilitate 
such exchanges is prerequisite. It has recently become more apparent to Greece that 
her EU partners may be more sensitive to and aware of Greece's particular security 
and defence concerns if better channels for communication allow for an interchange 
of ideas and opinions concerning security and defence issues. This could 
substantially increase the level and degree of legitimacy for EU proposed policies in 
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Greece since the Greek government and Greek public alike would be better informed 
of EU initiatives and vice versa. 
Second, Greece's seemingly 'schizophrenic' attitudes towards questions of security 
and defence need to be further investigated and examined to shed light on this 
enigma. A more in-depth study seems warranted to elucidate which socio-cultural 
and political variables are involved in this bicephalous separation of thought and 
ideas versus emotions and actions as concerns such issues as nationalism, security 
and defence. As to how this seemingly two-headed perception of the EU may affect 
the degree of legitimacy for the EU as its plans for the future expand into new policy 
areas, remains to be seen. It may be possible that this duality of attitudes will 
dissipate over time to be replaced by a more uniform receptivity to FU goals of a 
united Europe. Yet likewise there remains the possibility that Greece's fickleness 
will continue to perplex its EU partners and foreign observers alike. Much depends 
upon how far Greece is able to meet the challenges of EU integration, particularly 
economically, and how successful she is at modernising the country which requires a 
political leadership that will take bold steps in reorganising Greece's infrastructures 
and concomitantly reorienting popular attitudes and practices. 
Third, Greece has an historic opportunity to play a decisive role in Balkan affairs in 
the aftermath of the demise of communism. Yet there remains a great deal of 
instability in the region which also creates uneasy relations among Balkan 
neighbours who have distinctive historical, religious, ethnic and cultural 
backgrounds. If Greece is able to sustain peaceful and mutually beneficial relations 
with all of her neighbours, including Turkey to the east, then indeed she will have 
proven that her democratic institutions and practices are well consolidated and 
anchored. Likewise she will have proven that she is capable of developing a mature 
foreign policy. The potential for economic activity leading to prosperity between 
Greece and these newly created (newly independent) states is great, if Greece can 
maintain friendly working relations with them. This will also enhance a sense of 
legitimacy in Greece for policies which are able to promote such cooperation. A 
leadership role in the Balkans would appear to be the most advantageous stance that 
Greece could take, rather than simply reactive, knee-jerk responses to particular 
incidents as they unfold. Presently as the only member of the EU in the Balkan 
region, Greece has the opportunity to capitalise on its relationship with the EU and 
can act as a bridge between the west and the Balkans to the advantage of both. 
These types of activities and expressions of leadership could certainly inspire a 
greater degree of legitimacy for Greek policies both at home and abroad. 
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Finally, the issue of security and defence in Greece and the bi-polar attitudes towards 
these issues unveils a larger question concerning legitimacy. The Greek case re%-eals 
that there is a need for Greece to rely on European and other international 
organisations to ensure a level of security for the country. Therefore, on the one 
hand, she relies on and needs to participate in these international organisations to 
protect her territorial integrity, which means she is dependent on them. Yet on the 
other hand, most citizens still perceive the nation-state as the legitimate actor which 
should protect and secure its citizens from foreign aggression. Howevcr, Grecce wIII 
have to weigh these two variables and contemplate the trade-offs which are 
inevitable. Letting other organisations make decisions concerning foreign policy 
and defence considerably blurs the lines between the national and international, 
between the domestic and foreign spheres of policy-making. A tension has thus 
arisen between: (a) the nation-state which can no longer handle entirely on its own 
such pressing concerns as security and defence, but where legitimacy is safek-ept, 
and (b) the EU and other international organisations, which are now willing and 
perhaps best able in some areas to develop a sturdier bulwark for security and 
defence, but which lack the requisite degree of popular legitimacy. However, this 
dilemma does not appear to be merely a straightforward case of transferring the 
locus of where legitimacy lies, in other words moving it from a national to an 
international level, although this in itself would be a formidable feat. Rather, a more 
complex dialectic of forces and actors have come on to the international scene which 
are causing a mutation of national and international responsibilities such as that of 
security and defence. As has been demonstrated in this study, the EU is believed to 
be one such actor. At present there appears to be no simple answer as to how these 
actors will acquire a sense of political and social legitimacy and how this will affect 
a member state such as Greece. Part of the problem of examining such questions is 
due to the lack of an appropriate vernacular which could be utilised for such 
investigations, and this indeed creates obstacles for social scientists attempting to 




This study has investigated both political and social legitimacy by offering a 
theoretical differentiation of the concept along five dimensions: those of civil 
society, democracy, the welfare state, the economic environment, and security and 
defence. Joseph Weiler's distinction between 'formal' and 'social' legitimacy has 
been adopted and expanded to relate the question of legitimacy to the European 
Union and to the case of a member state, that of Greece. As has been demonstrated 
throughout this study, the concept of legitimacy is a dynamic one, and what tile 
concept has meant and how it has been examined has changed over time, as has the 
historical context in which the question has been raised. Since legitimacy is a 
process, it is difficult to pin down and define. Therefore any scheme developed to 
examine this concept must be flexible and pliable to keep pace with the inherent 
metamorphosis of the concept. 
The first part of this study began by applying the five dimensions of legitimacy to 
the European Union. A specific sequence of the dimensions was selected for this 
examination of legitimacy and the EU so as to create a more comprehensive and 
specific investigation of the same. Since the political and economic dimensions of 
the EU legitimacy question are at the foreground of current debates, it seemed timely 
and auspicious to place them first. As welfare concerns are tied to the economic 
environment of the EU, those dimensions were placed next. Civil society and 
security and defence matters followed. The aim has been to apply these five 
dimensions of legitimacy to the EU as a vehicle for exploring these same dimensions 
for one of its member states, Greece. 
The investigation into legitimacy and the European Union revealed scý, eral 
challenges which the EU currently faces in its endeavors to achieve further 
integration of member states. Lacking both a degree of social and political 
legitimacy in its institutional make-up and in its policy and decision-making 
procedures has meant that the EU has become susceptible to criticisms and wavering 
degrees of popular support for its outlined goals among the citizens of the Union and 
among European leaders alike. As has been laid bare in this studý,, the 'democratic 
deficit; ' at best mixed forecasts emanating from the economic environment-, and the 
prevalence of nationalism in fields of welfare and security/defence are merelý, a few 
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areas where the legitimacy question seems especially acute and which the EU can no 
longer afford to ignore. Attempting to create a European 'Common social , -, pace' has 
likewise proven to be a formidable task which has met up with a mix of successes 
and failures. 
However, the examination of legitimacy and the EU in this study further revealed 
that the question of legitimacy needs to be sought within the day-to-daY operations 
of EU institutions and within its policy-making and decision-making procedures 
rather than assuming that there is a single factor (or a single set of factors) which can 
be established which directly feeds into the question of legitimacy. Put differently. 
an investigation into the question of legitimacy in this study has shown that a variet ' N. 
of factors and forces are involved in the question of legitimacy and these either 
enhance or diminish the degree of legitimacy that the EU possesses. This same 
principle holds true for its member states. 
What also needs to be acknowledged is that the EU currently is neither national nor 
supranational but instead a new kind of mixed polity for which the social sciences 
lack an appropriate language for discussion. Simply applying the language and laws 
of the nation-state is insufficient to examine such questions as legitimacy. Ideas of 
what is democratic for example, are based on how this notion is understood and 
applied at a national level rather than how this can (or should) be understood and 
applied at an EU level. Such dilemmas further necessitate the need to devclop a 
scheme which can take into consideration such idiosyncrasies. 
Moreover, further perplexing questions arise as one delves deeper into a discussion 
of the EU and the question of legitimacy. For instance, one may ask: can the EU be 
perceived of as legitimate if it does not express the interests and views of a majority 
of those who it is supposed to represent? Can the EU possibly ever actually express 
the interests and views of the 'citizens of the Union? What types of problems does 
further enlargement of the EU pose for the question of legitimacy? One is required to 
address these and other queries if an accurate picture of the question of legitimacy is 
to surface. 
Primarily, however, the examination of the European Union. although a fascinating It, 
subject unto itself, was conducted largely to enlighten a discussion of the relations 
between its institutions and processes and those of its most southea. stern member, 
Greece. Greece is a unique case as she is unlike her European Union partners in 
many ways. As has been demonstrated throughout this study, Greecc has distinct 
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cultural and historical influences which derive from her Byzantine and Ottoman past. 
Greece is the only EU member of Orthodox Christianity, and which has the highest 
level of religious homogeneity among its partners. Greece does not share a land 
border with any other EU partner and is geopolitically situated in an historically 
volatile area of Europe which poses particular security dilemmas for the countrY. 
Greece's marriage with the Community, now the Union, has been somewhat of an 
uneven relationship. By joining the Community as a full member in 1981 Greece 
was able to secure her democratic institutions -- after a turbulent Second World War, 
an ensuing civil war, and from 1967-74 a dictatorship -- and establish her place 
among the western states of Europe. As has been revealed, for many, membership in 
the Community allowed Greece to redefine and reorient her national identity and 
become more 'European. ' But her distinguishing socio-cultural characteristics, her 
inability to modernise her state infrastructures -- the very way Greeks define 
themselves as a nation -- and defiant political behaviour towards implementing 
Community economic policies have often resulted in Greece's ostracism by her EU 
partners. Additionally, when Greece joined the Community in 1981 an economic 
recession had affected most of Europe while Greece was caught up with her own 
economic dilemmas inherited from the previous decade. This econornic climate 
exacerbated Greece's difficulties in synchronising and coordinating her economic 
activities with that of her new partners. Likewise, the policies which were pursued 
by Andreas Papandreou's PASOK party during Greece's first eight years in the 
Community -- policies of economic inefficiency and waste, state overexpansion and 
the perpetuation of clientelist practices -- further exaggerated and stretched Greece's 
distance from other Community members and from the process of integration. For 
many observing Greece and its relationship with the Community retrospectively, the 
problem has been defined in specific terms: Greece never did 'Integrate' 
(structurally) nor 'assimilate' (attitudinally) into the Community, it simply joined, 
without undergoing the necessary transformations which would have allowed her to 
I synchronise' and 'coordinate' her policies and practices with those of her partners. 
This has resulted in wavering feelings of legitimacy on the part of Greeks for the EU 
and vice versa. 
There is a temptation when studying a country like Greece to try to draw 
comparisons with other Mediterranean member states who share a sillillar 
geographical setting. However, although there certainlý' are similarities which one 
can draw out by studying Greece, Spain and Portugal as a group -- for example, they 
all joined in the decade of the 1980's; they secured democratic governments in the Z7 
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mid 1970's after having previously experienced dictatorships; their industrial sector" 
are less developed when compared with their northern EU partners -- there are 
likewise numerous differences. Greece stands out since she was the first of the three 
to join which meant that Spain and Portugal had a bit more time to prepare 
macroeconomic policies in tune with those of the Community and adjust their 
infrastructures for accession. When joining in 1986, Spain and Portugal had the 
advantage of entering at a time when Europe was beginning to recover from the 
economic recession which had begun in the 1970's with the oil crisis and which 
lingered on into the mid 1980's. Likewise Spain and Portugal, sharing common 
borders (and a religion found among existing member states), were ultimately able to 
integrate (economically and in terms of cultural assimilation) more easily into the 
Community than was the case with Greece. 
Furthermore Greece was never an imperial power in the modern era as was Spain 
and Portugal who had control over colonies and who also had developed working 
relationships with other nation-states of northern and western Europe. For example, 
the Portuguese from the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries had both thriving 
commercial and political ties with Great Britain which allowed the British a 
preferential access to Portuguese markets in return for British military protection. 
The Portuguese were able to extend their empire into Africa in the nineteen and early 
twentieth centuries, colonising for example Angola, Mozambique and Guinea- 
Bissau. The Spanish likewise continued to be a formidable power to be reckoned 
with in Europe throughout the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, while in contrast 
Greece in the 1830's was trying to consolidate itself as a newly independent nation- 
state. In other words, Greece lacked many of the 'European' characteristics that her 
Iberian and Spanish southern EU member partners had acquired in the previous two 
centuries which tied them more closely to western Europe and which paved the way 
for their eventual incorporation into a European Community in the twentieth century. 
Greece emerged from an eastern empire which coloured its society and politics and 
which would markedly distinguish her independent make-up from those nation- 
states with whom she would in the late twentieth century refer to as EU partners. 
Part 11 of this study began applying the five dimensions of legitimacy to Greece by 
beginning with an examination of Greek civil society. What has been emphasised is 
Greece's underdeveloped civic environment and the persistence of socio-cultural 
practices from the past. Clientelism, a mistrust of authority, and the role of the state W 
as patron employing large numbers of citizens are but a few of the legacies that 
Greece has inherited from Ottoman rule and which have now taken on a modern 
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guise. These characteristics have created a sense of suspicion and wearine"S of 
voluntary or other organisations not sanctioned by the state or not under the tutelaý'e 
of one of the major political parties. The role of the Greek Orthodox Church and the 
family are two social structures which continue to greatly influence the social make- 
up of contemporary Greek society which have been brought into the discussion. 
Therefore these socio-cultural features of Greek society weigh heaN-ily into an 
explanation of social legitimacy in Greece as has been demonstrated throughout thi" 
study. From the Greek point of view, these are the defining characteristics of the 
country, many of which are perceived of as built in features. For the EU, howeN. Cr. 
the prolongation of such practices and habits are proof that Greece has been unable 
to compromise its differences and assimilate into the Union. These traditional 
characteristics are those which likewise undermine the legitimacy of a nlo(lern 
nation-state. 
The political environment in Greece likewise has characteristics peculiar to it as was 
revealed through an examination of both the formal aspects of the Greek political 
system and a look at political culture. By investigating the structures of the Greek 
political system and how they function, the centralised nature of the system became 
obvious as did the overwhelming degree of functional power that the Prime Minister 
and his cabinet has in the policy-making and decision-making processes. The 
predominance of political parties within the political arena, despite the increased 
disaffection for them, remains an important feature of the Greek political 
environment. The current electoral system with its discriminatory threshold levels 
and its frequent modification based on the self-serving interests of the government in 
power were also cited. A steady rise during the last six years of those who are 
dissatisfied with the operation of democracy in the country revealed that a growing 
number of Greek citizens are not content. Several recent political scandals as well as 
other incidents were cited as possible explanations for this rise in dissatisfaction with 
the operation of democracy. Nevertheless, the democratic process has withstood 
various pushes and pulls during the last fifteen years and has remained intact which 
seems to confirm that Greece has become 'democratically consolidated. ' The 
inability to decentralise and devolve power to other tiers of government was also 
pointed out as a shortcoming of the Greek political system, although as was 
mentioned, this is now being discussed by the new PASOK government under the 
Prime Ministership of Kostas Simitis. 
By applying Gosta Esping- Ande rse n's and Stephen Liebfried',, schemes of welfare 
state regime types, Greece was characterised as a Yudimental-ý" welfare , tate and her 
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particular features were explored. Noteworthy are Greece's labour market structures 
which include a large self-employed work force and approximately one-fourth of the 
employed population still involved in agriculture. The Greek state has acted as an 
employer via a large public bureaucracy, but welfare state policies in Greece are 
undeveloped and uneven and have not adequately contributed to establishing social 
policies to meet the needs of citizens. The various particularities of the Greek 
welfare which have been highlighted in this study: the absence of a general basic 
minimum level of subsistence; lack of harmonisation of health insurance plans and 
the extent to which they are subsidised by the state; and the continuing politicisation 
of welfare state policies, have revealed some of the dilemmas of constructing social 
welfare policies in Greece. The recent debates over privatisation, particularly of 
traditionally state owned utilities, were likewise brought up. This is a topic which 
the EU has been monitoring closely in Greece, as prerequisites of free market 
competition underlie EU integrative policies. However, this is an issue which has 
been especially complex in Greece due to public worker disagreement with 
privatisation plans which stem back largely to the perceived role of the Greek state 
as provider and as employer. These perceived politically and socially sensitive 
issues for Greeks have not been viewed as sympathetically by the EU as Greeks 
would have hoped, as the EU has often posed the ultimatum that Greece either 
privatise or else shut down public enterprises. 
Furthermore, EU pressure emanating from Brussels to Athens is most conspicuous in 
economic matters, as a discussion of the economic environment in Greece revealed. 
Through a variety of funding projects, particularly the First and Second Community 
Support Frameworks (CSFs), the EU has attempted to redress Greece's economic 
distance from the Union with varied success. A brief review of the PASOK era 
under Andreas Papandreou from 1981-89 laid the setting for a more comprehensive 
understanding of the difficulties Greece currently faces in meeting the criteria for 
European Monetary Union and more generally for economic convergence with 
member states. Although both the media and recent studies have emphasised the 
economic dimension as pre-eminent for any discussion of the future of the EU and 
the question of legitimacy, the case of Greece uncovered that economic efficiency is 
only one of many factors that feeds into the question of legitimacy and is intimately 
wrapped up with political and social factors which can not be separated out. The 
example of Greece is also distinguished by its large underground economy which 
plays a decisive role in the economic environment in Greece and in sustaining a 
standard of living among its citizens which most likely could not be presently 
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provided by the legal economy. This particular dimension of legitimacy in Greece 
has been given much attention by scholars and observers of the case of Greece 
(including those from the EU), but many studies have been unable to link up the 
socio-cultural and political factors embedded within. The EU clearly wants Greece 
to implement a more strident economic policy leading to economic convergence. 
while Greek governments seek to demonstrate that there are formidable ohstacleý, 
from the domestic arena which are thrown into the path of any such attempt,,,. 
Clearly there are political costs of such policies which weigh in heavy and the 
unspoken truth remains that unpopular governments can be voted out of office conle 
election time. 
As things presently stand, Greece will not be able to join the EMU in 1999. As the 
situation now appears, Greece's economic policies for economic convergence are 
indeed ambitious, and the present Greek government as well as EU officials do not 
foresee Greece meeting the EMU criteria in 1999. Nevertheless, Greeks have 
expressed their disapproval of a two-tier or two-speed Europe with those mernbers 
unable to attain monetary union being relegated perhaps permanently to secondary 
status. However, when and if other EU partners are able to move ahead in 1999 to a 
full-fledged EMU, these debates will be at the forefront of discussion. Nonetheless 
Greece's poor economic record, and the political consequences of this, will most 
likely prohibit her from being a persuasive influence one way or the other. 
The last dimensions of legitimacy applied to Greece, those of security and defence, 
disclose additional clues to the question of legitimacy by exploring Greece's 
geopolitical circumstances including the repercussions of her geographical setting, 
her sense of national identification, and her participation in the EU Common Foreign 
and Security Policy (CFSP) and the Western European Union (WEU). Just as the 
discussion of the welfare state opened up the matter of sovereignty and what have 
been considered traditionally national responsibilities, defence and security matters 
increasingly indicated the extent to which certain areas are considered to continue to 
reside within the confines of the nation-state despite increasing pressures emerging 
from the forces propelling globalisation. 
The break-up of the former Soviet Union and its effects on Europe as a xhole have 
recently become the topic of much academic debate. How Greece has been affected 
by these changes, particularly the disintegration of the former Yugoslavia and Lhe 
creation of an independent 'Republic of Macedonia' have been outlined. Two 
overriding considerations emerge from the historical transforniations which occurred 
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at Greece's doorstep. First, Greek national sentiments arose in reaction to entlamed 
ethnic conflicts bursting forth within neighbouring territories and bv whilt wa. " 
considered among Greeks as premature official recognition of these newlý 
independent republics by some EU members. Second, a Greek chord was struck 
rekindling the (high-strung) age-old question of 'Macedonia. ' Furthermore, tile 
economic blockade which Greece erected against the Former Yugoslav Republic of 
Macedonia (FYROM) sparked off tensions between Greece and the EU which 
further aggravated relations between the two. 
Other issues surrounding security and defence such as immigration dilemmas, which 
have likewise become a concern for many European countries, are for Greece 
predominantly attributable to the influx of illegal Albanians from the north. 
However, the most potentially explosive security dilemma for Greece continLies to 
be her rival to the east, Turkey. The recent conflict in the Aegean on the islet of 
Imia has again brought up the threat of Turkish aggression which Greeks fear most. 
The inability of the two countries to reach definitive agreements on territorial 
boundaries (both air and sea) and the continuing partition of CVprus are open 
wounds which constantly perpetuate animosities between these two NATO 
members. The signing of a customs agreement between Turkey and the EU in 1995 
brought the EU in as a third party into these predominantly bilateral disaireements 
between Greece and Turkey. However, the EU's indecisiveness in taking action in 
matters concerning foreign policy and diplomacy have resulted in other third actors, 
primarily the United States, stepping in to defuse any possible conflict which may 
arise between Greece and Turkey. Nonetheless, the EU's ineptness in foreign and 
defence policy matters was made more apparent by this recent incident in the eastern 
Aegean as was the EU's lack of political and social legitimacy in these areas. 
Greece's persistent calls for a more coordinated European CFSP may be taken up at 
the 1996 Intergovernmental Conference, but it is too early to predict what the 
outcome may be. Greece's participation in the WEU is perceived by Greeks as a 
way to further safeguard her territorial integrity from encroaching intruders, but 
there are no visible signs yet that such membership will in any way guarantee and 
secure Greece's borders from attack. 
Working on the assumption that questions of legitimacy can best be uncovered by 
exploring the everyday operation of political, social and economic institutions, this 
study has endeavored to outline a method for such an investigation. Both the 
European Union and one of its member states. Greece, have been unique and 
engaging examples which have illustrated and made more concrete a theoretical 
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conceptualisation of legitimacy. Legitimacy is not something that is easily 
quantifiable nor is it easily detectable. Yet its ubiquitous nature has constantly 
fascinated and eluded social scientists in the modem era and will no less continue to 
do so into the next millennium. 
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Legitimacy and the Case of GREECE: 
A Summarv Historical Chronology 
DATES EVENTS RELATION TO THE QUESTIONOF 
LEGITIMACY 
1821 25 March: Successful Greek Beginning of legitimate reý: oý, Ynition ol an 
war of independence begi s autonomous Greek state 
1832 Greece officially recognised as Consolidation process begins ('Grand Idea'), Greeý: e 
an independent state by Sultan adopts western constitutional practices: foi-nial 
legitimacy 
1833 King Otho arrives in Athens Greece under a monarchical reolme dominated hN, 
foreign powers and thus independent in a'nominal' 
sense only 
1863 George I becomes King new constitution limiting the power of the king; 
ormal legitimacy 
1915-1922 Two rival governments formed Formal legitimacy crisis occurs; 'Grand Idea' put to 
(King Konstantine vs. rest but hostilities with Turkey continue; 
Eleftherios Venizelos), the polarisation of party politics which will affect the 
National Schism; Asia Minor political culture of the country throughout the 20th 
Catastrophe century, social legitimacy 
1936-1941 August: loannis Metaxas This regime lacked bothfonnal legitimacy (wis 
Dictatorship anti -democratic) and social legitimacy as it had no 
real popular base of support 
1941 April: Germany invades Greece Foreign occupation of the country; exogenous 
during WWII; Communists factors affecting indigenous sense of legitimacy; 
form EAM -- National considerably large percentage of popular support 
Liberation Front, and ELAS -- for EAMIELAS 
National People's Liberation 
Army 
Dec. 1944 Dekemvriana: Internal debacle Formal legitimacy crisis brought about by the ýý. irs 
between ELAS forces which end and the radicalisation ofELAS 
attempted to take over power 
vs. Georgios Papandreou's 
government which was 
supported by the UK and its 
allies 
1946-1949 Greek Civil War Polarisation of party politics reaches a climax; 
hostilities and animosities fornented during this era 
have affected the political culture in Greece 
throughout the post-war epoch, formal legitimacy 
and social legitinlacy 
1947- 1974 Greek Communist parties Illegal operation of the forces of the Left in Greece 
outlawed 
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1967-1974 Military Junta: Colonel 'Illegitimate' anti -democratic government usurps 
Papadopoulos the reigns of power; the forces of the Right become 
associated with nondemocratic practices in the 
overthrowing of the military junta 
July 1974 Fall of the military junta; 'Legitimate' government restored; beginning of an 
abolition of the monarchy; 20 era of democratic consolidation and democratic 
July Turkish invasion of stability in Greece; security and defence issues with 
northern Cyprus; 24 July Turkey come to the foreground of discussion; 
Konstantinos Karamanlis sworn Karamanlis forms conservative New Democracy 
in as Prime Minister party which becomes one of the two leading 
political parties in Greece in the post-junta era. 
Sept. 1974 Andreas Papandreou forms PASOK became a legitimate actor bothformally 
PASOK party (within the political system) and socially as it 
began as a populist movement as much as it did a 
political party. 
1975 June: new constitution formed Formal legitimacy 
Jan. 1981 Greece becomes 10th member Greece gaining legitimacy (both formal and social) 
of the EC by being a member of this western club ? 
1986 constitutional revision Functional powers of the President of the Republic 
reduced, formal legitimacy 
1989 June national elections: no party Democratic institutional mechanisms tested, formal 
wins a majority of votes to form legitimacy 
government, crisis averted due 
to a conservative-communist 
coalition from July to Oct. 1989 
which had as a goal catharsis 
in order to restore a sense of This caretaker government was formed as an 
social legitimacy in Greece interim government to oversee elections in March 
Nov. 1989 to Feb. 1990: of 1990 which saw a victory for the New 
Ecumenical government Democracy party led by Konstantinos Mitsotakis; 
consisting of the three major formal legitimacy 
parties -- New Democracy, 
PASOK, and Synaspismos 
March 1990 K. Mitsotakis's ND party wins Papandreou's PASOK party under siege: Koskota 
the national elections scandal and allegations of corruption involving 
PASOK MPs and party cadres precipitate a loss of 
social legitimacy for the party 
June 1993 K. Mitsotakis's government falls Internal ND'legitimacy dilemma'as Samaras' 
from power before serving out Political Spring party reveals disenchantment with 
full-term. Antonios Samaras the ND party 
forms a break-away party 
'Political Spring' 
Oct. 1993 PASOK wins the national PASOK party reacquires its sense of legitimacy 
elections, Andreas Papandreou 
back in power 
January 1996 Andreas Papandreou resigns as PASOK party mechanism activated to select a new 
PM due to illness; Kostas Prime Minister; first time a PASOK government is 
Simitis voted in as new Prime formed without Andreas Papandreou as Prime 
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The Question of Legitimacy 
Tina Mavrikos 
Abstract 
Discussions conceming the nature of Legitimacy have retumed to the center of 
academic debate in this twilight Period of the twentieth century. Theories of the 
concept of legitimacy that develeped at the beginning of the twentieth century 
and were re/ined throughout the second half now appear to be inadequate to 
explain the dynamics of legitimacy and the legitimation process. By acquiring 
more power through the accession of new members, the European Union is an 
example of a new political formation that renders inadequate previous ex- 
planations employed to analyze legitimacy. A new approach is outlined here by 
takingfour basic dimensions--civic society, democracy, the weyizre state, and 
security1defense-that are then related to the EU With the hope of shedding new 
light on which set offorces is involved in legitimation. Observations are also 
made on how Greece may be related to these dimensions. 
Introduction 
There has always been a problem within the social sciences of how to 
define difficult concepts such as legitimacy and legitimation. In fact, the 
many meanings of these terms reflect the dilemma of relativism that is 
involved in their definition. Among the array of definitions are subjec- 
tive, moral, and evaluative interpretations. This obliges those who study 
these concepts to formulate their own definition in order to allow others 
to understand their analysis. Yet it is this very dilemma that now 
confronts those who endeavor to find an appropriate definition of these 
concepts for the European Union (EU) and its member states in the 
post-Maastricht era and the era of accession of new members. 
Restated, the dilemma is: How do we define-or redefine the 
concepts of legitimacy and legitimation in a way that relates them more 
appropriately to the EU and its member states? This question seems 
more urgent now than ever, since the EU is continuing to expand into 
new policy areas that will intimately affect the citizens of EU member 
nation-states, and since continuing enlargement of the community will 
mean that new members (some accustomed to very different ways of 
making decisions) are likely to challenge existing procedures. 
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The EU is currently in a crucial phase of the process of creating a 
united Europe as envisaged in the TEU-Treaty on European Union 
(Commission of the European Communities 1992). This decisive phase 
will require a sense of legitimacy on the part of all involved (both 
directly and indirectly) if the goals of a European Monetary Union 
(EMU) and a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) are to be 
achieved, as well as many other policy areas outlined in the TEU. A 
notion of legitimacy and the process of legitimation whereby this 
legitimacy is created are prerequisites if such policies are to be effec- 
tively implemented. 
One needs to go beyond the rather simplistic idea that legitima- 
tion as it refers to the EU consists merely of the "acceptance" of a set of 
specific policies. The EU has doubtlessly acquired a degree of "func- 
tionaI" legitimacy in its member nation-states. This means that it has a 
policy agenda and that tangible results can be reviewed and evaluated. 
For example, Greek citizens surveyed in Eurobarmwter (1993b) show a 
relatively high level of support for the EU, an attitude partially expli- 
cable because Greece has received a sizable amount of EU fundingý--990 
million ecu-from the Delors II, 5-year plan for 1994-1999 (Verros 
1994). 
However, the EU will require much more than functional legiti- 
macy if it is to achieve its goals. Whether or not particular policies are 
viewed as acceptable is not enough. The more profound question now 
being asked is whether the EU should have the authority to make 
binding decisions in certain areas once reserved for national govern- 
ments and, if so, under what conditions this authority should be 
accepted. 
The notion of democracy has been at the root of the legitimation 
process in Western European nation-states at least since the end of 
World War 11. It was a prerequisite for original membership in the EEC 
as well as for later membership. However, discussion continues today 
about whether the EU's own institutions operate under "democratic" 
principles. As British MP David Martin has said (1991: 22), "If the EC was 
a state and applied to join the Community, it would be turned down on 
the grounds that it was not a democracy. " Thus the EU is experiencing 
a "democratic deficit" owing to a realization that its organs fail to adhere 
to "democratic procedures" in either policy making or decision making, 
at least as far as those processes are understood in Western European 
nation-states. Yet the European Parliament (EP) that was elected in June 
1994 seems set on testing its new authority gained through the TEU, 
which requires parliamentary consent to specific proposals before they 
are implemented. The EP's close vote in July 1994 for the newly elected 
president of the Commission, Jacques Santer-260 to 238, with 23 
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abstentions (Barber 1994)-and the interrogation of new commission- 
ers injanuary 1995 reveal that the EP is determined to use its influence 
to the maximum. But the EP's limited powers remain, as does its role as 
primarily an advisory body. 
What must be recognized is that the EU is not a nation, a state, or 
an international organization as those terms have come to be defined. It 
is something else. Specifying the nature of that something else is part of 
the legitimation problem. Neither of today's quasi-definitions--that the 
EU is a union on the road to becoming federal, and that the EU is a 
community of nation-states--sheds much light on the question of how it 
may be legitimized by the member governments and their citizens. What 
may be needed is a fresh look at the concept of legitimacy as it applies to 
the EU and its member nation-states as more powers and areas of 
competence are transferred from the nation-state to the EU. 
What follows is an attempt to analyze the question of legitimacy 
and the legitimation process as these apply to the European Union and 
its member nation-states, while making some observations about Greece. 
Max Weber 
Of the numerous contemporary analyses of legitimacy and the legitima- 
tion process found in the social science literature, ' a great many draw on 
the ideas of Max Weber, whose original "three pure types of legitimate 
domination"-traditional, charismatic, and legal/rational rule-have 
continued to be utilized as a springboard for further examination of the 
question of legitimacy and the process of legitimation. Although written 
in a different era and under quite different circumstances, Weber's 
examination of the sources of legitimacy-particularly legal/rational 
rule-may serve as a starting point for an inquiry into the principles 
associated with legitimacy both on the EU level and on the level of the 
member nation-states. 
In his writings concerning legal rule, Weber took as his point of 
departure the then just developing technocratic character of the society 
he was analyzing in order to strengthen his supposition that, along with 
the development of capitalism, bureaucratization was going to become 
the decisive force in the organization and administration of modem 
society. He was convinced that legitimacy could be based on formal, 
legal procedures. Laws enacted by legal procedures would be perceived 
as legitimate by citizens, as would "the right of those elevated to 
authority under such rules to issue commands (legal authority)" 
(1978: 1.215). What must be borne in mind, however, is that Weber 
outlined the threefold explanation of the sources of authority as "ideal" 
types, recognizing that none could exist in "pure" form! 
I 
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In the post-TEU era of European integration, however, the politi- 
cal climate in Europe and the nature of relations among political actors 
and institutions have changed spectacularly since Weber's time. No one 
would argue against the notion that the bureaucratic apparatus in 
Western European nation-states continues to be of utmost importance 
in the organization of administrative operations and that in some 
cases-for example, Greece-it continues to expand as governments 
take on more welfare and regulatory respo nsibih ties. But the expansion 
of the bureaucracy has been accompanied by a concomitant recognition 
by political leaders that technocratic "expertise" cannot alone create 
legitimacy for public policy. It has also been generally recognized, both 
by those directly involved with the EU integrative process and by 
observers of that process, that EU governance can no longer be 
legitimized solely by the logical, rational characteristics of technocracy 
(see Wallace 1994), especially as those characteristics were once per- 
ceived by Weber. One must move beyond Weber's analysis of legal, 
rational authority, which can be expanded to include other principles 
currently associated with legitimacy, such as (a) the notion of "civil 
society" as it has developed in Western Europe, (b) the so-called "crisis 
of democracy, "-' and (c) the role assumed by the welfare state in the 
latter part of this century. Still important in European affairs is the issue 
of security and defense that has remained within the realm of the 
nation-state to a large extent but that continues to act as a dynamic 
affecting the question of legitimacy within the EU and its member 
nation-states. 
Civil society 
As Table I demonstrates, one of the immediately identifiable principles 
associated with the issue of legitimacy is the much discussed idea of civil 
society. 
As with "legitimacy, " the expression "civil society" has been used in 
a variety of disparate ways to describe society as it has developed in the 
Western world. Walzer writes that the "words 'civil society' name the 
space of uncoerced human association and also the set of relational 
networks-formed for the sake of family, faith, interest and ideology- 
that fill this space" (1992: 89). Others have argued that civil society "can 
only be located in the economic sphere" (GeUner 1991: 498). Arato and 
Cohen define it as "a sphere of social inter-action between economy and 
state, composed above all of the intimate sphere (especially the family), 
the sphere of associations (especially voluntary associations), social 
movements, and forms of public communication" (1992: ix). Moreover, 
debates continue to rage regarding which characteristics distinguish the 
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"private" from the "public" sphere within civil society, the answers being 
quite different since they depend on one's political position either to 
the left or the right. 4 
Despite the controversy that continues about how to define "civil 
society, " one detects in the citizens of Western European nation-states, 
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especially those in northwest Europe, a well-established conception of 
civil society. Social, political, and economic associations and interest 
groups became well formed in these societies during the course of this 
century, leading to the ripening of civil consciousness. The same is not 
true, however, in Southern European nations such as Greece and 
southern Italy, which fail to share with their northern EU partners the 
same progressive evolution of civil society. In these nations one sees an incongruity and, often, a commingling of the "private" and "public" 
spheres (see Table 2). 
This commingling of the private and public can be explained 
partially in terms of the patron-client networks still in operation today in 
Italy and Greece. Party politics and party patronage dominate political 
relations, for example between "private" citizens and "public" officials. 
This has retarded the development of interest groups and associations; 
economic, political, and even issue-oriented organizations have there- 
fore been much slower to form in the nation-states of Southern Europe, 
and in some cases are still in embryonic form. Civil society in the 
southern European nation-states is distinguished from that of the 
northern nation-states by structural differences as well as by diverse 
historical factors. 
Be that as it may, one needs to identify the links that exist between 
the legitimacy issue and an understanding of civil society. Relevant to 
the sources behind legitimacy are the degree and extent of civil society's 
growth or lack of growth, its inclusive institutions, and its relationship to 
the state. Wherever the conception and ideal of civil society and the 
"social" have been well cemented into the foundation of society through 
political, social, and economic structures, as in the northwestern EU 
member nation-states, one discerns a degree of legitimacy concerning 
the political establishment that is lacking in the southern nation-states. 
Wherever the idea of modern civil society, with its institutions and 
associations, is less well formed, as in Greece, one finds either that the 
gaps are filled by traditional institutions, other structures, or practices 
that legitimize the status quo, or that a dilemma of legitimacy arises. In 
either case, the dynamics of civil society need to be added to the 
legitimacy equation. 
In attempting to apply the concept of civil society to the EU, one is 
immediately confronted with several obstacles, one of which is defini- 
tional. Characteristics of "European" civil society are difficult to distin- 
guish since, as noted above, structural differences exist between North 
European and South European member nation-states. Besides visible 
social disparities among the EU partners, there is the difficulty of 
sensing a common social environment when so many different ideas 
exist of what this "common" environment should be. In sum, now the 
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Table 2. The Greek Nation-State 
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institutions of tertiary education); Greek constitution recognizes only national 
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geography, which affects national security; Greeks feel that security should be 
one of the EU's primary concerns. 
" Greece does not have troops participating in the UN peacekeeping forces; NATO 
member; Greece became a full member of the West European Union in April 
1995. 
larger question is how to create among EU citizens a mental impression 
of a European consciousness that will not necessarily replace national 
identification but, if it is to be legitimized, will need to become more 
thanjust an additional social identification that is tacked on. 
One solution to this problem has been offered by those who wish 
to further the EU's social integration. It is to create a "common 
European social space, " a concept made concrete by the establishment 
of a "common citizenship" within the TEU. -' This common citizenship 
has come to mean that all citizens of EU nation-states share some rights 
and freedoms. In more functional terms, EU citizenship has been 
applied to electoral procedures: in the June 1994 Euro-elections, 
permanent residents living in a member state of which they were not 
nationals were permitted for the first time both to vote and to stand as 
candidates in that member state. The same applies to municipal 
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elections. The TEU (Title 2, Articles 8c-8e) also specifies that one may be protected by any member state's consuls or diplomatic missions in 
countries lacking the diplomatic officials of one's own nation-state; that 
one may petition the European Parliament; that one may apply for the 
office of ombudsman, etc. 
These measures were designed to forge a European identity 
among citizens of the Union. The ideal of shared legal rights and 
obligations was meant to help create a "common" social space that is 
seen by many, especially those with a federalist vision for the EU, as the first step toward a supranational social environment. However, it is still doubtful whether a common citizenship, as defined in the TEU-that is, 
in limited legal terms-can produce the desired spirit of acquis 
communautaire meant to underlie further EU social cohesion. In addi- 
tion, there is the additional question of how to create legitimacy for a 
common European social space that aspires to stretch beyond the mere 
legal parameters described within the TEU-a necessary development if 
further social integration is to occur. In other words, it will be more 
difficult to legitimize a Gemeinschaft notion of EU citizenship than a 
more restricted, contractual idea of EU common rights and obligations. 
The TEU also pledges to uphold the principles spelled out in the 
"Protocol on Social Policy"' of the 1989 Social Charter. Great Britain's 
decision to opt out of the social chapter of the Maastricht Treaty was the 
first blatant indication that differences of opinion would be found 
among EU member governments about what should be defined as the 
so-called "common" social provisions and what will be found acceptable. 
In reality, the objectives spelled out in the Protocol on Social Policy are 
imprecise, adding nothing very new to the 1989 Social Charter or to the 
establishment of a common social space. Nevertheless, they were enough 
to make John Major's government opt out and Silvio Berlusconi's to 
reevaluate Italy's participation in the Social Chapter (Smart 1994). 
To arouse support for an evolving common European social space 
seems a formidable task at the moment. Yet an evolving concept of 
"European" civil society is necessary if the EU is to be perceived as 
legitimate by its citizens. If a sense of legitimacy is to be obtained for the 
European social project, a higher level of awareness by EU citizens 
regarding what this social policy is about, and how it will affect them, is 
essential. Surveys continue to show that in general there is a very low 
level of knowledge about EU integration, indeed that "almost three- 
quarters of EU citizens continue to feel uninformed about the EC" 
(Eurobarometer 1993b). This is particularly true regarding the "social" 
aspects of integration. If a feeling of legitimacy is to be developed 
among EU member citizens, a much more concerted effort is needed to 
create this "common European social space, " part of which effort entails 
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convincing national governments that this is both politically sound and 
economically feasible. 
Democracy 
As noted above, the ideal of democracy has been one of the political 
cornerstones of Western nation-states and remains so today. What is 
occurring, however, in this time of globalization during the twilight 
period of the twentieth century, is a renewed examination of compo- 
nents of representative democracy that were once considered incontest- 
able. On the level of the nation-state as well as on the level of the EU, 
public debate has been emphasizing questions about the degree of 
satisfaction regarding how well democracy works. Polls and surveys 
reveal that more people are dissatisfied than are satisfied with democ- 
racy in their country. This dissatisfaction is particularly acute among the 
citizens of Greece and Italy (Eurobarometer 1993b: A28). In fact, the 
"democratic deficit" is a national concern as well as an EU one, albeit in 
different ways and to varying degrees. But the general cause of dissatis- 
faction is difficult to ascertain because of the great dissimilarities found 
among EU member nation-states. Nevertheless, it has been noted that 
'Apeople living in Mediterranean countries (E, FG&I)l are more numer- 
ous to express dissatisfaction with their own country's democracy, while 
citizens coming from the smaller member countries of the Community 
are more numerous to be satisfied with the functioning of EU democ- 
racy" (Eurobarometer 1993b: 10). One wonders, however, whether this 
helps to explain the different levels of satisfaction with democracy. In 
Greece, for example, one sees much cynicism concerning whether the 
political environment reflects democratic principles. Perhaps because of 
their tumultuous political past, and perhaps because of the patronage 
system still in operation, as well as numerous other historical, political, 
and socioeconomic factors, a majority of Greeks (66%) are dissatisfied 
with the way democracy works in their country. A larger majority of 
Italians (77%) are similarly dissatisfied (Eurobamwter 1944, figure 1-2); 
they, too, possess a patron-client system still in operation and politicians 
with ignominious reputations. But to explain the specific causes of such 
dissatisf-action-and of the resulting level of legitimacy felt among 
citizens--would necessitate an exploration of each nation-state's politi- 
cal, social, and economic factors that either contribute to or hinder the 
implementation of democratic principles. 
Some studies attribute the transformation of democracy to the rise 
of transnational systems that have usurped some of the powers tradi- 
tionally exercised by national goverrunents. As Dahl notes (1994: 27), 
"the proliferation of transnational activities and decisions reduces the 
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capacity of the citizens of a country to exercise control over matters 
vitally important to them by means of their national government. " This 
transfer of decision making to a transnational system-the EU-has not 
been accompanied by democratic procedures that fill in the gaps left 
behind. In other words, more powers of decision making are being 
transferred from the national to the EU level without the accompanying 
degree of democratic procedures that is needed to make this transfer 
legitimate for the citizens of the EU member nation-states. Policy 
decisions are made by individuals who act in the name of a united 
Europe but who are far removed from the citizens of the Union, with the 
European Parliament being the only democratically accountable institu- 
tion. 
The lack of democratic procedures in policy decision making at 
the EU level has become more of a concern for those involved in EU 
integration. Lobbying is now one of the modes of citizen input at the 
Community level. Since the signing of the 1986 Single European Act, 
organizations such as environmental groups, financial and business 
associations, etc. have approached particular EU Commissioners in an 
attempt to influence the outcome of specific policies. But many lobbyists 
go to Brussels lacking an adequate understanding of how decision 
making operates in the EU, and therefore are not very effective. In 
member states such as Greece, where there are far fewer associations or 
interest groups on a national level, we witness a dramatic absence of 
lobbyists; the lack of these types of structures puts a member-state like 
Greece at a disadvantage insofar as influencing Brussels is concerned. 
The result is a dearth of information on both sides. Greek citizens do 
not know how the EU operates and the Commissioners do not know the 
views of Greek citizens on certain policy issues being formulated on the 
EU level. Thus the "democratic deficit" operates together with an 
"information deficit, " given that less than half of most EU citizens and 
less than a third of Greeks feel informed regarding EU activities and 
how they can influence the policy-making process. 
The principle of subsidiarity has been employed as another way to 
create a sense of legitimacy for the EU in the post-TEU era, while it 
strives at the same time to diminish the "democratic deficit" by bringing 
the decision making process closer to the citizens. Although there are 
various interpretations of what subsidiarity means in practice, in the 
TEU it is a principle whereby "decisions are taken as closely as possible 
to the citizen. "" Elsewhere in the TEU, however, subsidiarity is portrayed 
as a device for setting limits to Community competencies (Tide 1, 
Article 3b). Accordingly, it has been argued that subsidiarity is treated in 
the TEU as both a substantive principle and a procedural criterion (see 
Scott 1994 for a comprehensive discussion). Fundamentally, however, 
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subsidiarity at the nation-state level requires a devolution of the decision 
making process from the central administration onto lower echelons of 
government. In the case of Greece, whose governmental apparatus is 
extremely centralized, the principle of subsidiarity is difficult to imple- 
ment. Recent attempts there to develop other tiers of government (i. e., 
the direct election of prefecture councils in October 1994) and to 
devolve some decision making powers upon them are welcome, but only 
if they can escape the clientalist practices that continue to corrupt the 
central administration. Where there is a higher degree of devolution of 
power upon lower levels of government, particularly upon regional 
levels, as is the case in Germany, for example, one may expect the 
principle of subsidiarity to function more efficiently in bringing decision 
making closer to the citizen. Reserved optimism may be expressed for 
the possibility of a member state such as Greece using a principle like 
subsidiarity to reduce the "democratic deficit, " since no precedent of 
decentralization exists and since interest groups that are independent of 
the major political parties are frail and remain in their infancy. 
Democracy is thus a constituent element in a contemporary 
discussion of legitimacy. Along with civil society, it is a leading force in 
establishing the determinants of legitimacy, on both a national level and 
in the EU. 
The we4(are state 
The rise of the welfare state in the West in the twentieth century has 
created a lively debate on the connection between this development and 
the question of legitimacy. One side of the debate focuses on the ideas of 
Habermas and other German theorists such as Niklas Luhmann (see 
McCarthy 1978)' and Claus Offe (1984). Habermas's examination of the 
rise of the modem capitalist welfare state leads him to conclude that 
"threats to legitimacy can be averted only if the state can credibly 
present itself as a social welfare state which intercepts the dysfunctional 
side-effects of the economic process and renders them harmless for the 
individual" (1974: 194). His conception of the role of the state in 
advanced capitalist systems hinges on the premise that the capitalist 
market creates needs that it cannot feasibly sustain and that this forces 
the state to step in and remedy the situation, for example by creating 
policies to protect the natural and social environments. However, the 
state eventually finds that it must take on more and more responsibilities 
to avert a crisis; by interfering in this way, it ultimately tampers with the 
"natural" regulation of the laws of free market capitalism (see Habermas 
1973). In other words, the "invisible hand" becomes reified and, worse 
still, must then be guided. This creates the need for the legitimation of 
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state activity, since it falls within the scope of the "political. " Another side 
of the debate focuses on the theoretical contributions of two British 
empiricists, T. H. Marshall (1965) and Richard Titmuss (1974), the former concentrating on social citizenship rights in England, the latter 
offering a three-model scheme of social policy. Other studies exploring 
the welfare state have concentrated on industrialization, or the question 
of equality, or a historical examination of the state-to mention only a few of the areas under investigation. Yet, even though the welfare state is 
of utmost relevance for a contemporary understanding of legitimacy, it 
and its relationship with the issue of legitimacy are under-investigated. 
Few would deny that Western society's technological adNancement 
and industrial innovation have resulted in unprecedented intellectual 
achievements, but have also caused insurmountable obstacles for the 
state. The modern welfare state now needs to face manifold demands 
ranging, for example, from the need to participate in a global economic 
environment through the use of fiber optics, to the need to enact 
environmental measures to avert ecological disaster, to the need to 
provide adequate housing for those who cannot afford it. At best, the 
welfare state has become attenuated; some would even argue that it can 
no longer handle the demands that it faces. Indeed, the innumerable 
responsibilities and regulations that the welfare state now attempts to 
juggle have placed heavy strains on the institutional structures within its 
boundaries. 
Yet we have not seen the evolution of any other political order that 
could replace the welfare state as we have come to understand it. 
Disputes continue regarding the degree of sovereignty that has been 
retained or lost by the nation-state in the world of interdependence 
brought about by globalization. Both those who advocate the nation- 
state's permanence and those who forecast its demise seek facts to 
sustain their position. But both sides agree, given the transformations 
introduced by the present era-transformations affecting the political, 
social, and economic environments-that the institutions within these 
environments cannot remain ossified but must change in order to 
respond to the new needs of a society in flux. 
In light of the enormous demands required of welfare states, one 
would expect that their citizens would acknowledge that certain areas of 
state responsibility could be best fulfilled through the cooperation of 
nation-states. Once we recognize that, owing to the economic interde- 
pendence created by world markets, the economic environment of the 
modern nation-state no longer functions autonomously, it would seem 
to make sense that other areas traditionally controlled by the state could 
also be best handled through coordination with other states facing 
similar dilemmas. When asked, however, a great majority of EU member 
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citizens believe that their national government should retain its respon- 
sibility for deciding policies in areas such as health and social welfare, 
education, cultural policy, and participation of workers' representatives 
on company boards (Eurobaronwter 1993b: A53-A54). Citizens are not 
willing to have these types of welfare issues decidedjointly with other EU 
partners. This is also true for security and defense policies, as will be 
discussed below. 
In contrast, a vast majority of Europeans believe that scientific and 
technological policy can best be handledjointly on the EU level. They 
have become convinced that technical solutions are more efficiently 
found on this level; in addition, this relieves the national governments of 
a large economic burden. Therefore, policies concerning the protection 
of the environment, scientific and technological research, the fight 
against drugs, and even unemployment (although with less enthusiastic 
support) are perceived by the public as best decided jointly by the EU. 
Although one might assume from the above that a clear distinction 
exists between what the public perceives as a national policy agenda and 
what it perceives as a European one, actually the matter is complicated 
by the debate about what should be kept within the public domain and 
what should be placed within the private sphere. National governments 
in Europe have been trying to relieve their economic burden by shifting 
to the private sphere responsibilities-ranging from public health care, 
to university education, to daycare centers, to pubic utilities-that are 
no longer affordable. A cost-analysis philosophy has increasingly be- 
come the guiding force in determining which public services will 
continue to be provided and which will be driven into the private 
sphere. Indeed, we are witnessing a major transposition of the "public 
i" into the "private. " As Wallace has aptly noted (1994: 94), "By the 1990s it 
had become much less clear what could be widely agreed as a public 
good at all, thus making it much harder to run the argument for 
additional policy roles and functions at the EC level. " 
This transformation of the welfare state in the twilight of the 
twentieth century has made it more difficult for national governments to 
retain a legitimacy that was partially connected to public provisions 
demanded by citizens and enacted in the post-World War II era. The 
result is a legitimacy gap between the "governed" and the "governors, " 
the extent of which depends upon the degree to which the state 
originally took on welfare responsibilities. 
Greece is a particularly appropriate example today, as it is pres- 
ently reshuffling the "public" and "private" domains, whose boundaries, 
as explained above, cannot alwa), s be clearly discerned. The national 
government has begun to battle against a huge, bloated public sector 
that is extreme1v inefficient both economically and in term-, of services 
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provided. This public sector has traditionally owned and operated the 
major utilities-telephone, electricity, water supply-and has provided 
what have become standard welfare services: free education at prirnarý, 
secondary, and tertiary levels, and a national health care system. 
Recently, the national government has acknowledged the economic 
reality that it can no longer sustain these responsibilities and that 
privatization appears to be the only way out. But the idea of privatization 
of the social space has been met with formidable objections by the 
portion of the Greek public that has benefited most from this sN, s-tem 
and has become accustomed to receiving such services from the 
government. Vociferous protests by trade unions have created inimcilse 
obstacles for the government, irrespective of the party in power, as both 
the conservative New Democracy party during its administration ind 
PASOK during its tenure in office have needed to confront tendentious 
striking workers and demonstrators. 
A legitimacy dilemma may be averted so long as face-to-face 
relations between "private" citizens and "public" officials (not to men- 
tion promises of party loyalty in exchange for favors) remain more 
enduring than public policy proclamations on the mass media; never- 
theless, there is evidence that the gap in Greece between the govcrned 
and the governors is widening, which does not bode well for the future. 
The numerous transmutations occurring within the welfare statc 
are indeed significant both for the welfare state's future form and for 
the question of legitimacy. The EU's contribution to this debate will 
depend largely upon the importance the issue is given within thc EU 
and how it is seen to affect the policy making process. A more 
comprehensive investigation of the welfare state is warranted, if only 
because the challenges it faces seem increasingly more insurmountable, 
and because this directly affects the issue of legitimacy. 
Secun'ty and defense 
The final area that I wish to consider as a link to the question of 
legitimacy is warfare and seCLIfity, which in turn is tied to the more 
general category of defense. In this century, with its unprecedented 
build-tip of the nation-state, warfare, security, and defense responsibili- 
ties have been placed within the sovereign borders of the nation-state as 
liabilities of the national government. Weber's definition of the state as 
44a human community that successfully claims the monopoly of the 
legitimate use of physical force within a given territor-ý` (Weber 1958: 78) 
reflects the expectations that issues of security and defense will reside 
solely within the realm of state responsibility and that these issues ý611 be 
legitimate there. 
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However, as the ideal of cooperative relations among Western 
nation-states evolved into modem forms of organization in the post- 
World War 11 era, the issues of security and defense began to be 
perceived in relation to other nation-states. A system of friendly alliances 
was transformed into organizations such as NATO and the European 
Coal and Steel Community that had as one of their goals the prevention 
of any future hostilities among their member nation-states. Today, in this 
era of rapidly changing geopolitics, the need for cooperation among 
Western European nation-states appears to be more pressing than ever. 
The conflicts in the Balkans and the tumultuous changes that continue 
to occur in Eastern Europe have created uncertainty and fear for those 
residing in continental Europe, and especially for a nation-state such as 
Greece, whose geographical proximity to the conflicts makes its position 
precarious. 
Although ajoint effort to maintain peace is a goal held in common 
by all the EU partners, there is less consensus regarding how this goal 
may best be accomplished. In general, EU member governments and 
citizens continue to feel that policies concerning security and defense 
should be formulated at a national level. In the particular case of 
Greece, 65% of those asked took this position (Eurobarometer 1994. -A34). 
The opinions of Greek citizens on this issue are consistent with the more 
general trend in the EU, where "there has been a significant shift over 
the past six months [June-December 1993] away from the Unionjointly 
taking decisions on security/defence issues in favour of one's national 
government solely dealing with them" (Eurobarometer 1993b: l). This 
trend would appear to create obstacles to the legitimation of the 
"Provisions on a Common Foreign and Security Policy" specified in Title 
5 of the TEU, whose goal is the eventual adoption of a common defense 
policy. To legitimize such a policy at present would require much more 
purposeful effort by those promoting integration, since most Europeans 
still believe that unilateral action must be allowed in security issues. 
In Greece this insistence on unilateral action is particularly strong, 
since Greece shares borders with three northern neighbors whose 
political stability is uncertain and since skirmishes with Turkey continue. 
Security threats being foremost on the minds of the Greek people, 
foreign policy issues occupy a prominent place on the Greek national 
agenda. Greece's worries have been augmented by the conflicts raging 
in the former Yugoslav republics, by the influx of refugees from Albania, 
and by the persistent disagreements with the Former Yugoslav Republic 
of Macedonia (FYROM). Yet Greece continues to participate in organi- 
zations such as NATO in which other EU members are found, and is 
now a full member of the West European Union (WEU), which is meant 
to be the EU's future defense arm. On the other hand, unlike many of 
v 
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her EU partners, Greece does not have troops participating in UN 
peacekeeping missions. Arguably, Greece has been more adversely 
affected by the demise of communism in the Soviet Union and Eastern 
Europe than have her EU partners, since communism ironically acted as 
a stabilizing force in the Balkans. With the collapse of communism came 
a geopolitical crisis that has resulted in a degree of political instability 
not seen in the Balkans since the first decades of this century. As a result, 
Greece has been forced to contend with states whose ethnic diversities 
were contained under communist rule but then exploded when relieved 
of these oppressive regimes, dragging Greece back into the Balkans. " 
The complexity and sensitivity of issues of security and defense will 
keep them as primarily national competencies. Citizens view these 
responsibilities as belonging to their national governments. Further- 
more, the degree of geopolitical diversity among EU member nation- 
states will most likely prevent a common security and defense policy 
from being easily established in the near future. Legitimizing such a 
common policy would directly challenge the existing concept of state 
sovereignty, which is conceivably the underlying-and most compli- 
cated-issue involved in developing a common policy in this area. 
With three additional nation-states having joined the EU in 
January 1995, and still more in the queue, coordination of policy areas 
such as security and defense poses an even greater challenge to the EU. 
If and when nation-states from what was previously called Eastern 
Europe the Czech Republic, Poland, Hungary-join as full members, 
further complications will be added to the already long list of obstacles 
prohibiting the development of a fully comprehensive defense policy. 
And if and when such a policy is eventually instituted, the question of its 
legitimation will be decisive in determining whether it can be successful 
in securing peace in Europe in the twenty-first century. 
Conclusion 
To investigate legitimacy and the process of legitimation, one must 
analyze their underlying impetus. I have outlined four dimensions that 
appear to be linked with the issue of legitimacy. Civil society and 
democracy are broad principles integrally connected with both the 
process of creating legitimacy and the end product itself. Although in 
different ways, each of these notions can either lend credence to the 
idea of legitimacy or be responsible for its demise. The welfare state and 
the area of security and defense are additional variables in the legitimacy 
equation-forces that can act as a bulwark for legitimacy or cause its 
entropy. I have tried to make a few observations on the relation of these 
four dimensions to a particular nation-state, Greece, although that 
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obviously requires a separate study. I have chosen to relate the concept 
of legitimacy primarily to the European Union because the EU, as it 
expands, is beginning to challenge the traditional concepts and catego- 
ries that have been employed hitherto in order to describe this century's 
political and social formations. As new political forms such as the EU 
appear, the social sciences are challenged to try to make sense of them. 
In anticipation of the 1996 Intergovernmental Conference (IGC), 
much debate has centered on the issue of EU legitimacy and how this 
will affect the ways in which the organs of the EU should be reevaluated. 
Preparation is already under way for the IGC, and issues are being 
discussed in committees that are determining the conference's organiza- 
tion and content. What remains to be seen is what will emerge from the 
conference itself, what changes will be made to the TEU, and how this 
will affect the EU's sense of legitimacy. Discussions already abound. 
Diverse opinions are being expressed, ranging from those advocating a 
radical restructuring of the EU organs and more synchronized integra- 
tion leading to a federal type system, to those calling for a two-tier EU 
with a core set of EU member states taking the first steps toward 
integration and being followed by other members as they catch up, to 
those claiming that intergovernmentalism should be the guiding ideo- 
logical force behind a larger EU. It remains to be seen how Greece will 
contribute to this discussion that appears to be shaping the future of 
Europe. 
THE UNIVERSITY OF EDINBURGH 
NOTES 
v 
'See the summer issue of Cu"ent Sociology 35 (1987), which explores the various 
interpretations of legitimation that were the focus of the International Conference on 
Legitimation and Society held in Rome in 1983. 
2'ln general, it should be kept clearly in mind that the basis of every authority, and 
correspondingly of every kind of willingness to obeyll is a beW, a belief by virtue of which 
persons exercising authority are lent prestige. The composition of this belief is seldom 
altogether simple. In the case of 'legal authority, ' it is never purely legal. The belief in 
legality comes to be established and habitual, and this means it is partly traditional" 
(Weber 1978: 1.263). 
3 It is interesting that among Weber's multifarious writings there is only slight 
mention of the thorny topic of 'democracy. " 
I Discussion of this issue continues. Habermas (1993) analyzes the development of 
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"bourgeois civil society-" Seligman (1992) focuses more on the ethical, philosophical 
elements underlying the idea of civil society. Other studies--e. g., Grarnsci (1971)- 
concentrate on the dichotomy between civil society and the state. For more contemporary 
critiques, see Keane (1988a) and Keane (1988b). 
' Treaty on European Union, Title 1, "Common Provisions. * See also Tide 2, Part 2, 
"Citizen. ship of the Union. " 
6 See TEU, "Protocol on Social Policy, " p. 196, and "Agreement on Social Policy 
Concluded between the Member States of the European Community with the Exception 
of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, " p. 197. 
"Spain, France, Greece, Italy. 
" Treaty on European Union, Title 1, "Common Provisions, " p. 7. 
'Since little has been translated from the original German, this work explores the 
specifics of Niklas Luhmann's ideas for the English-speaking audience. See especially "3.5 
On the scope and limits of functionalist theory" (pp. 213-232). 
"'See Clogg (1992), especially pp. 204-209, where the author examines the effects of 
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